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

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THE

WHOLE WORKS

OF

THE RIGHT REV. JEREMY TAYLOR, D.D.

LORD BISHOP OF DOWN, CONNOR, AND DROMORE:

WITH

A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR,

AND

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF HIS WRITINGS,

BY

REGINALD HEBER, A.M.

CANON OF ST. ASAPH, RECTOR OF HODNET, AND LATE FELLOW OF ALL SOULS' COLLEGE, OXFORD.

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
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PART II.

SECTION X.—*Of the Seal of Confession.*

1. I FIRST instance in their *seal of confession;* and the question is not, whether a priest is to take care of his penitent's fame, or whether he be not, in all prudent and pious ways, to be careful, lest he make that intercourse odious; for certainly he is:—but whether the seal of confession be so sacred and impregnable, that it is not to be opened in the imminent danger of a king, or kingdom; or for the doing the greatest good, or avoiding the greatest evil, in the world: that is now the question, and such a broad seal as this, is no part of the Christian religion,—was never spoken of by the prophets or apostles, in the Old or the New Testament,—never was so much as mentioned in the books of the ancient fathers and doctors,—not so much as named in the ancient councils of the church; and was not heard of, until after the time of Pope Gregory the Seventh. Now how this is determined and practised in the church of Rome, we may quickly see. The first direct rule in the western church we find in this affair, is the canon of the Lateran council; "cap. Omnis Utriusque[a];" in which to confess at Easter was made an ecclesiastical law; and as an appendix to it, this caution; "Caveat autem omninò, ne verbo, aut signo, aut alio quovis modo, aliquatenus prodat peccatorem: sed, si prudentiore consilio indiguerit, illud, absque ullâ expressione personæ, requirat." This law

[a] Decretal. de Pœnitentiis et Remissionibus.

concerning them that do confess their secret sins to a priest, in order to counsel, comfort, and pardon from God by his ministry, is very prudent and pious; and it relates only to the person, not to the crimes: these may, upon the account of any doubt, or the advantage of better counsel and instruction, be revealed; the person, upon such accounts, may not, "nisi veritas aut obedientia aliud exigat," as St. Bonaventure[b] said well; "unless truth or obedience require the contrary:" for indeed the person is not often so material as to the inquiry of future counsel or present judgment, as the greatness, and other circumstances of the sin. But this was an ancient ecclesiastical rule, as we find it related by Sozomen[c]: "Presbyterum aliquem vitæ integritate quam maximè spectabilem, secretorum etiam tenacem, ac sapientem, huic officio præfecerunt;" "A penitentiary priest was appointed for the penitents, a man that was of good life, wise, and secret." So far was well, and agreeable to common prudence, and natural reason, and the words of Solomon[d]: "Qui ambulat fraudulenter, revelat arcanum; qui autem fidelis est, celat amici commissum." There is, in this case, some more reason than in ordinary secrets; but still the obligation is the same, and to be governed by prudence, and is subject to contradiction, by greater causes. The same also is the law in the Greek church, mentioned by St. Basil[e]: "Our fathers permitted not, that women, that had committed adultery, and were penitent, should be delated in public[f]." This is the whole ground and foundation, on which the seal of confession does, or can rely; save only, that, in several churches, there were several laws in after-ages to the same purpose, and particularly, in the eleventh canon of the church of England; adding also the penalty of irregularity, to every priest, that shall reveal any thing committed to him in private confession, but with this proviso; that it be not binding, in such cases where the concealment is made capital, by the laws of the kingdom: which because it is very strict, and yet very prudent, I shall make it appear, that the church of England walks wisely in it, and according to the precedents of the ancient catholic church, in command-

[b] In 3. dist. 21.
[c] Lib. 7. cap. 16. Hist. Eccles.
[d] Prov. xi. 13.
[e] Epist. ad Amphilochium.
[f] Τὰς μοιχευθείσας γυναῖκας καὶ ἐξαγορευσάσας δι' αὐλάζειαν δημοσιεύειν οὐκ ἐκέλευσαν οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν. A. D. 1603.

ing the seal to be broken up in some cases; and yet she hath restrained it more than formerly was observed in the churches of God.

Burchard[g] expressly affirms, that before the Nicene council, the penitentiary priest might publish what he heard in confessions, if it were for the good of the penitent, or for the greatness of the crime, as it seemed fit to the confessor.

And that he says true, we have sufficient testimony from Origen[h]: "Tantummodo circumspice diligentius, cui debeas confiteri peccatum tuum.—Si intellexerit et præviderit talem esse languorem tuum, qui in conventu totius ecclesiæ exponi debeat et curari, ex quo fortassis et cæteri ædificari poterunt, et tu ipse facilè sanari, multâ hoc deliberatione et satis perito medici illius consilio procurandum est." By which words he affirms, 1. That it was in the power of the confessor to command the publication of certain crimes. 2. That though it was not lightly to be done, yet, upon great reason, it might. 3. That the spiritual good of the penitent, and the edification of others, were causes sufficient for the publication. 4. That of these, the confessor was judge. 5. That this was no otherwise done by the consent of the party, but because he was bound to consent, when the confessor enjoined it: and the matter is evident, in the case of the incestuous Corinthian; who either was restored without private confession; or, if he was not, St. Paul caused it to be published in the church, and submitted the man to the severest discipline, and yet public, that was then or since in the world. The like to this, we find in a decretal epistle of Pope Leo[i]; for when some confessors, exceeding the ancient ecclesiastical rule, were not so prudent and deliberate in conducting their penitents, as formerly they were, but commanded that all their whole confessions should be written down, and publicly read; he says, "Though the plenitude of faith might be laudable, that is not afraid to blush in public, yet the confession is sufficient, if it be made in secret, first to God, and then to the priest:" and adds, "Non omnium hujusmodi sunt peccata, ut ea quæ pœnitentiam poscunt, non timeant publicari;" "All sins are not of that nature, that are fit to be

[g] Lib. 19. Decreti sui, c. 37. Concil. Mogunt. cap. 10. 21.
[h] Homil. 2. in Psal. xxxvii. [i] Epist. 80. ad Episc. Campaniæ.

published:" and therefore "removeatur tam improbabilis consuetudo;" "let such a reprovable custom be taken away.' In which words of St. Leo, we find, 1. That the seal of confession, as at this day it is understood at Rome, was no such inviolable and religious secret; for by a contrary custom, it was too much broken. 2. That he blames not the publication of some sins, but that they indiscriminately did publish all. 3. That the nature of some sins did not permit it: for, as he adds afterward, men by this means were betrayed to the malice of their enemies, who would bring them before tribunals, in some cases. 4. That this was not spoken in case of public crimes, delated, and brought into public notice, but such as were spoken in private confession. And here I cannot but desire, there had been some more ingenuity in Bellarmine [k], who, relating to this epistle of St. Leo, affirms, that St. Leo says, 'It is against the apostolical rule, to reveal secret sins, declared in confession;' when it is plain, that St. Leo only blames the custom of revealing all; saying, 'that all sins are not of that nature, as to be fit to be revealed.' And by these precedent authorities, we shall the easier understand that famous fact of Nectarius, who abolished the custom of having sins published in the church, and therefore took away the penitentiary priest; whose office was (as I proved out of Origen, Sozomen, and Burchard), to enjoin the publication of some sins, according to his discretion. It happened in Constantinople, that a foul fact was committed, and it was published in the ears of the people, and a tumult was raised about it; and the remedy was, that Nectarius took away the office and the custom together. "Consulentibus quibusdam, ut unicuique liberum permitteret, prout sibi ipse conscius esset et confideret, ad mysteriorum communionem accedere, pœnitentiarum illum presbyterum exauctoravit." Every man was thenceforth left to his liberty, according to the dictate and confidence of his own conscience, to come to the communion; and this afterward passed into a rite: for the manners of men growing degenerate, and worse sins being now confessed than, as he supposes, formerly they had been; the judges having been more severe, and the people more modest, it was fit enough that this custom, upon the occasion of such a scan-

[k] De Pœnitentiâ, lib. 3. cap. 14. Denique cum Secreta.

dal, and so much mischief like to follow it, should be laid aside wholly; and so it was. Here is a plain story, truly told by Sozomen, and the matter is easy to be understood. But Bellarmine, seeing the practice and doctrine of the church of Rome pinched by it, makes a distinction, derived from the present custom of his church, of public confession and private, saying, that Nectarius took away the public, and not the private. This I shall have occasion to discuss in the next section. I am now only to speak concerning the seal of confession; which from this authority, is apparent, was not such a sacred thing, but that it was made wholly to minister to the public and private edification of the penitent, and the whole church.

Thus this affair stood in the primitive church. In descending ages when private confessions grew frequent, and were converted into a sacrament; the seal also was made more tenacious; and yet by the discipline of the church, there were divers cases, in which the seal might be broken up. 1. There is a famous gloss in "cap. Tua nos, lib. 4. Decretal. tit. 1. de Sponsalibus et Matrimonio;" where the Pope, answering to a question concerning a pretended contract of marriage, says, that the marriage is good, unless the inquiring Bishop of Brescia could have assured him, that the man did never consent, or intend the marriage, "Quod qualiter tibi constiterit, non videmus." The gloss upon these words say, "Imò benè potuit constare: quia vir ille hoc ei confitebatur," "The bishop might well know it, because the man had confessed it to him; or because he had revealed it to him in penitential confession. For though, in judicial confession before a tribunal, no man is to be believed to the prejudice of a third person, yet, in penitential confession, he is to be believed; because it is not to be supposed, that he then is unmindful of his salvation."—Where the gloss observing that he did or might have received it in confession, and yet make use of it in consultation with his superiors, and upon that answer was to pronounce it to be, or not to be, a marriage, and to treat the persons accordingly; it follows that the thing itself might be revealed for the good of the penitent's soul; and this was done by the Cardinal of St. Lawrence in the case of a woman introducing a supposititious child to the inheritance of her husband; and this revelation

of the confession produced a decretal epistle[l] from the Pope in that particular case; and of this doctors[m] give this reason; because a thing so odious, and that would bring so certain ruin to souls, might not be permitted, with so great scandal and so great mischief. 2. And that confession may be revealed for the regulating a doubtful case of marriage, is the opinion of many great canonists. 3. That it may be revealed in the case of heresy confessed, I think there was no doubt of it at any time. 4. And that every confessor may reveal the confession by the penitent's leave, is taught by Durandus, Almain, Medina, and Navar; and generally by all the ancient scholars of St. Thomas. Now if a law be made, that, in certain cases, the confessor shall publish the confession, then every man's consent is involved in it, as his private right is in the public interest; of which it is a part, and to which it is subordinate and must yield. But who pleases to see how this affair once did stand in the church of Rome, and more especially in the catholic church, if he be not yet, may be satisfied by the proofs which Altisiodorensis gives of the lawfulness of publishing confessions in certain cases. 5. Lastly, if a sinful intention of committing a grievous crime be revealed in confession, and the person confessing cannot desist from, or will not alter, his purpose; then that the seal of confession may be broken open, is affirmed by Alexander of Ales[n], by the 'Summa Angelica[o],' which also reckons five cases more, in which it is lawful to reveal confessions. The same also is taught by Panormitan[p], Hostiensis[q], the 'Summa Sylvestrina[r],' and by Pope Innocent himself[s].'

But now, if we consider, how it is in the church of Rome at this day, and hath been this last age for the most part; we shall find that this human constitution, relying upon prudent and pious considerations, is urged as a sacramental obligation and a great part of the religion; and is not accounted obliging only for the reasons of its first sanction; nor as an act of obedience to the positive law, but as a natural, essential, divine, and unalterable obligation. And from thence these doctrines are derived. 1. That what a priest knows in

[l] Lib. S. Decret. tit. 38. cap. Officii. de Pœnit. et Remiss.
[m] Vide Suarez. de Paz in Pract. Criminal. Eccles. cap. 109.
[n] Par. 4. q. 28. mem. 2. art. 2. in Respons.
[o] Confessio ult. num. 7.
[p] Cap. Omnis. de Pœnit. et Remis. num. 24.
[q] Super 5. cap. Omnis.
[r] In Confess. 3. num. 2.
[s] In cap. Omnis. Verb. prodit.

confession, he knows it not as a man, but as God: which proposition as it is foolish, and too near to blasphemy, and may as well infer, that the priest may be then adored by the penitent with the distinction, viz. not as a man, but as God; so is expressly confuted by the gloss above cited, and by Scotus[t]; but taught by the modern casuists, and is the ground of a strange practice. For, 2. As a consequent of the former, it is taught in the church of Rome by their greatest guides, that if a priest having heard a thing only in confession[u]; if being asked, and sworn, he shall say, he never heard that thing, he neither lies nor forswears. So Emanuel Sà teaches[x]; and adds, that in the same manner the penitent may also swear, that he said nothing, or no such thing, in confession. But how this should be excused, or whether they think the penitent to have spoken to none but God; I am not yet satisfied. 3. It is not lawful to reveal any thing that is told only in confession, though it be to avoid the greatest evil that can happen, so said Bellarmine[y]; to save a whole commonwealth from damage temporal or spiritual, so Suarez[z]; to save the lives of all the kings in Christendom, so Binet[a] told Isaac Casaubon in the King's library at Paris. The same is openly avowed by Eudæmon Johannes[b], that there is no evil so great, for the avoiding of which it can be lawful to reveal confession; and that this may appear to be a catholic doctrine, the same author reckons up so many moderns teaching the same, that the very names of the authors and books fill up several pages; and that it is the catholic doctrine, is expressly taught by the author of the famous apology made for the Jesuits, after the horrid parricide of Henry the Fourth of France. They add, even beyond this, all the curiosity of the very circumstances of silence; that this silence does not only oblige in the case of perfect confession, but, if it be begun, not only in case of confession clear and express, but if it be so much as in relation to confession: not only the confessor, but the messenger, the interpreter, the counsellor, he that hears it by chance,

[t] In quartum librum Sent. dist. 21.
[u] Vide Richard. in lib. 4. Sent. dist. eâd. art. 4. q. 1.
[x] Aphor. v. Confess. n. 23.
[y] Apolog. adv. Reg. M. Brit.
[z] Disp. 33. in 3. par. D. Thom. sect. 1. n. 2.
[a] Præstaret Reges omnes perire, quam si vel semel Confessionis sigillum violaretur. Epist. ad Fontonem Ducæum, p. 140.
[b] Apolog. pro Garnette, c. 13.

or by stealth: and he that was told of it by him, that should, but did not, conceal it: the seal is to be kept by all means, directly and indirectly, by words and signs, judicially and extrajudicially, unless the penitent give leave: but that leave is to be express, and is not to be asked but in the case of a compelling necessity; neither can the confessor impose a public penance upon him, who hath confessed privately. Which things, especially the last, are most diametrically opposed to the doctrine and discipline of the primitive church, as I have already proved; but these things are expressly taught as the doctrine of the most famous casuists of the church of Rome, by Escobar [c], who comparing his book in method to the seven seals of the Revelation, which the four living creatures read,—Suarez the ox, Molina the man, Vasquez the eagle, and Valentia the lion,—and twenty-four elders, that is, twenty-four Jesuits also read these seven seals; though when they come to be reckoned, they prove twenty-five, so fatal is that antichristian number to the church of Rome, that it occurs in every accident: but his meaning is, that the doctrine he teaches are the doctrines of all those twenty-five famous leading men; "Penes quos imperium literarum et conscientiarum." If now it be not the catholic doctrine, then is it heretical? And then, why is it not disowned? Why are not they that say so, censured? Why is not the doctrine condemned? Why is it publicly maintained and allowed by authority? Why is it pleaded in bar against execution of justice in the case of treason; as it was by F. Garnet himself, and all his apologists? But if this be the catholic doctrine, then let it be considered, how cheap are the lives of kings in their eyes, who consult more with the safety of a villain, whom they dare not absolve [d], than of a king, who is worthy ten thousands of his people; and let it be also considered, that, by using all the ways in the world to make confession easy to traitors and homicides, they make it odious to kings and princes, and to all that love the safety of their sovereigns, and of the public. We find that the laws of God yield to charity and necessity, and Christ followed the act of David; who, "when he was hungry, ate the shewbread, which was unlawful to be eaten but by the priest

[c] Moral. Theol. tract. 7. examen. 4. de Pœnit. sect. 6. n. 63—65, &c.
[d] Script. Garnetti apud Is. Casauboni Ep. ad Fron. Ducæum, p. 137.

alone:" and he that commanded us to go, and learn what that means, "I will have mercy and not sacrifice," intended not that the seal of confession should, upon pretence of religion, be used to the most uncharitable ends in the world; no, though it had been made sacred by a divine commandment; which it is not, but is wholly introduced by custom and canons ecclesiastical: and when we see that things dedicated to God, and made sacred by religion, and the laws of God confirming such religion, can be aliened and made common in cases of extreme necessity, or great charity; it is a strange superstition, that shall hold that fast with teeth and nails, and never let it go, no, not to save a soul, not to preserve the life of kings, not to prevent the greatest mischief in the world; this is certainly a making the commandments of men greater and more sacred than the commandments of God, and a passing them into a doctrine, great, necessary, and unalterable, as a fundamental article.

SECTION XI.

Of the imposing Auricular Confession upon Consciences, without Authority from God.

THAT confession to a priest, is a doctrine taught as necessary in the church of Rome, is without all question; and yet that it is but the commandment of men, I shall, I hope, clearly enough evince; and if I do, I suppose the charge laid against the church of Rome, which is the same Christ laid against the Pharisees, will be fully made good, as to this instance; for this is one of the sorts of that crime, to say, "Dixit Dominus, Dominus autem non dixit;" to pretend a rite to be of divine institution when it is not so, but "humanum inventum," "a device of man's brain."—The other (which is, still supposing an institution to be human and positive, yet to urge it with the same severe religion, as they do a divine commandment) I shall consider in other instances. For the present the inquiry is concerning *auricular confession*, and its pretended necessity. The first decree concerning it, was in the Lateran council[e]; in which "every person of years of discre-

[e] Can. 21.

tion is commanded to confess all his sins to his own priest, at least once in the year; or to another priest, with the leave of his own; otherwise while he is living, he must be driven from entrance into the church; and when he is dead, he must have no Christian burial."—This is very severe; but yet here is no damnation to them that neglect it; and the duty is not pretended to be by divine commandment: and therefore, lest that severity might seem too much to be laid upon human law, they made it up in the new forge at Trent[e]; and there it was decreed that, "To confess all, and every mortal sin, which, after diligent inquiry, we remember, and every evil thought or desire, and the circumstances that change the nature of the sin, is necessary for the remission of sins, and of divine institution; and he that denies this, is to be anathema."

Whether to confess to a priest be an advisable discipline, and a good instance, instrument, and ministry of repentance, and may serve many good ends in the church, and to the souls of needing persons,—is no part of the question. We find, that, in the Acts of the Apostles, divers converted persons came to St. Paul, either publicly or privately, "and confessed their deeds[f];" and burnt their books of exorcism, that is, did what became severe and hearty penitents, who needed counsel and comfort, and that their repentance should be conducted by wise guides. And when St. James exhorts all Christians "to confess their sins to one another," certainly it is more agreeable to all spiritual ends, that this be done rather to the curate of souls, than to the ordinary brethren. The church of England is no way engaged against it, but advises it, and practises it. The Calvinist churches do not practise it much, because they know not well how to divest it from its evil appendages, which are put to it by the customs of the world, and to which it is too much exposed by the interests, weaknesses, and partialities, of men. But they commending it, shew they would use it willingly, if they could order it unto edification. "Interim quin sistant se pastori oves, quoties sacram cœnam participare volunt, adeò non reclamo, ut maximè velim hoc ubique observari."—

[e] Sess. 14. cap. 6, 7.

[f] Πράξεις, i. e. magicas incantationes; simile illud ibidem, ἱκανοὶ τῶν τὰ περίεργα πραξάντων πράξεις nimirum τῶν περιέργων.

[g] Calvin. Instit. lib. 3. cap. 4. sect. 12, 13.

And for the Lutheran churches, that it is their practice, we may see it in Chemnitius[h], who was one of greatest fame amongst them; and he is noted to this purpose by[i] Bellarmine; only they all consent, that it is not necessary nor of divine institution; and being but of man's invention, it ought not to pass into a doctrine; and, as the apostles said in the matter of circumcision, "a burden ought not to be put upon the necks of the disciples:" and that, "in lege gratiæ, longè difficillimum" too, as Major[k] observes truly, by far greater than any burden in the law of grace, the time of the Gospel. Let it be commanded to all, to whom it is needful, or profitable; but let it be free, as to the conscience precisely, and bound but by the cords of a man, and as other ecclesiastical laws are, which are capable of exceptions, restrictions, cautions, dispensations, rescindings, and abolitions, by the same authority, or upon greater reasons.

The question then is, whether to confess all our greater sins to a priest, all that upon strict inquiry we can remember, be necessary to salvation? This the church of Rome now affirms; and this the church of England and all Protestant churches deny; and complain sadly, that the commandments of men are changed into the doctrines of God, by a Pharisaical empire, and superstition. Here then we join issue.

1. And in the first place, I shall represent, that the doctrine of the necessity of confession to a priest, is a new doctrine, even in the church of Rome, and was not esteemed any part of the catholic religion before the council of Trent. For first, the gloss "de Pœnit. dist. 5. c. in Pœnitentiâ," inquiring where or when oral confession was instituted, says, some say it was instituted in Paradise, others say it was instituted when Joshua called upon Achan to confess his sin: others say it was instituted in the New Testament by St. James: "it is better said, that it was instituted by a certain universal tradition of the church, and the tradition of the church is obligatory as a precept. Therefore, confession of deadly sins is necessary with us (viz. Latins) but not with the Greeks; because no such tradition hath come to them."

[h] 2. Part. Exam. Concil. Trid. cap. 5. de Pœnit.
[i] Lib. 3. de Pœnit. cap. 1. sect. Martinus Kemnitius.
[k] In 4. dist. 17. q. 2. ex Scoto.

This is the full state of this affair, in the age when Semeca, who was the glossator, lived; and it is briefly this. 1. There was no resolution or agreement whence it came. 2. The glossator's opinion was, it came from the universal tradition of the church. 3. It was but a kind of universal tradition; not absolute, clear, and certain. 4. It was only a tradition in the Latin church. 5. The Greeks had no such tradition. 6. The Greeks were not obliged to it; it was not necessary to them. Concerning the Greek church, I shall afterward consider it in a more opportune place; here only I consider it as it was in the Latin church: and of this I suppose there needs no better record than the canon law itself, and the authentic glosses upon it; which glosses, although they be not law, but as far as they please, yet they are perfect testimony as to matter of fact, and what the opinions of the doctors were at that time. And therefore, to the former, I add this; that in 'cap. Convertimini,' Gratian hath these words: "Unde datur intelligi, quod etiam ore tacente veniam consequi possumus;" "Without confession of the mouth we may obtain pardon of our sins;" and this point he pursues in all that long chapter; and in the chapter 'Resuscitatus,' out of St. Austin's doctrine; and in the chapter 'Qui Natus,' out of the doctrine of St. John's Epistle; the conclusion of which chapter is, "Cum ergo ante confessionem (ut probatum est) sumus resuscitati per gratiam, et filii lucis facti; evidentissimè apparet quod solâ cordis contritione sine confessione oris, peccatum remittitur:" and, in the chapter 'Omnis qui non diligit,' he expressly conclùdes out of St. John's words: "Non ergo in confessione peccatum remittitur, quod jam remissum esse probatur: fit itaque confessio ad ostensionem pœnitentiæ, non ad impetrationem veniæ." And at the end of this chapter, according to his custom in such disputable things; when he says, "alii è contrario testantur;" "others witness to the contrary," that, without confession oral, and works of satisfaction, no man is cleansed from his sin; the gloss upon the place, says thus: "Ab hoc loco usque ad 'Sed his auctoritatibus' pro aliâ parte allegat, quod scil. adulto peccatum non dimittitur sine oris confessione, quod tamen falsum est:" only he says, that "Confession doth cleanse, and satisfaction doth cleanse: so that though by contrition of the heart, the sin is pardoned; yet these still

cleanse more and more, as a man is more innovated" or amended. " But these authorities brought in," viz. that sin is not pardoned without confession, " if they be diligently expounded, prove but little." But friar Maurique, who by Pius V. made and published a censure upon the glosses, appointed these words, " quod tamen falsum est," to be left out; but the Roman correctors under Gregory XIII. let them alone; but put in the margent a mark of contradiction upon it; saying, " Imò verissimum est." But that was new doctrine, and although Semeca, the author of the gloss, affirmed it expressly to be false, yet Gratian himself was more reserved; but yet not of the new opinion, but left the matter indifferent: for after he had alleged Scripture, and authorities of fathers on one side, and authority of fathers on the other; he concludes, " Quibus auctoritatibus vel quibuslibet rationum firmamentis utraque sententia satisfactionis et confessionis innitatur, in medium breviter exposuimus. Cui autem harum potius adhærendum sit, lectoris judicio reservatur. Utraque enim fautores habet sapientes et religiosos viros [l]." Now how well this agrees with the determination of the council of Trent [m], every man, by comparing, can easily judge; only it is certain, this doctrine cannot pretend to be derived by tradition from the apostles. Of the same opinion was the Abbot of Panormo; saying, " That opinion (viz. of the gloss) does much please me: because there is no manifest authority that does intimate, that either God or Christ instituted confession to be made to a priest." But it were endless to name the sentences of the canonists in this question; once for all, the testimony of Maldonat [n] may secure us: " Juris pontificii periti, secuti suum primum interpretem, omnes dicunt confessionem tantum esse introductam jure ecclesiastico." But to clear the whole question, I shall, 1. prove, that the necessity of confessing our sins to a priest is not found in Scripture; but very much to disprove it. 2. That there is no reason enforcing this necessity, but very much against it. 3. That there is no ecclesiastical tradition of any such necessity; but apparently the contrary: and the consequent of these things will be, that the church of Rome

[l] De Pœnit. d. 1. cap. Quamvis Plenitudo.
[m] Lib. 5. de Decret. de Pœnit. et Rem. in cap. Omnis utriusque sexus.
[n] Disp. de Sacr. tom. 2. de Confess. Orig. c. 2.

hath introduced a new doctrine, false and burdensome, dangerous and superstitious.

1. If we consider how this article is managed in Scripture, we shall find that our blessed Saviour said nothing at all concerning it; the council of Trent indeed makes their new doctrine to rely upon the words of Christ recited by St. John[o]; "Whose sins ye remit, they are remitted," &c. But see with what success: for, besides that all the canonists allow not, that confession was instituted by Christ; Aquinas, Scotus, Gabriel Clavasinus, the author of the 'Summa Angelica,' Hugo de S. Victore, Bonaventure, Alensis, Tho. Waldensis, Ferus, Cajetan, Erasmus, B. Rhenanus, and Jansenius, though differing much in the particulars of this question, yet all consent that, precisely from the words of Christ, no necessity of confession to a priest can be concluded. 2. Amongst those of the Roman church, who did endeavour to found the necessity of confession upon those words, none do agree about the way of drawing their argument; as may be seen in Scotus[p], Aureolus, Johannes Major, Thomas de Argentina, Richardus, Durandus Almain, Dominicus à Soto, Alphonsus à Castro, Adrianus, Petrus de Aquila, and others, before the council of Trent. 3. Though these men go several ways (which shews, as Scotus expresses it, "hoc verbum non est præcisum") yet they all agree well enough in this, that they are all equally out of the story, and none of them well performs what he undertakes; it is not mine alone, but the judgment which Vasquez[q] makes of them, who confuted many of them by arguments of his own, and by the arguments which they use one against another, and gives this censure of them: "Inter eos, qui planè fatentur ex illis verbis Joh. xx. necessitatem confessionis (supple, *elici*), vix invenias qui efficaciter deducat."—And therefore this place of St. John is but an infirm foundation to build so great a structure on it as the whole economy of their sacrament of penance, and the necessity of confession upon it; since so many learned and acute men, master-builders, believe nothing at all of it; and others that do, agree not well in the framing of the structure upon it, but make a Babel of it; and at last their attempts prove vain and useless, by the testimony of their fellow-labourers.

There are some other places of Scripture, which are pre-

[o] John, xx. 21. [p] In lib. 4. Sent. dist. 17. [q] Qu. 90. in 3. Thom. dub. 2.

tended for the necessity of confession, but they need no particular scrutiny; not only because they are rejected by their own parties as insufficient[r]; but because all are principally devolved upon the twentieth of St. John; and the council of Trent itself wholly relies upon it. This therefore being the foundation, if it fails them as to their pretensions, their building must needs be ruinous. But I shall consider it a little.

When Christ said to his apostles, "Whose sins ye remit, they shall be remitted to them; and whose sins ye retain, they shall be retained;" he made (says Bellarmine, and generally the latter school of Roman doctors) the apostles, and all priests, judges upon earth; that without their sentence, no man, that hath sinned after baptism, can be reconciled. But the priests, who are judges, can give no right or unerring sentence, unless they hear all the particulars they are to judge. Therefore by Christ's law they are tied to tell in confession all their particular sins to a priest.—This is the sum of all that is said in this affair. Other light skirmishes there are, but the main battle is here.

Now all the parts of this great argument must be considered: and, 1. I deny the argument; and supposing both the premises true, that Christ had made them judges, and that without particular cognizance they could not give judgment according to Christ's intention; yet it follows not, that therefore it is necessary, that the penitent shall confess all his sins to the priest. For, who shall compel the penitent to appear in judgment? Where are they obliged to come and accuse themselves before the judges? Indeed if they were before them, we will suppose the priests to have power to judge them; but how can it be hence deduced, that the penitents are bound to come to this judicatory, and not to stand alone to the divine tribunal. A physician may have power to cure diseases, yet the patients are not bound to come to him; neither, it may be, will they, if they can be cured by other means. And if a king sends a judge with

[r] Primum istorum esset magis conveniens tenendum, si posset evidenter haberi istud præceptum ex evangelio. Nec oportet ad hoc adducere illud Matthæi xvi. 'Tibi dabo claves regni cœlorum,' quia non est nisi promissio de datione futura. Sed si aliquid in evangelio, videlicet, ad hoc videtur illud Joh. xx. 'Accipite Spir. S. Quorum remiseritis,' &c. dicitur quod sic, de illo verbo Jacob. v. 'Confitemini alterutrùm peccata,' &c. sed nec per hoc videretur mihi quod Jacobus præceptum hoc dedit, nec præceptum à Christo promulgavit. Scotus in lib. 4. dist. 17. sect. de secundo.

competent authority to judge all the questions in a province; he can judge them that come, but he cannot compel them to come; and they may make an end of their quarrels among themselves, or by arbitration of neighbours; and if they have offended the king, they may address themselves to his clemency, and sue for pardon. And since it is certain, by their own confession, that a penitent cannot, by the force of these words of Christ, be compelled to confess his venial sins, how does it appear, that he is tied to confess his mortal sins? For if a man be tied to repent of all his sins, then repentance may be performed without the ministry of the priest, or else he must repent before the priest for all his sins. But if he may repent of his venial sins, and yet not go to the priest; then to go to the priest is not an essential part of the repentance: and if it be thus in the case of venial sins, let them shew from the words of Christ any difference in the case between the one and the other; especially if we consider, that though it may be convenient to go to the priest to be taught and guided, yet the necessity of going to him is to be absolved by his ministry. But that of this there was no necessity believed in the primitive church, appears in this; because they did not expect pardon from the bishop or priest in the greatest crimes, but were referred wholly to God for the pardon of them: "Non sine spe tamen remissionis, quam ab eo planè sperare debebit qui ejus largitatem solus obtinet; et tam dives misericordiæ est, ut nemo desperet:" so said the bishops of France in their synod held about the time of Pope Zephyrinus. To the same purpose are the words of Tertullian: "Salvâ illâ pœnitentiæ specie post fidem, quæ aut levioribus delictis veniam ab episcopo consequi poterit, aut majoribus et irremissibilibus à Deo solo." The like also is in the thirty-first epistle of St. Cyprian. Now, first, it is easy to observe how vast the difference is between the old catholic church and the present Roman: these say, that venial sins are not of necessity to be confessed to the priest or bishop; and that, without their ministry, they can be pardoned: but they of old said, that the smaller sins were to be submitted to the bishop's ministry. On the other side, the Roman doctors say, it is absolutely necessary to bring our mortal sins, and confess them, in order to be absolved by the priest; but the old Catholics

said, that the greatest sins are wholly to be confessed and submitted to God, who may pardon them, if he please, and will, if he be rightly sought to; but to the church they need not be confessed, because these were only and immediately fit for the divine cognizance. What is now-a-days a reserved case to the Pope, was anciently a case reserved to God; and what was only submitted formerly to the bishop, is now not worth much taking notice of by any one. But now put these together. By the Roman doctrine you are not, by the duty of repentance, tied to confess your venial sins; and by the primitive, it is to no purpose to bring the greatest crimes to ecclesiastical repentance; but by their immediate address to God they had hopes of pardon: from hence it follows, that there is no necessity of doing one or other, that is, there is no commandment of God for it; nor yet any necessity in the nature of the thing requiring it.

Venerable Bede[s] had an opinion, that those sins only which are like to leprosy, ought to be submitted to the judgment of the church: "Cætera verò vitia, tanquam valetudines, et quasi membrorum animæ atque sensuum, per semetipsum interius in conscientiâ et intellectu Dominus sanat." And Goffridus Vindocinensis[t] tells of one William, a learned man, whose doctrine it was, that there were but four sorts of sins, which needed confession, the error of Gentilism, schism, heretical pravity, and judaical perfidiousness: "Cætera autem peccata à Domino sine confessione sanari." But besides this, I demand, whether or no hath the priest a power to remit venial[u] sins, and that this power (in the words of St. John, chap. xx.) was given to him by Christ? If Christ did, in these words, give him power to remit venial sins, and yet the penitent is not bound to recount them in particular, or at all to submit them to his judicatory; it will follow undeniably, that the giving power of remission of sins to the priest, does not infer a necessity in the penitent to come to confess them. And these things I suppose Vasquez understood well enough; when he affirms expressly, that it may well stand with the ordinary power of a judge, that his power

[s] In Lucæ Evang. cap. 69. tom. 5. Colon. Agripp. 1612. [t] Lib. 5. ep. 16.

[u] Concil. Trid. sess. 14. c. 5. Nam venialia quibus à gratia Dei non excludimur, et in quæ frequentiùs labimur, quanquam recte et utiliter citraque omnem præsumptionem in confessione dicantur, quod piorum hominum usus demonstrat, taceri tamen citra culpam, multisque aliis remediis expiari possunt.

be such as that it be free for the subjects to submit to it, or to end their controversies another way. And that it was so in this case is the doctrine of Scotus [x], before cited, and many others. Add to this, the argument of Scotus [y], the priest retains no sins, but such, which some way or other, are declared to him to have no true signs of repentance; and yet those, which are no way manifested to the priest, God retains unto the vengeance of hell: therefore neither is that word, "Whose sins ye remit," precise; that is, if God retains some, which the priest does not retain, then also he does remit some which the priest does not remit; and therefore, there is no negative affixed to the affirmative, which shews that the remission or retention does not necessarily depend on the priest's ministration. So that, supposing it to be true, that the priest hath a power to remit or retain sins, as a judge, and that this power cannot be exercised without knowing what he is to judge; yet it follows not from hence, that the people are bound to come this way, and to confess their sins to them, or to ask their pardon. But,

2. The second proposition is also false: for, supposing the priest, by the words of Christ, hath given to him the ordinary power of a judge; and that, as such, he hath power of remitting and retaining sins: yet this power of judging may be such, as that it may be performed without enumeration of all the particulars we remember. For the judgment the priest is to make, is not of the *sins*, but of the *persons*. It is not said "Quæcunque," but "Quorumcunque remiseritis peccata." Our blessed Saviour, in these words, did not distinguish two sorts of sins, one to be remitted, and another to be retained; so that it should be necessary to know the special nature of the sins: he only reckoned one kind, that is, under which all sins are contained. But he distinguished two sorts of sinners; saying, 'Quorum,' and 'Quorum [z];' the one of penitents (according to the whole design and purpose of the Gospel), and their sins are to be remitted; and another of impenitent, whose sins are not to be remitted, but retained. And therefore it becomes the minister of souls, to know the state of the penitent, rather than the nature and number of the sins. Neither gave he any power to punish, but to pardon, or not to pardon. If Christ had intended to have given

[x] Vide Vasquez in 3. tom. 4. q. 90. art. 1. dub. 2. sect. 3.
[y] Ubi supra. [z] Vid. Padre Paolo Hist. Conc. Trid. lib. 4.

to the priests a power to impose a punishment according to the quality of every sin; the priest indeed had been the executioner of the divine wrath: but then, because no punishment in this life can be equal to the demerit of a sin, which deserves the eternal wrath of God; it is certain, the priest is not to punish them by way of vengeance. We do not find any thing in the words of Christ, obliging the priest directly to impose penances on the penitent sinner; he may voluntarily submit himself to them if he please, and he may do very well, if he do so: but the power of retaining sins, gives no power to punish him, whether he will or no; for the power of retaining is rather to be exercised upon the impenitent, than upon the penitent. Besides this, the word of 'remitting' sins, does not certainly give the priest a power to impose penances; for it were a prodigy of interpretation to expound 'remittere' by 'punire.' But if by 'retaining' it be said, this power is given him; then this must needs belong to the impenitent, who are not remitted; and not to the penitent, whose sins at that time they remit, and retain not; unless they can do both at the same time. But if the punishment designed, be only by way of remedy, or of disposing the sinners, to true penitence; then if the person be already truly penitent, the priest hath nothing to do, but to pardon him in the name of God. Now certainly both these things may be done without the special enumeration of all his remembered sins. For, 1. The penitent may, and often does, forget many particulars; and then, in that case, all that the priest can expect, or proceed to judgment upon, is the saying in general, 'He is truly sorrowful for them, and for the time to come will avoid them:' and if he then absolve the penitent, as he must, and usually does; it follows, that if he does well (and he can do no better), he may make a judgment of his penitent without special enumeration of his sins; and if the priest pardons no sins but those which are enumerated, the penitent will be in an evil condition in most cases: but if he can and does pardon those which are forgotten, then the special enumeration is not indispensably necessary; for it were a strange thing, if sins should be easier remitted for being forgotten, and the harder for being remembered; there being in the Gospel no other condition mentioned, but 'the confessing, and forsaking them:' and if there

be any difference, certainly he, who, out of carelessness of spirit, or the multitude of his sins, or want of the sharpness of sorrow (for these commonly are causes of it), forgets many of his sins, is, in all reason, further from pardon, than he whose conscience, being sore wounded, cannot forget that, which stings him so perpetually. If he that remembers most, because he is most penitent, be tied to a more severe discipline, than he that remembers least,—then, according to this discipline, the worst man is in the best condition. But what if the sinner, out of bashfulness, do omit to enumerate some sin? Is there no consulting with his modesty? Is there no help for him, but he must confess, or die? St. Ambrose[a] gives a perfect answer to this case: "Lavant lacrymæ delictum, quod voce pudor est confiteri, et veniæ fletus consulunt, et verecundæ lacrymæ sine horrore culpam loquuntur. Lacrymæ crimen sine offensione verecundiæ confitentur."—And the same is almost in words affirmed by Maximus Taurinensis[b]: "Lavat lacryma delictum, quod voce pudor est confiteri: lacrymæ ergo verecundiæ pariter consulunt et saluti; nec erubescunt in petendo, et impetrant in rogando."—And that this may not seem a propriety of St. Peter's repentance, because sacramental confession was not yet instituted (for that Bellarmine offers for an answer); besides that sacramental confession was, as I have made to appear, never instituted, either then, or since then, in Scripture, by Christ, or by his apostles; besides this, I say, St. Ambrose[c] applies the precedent of St. Peter to every one of us;—"Flevit ergo amarissimè Petrus: flevit ut lacrymis suum posset lavare delictum; et tu si veniam vis mereri, dilue culpam lacrymis tuam."—And to the same sense also is that of Cassian: "Quòd si, verecundiâ retrahente, revelare [peccata] coram hominibus erubescis, illi quem latere non possunt, confiteri ea jugi supplicatione non desinas, ac dicere, 'Tibi soli peccavi, et malum coram te feci,' qui et absque illius verecundiæ publicatione curare, et sine improperio peccato donare consuevit."—To these I shall add a pregnant testimony of Julianus Pomerius, or of Prosper[d]; "Quòd si ipsi sibi judices fiant, et veluti suæ iniquitatis ultores hic in se voluntariam pœnam severissimæ animadversionis exer-

[a] In Lucam, lib. 10. cap. 22.
[b] Homil. S. de Pœnitentiâ Petri.
[c] Collat. 20. c. 8.
[d] De Vitâ Contemplativa, lib. 2. cap. 7.

ceant, temporalibus pœnis mutaverint æterna supplicia, et lacrymis ex verâ cordis compunctione fluentibus restinguent æterni ignis incendia." And this was the opinion of divers learned persons in Peter Lombard's time [e], that if men fear to confess lest they be disgraced, or lest others should be tempted by their evil example; and therefore conceal them from man, and reveal them to God; they obtain pardon.

Secondly: For those sins, which they do enumerate; the priest, by them, cannot make a truer judgment of the penitent's repentance and disposition to amendment, than he can by his general profession of his true and deep contrition, and such other human indications, by which such things are signified. For still it is to be remembered, he is not the judge of the sin, but of the man. For Christ hath left no rules, by which the sin is to be judged; no penitential tables, no chancery tax, no penitential canons; neither did the apostles: and those which were in use in the primitive church, as they were vastly short of the merit of the sins, so they are very vastly greater than are now in use, or will be endured: by which it plainly enough appears, that they impose penances at their pleasure, as the people are content to take them; and for the greatest sins, we see, they impose ridiculous penances; and themselves profess they impose but a part of their penance that is due: which certainly cannot be any compliance with any law of God, which is always wiser, more just, and more to purpose. And therefore, to exact a special enumeration of all our sins remembered, to enable the priest only to impose a part of penance, is as if a prince should raise an army of ten thousand men to suppress a tumult, raised in a little village against the petty constable. Besides which, in the church of Rome they have an old rule, which is to this day in use among them;

> Sitque modus pœnæ justæ moderatio culpæ;
> Quæ tanto levior, quanto contritio major.

And therefore, "fortiter contritus leviter plectatur;" "he that is greatly sorrowful, needs but little penance." By which is to be understood, that the penance is but to supply the want of internal sorrow; which the priest can no way make judgment of, but by such signs as the penitent is

[e] Lombard. Sent. lib. 4. d. 7. ad finem lit. C.

pleased to give him. To what purpose then can it be to enumerate all his sins; which he can do with a little sorrow or a great one, with attrition or contrition, and no man knows it, but God alone? And it may be done without any sorrow at all, and the sorrow may be put on, or acted; and when the penance is imposed, as it must needs be less than the sin, so it may be performed without true repentance. And therefore, neither is the imposing penance any sufficient signification of what the priest inquires after. And because every deliberate sin deserves more than the biggest penance, that is imposed on any man for the greatest, and in that, as to the sin itself, there can be no error in the greatness of it; it follows, that, by the particular enumeration, the priest cannot be helped to make his judgment of the person; and by it or any thing else he can never equally punish the sin; therefore, supposing the priest to be a judge, the necessity of particular confession will not be necessary: especially if we consider,

Thirdly: That by the Roman doctrine, it is not necessary to salvation, that the penitent should perform any penances, he may defer them to purgatory if he please; so that, special confession cannot be necessary to salvation for the reason pretended, viz. that the priest may judge well concerning imposing penances, since they are necessary only for the avoiding purgatory, and not for the avoiding damnation. 4. This further appears in the case of baptism; which is the most apparent and evident use of the power of the keys, it being truly and properly the intromission of catechumens into the house of God, and an admitting them to all the promises and benefits of the kingdom, and, which is the greatest, the most absolute and most evident remission of all the sins precommitted; and yet towards the dispensing this pardon, no particular confession of sins is previous, by any necessity or divine law. Repentance in persons of choice and discretion is, and was always, necessary: but because persons were not tied to confess their sins particularly to a priest before baptism; it is certain, that repentance can be perfect without this confession. And this argument is yet of greater force and persuasion against the church of Rome; for since baptizing is for remission of sins, and is the first act of the power of the keys, and the evident way of opening the doors

of the house of God, and yet the power of baptizing is, in the church of Rome, in the absence of a priest, given to a layman, and frequently to a deacon; it follows, that the power of the keys, and a power of remitting sins, is no judiciary act; unless a layman be declared capable of the power of judging, and of remitting of sins. 5. If we consider, that, without true repentance, no sin can be pardoned: and with it all sins may; and that no one sin is pardoned as to the final state of our souls, but at the same time all are pardoned: it must needs follow, that it is not the number of sins, but the condition of the person, the change of his life, the sorrow of his heart, the truth of his conversion, and his hatred of all sin, that he is to consider. If his repentance be a true change from evil to good, from sin to God, a thousand sins are pardoned as soon as one; and the infinite mercy of God does equally exceed one sin and one thousand. Indeed, in order to counsel or comfort, it may be very useful to tell all that grieves the penitent, all that for which he hath no rest, and cannot get satisfaction: but as to the exercising any other judgment upon the man either for the present, or for the future; to reckon up what is past seems not very useful, or at all reasonable: but as the priest, who baptizes a convert, judges of him, as far as he can, and ought; that is, whether he hath laid aside every hinderance, and be disposed to receive remission of sins by the Spirit of God in baptism: so it is in repentance,—the man's conversion and change are to be considered; which cannot be by what is past, but by what is present, or future.

And now, 3. Although the judicial power of the priest cannot infer the necessity of particular confession; yet if the judicial power be also of another nature, than is supposed, or rather be not properly 'judicium fori,' 'the judgment of a tribunal,' coercive, penal, and exterminating, by proper effect, and real change of state and person; then the superstructure, and the foundation too, will be digged down. And this therefore shall be considered briefly. And here the scene is a little changed, and the words of Christ to St. Peter, are brought in as auxiliaries, to prove the priest's power to be judicial; and that, with the words of Christ to his apostles, John, xx. must demonstrate this point. 1. Therefore I have

the testimony and opinion of the Master of the Sentences[f], affirming that the priest's power is declarative, not judicial; the sentence of an ambassador, not of a judge; "Sacerdotibus tribuit potestatem solvendi et ligandi; id est, ostendendi homines ligatos vel solutos;" "The priest's power of loosing and binding, is a power of shewing and declaring who are bound, and who are loosed. For when Christ had cured the leper, he sent him to the priest, by whose judgment he was to be declared clean: and when Lazarus was first restored to life by Christ, then he bade his disciples loose him and let him go." And if it be inquired, To what purposes is the priest's solution, if the man be pardoned already? it is answered; that "Although he be absolved before God, yet he is not accounted loosed in the face of the church, but by the judgment of the priest." But we have the sentence of a greater man[g] in the church, than Peter Lombard; viz. of St. Jerome himself, who discourses this affair dogmatically and fully, and so as not to be capable of evasion: speaking of those words of Christ to St. Peter, "I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven; whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven:" "This place (saith St. Jerome) some bishops and priests not understanding, take upon them something of the superstitiousness of the Pharisees, so as to condemn the innocent, or think to acquit the guilty; whereas God inquires not, what is the sentence of the priest, but the life of the guilty. In Leviticus, the lepers were commanded to shew themselves to the priests, who neither make them leprous nor clean; but they discern who are clean, and who are unclean. As therefore there, the priest makes the leprous man clean, or unclean: so here, does the bishop, or the priest, bind or loose; i. e. according to their office, when he hears the variety of sins, he knows who is to be bound, and who is to be loosed."—St. Ambrose[h] adds one advantage more, as consequent to the priests' absolving of penitents; but expressly declares against the pro-

[f] Sent. lib. 4. dist. 18. lit. F. [g] St. Jerome in Matt. lib. 3. ad cap. 16.

[h] Homines in remissione peccatorum ministerium suum exhibent, non jus alicujus potestatis exercent; neque enim in suo, sed in nomine Patris, Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, peccata dimittuntur. Isti rogant, divinitas donat, &c. St. Ambros. de Spir. S. lib. 3. cap. 19.

per judical power; "Men give their ministry in the remission of sins, but they exercise not the right of any power: neither are sins remitted by them in their own, but in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Men pray, but it is God who forgives: it is man's obsequiousness, but the bountiful gift is from God. So likewise, there is no doubt, sins are forgiven in baptism, but the operation is of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit." Here, St. Ambrose affirms the priest's power of pardoning sins, to be wholly ministerial, and optative, or by way of prayer. Just as it is in baptism, so it is in repentance after baptism: sins are pardoned to the truly penitent; but here is no proper judicial power. The bishop prays, and God pardons: the priest does his ministry, and God gives the gift. Here are three witnesses, against whom there is no exception; and what they have said, was good catholic doctrine in their ages; that is from the fourth age after Christ, to the eleventh: how it hath fallen into heresy since that time, is now not worth inquiring; but yet how reasonable that old doctrine is, is very fit to consider.

Of necessity it must be true; because whatever kind of absolution or binding it is, that the bishops and priests have power to use; it does its work intended, without any real changing of state in the penitent. The priest alters nothing; he diminishes no man's right; he gives nothing to him but what he had before. The priest baptizes, and he absolves, and he communicates, and he prays, and he declares the will of God; and, by importunity, he compels men to come, and if he find them unworthy, he keeps them out; but it is such, as he finds to be unworthy: such who are in a state of perdition, he cannot, he ought not, to admit to the ministries of life. True it is, he prays to God for pardon, and so he prays that God will give the sinner the grace of repentance: but he can no more give pardon, than he can give repentance; he that gives this, gives that.

And it is so also in the case of absolution: he can absolve none but those, that are truly penitent: he can give thanks indeed to God on his behalf; but as that thanksgiving supposes pardon, so that pardon supposes repentance: and if it be true repentance, the priest will as certainly find him pardoned, as find him penitent. And therefore we find, in the old penitentials and usages of the church, that the

priest did not absolve the penitent in the indicative or judicial form. To this purpose it is observed by Goar, in the Euchologion [i], that now, "many do freely assert, and tenaciously defend, and clearly teach, and prosperously write, that the solemn form of reconciling, 'Absolvo te à peccatis tuis,' is not perhaps above the age of four hundred years; and that the old form of absolution in the Latin church, was composed in words of deprecation, so far as we may conjecture out of the ecclesiastical history, ancient rituals, tradition, and other testimonies without exception."—And in the Opuscula [k] of Thomas Aquinas, he tells that a doctor said to him, that the optative form, or deprecatory, was the usual, and that then it was not thirty years since the indicative form of 'Ego te absolvo' was used; which computation comes near the computation made by Goar. And this is the more evidently so, in that it appears, that in the ancient discipline of the church, a deacon might reconcile the penitents, if the priest were absent: "Si autem necessitas evenerit, et presbyter non fuerit præsens, diaconus suscipiat pœnitentem, ac det sanctam communionem [l]:" and if a deacon can minister this affair, then the priest is not indispensably necessary, nor his power judicial and pretorial.

But besides this, the power of the keys is under the master in the hands of the steward of the house; who is the minister of government: and the power of remitting and retaining being but the verification of the promise of the keys, is to be understood by the same analogy, and is exercised in many instances, and to many great purposes, though no man had ever dreamt of a judicial power of absolution of secret sins; viz. in discipline and government, in removing scandals, in restoring persons 'overtaken in a fault' to the peace of the church, in sustaining the weak, in cutting off of corrupt members, in rejecting heretics, in preaching peace by Jesus Christ, and repentance through his name, and ministering the word of reconciliation, and interceding in the ministry of Christ's mediation; that is, being God's ambassador, he is God's messenger in the great work of the Gospel, which is repentance and forgiveness. In short, binding and loosing, remitting and retaining, are acts of government relating to public discipline. And of any other pardoning

[i] Pag. 676. [k] Opusc. 22. [l] Alcuin. de Divin. Offic. cap. de Jejunio.

or retaining, no man hath any power but what he ministers in the word of God and prayer, unto which the ministry of the sacraments is understood to belong. For what does the church, when she binds a sinner or retains his sin, but separate him from the communication of public prayers and sacraments? according to that saying of Tertullian [m]; "Summum futuri judicii præjudicium est, si quis ita deliquerit, ut à communicatione orationis et conventus et omnis sancti commercii relegetur."—And the like was said by St. Austin [n]; "Versetur ante oculos imago futuri judicii, ut cum alii accedunt ad altare Dei, quo ipse non accedit, cogitet quàm sit contremiscenda illa pœna, qua percipientibus aliis vitam æternam, alii in mortem præcipitantur æternam."—And when the church, upon the sinner's repentance, does restore him to the benefit of public assemblies and sacraments; she does truly pardon his sins, that is, she takes off the evil, that was upon him for his sins. For so Christ proved his power on earth to forgive sins, by taking the poor man's palsy away: and so does the church pardon his sins by taking away that horrible punishment of separating him from all the public communion of the church: and both these are, in their several kinds, the most material and proper pardons.

But then, as the church gives pardon proportionable to the evil she inflicts, which God also will verify, if it be done here in truth and righteousness; so there is a pardon, which God only gives. He is the injured and offended person, and he alone can remit of his own right. But yet to this pardon the church does co-operate by her ministry. Now what this pardon is, we understand best by the evils, that are by him inflicted upon the sinner. For to talk of a power of pardoning sins, where there is no power to take away the punishment of sin, is but a dream of a shadow: sins are only then pardoned, when the punishment is removed. Now who but God alone can take away a sickness, or rescue a soul from the power of his sins, or snatch him out of the devil's possession? The Spirit of God alone can do this, 'it is the Spirit that quickeneth,' and raiseth from spiritual death, and giveth us the life of God. Man can pray for the Spirit, but God alone can give it; our blessed Saviour obtained for us the Spirit of God by this way, by prayer I will pray

[m] Apolog. c. 39. [n] Homil. 5

unto the Father, and he shall give you another Comforter, even the Spirit of truth;" and therefore much less do any of Christ's ministers convey the Spirit to any one, but by prayer, and holy ministries in the way of prayer: but this is best illustrated by the case of baptism. "It is a matter of equal power, said Alexander of Ales[o], to baptize with internal baptism, and to absolve from deadly sin. But it was not fit, that God should communicate the power of baptizing internally unto any, lest we should place our hope in man." And St. Austin (if at least he be the author of the 'Scala Paradisi[p]') says, "The office of baptizing, the Lord granted unto many; but the power and authority of remitting sins in baptism, he retained unto himself alone; wherefore St. John, 'antonomasticè et discretivè,' 'by way of distinction and singularity,' affirms, that, He it is who baptizes with the Holy Ghost." And I shall apply this to the power of the keys in the ministry of repentance, by the words of St. Cyprian[q]: "Remissio peccatorum, sive per baptismum sive per alia sacramenta donetur, propriè Spiritûs Sancti est, et ipsi soli hujus efficientiæ privilegium manet."—As therefore the bishop, or the priest, can give the Holy Ghost to a repenting sinner, so he can give him pardon, and no otherwise: that is, by prayer, and the ministry of the sacraments to persons fitly disposed, who also can and have received the Holy Ghost, without any such ministry of man; as appears in St. Peter's question; "What hinders these men to be baptized, who have received the Holy Ghost as well as we?" And it is done every day, and every hour, in the communion of saints, in the immissions and visitations from heaven, which the saints of God daily receive, and often perceive and feel. "Every man is bound by the cords of his own sins, which ropes and bands the apostles can loose, imitating therein their Master, who said to them, 'Whatsoever ye shall loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven.' 'Solvunt autem eos apostoli, sermone Dei, et testimoniis Scripturarum, et exhortatione virtutum,'" saith St. Jerome[r]. For the word of God, which is intrusted to the ministry of the church, is that rule and measure, by which God will judge us all, at the last day; and therefore, by the

[o] Summ. part. 4. q. 21. memb. 1.

[p] Tom. Operum August. Scala Parad. cap. 5.

[q] De operibus Cardinalibus Christi inter Cypriani opera; sed varius Arnoldi Bonævallensis.

[r] Lib. 6. Comment. in Isai. cap. xiv.

word of God we stand or fall, we are bound or loosed: which word when the ministers of the Gospel dispense rightly, they bind or loose; and what they so bind or loose on earth, God will bind and loose in heaven. That is, by the same measures he will judge the man, by which he hath commanded his ministers to judge them by; that is, they preach remission of sins to the penitent, and God will make it good; and they threaten eternal death to the impenitent, and God will inflict it. But other powers of binding and loosing than what hath been already instanced, those words of Christ prove not. And these powers, and no other, do we find used by the apostles: "To us (saith St. Paul[s]) is committed the word of reconciliation: now then we are ambassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech you by us, we pray you in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God." Christ is the great minister of reconciliation; we are his ambassadors to the people for that purpose: and we are to preach to them, and to exhort them: to pray them, and to pray for them; and we also, by our ministry, reconcile them; and we pardon their sins; for God hath set us over the people to that purpose: but then it is also in that manner that God set the priest over the leprous; Μιάνσει μιανεῖ αὐτὸν ὁ ἱερεὺς, "The priest with pollution shall pollute them[t]," and the priest shall cleanse him, that is, shall declare him so. And it is in the same manner that God set the prophet Jeremy[u] over the nations, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy, to throw down, to build, and to plant: that is, by "putting his word into his mouth" to do all this, to preach all this, to promise or to threaten respectively, all this. The ministers of the Gospel do pardon sins, just as they save men; "This doing, thou shalt save thyself, and them that hear thee;" that is, 'by attending to and continuing in the doctrine of Christ[x]:' and "He that converts a sinner from the error of his way, saves a soul from death, and covers a multitude of sins[y]." Bringing the man to repentance, persuading him to turn from vanity to the living God; thus he brings pardon to him, and salvation. And if it be said, that a layman can do this; I answer, it is very well for him if he does; and he can, if it please God to assist him: but the ordinary ministry is appointed

[s] 2 Cor. v. 19, 20. [t] Lev. xiii. 44. 5. 7. [u] Jer. i. 10.
[x] 1 Tim. iv. 16. [y] Jam. v. 20.

to bishops and priests: so that although a layman do it extraordinarily, that can be no prejudice to the ordinary power of the keys in the hands of the clergy; which is but a ministry of prayer, of the word and sacraments: according to the saying of their own Ferus[z] upon this place: "Christ in this word shews how, and to what use, he at this time gave them the Holy Ghost, to wit, for the remission of sins; neither for the apostles themselves alone; 'sed ut eundem Spiritum, eandemque remissionem peccatorum verbo prædicationis, et sacramentis verbo annexis, distribuerunt.'" And again, he brings in Christ saying, "I therefore choose you, and I seal your hearts by the Holy Ghost unto the word of the Gospel, and confirm you, that going into the world, ye may preach the Gospel to every creature, and that ye may distribute that very remission by the word of the Gospel, and the sacraments." For the words of Christ are general and indefinite; and they are comprehensive of the whole power and ministry ecclesiastical: and in those parts of it which are evident and confessed, viz. preaching remission of sins and baptism, a special enumeration of our sins is neither naturally necessary, nor esteemed so by custom, nor made so by virtue of these words of Christ; therefore it is no way necessary, neither have they at all proved it so by Scripture. And to this I add only what Ambrosius Pelargus, a divine of the elector of Triers, said in the council of Trent; "that the words of our Lord, 'Quorum remiseritis', were perhaps not expounded, by any father, for an institution of the sacrament of penance: and that by some they were understood of baptism; by others, of any other thing by which pardon of sins is received[a]."

But since there is no necessity declared in Scripture of confessing all our sins to a priest, no mention of sacramental penance, or confession, it must needs seem strange, that a doctrine, of which there is no commandment in Scripture, no direction for the manner of doing so difficult a work, no office or officer described to any such purpose; that a doctrine, I say, of which in the fountain of salvation there is no spring, should yet become, in process of time, to be the condition of salvation: and yet for preaching, praying, baptizing, communicating, we have precept upon precept, and line

[z] John, xx. [a] Hist. Concil. Trid. A.D. 155. sub. Julio Tertio.

upon line; we have in Scripture three epistles written to two bishops, in which the episcopal office is abundantly described; and excellent canons established; and the parts of their duty enumerated: and yet no care taken about the office of 'father confessor.' Indeed we find a pious exhortation to all spiritual persons, that, "if any man be overtaken in a fault, they should restore such a one in the spirit of meekness;" 'restore him,' that is, to the public peace and communion of the church, from which by his delinquency he fell; and restore him also, by the word of his proper ministry, to the favour of God; by exhortations to him, by reproving of him, by praying for him: and besides this, we have some little limits more, which the church of Rome, if they please, may make good use of in this question; such as are, "that they who sin, should be rebuked before all men, that others also may fear[b];" which indeed is a good warranty for public discipline, but very little for private confession. And St. Paul charges Timothy, that he should "lay hands suddenly on no man," that he be not partaker of other men's sins; which is a good caution against the Roman way of absolving them that confess, as soon as they have confessed, before they have made their satisfactions. The same Apostle speaks also of "some that creep into houses, and lead captive silly women;" I should have thought, he had intended it against such, as then abused auricular confession; it being so like what they do now; but that St. Paul knew nothing of these lately-introduced practices: and lastly, he commands every one that is to receive the holy communion, "to examine himself, and so let him eat:" he forgot, it seems, to enjoin them to go to confession to be examined: which certainly he could never have done more opportunely than here; and, if it had been necessary, he could never have omitted it more indecently. But it seems, the first Christians were admitted upon other terms by the apostles, than they are at this day by the Roman clergy. And indeed it were infinitely strange, that since, in the Old Testament, remission of sins was given to every one, that confessed to God, and turned from his evil way[c], that, in the New Testament, to which liberty is a

[b] 1 Tim. v. 20.

[c] Isai. i. 16—18. Ezek. xviii. 22. xxxiii. 15, 16. Isai. xxx. 15. secundùm LXX. Ὅταν ἀποστραφεὶς στενάξῃς, τότε σωθήσῃ.

special privilege, and the imposed yoke of Christ infinitely more easy than the burden of the law; and repentance is the very formality of the Gospel-covenant; and yet, that pardon of our sins shall not be given to us Christians on so easy terms as it was to the Jews; but an intolerable new burden shall be made a new condition of obtaining pardon. And this will appear yet the more strange; when we consider, that all the sermons of the prophets concerning repentance, were not derivations from Moses's law, but homilies evangelical, and went before to prepare the way of the Lord; and John Baptist was last of them; and that, in this matter, the sermons of the prophets were but the Gospel antedated; and, in this affair, there was no change but to the better and to a clearer manifestation of the divine mercy, and the sweet yoke of Christ; the disciples of Christ preached the same doctrine of repentance that the Baptist did, and the Baptist the same that the prophets did, and there was no difference; Christ was the same in all, and he that commanded his disciples to fast to God alone in private, intended that all the parts of repentance transacted between God and our consciences, should be as sufficient as that one of fasting, and that other of prayer: and it is said so in all; "for, if we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness." It is God alone that can cleanse our hearts, and he that cleanses us, he alone does forgive us; and this is upon our confession to him: his justice and faithfulness are at stake for it; and therefore it supposes a promise: which we often find upon our confessions made to God, but it was never promised upon confession made to the priest.

But now, in the next place, if we consider, whether this thing be reasonable, to impose such a yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which upon their fathers was not put in the Old Testament, nor ever commanded in the New; we shall find, that, although many good things might be consequent to the religious and free and prudent use of confession; yet, by changing into a doctrine of God, that which, at most, is but a commandment of man, it will not, by all the contingent good, make recompense for the intolerable evils it introduces. And here first I consider, that many times things seem profitable to us, and may minister to good ends; but God

judges them useless and dangerous: for he judges not as we judge. The worshipping of angels, and the abstaining from meats, which some false apostles introduced, looked well, and pretended to humility, and mortification of the body; but the Apostle approved them not: and of the same mind were the succeeding ages of the church; who condemned the dry diet, and the ascetic fasts of Montanus, though they were pretended only for discipline; but when they came to be imposed, they grew intolerable. Certainly, men lived better lives, when, by the discipline of the church, sinners were brought to public stations and penance, than now they do by all the advantages, real or pretended, from auricular confession; and yet the church thought fit to lay it aside, and nothing is left but the shadow of it.

2. This whole topic can only be a prudential consideration, and can no way infer a divine institution; for though it was as convenient before Christ, as since, and might have had the same effects upon the public or private good, then, as now; yet God was not pleased to appoint it in almost forty ages; and we say, he hath not done it yet. However, let it be considered, that there being some things, which, St. Paul says, are not to be "so much as named" amongst Christians; it must needs look indecently, that all men and all women should come and make the priest's ears a common sewer to empty all their filthiness; and that which a modest man would blush to hear, he must be used to, and it is the greatest part of his employment to attend to. True it is, that a physician must see and handle the impurest ulcers; but it is, because the cure does not depend upon the patient, but upon the physician, who, by general advertisement, cannot cure the patient, unless he had a universal medicine, which the priest hath: the medicine of repentance, which can indifferently cure all sins, whether the priest know them or no. And therefore, all this filthy communication is therefore intolerable, because it is not necessary: and it not only pollutes the priest's ears, but his tongue too; for, lest any circumstance, or any sin, be concealed, he thinks himself obliged to interrogate, and proceed to particular questions in the basest things. Such as that which is to be seen in Burchard [d], and such which are too largely described in San-

[d] Lib. 19. Decret. de Matrimonio.

chez; which thing does not only deturpate all honest and modest conversation, but it teaches men to understand more sins than ever they (it may be) knew of. And I believe, there are but few in the world at this day, that did ever think of such a crime, as Burchard hath taught them by that question; and possibly it might have expired in the very first instances, if there had been no further notice taken of it. I need not tell how the continual representment of such things to the priest, must needs infect the fancy and the memory with filthy imaginations, and be a state of temptation to them that are very often young men and vigorous, and always unmarried and tempted. Φθείρουσιν ἤθη χρῆσθ' ὁμιλίαι κακαί. Aretine's tables do not more pollute the heart through the eyes, than a foul narrative of a beastly action with all the circumstances of perpetration does through the ears; for, as it was said of Thomas Cantipratanus, "vexatis exteriùs auribus, interiùs tentationum stimulis agitabatur[e]." And Marcus Eremita, that lived in that age, in which this auricular confession began to be the mode of the Latin church, speaks against it severely: "If thou wilt offer to God an unreprovable confession, do not recount thy sins particularly, for so thou dost greatly defile thy mind; but generously endure their assaults, or what they have brought upon thee[f]." We need no further witness of it, but the question and case of conscience which Cajetan puts: "Utrum confessor cognoscens ex his quæ audit in confessione, sequi in seipso emissionem seminis sibi displicentem, peccet mortaliter audiendo vel prosequendo tales confessiones[g]?" The question is largely handled, but not so fit to be read; but instead of it, I shall only note the answer of another cardinal: "Confessarius, si fortè dum audit confessiones, in tales incidit pollutiones, non ob id tenetur non audire alios, nisi sit periculum complacentiæ in pollutione; tunc enim tenetur relinquere confessiones, et auferre peccati occasionem; secus non[h]." This question and this answer I here bring to no other purpose, but to represent that the priests dwell in temptation; and that their manner of receiving confessions is a perpetual danger, by which he that loves it, may chance

[e] In vitâ ejus apud Hagiolog. Brabant.
[f] De iis qui putant se operibus justificari. Biblioth. Patrum, tom. Gr. Lat.
[g] Opusc. Cajet. tract. 22.
[h] Lib. 5. Inst. Sacerd. c. 3. sub fig. 5. edit. Paris. 1619. p. 372.

to perish. And of this there have been too many sad examples remarked, evidencing that this private confession hath been the occasion and the opportunity of the vilest crimes. There happened but one such sad thing in the ancient Greek church, which became public by the discipline of public confession, but was acted by the opportunity of the private intercourse; and that was then thought sufficient to alter that whole discipline: but it is infinitely more reasonable, to take off the law of private confession, and in that manner as it is enjoined; if we consider the intolerable evils which are committed frequently upon this sense. Erasmus[i] makes a sad complaint of it, that the penitents do often light upon priests, who, under the pretext of confession, commit things not to be spoken of; and instead of physicians, become partners, or masters, or disciples, of turpitude. The matter is notorious, and very scandalous, and very frequent: insomuch that it produced two bulls of two popes 'contra sollicitantes in confessione;' the first was of Pius the Fourth to the Bishop of Seville, A. D. 1561, April 16; the other of Gregory the Fifteenth, 1622, August 30, which bulls take notice of it, and severely prohibit the confessors to tempt the women to indecencies, when they come to confession. Concerning which bulls, and the sad causes procuring them, even the intolerable and frequent impieties acted by and in confessions, who desires to be plentifully satisfied, may please to read the book of Johannes Escobar à Corro, a Spanish lawyer; which is a commentary on those two bulls[k]; and in the beginning he shall find sad complaints and sadder stories. But I love not to stir up so much dirt. That which is altogether as remarkable, and, it may be, much more, is, that this auricular confession not only can, but oftentimes hath been made the most advantageous way of plotting, propagating, and carrying on, treasonable propositions and designs. I shall not instance in that horrid design of the gunpowder treason; for that is known every where amongst us; but in the holy league of France. "When the pulpits became unsafe for tumultuous and traitorous preachers, the confessors in private confessions did that with more safety; they slandered the king, and endeavoured to prove it lawful for sub-

[i] In Exomolog. p. 128, 129, &c.
[k] Videatur etiam Orlandini Hist. Societ. J. lib. 9. sect. 70.

jects to covenant or make leagues and confederacies without their king's leave; they sometimes refused to absolve them, unless they would enter into the league; and persuaded many miserable persons to be of the faction. But this thing was not done so secretly, but notice enough was taken of it; and complaint was made to the Bishop, and then to Franciscus Maurocenus the cardinal legate; who gave notice and caution against it; and the effect it produced was only this; they proceeded afterward more warily; and began to preach this doctrine; that it was as great a fault if the confitent reveal what he hears from the confessor in confession, as if the priest should reveal the sins told him by the penitent:" this narrative I have from Thuanus[l]. To which I add one more, related in the life of Padre Paolo; that "Hippolito da Lucca fù in fama sinistra d' haver nelle confessioni, e ragionamenti corrotto con larghe promesse e gran speranza persuaso alla Duchessa d' aderire alla fazione ecclesiastica:" "Hippolitus of Lucca was evil reported to have, in discourse or in confession, persuaded the Dutchess of Urbin against Cæsar d' Este, and to have corrupted her into the faction of the church." For which he was made a bishop[m], and in Rome was always one of the prelates deputed in the examination of that controversy. If it were possible, and if it could be in the world, I should believe it to be a baser prostitution of religion to temporal designs, which is written of F. Arnold the Jesuit[n], confessor to Lewis the Thirteenth of France; that he caused the king at confession solemnly to swear, never to dislike what Luines the great favourite did, nor himself to meddle with any state affair. Now what advantage the Pope hath over Christian princes in this particular, and how much they have, and how much more they may suffer, by this economy, is a matter of great consideration: "Admonetur omnis ætas posse fieri, quod jam factum vidimus."

3. There is yet another very great evil, that attends upon the Roman way of auricular confession; and that is, an eternal scruple of conscience, which to the timorous and melancholy, to the pious, and considering, and zealous, is almost unavoid-

[l] Hist. lib. 85. pag. 100. in Leida, 1646.
[m] By Card. Aldobrandino, the nephew of P. Clement VIII.
[n] Memoires de Duc de Rohan, lib. 1.

able. For, besides that there is no certainty of distinction between the mortal and venial sins; there being no catalogues of one and the other, save only that they usually reckon but seven deadly sins; and the rest are, or may be, easily by the ignorant supposed to be venial; and even those sins, which are under those seven heads, are not all mortal; for there are amongst them many ways of changing their mortality into veniality; and consequent to all this, they are either tempted to slight most sins, or to be troubled with perpetual disputes concerning almost every thing: besides this, I say, there can be no peace (because there can be no certain rule given) concerning the examination of our consciences; for who can say, he hath done it sufficiently, or who knows what is sufficient; and yet if it be not sufficient, then the sins which are forgotten by carelessness, and not called to mind by sufficient diligence, are not pardoned, and then the penitent hath had much trouble to no purpose. There are some confessions imperfect but valid, some invalid for their imperfection, some perfect, and yet invalid: and they that made the distinction, made the rule, and it binds as they please; but it can cause scruples beyond their power of remedy; because there is no certain principle, from whence men can derive peace and a certain determination, some affirming, and some denying, and both of them by chance, or humour. There are also many reserved cases; some to the bishop, some to the patriarch, some to the Pope; and when you shall have run through the fire for these before the priest, you must run once or twice more; and your first absolution is of no force: and amongst these reserved cases, there is also great difference; some are reserved by reason of censures ecclesiastical, and some by reason of the greatness of the sin; and these things may be hidden from his eyes, and he, supposing himself absolved, will perceive himself deceived; and absolved but from one half. Some indeed think, that if the superior absolve from the reserved cases alone, that grace is given by which all the rest are remitted; and on the other side, some think if the inferior absolves from what he can, grace is given of remitting even of the reserved: but this is uncertain, and all agree, that the penitent is never the nearer, but that he is still obliged to confess the reserved cases to the superior, if he went first to the inferior; or all to the inferior, in case

he went first to the superior, confessing only the reserved. There are also many difficulties in the confession of such things, in which the sinner had partners: for if he confess the sin so, as to accuse any other, he sins; if he does not, in many cases he cannot confess the circumstances, that alter the nature of the crime. Some therefore tell him, he may conceal such sins till a fitter opportunity; others say, he may let it quite alone: others yet say, he may get another confessor; but then there will come another scruple, whether he may do this with leave, or without leave; or, if he ask leave, whether or no, in case it be denied him, he may take leave in such an accident. Upon these and many other like accounts, there will arise many more questions concerning the iteration of his confession; for if the first confession be by any means made invalid, it must be done over again. But here, in the very beginning of this affair, the penitent must be sure that his former confession was invalid. For if it was, he cannot be pardoned unless he renew it; and if it was not, let him take heed: for to confess the same things twice, and twice to be absolved, it may be, is not lawful; and against it, Cajetan [o], after the scholastical manner, brings divers reasons. But suppose the penitent at peace for this, then there are very many cases, in which confession is to be repeated; and though it was done before, yet it must be done over again. As if there be no manner of contrition, without doubt it must be iterated; but there are many cases concerning contrition: and if it be at all, though imperfect, it is not to be iterated. But what is, and what is not contrition; what is perfect, and what is imperfect: which is the first degree that makes the confession valid, can never be told. But then there is some comfort to be had; for, the sacrament of penance may be true, and yet without form or life, at the same time [p]. And there are divers cases, in which true confession, that is but materially half, may be reduced to that, which is but formally half: and if there be but a propinquity of the mind to a carelessness concerning the integrity of confession; the man cannot be sure, that things go well with him. And sometimes it happens that the church is satisfied, when God is not satisfied, as in the case of the 'informis confessio;' and then the

[o] Quæst. quodlibet. quæst. 6. de Confess. [p] Cajetan. summ. v. Confessio.

man is absolved, but his sin is not pardoned; and yet, because he thinks it is, his soul is cozened. And yet this is but the beginning of scruples. For, suppose the penitent hath done his duty, examined himself strictly, repented sadly, confessed fully, and is absolved formally; yet all this may come to nothing by reason, that there may be some invalidity in the ordination of the priest, by crime, by irregularity, by direct deficiency of something in the whole succession and ordination; or, it may be, he hath not ordinary, or delegate jurisdiction; for, it is not enough that he is a priest, unless he have another authority, says Catejan[q]; besides his order, he must have jurisdiction, which is carefully to be inquired after, by reason of the infinite number of friars, that take upon them to hear confessions; or if he have both, yet the use of his power may be interverted or suspended for the time, and then his absolution is worth nothing. But here there is some remedy made to the poor distracted penitent; for by the constitution of the council of Constance, under Pope Martin the Fifth, though the priest be excommunicate, the confession is not to be iterated: but then this also ends in scruples; for this constitution itself does not hold, if the excommunication be for the notorious smiting of a clergyman; or if it be not, yet if the excommunication be denounced, be it for what it will, his absolution is void: and therefore the penitent should do well to look about him; especially since, after all this, there may be innumerable deficiences; yea, some even for want of skill and knowledge in the confessor; and when that happens, when the confession is to be iterated, there are no certain rules, but it must be left to the opinion of another confessor. And when he comes, the poor penitent, it may be, is no surer of him than of the other; for if he have no will to absolve the penitent, let him dissemble it as he list, the absolution was but jocular, or pretended, or never intended; or, it may be, he is secretly an atheist, and laughs at the penitent himself too, for acting, as he thinks, such a troublesome, theatrical nothing; and then the man's sins cannot be pardoned. And, is there no remedy for all this evil? It is true, the cases are sad and dangerous, but the church of Rome hath (such is her prudence and indulgence) found out as much relief as the wit of man can possibly

[q] Summ. verb. Absolutio.

invent. For though there may be thus many, and many more deficiencies; yet there are some extraordinary ways to make it up as well as it can. For, to prevent all the contingent mischiefs, let the penitent be as wise as he can, and choose his man upon whom these defailances may not be observed; for a man in necessity, as in danger of death, may be absolved by any one, that is a priest; but yet, if the penitent escape the sickness, or that danger, he must go to him again, or to somebody else; by which it appears, that his affair was left but imperfect. But some persons have liberty by reason of their dignity, and some by reason of their condition, as being pilgrims or wanderers; and they have greater freedom, and cannot easily fall into many nullities; or they may have an explicit, or an implicit licence: but then they must take heed; for, besides many of the precedent dangers, they must know, that the licence extends only to the paschal confessions, or the usual; but not the extraordinary or emergent: and moreover, they can go but to the appointed confessors, in the places where they are present; and because under these there is the same danger, as in all that went before, the little more certainty which I hoped for in some few cases, comes to nothing. But I go about to reckon the sands on the shore. I shall therefore sum this up with the words of a famous preacher, reported by Beatus Rhenanus[r] to have made this observation, that "Thomas Aquinas and Scotus, men too subtle, have made confession to be such, that, according to their doctrines, it is impossible to confess;" and that the consciences of penitents, which should be extricated and eased, are, by this means, catched in a snare, and put to torments, said Cassander[s]; so that although confession to a priest, prudently managed, without scruple, upon the case of a grieved and an unquiet conscience, and in order to counsel and the perfections of repentance, may be of excellent use; yet to enjoin it in all cases, to make it necessary to salvation, when God hath not made it so; to exact an enumeration of all our sins in all cases, and of all persons; to clog it with so many questions and innumerable inextricable difficulties, and all this, besides the evil manage and conduct of

[r] Præfat. in lib. Tertul. de Pœniten.

[s] Consult. art. 11. videatur etiam Johannes de Sylva in fine tractat. de jurejurando.

it, is the rack of consciences, the slavery of the church, the evil snare of the simple, and the artifice of the crafty: it was or might have been as the brazen serpent a memorial of duty, but now it is 'Nehushtan,' 'æs eorum;' something of their own framing.

And this will yet further appear in this, that there is no ecclesiastical tradition of the necessity of confessing all our sins to a priest in order to pardon. That it was not the established doctrine of the Latin church, I have already proved in the beginning of this section; the case is notorious; and the original law of this we find in Platina, in the life of Pope Zephyrinus. "Idem præterea instituit, ut omnes Christiani, annos pubertatis attingentes, singulis annis, in solenni die paschæ, publicè communicarent. Quod quidem institutum Innocentius Tertius deinceps non ad communionem solum, verum etiam ad confessionem delictorum traduxit." Platina was the Pope's secretary, and well understood the interests of that church, and was sufficiently versed in the records and monuments of the popes; and tells, that as Zephyrinus commanded the eucharist to be taken at Easter; so Innocent III. commanded confession of sins. Before this, there was no command, no decree of any council or Pope enjoining it: only in the council of Cabaillon [t], it was declared to be profitable, that penance should be enjoined to the penitent by the priest after confession made to him. But there was no command for it; and in the second council of Cabaillon [u], it was but a disputed case, whether they ought to confess to God alone, or also to the priest. Some said one, and some said another, "quod utrumque non sine magno fructu intra sanctam fit ecclesiam [x]." And Theodulfus, bishop of Orleans, tells the particulars: "The confession we make to the priests, gives us this help, that having received his salutary counsel, by the most wholesome duties of repentance, or by mutual prayers, we wash away the stains of our sins. But the confession we make to God alone, avails us in this, because by how much we are mindful of our sins, by so much the Lord forgets them; and on the contrary, by how much we forget them, by so much the Lord remembers them, according to the saying of the Prophet, 'and I will remember thy sins.'" But the fathers of the council gave a good account of these particulars also.

[t] Can. 8. [u] Can. 33. [x] In tom. 2. Concil. Gallic. c. 30. p. 219.

"Confessio itaque, quæ Deo fit, purgat peccata: ea verò quæ sacerdoti fit, docet, qualiter ipsa purgentur peccata: Deus enim, salutis et sanitatis auctor et largitor, plerunque hanc præbet suæ potentiæ invisibili administratione [y], plerunque medicorum operatione:" which words are an excellent declaration of the advantages of confession to a priest, but a full argument that it is not necessary, or that, without it, pardon of sins is not to be obtained. Gratian quoting the words, cites Theodore, archbishop of Canterbury; but falsely: for it is in the second council of Cabaillon, and not in Theodore's Penitential. But I will not trouble the reader further, in the matter of the Latin church; in which it is evident, by what hath been already said, there was concerning this no apostolical tradition.

How it was in the Greek church, is only to be inquired. Now we might make as quick an end of this also, if we might be permitted to take Semeca's word [z], the gloss of the canon law; which affirms that, "Confession of deadly sins is not necessary among the Greeks, because no such tradition hath descended unto them." This acknowledgment and report of the Greeks, not esteeming confession to a priest to be necessary, is not only in the gloss above cited; but in Gratian [a] himself, and in the more ancient collection of canons by Burchard, and Ivo Carnotensis. Bellarmine fancies that these words "ut Græci" are crept into the text of Gratian out of the margent. Well! suppose that; but then how came they into the elder collections of Burchard and Ivo? That is not to be told; but creep in they did, some way or other; because they are not in the Capitular of Theodore, archbishop of Canterbury; and yet from thence this canon was taken; and that Capitular was taken from the second council of Cabaillon; in which also, there are no such words extant; so the Cardinal [b]. In which Bellarmine betrays his carelessness or his ignorance very greatly. 1. Because there is no such thing extant in the world, that any man knows and tells of, as the Capitular of Theodore. 2. He indeed made a penitential, a copy of which is in Bene't-college library in Cambridge, from whence I have received some extracts, by the favour and industry of my friends; and

[y] Sola Contritione, ait glossa, ibid. et habetur de Pœnit. dist. 1. cap. Quidam Deo.
[z] De Pœnit. dist. 5. c. in Pœnit.
[a] De Pœnit. dist. 1. c. Quidam Deo.
[b] De Pœnit. lib. 3. cap. 5.

another copy of it is in Sir Robert Cotton's library. 3. True it is, there is in that Penitential no such words as "ut Græci," but a direct affirmation, "Confessionem suam Deo soli, si necesse est, licebit agere." 4. That Theodore should take this chapter out of the second council of Cabaillon, is an intolerable piece of ignorance or negligence in so great a scholar as Bellarmine; when it is notorious, that the council was after Theodore, above one hundred and twenty years. 5. But then lastly, because Theodore, though he sat in the seat of Canterbury, yet was a Greek born; his words are a good record of the opinion of the Greeks, that "Confession of sins is, if there be need, to be made to God alone." But this I shall prove with firmer testimonies; not many, but pregnant, clear, and undeniable.

St. Gregory Nyssen [c] observed, that the ancient fathers before him, in their public discipline, did take no notice of the sins of covetousness, that is, left them without public penance, otherwise than it was ordered in other sins; and therefore, he interposes his judgment thus. "But concerning these things, because this is pretermitted by the fathers, I do think it sufficient to cure the affections of covetousness with the public word of doctrine, or instruction, curing the diseases, as it were, of repletion by the word." That is plainly thus: the sins of covetousness had no canonical penances imposed upon them: and therefore many persons thought but little of them: therefore, to cure this evil, let this sin be reproved in public sermons, though there be no imposition of public penances. So that here is a remedy without penances, a cure without confession, a public sermon instead of a public or private judicatory.

But the fact of Nectarius, in abrogating the public penitentiary priest upon the occasion of a scandal, does bear much weight in this question. I shall not repeat the story; who please, may read it in Socrates, Sozomen, Epiphanius, Cassiodore, and Nicephorus [d]; and it is known every where. Only they who are pinched by it, endeavour to confound it, as Waldensis and Camus: some by denying it, as Latinus Latinius; others by disputing concerning every thing in it;

[c] Epist. Canon. ad Letorum.

[d] Relect. de Pœnit. part. 5. sect. Ad sextum. p. 31. edit. Salmanticæ, 1563. per Matthiam Gartium.

some saying, that Nectarius abrogated sacramental confession; others, that he abrogated the public only, so very many say: and a third sort, who yet speak with most probability, that he only took away the office of the public penitentiary, which was instituted in the time of Decius, and left things as that decree found them; that is, that those who had sinned those sins, which were noted in the penitential canons, should confess them to the bishop, or in the face of the church, and submit themselves to the canonical penances. This passed into the office of the public penitentiary; and that into nothing, in the Greek church. But there is nothing of this, that I insist upon; but I put the stress of this question upon the product of this. For Eudæmon [e] gave counsel to Nectarius and he followed it, that he took away the penitentiary priest, "ut liberam daret potestatem, uti pro suâ quisque conscientiâ ad mysteria participanda accederet." So Socrates, and Sozomen, to the same purpose: "Ut unicuique liberum permitteret, prout sibi ipse conscius esset et confideret, ad mysteriorum communionem accedere, pœnitentiarium illum presbyterum exauctoravit." Now if Nectarius, by this decree, took away sacramental confession, as the Roman doctors call it, then it is a clear case, the Greek church did not believe it necessary; if it was only the public confession they abolished, then, for aught appears, there was no other at that time; I mean, none commanded, none under any law, or under any necessity: but whatever it was that was abolished, private confession did not, by any decree, succeed in the place of it; but every man was left to his liberty and the dictates of his own conscience, and according to his own persuasion, to his fears or his confidence, so to come and partake of the divine mysteries. All which is a plain demonstration, that they understood nothing of the necessity of confession to a priest of all their sins, before they came to the holy sacrament.

And in pursuance of this, are those many exhortations and discourses of St. Chrysostom, who, succeeding Nectarius, by his public doctrine could best inform us, how they understood the consequence of that decree, and of this whole question. The sum of whose doctrine is this: It is not necessary to have your sins revealed, or brought in public, not

[e] Lib. 5. c. 19. Eccl. Hist. lib. 7. cap. 16.

only in the congregation, but not to any one, but to God alone. "Make a scrutiny, and pass a judgment on your sins inwardly in your conscience, none being present but God alone, that seeth all things[f]." And again: "Declare unto God alone thy sin, saying, Against thee only have I sinned and done evil in thy sight; and thy sin is forgiven thee. I do not say, Tell to thy fellow-servant, who upbraids thee, but tell them to God who heals thy sins[g]." And, that after the abolition of the penitentiary priest nothing was surrogated in his stead, but pious homilies and public exhortations, we learn from those words of his; "We do not bring the sinners into the midst, and publish their sins; but having propounded the common doctrine to all, we leave it to the conscience of the auditors, that out of those things, which are spoken, every one may find a medicine fitted for his wound[h]." "Let the discussion of thy sins be in the accounts of thy conscience; let the judgment be passed without a witness: let God alone see thee confessing; God who upbraids not thy sins, but out of this confession blots them out." "Hast thou sinned, enter into the church, say unto God, I have sinned. I exact nothing of thee, but that alone." The same he says in many other[i] places: now against so many, so clear, and dogmatical testimonies, it will be to no purpose to say, that St. Chrysostom only spake against the penitentiary priest set over the public penitents; and this he did, in pursuance of his predecessor's act. For, besides that some of these homilies were written, before St. Chrysostom was bishop, viz. his one-and-twenty homilies to the people of Antioch, and the fourth homily of Lazarus which was preached at Antioch before he came to Constantinople, when he was but a priest under Flavianus his bishop; and his homilies on St. Matthew; besides this, it is plain that he not only speaks against the public judicial penance and confession; but against all, except that alone which is made to God; allowing the sufficiency of this for pardon, and disal-

[f] Homil. 56. sive 8. de Pœnit. tom. 1.

[g] Homil. 9. de Pœnit. sive homil. 59. homil. 2. in Psal. l. homil. Quod peccata non sint evulganda. vid. tom. 57.

[h] Homil de Pœnit. et Confessione, tom. 58. tom. 5. homil. 68. tom. 5.

[i] Homil. 31. in Ep. ad Hebr. homil. 20. in Matt. homil. 28. in 1 Cor. homil. 21. ad Pop. Antioch. εἰς ἀδρίαντας, homil. 4. de Lazaro.

lowing the necessity of all other. To these things Bellarmine, Perron, Petrus de Soto, Vasquez, Valentia, and others, strive to find out answers; but they neither agree together, neither do their answers fit the testimonies; as is evident to them, that compare the one and the other, the chief of which I have remarked, in passing by. The best answers that can be given, are those which Latinus Latinius and Petavius give[k]; the first affirming, that these homilies, 1. are not St. Chrysostom's: or, 2. that they are corrupted by heretics; and the latter confessing they are his, but blames St. Chrysostom for preaching such things. And to these answers I hope I shall not need to make any reply. To the two first of Latinus, Vasquez hath answered perfectly; and to that of Petavius, there needs none; Petavius, instead of answering, making himself a judge of St. Chrysostom. I suppose if we had done so in any question against them, they would have taken it in great scorn and indignation; and, therefore, we choose to follow St. Chrysostom, rather than Master Petavius.

I do not deny, but the Roman doctors do bring many sayings of the Greek and Latin fathers, shewing the usefulness of confession to a priest, and exhorting and pressing men to it: but their arts are notorious, and evident; and what, according to the discipline of the church at that time, they spake in behalf of the exomologesis or public discipline, that these doctors translate to the private confession; and yet whatever we bring out of antiquity against the necessity of confession to a priest, that they will resolvedly understand only of the public. But, besides what hath been said to every of the particulars, I shall conclude this point with the sayings of some eminent men of their own, who have made the same observation. "In hoc labuntur theologi quidam parùm attenti, quòd, quæ veteres illi de hujusmodi publicâ et generali confessione, quæ nihil aliud erat quàm signis quibusdam et piaminibus ab episcopo indictis, se peccatorem, et bonorum communione indignum agnoscere, trahunt ad hanc occultam et longè diversi generis:" so Erasmus[l]. And B. Rhenanus says, "Let no man wonder that Tertullian speaks nothing of

[k] In 3. part. Tho. tom. 4. q. 90. a. 1. dub. 3. n. 31.
[l] In S. Hieron. epist. ad Oceanum, sive Epitaph. Fabiolæ.

the secret or clancular confession of sins; which, so far as we conjecture, was bred out of the (old) exomologesis, by the unconstrained piety of men. For we do not find it at all commanded of old [m]."

The conclusion of these premises is this, that the old ecclesiastic discipline being passed into desuetude and indevotion, the Latin church especially, kept up some little broken planks of it; which, so long as charity and devotion were warm, and secular interest had not turned religion into arts, did, in some good measure, supply the want of the old better discipline; but when it had degenerated into little forms, and yet was found to serve great ends of power, wealth, and ambition, it passed into new doctrines, and is now bold to pretend to divine institution, though it be nothing but the commandment of men, a snare of consciences, and a ministry of human policy; false in the proposition, and intolerable in the conclusion.

There are divers other instances reducible to this charge, and especially the prohibition of priests' marriage, and the abstinence from flesh at certain times; which are grown up from human ordinances to be established doctrines, that is, to be urged with greater severity than the laws of God; insomuch that the church of Rome permits concubinate and stews at the same time, when she will not permit chaste marriages to her clergy. And for abstinence from flesh at times appointed, "veluti parricida penè dixerim rapitur ad supplicium, qui pro piscium carnibus gustârit carnes suillas." But I shall not now insist upon these; having so many other things to say, and especially, having already in another place [n] verified this charge against them in these instances. I shall only name one testimony of their own, which is a pregnant mother of many instances: and it is in their own canon law [o]: "They that voluntarily violate the canons, are heavily judged by the holy fathers, and are damned by the Holy Ghost, by whose instinct they were dictated [p]. For they do not incongruously seem to blaspheme the Holy Ghost." And a little after: "Such a presumption is manifestly one of the kinds of them, that blaspheme against the

[m] Præfat. in lib. Tertul. de Pœnit.
[n] Rule of Conscience, lib. 3. cap. 4. rule 13. 19. and 20.
[o] Caus. 25. q. 1. c. Violatores Canonum. [p] Dicati pro dictati.

Holy Ghost." Now if the laws of their church, which are discordant enough, and many times of themselves too blamable [q], be yet by them accounted so sacred, that it is taught to be a sin against the Holy Ghost, willingly to break them; in the world there cannot be a greater verification of this charge upon them: it being confessed on all hands, that, not every man who voluntarily violates a divine commandment, does blaspheme the Holy Ghost.

BOOK II.

SECTION I.—*Of Indulgences.*

ONE of the great instances to prove the Roman religion to be new, not primitive, not apostolic, is the foolish and unjustifiable doctrine of indulgences. This point I have already handled; so fully and so without contradiction from the Roman doctors (except that they have causelessly snarled at some of the testimonies), that, for aught yet appears, that discourse may remain a sufficient reproof of the church of Rome until the day of their reformation. The first testimony I brought, is the confession of a party: for I affirmed that Bishop Fisher, of Rochester, did confess, "that, in the beginning of the church, there was no use of indulgences, and that they began, after the people were awhile affrighted with the torments of purgatory." To this there are two answers; the first is, that Bishop Fisher said no such words. No? 'Proferte tabulas.'—His words are these; "Who can now wonder, that, in the beginning of the primitive church, there was no use of indulgences [r]?" And again: "Indulgences began awhile after men trembled at the torments of purgatory."—These are the words of Roffensis. What in the world can be plainer? And this is so evident, that Alphonsus à Castro [s] thinks himself concerned to answer the objection, and the danger of such concessions. "Neither, upon this occasion, are indulgences to be despised, because their use may seem

[q] Vide quæ supra annotavi ex Decreto Gratiani, sect. 1.
[r] In art. 13. contr. Luther. [s] Lib. 8. adv. Hæres. tit. Indulgentiæ.

to be received lately in the church, because there are many things known to posterity, which those ancient writers were wholly ignorant of." "Quid ergo mirum, si ad hunc modum contigeret de indulgentiis, ut apud priscos nulla sit de iis mentio?" Indeed, antiquity was wholly ignorant of these things: and as for their catholic posterity, some of them also did not believe that indulgences did profit any that were dead. Amongst these, Hostiensis and Biel were the most noted. But Biel was soon made to alter his opinion; Hostiensis did not, that I find[t].

The other answer is, by E. W., that "Roffensis saith it not so absolutely, but with this interrogation: 'Quis jam de indulgentiis mirari potest?' 'Who now can wonder concerning indulgences?'" Wonder! at what? for E. W. is loath to tell it: but truth must out. "Who now can wonder, that, in the beginning of the church, there was no use of indulgences?"—so Roffensis; which first supposes this; that in the primitive church there was no use of indulgences; none at all: and this, which is the main question here, is as absolutely affirmed as any thing; it is like a precognition to a scientifical discourse. And then the question, having presupposed this, does by direct implication say, it is no wonder, that there should be then no use of indulgences: that is, not only absolutely affirms the thing, but by consequence the notoriety of it and the reasonableness. Nothing affirms or denies more strongly than a question. "Are not my ways equal (said God), and are not your ways unequal?" that is, 'It is evident and notorious that it is so.'—And by this we understand the meaning of Roffensis, in the following words; "Yet, as they say, there was some very ancient use of them among the Romans." 'They say,'—that is, there is a talk of it amongst some or other; but such they were, whom Roffensis believed not; and that, upon which they did ground their fabulous report, was nothing but a ridiculous legend, which I have already confuted[u].

The same doctrine is taught by Antoninus, who confesses that concerning them we have nothing expressly in the Scriptures, or in the sayings of the ancient doctors. And

[t] Hostiensis in summâ lib. 5. tit. de Remiss. Biel in Canon. Missæ. lect. 57. vide Bellarm. lib. 1. c. 14. de Indul. sect. Quod ad primam.

[u] Dissuasive, part 1. sect. 3.

that he said so cannot be denied; but E. W. says, that I omit what Antoninus adds; that is, I did not transcribe his whole book. But what is it that I should have added? This; "Quamvis ad hoc inducatur illud apostoli, 2 Cor. ii. Si quid donavi vobis, propter vos in persona Christi."—Now to this there needs no answer, but this; that it is nothing to the purpose. 'To whom the Corinthians forgave any thing; to the same person St. Paul for their sakes did forgive also.'—But what then; therefore the Pope and his clergy have power to take off the temporal punishments, which God reserves upon sinners, after he hath forgiven them the temporal? and that the church hath power to forgive sins beforehand, and to set a price upon the basest crimes, and not to forgive, but sell indulgences? and lay up the supernumerary treasures of the saints' good works, and issue them out by retail in the market of purgatory? Because St. Paul caused the Corinthians to be absolved, and restored to the church's peace after a severe penance; so great, that the poor man was in danger of being swallowed up with despair and the subtilties of Satan; does this prove, that therefore all penances may be taken off, when there is no such danger, no such pious and charitable consideration? And yet, besides the inconsequence of all this, St. Paul gave no indulgence, but what the Christian church of Corinth (in which at that time there was no bishop) did first give themselves. Now the indulgence which the people give, will prove but little warrant to what the church of Rome pretends; not only for the former reasons, but also because the primitive church had said nothing expressly concerning indulgences; and therefore did not to any such purpose expound the words of St. Paul; but also because Antoninus himself was not moved by those words, to think they meant any thing of the Roman indulgences; but mentions it as the argument of other persons. Just as if I should write, that there is concerning transubstantiation nothing expressly said in the Scriptures, or in the writings of the ancient fathers; although 'Hoc est corpus meum' be brought in for it: would any man in his wits say, that I am of the opinion, that, in Scripture, there is something express for it, though I expressly deny it? I suppose not.

It appears now that Roffensis and à Castro declared

against the antiquity of indulgences; their own words are the witnesses; and the same is also true of Antoninus; and therefore the first discourse of indulgences, in 'the Dissuasive,' might have gone on prosperously, and needed not to have been interrupted. For if these quotations be true, as is pretended, and as now appears, there is nothing by my adversaries said in defence of indulgences, no pretence of an argument in justification of them; the whole matter is so foul, and yet so notorious, that the novelty of it is plainly acknowledged by their most learned men, and but faintly denied by the bolder people that care not what they say. So that I shall account the main point of indulgences to be (for aught yet appears to the contrary) gained against the church of Rome.

But there is another appendant question, that happens in by the by; nothing to the main inquiry, but a particular instance of the usual ways of earning indulgences, viz. by going in pilgrimages; which very particularly I affirmed to be reproved by the ancient fathers: and particularly by St. Gregory Nyssen, in a book or epistle of his written wholly on this subject (so I said), and so Possevine calls it, 'librum contra peregrinationes;' 'the book against pilgrimages.'—The epistle is large and learned, and greatly dissuasive of Christians from going in pilgrimage to Jerusalem. "Dominus profectionem in Hierosolyma inter recte facta, quæ eò (viz. ad regni cœlorum hæreditatem consequendam) dirigant, non enumeravit; ubi beatitudinem annunciat, tale studium talemque operam non est complexus." And again: "Spiritualem noxam affricat accuratum vitæ genus insistentibus. Non est ista tanto digna studio, imo est vitanda summo opere." And if this was directed principally to such persons, who had chosen to live a solitary and private life; yet that was, because such strict and religious persons were those, whose false show of piety he did, in that instance, reprove; but he reproves it by such arguments all the way, as concern all Christians, but especially women; and answers to an objection made against himself for going; which, he says, he did by command, and public charge, and for the service of the Arabian churches, and that he might confer with the bishops of Palestine. This epistle of St. Gregory Nyssen 'de adeuntibus Hierosolymam' was printed at Paris, in Greek,

by Gulielmus Morellus, and again published in Greek and Latin with a double version by Peter du Moulin, and is acknowledged by Baronius[x] to be legitimate; and therefore there is no denying the truth of the quotation: the author of the Letter had better to have rubbed his forehead hard, and to have answered as Possevine did[y]: "Ab hæreticis prodiit liber sub nomine Gregorii Nysseni:" and Bellarmine, being pinched with it, says, "Forte non est Nysseni; nec scitur quis ille verterit in sermonem Latinum, et forte etiam non invenitur Græce." All which is refuted by their own parties.

That St. Chrysostom was of the same judgment, appears plainly in these few words: "Namque ad impetrandam nostris sceleribus veniam, non pecunias impendere nec aliud aliquid hujusmodi facere: sola sufficit bonæ voluntatis integritas. Non opus est in longinqua peregrinando transire, nec ad remotissimas ire nationes[z]," &c. St. Chrysostom, according to the sense of the other fathers, teaches a religion and repentance wholly reducing us to a good life, a service perfectly consisting in the works of a good conscience. And in the exclusion of other external things, he reckons this of pilgrimages. For, how travelling into foreign countries for pardon of our crimes differs from pilgrimages, I have not been yet taught[a].

The[b] last I mentioned is St. Bernard: his words are these: "It is not necessary for thee to pass over sea, to penetrate the clouds, to go beyond the Alps; there is, I say, no great journey proposed to you; meet God within yourself, for the word is nigh unto thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart[c]," &c. So the author of the latter acknowledges St. Bernard to have said in the place quoted: yea, but says this objector, 'I might as well have quoted Moses, Deut. xiii. 14.' Well, what if I had quoted Moses; had it been ever the worse? But though I did not, yet St. Bernard quoted Moses, and that, it seems, troubled this gentleman. But St. Bernard's words are indeed agreeable to the words of Moses, but not all out

[x] Tom. 4. ad A. D. 386. num. 39.
[y] Lib. 3. de Cultu Sanct. cap. 8. sect. Ad Magdeburgenses.
[z] 1. Homil. in Philom. [a] A. L. p. 9. n. 23.
[b] A. L. ibid. p. 9. num. 24.
[c] Non oportet, ô homo, maria transfretare, nonpenetrare nubes, non transalpinare necesse est. Non grandis, inquam, tibi ostenditur via: usque temet-ipsum occurrere Deo tuo.

the same; for Moses made no prohibition of going to Rome, which I suppose St. Bernard meant by 'transalpinare.'

There remains in A. L.[d] yet one cavil, but it is a question of diligence, and not to the point in hand. The authority of St. Austin I marked under the title of his sermon 'de Martyribus.' But the gentleman, to shew his learning, tells us plainly that "there is but one in St. Austin's works with that title, to wit, his one hundred and seventeenth sermon 'de Diversis,' and in that there is not the least word to any such purpose." All this latter part may be true, but the first is a great mistake; for if the gentleman please to look in the Paris edition of St. Austin, 1571, tom. 10, pag. 277, he shall find the words I have quoted. And whereas he talks of one hundred and seventeen sermons 'de Diversis,' and of one only sermon 'de Martyribus,' I do a little wonder at him to talk so confidently; whereas in the edition I speak of, and which I followed, there are but forty-nine sermons, and seventeen under the title 'de Diversis,' and yet there are six sermons that bear the title 'de Martyribus,' but they are to be found under the title 'de Sanctis;' so that the gentleman looked in the wrong place for his quotation; and if he had not mistaken himself, he could have had no colour for an objection. But for the satisfaction of the reader; the words are these in his third sermon 'de Martyribus Diversis:' "Non dixit 'vade in orientem et quære justitiam; naviga usque ad occidentem, ut accipias indulgentiam.' Dimitte inimico tuo et dimittetur tibi: indulge et indulgetur tibi: da et dabitur tibi; nihil à te extra te quærit. Ad teipsum et ad conscientiam tuam te Deus dirigit. In te enim posuit quod requirit."—But now let it be considered, that all those charges, which are laid against the church of Rome and her greatest doctors respectively in the matter of indulgences, are found to be true; and if so, let the world judge, whether that doctrine and those practices be tolerable in a Christian church.

But that the reader may not be put off with a mere defence of four quotations, I shall add this; that I might have instanced in worse matters made by the popes of Rome to be the pious works, the condition of obtaining indulgences. Such as was the bull of Pope Julius the Second, giving indulgence to him that meeting a Frenchman should kill him, and another for the killing of a Venetian[e]. But we need not

[d] Ibid. num. 25. [e] De Regimine Principum, lib. 3. c. 10. inter opuscula, num. 20.

to wonder at it, since, according to the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas, "we ought to say, that in the Pope is the fulness of all graces; because he alone bestows a full indulgence of all our sins; so that what we say of our chief Prince and Lord (viz. Jesus Christ), does fit him; for 'we all received of his fulness.'" Which words, besides that they are horrid blasphemy, are also a fit principle of the doctrine and use of indulgences to those purposes, and in that evil manner, we complain of in the church of Rome.

I desire this only instance may be added to it, that Pope Paul the Third, he that convened the council of Trent, and Julius the Third, for fear, as I may suppose, the council should forbid any more such follies, for a farewell to this game, gave an indulgence [f] to the fraternity of the sacrament of the altar, or of the blessed body of our Lord Jesus Christ, of such a vastness and unreasonable folly, that it puts us beyond the question of religion, to an inquiry, whether it were not done either in perfect distraction, or, with a worse design, to make religion to be ridiculous, and expose it to a contempt and scorn. The conditions of the indulgence are, either to visit the church of St. Hilary of Chartres, to say a 'Pater Noster' and an 'Ave Mary' every Friday, or, at most, to be present at processions and other divine service upon 'Corpus Christi day.' The gift is as many privileges, indults, exemptions, liberties, immunities, plenary pardons of sins, and other spiritual graces, as were given to the fraternity of the image of our Saviour 'ad Sancta Sanctorum;' the fraternity of the charity and great hospital of St. James in Augusta of St. John Baptist, of St. Cosmus and Damianus; of the Florentine nation, of the hospital of the Holy Ghost in Saxia, of the order of St. Austin and St. Champ, of the fraternities of the said city; of the churches of our Lady 'de populo et verbo:' and all those that were ever given to them that visited these churches: or those which should be ever given hereafter.—A pretty large gift! In which there were so many pardons, quarter-pardons, half-pardons, true pardons, plenary pardons, quarantines, and years of quarantines; that it is a harder thing to number them, than to purchase them. I shall remark in these some particulars to be considered.

1. That a most scandalous and unchristian dissolution and death of all ecclesiastical discipline, is consequent to the

[f] Impress. Paris. per Philippum Hotet. 1550.

making all sin so cheap and trivial a thing; that the horrible demerits and exemplary punishment and remotion of scandal and satisfactions to the church, are indeed reduced to trifling and mock penances. He that shall send a servant with a candle to attend the holy sacrament, when it shall be carried to sick people, or shall go himself; or, if he can neither go nor send, if he say a 'Pater Noster' and an 'Ave;' he shall have a hundred years of true pardon. This is fair and easy. But then,

2. It would be considered what is meant by so many years of pardon, and so many years of true pardon. I know but of one natural interpretation of it; and that it can mean nothing, but that some of the pardons are but fantastical, and not true: and in this I find no fault, save only that it ought to have been said, that all of them are fantastical.

3. It were fit we learned, how to compute four thousand and eight hundred years of quarantines; and remission of a third part of all their sins; for so much is given to every brother and sister of this fraternity, upon Easter-day and eight days after. Now if a brother needs not thus many, it would be considered whether it do not encourage a brother or a frail sister to use all their medicine and to sin more freely, lest so great a gift become useless.

4. And this is so much the more considerable because the gift is vast beyond all imagination. The first four days in Lent they may purchase thirty-three thousand years of pardon, besides a plenary remission of all his sins over and above. The first week of Lent a hundred and three-and-thirty thousand years of pardon, besides five plenary remissions of all their sins, and two third parts besides, and the delivery of one soul out of purgatory. The second week in Lent a hundred and eight-and-fifty thousand years of pardon, besides the remission of all their sins, and a third part besides; and the delivery of one soul. The third week in Lent, eighty thousand years, besides a plenary remission, and the delivery of one soul out of purgatory. The fourth week in Lent, threescore thousand years of pardon, besides a remission of two thirds of all their sins; and one plenary remission and one soul delivered. The fifth week, seventy-nine thousand years of pardon, and the deliverance of two souls, only the two

thousand seven hundred years that are given for the Sunday may be had twice that day, if they will visit the altar twice; and as many quarantines. The sixth week two hundred and five thousand years, besides quarantines; and four plenary pardons. Only on Palm-Sunday, whose portion is twenty-five thousand years, it may be had twice that day. And all this is the price of him that shall, upon these days, visit the altar in the church of St. Hilary. And this runs on to the Fridays, and many festivals and other solemn days in the other parts of the year.

5. Though it may be, that a brother may not need all this, at least at that time; yet that there may be no insecurity, the said popes give to every brother and sister of the fraternity, plenary pardon and indulgence of all their sins thrice in their life, upon what day and hour they please. I suppose that one of the times shall be in the article of death; for that is the surest way for a weak brother. I have read [g], that the popes do not only give remission of sins already committed, but also of such as are to be committed. But whether it be so or no, there is in the bulls of this fraternity as good provision; for he that hath a dormant faculty for a plenary pardon lying by him to be used at what hour he please; hath a bull beforehand for pardon of sins afterward to be committed, when he hath a mind to it.

6. To what purpose is so much waste of the treasure of the church? "Quorsum perditio hæc?" Every brother or sister of this fraternity may have, for so many times visiting the altar aforesaid, fourteen or fifteen plenary pardons. Certainly the popes suppose these persons to be mighty criminals, that they need so many pardons, so many plenaries. But two alls of the same thing is as much as two nothings. But if there were not infinite causes of fear, that very many of them were nullities, and that none of them were of any certain avail, there could be no pretence of reasonableness in dispensing these jewels with so loose a hand, and useless a freedom, as if a man did shovel mustard, or pour hogsheads of vinegar into his friend's mouth, to make him swallow a mouthful of herbs.

7. What is the secret meaning of it, that in divers clauses in their bulls [h] of indulgences, they put in this clause, A par-

[g] Vide Review du Concile de Trent, lib. 5. c. 1. [h] Bull. Julii III. de an Jubil. 1.

don of all their sins, "be they never so heinous." The extraordinary cases reserved to the Pope; and the consequent difficulty of getting pardon of such great sins, because it would cost much more money, was or might be some little restraint to some persons from running easily into the most horrible impieties; but to give such a loose to this little, and this last rein and curb; and by an easy indulgence to take off all, even the most heinous sins, what is it but to give the devil an argument to tempt persons, that have any conscience or fear left, to throw off all fear and to stick at nothing?

8. It seems hard to give a reasonable account, what is meant by giving a plenary pardon of all their sins; and yet, at the same time, an indulgence of twelve thousand years, and as many quarantines; it seems the bounty of the church runs out of a conduit, though the vessels be full, yet the water still continues running and goes into waste.

9. In this great heap of indulgences (and so it is in very many other) power is given to a lay sister or brother to free a soul from purgatory. But if this be so easily granted, the necessity of masses will be very little; what need is there to give greater fees to a physician, when a sick person may be cured with a posset and pepper? The remedy of the way of indulgences is cheap and easy, a servant with a candle, a 'Pater' and an 'Ave,' a going to visit an altar, wearing the scapular of the Carmelites, or the cord of St. Francis: but masses for souls are a dear commodity, fivepence or sixpence is the least a mass will cost in some places; nay, it will stand in ninepence in other places. But then if the Pope can do this trick certainly, then what can be said to John Gerson's question,

Arbitrio Papa proprio si clavibus uti
Possit, cur sinit ut pœna pios cruciet?
Cur non evacuat loca purgandis animabus
Tradita? The answer makes up the tetrastic;
Sed servus esse fidelis amat.

The Pope may be kind, but he must be wise too; 'a faithful and wise steward;' he must not destroy the whole state of the purging church; if he takes away all the fuel from the fire, who shall make the pot boil? This may be done: "Ut possit superesse quos peccasse pœniteat:" sinners must pay for it, in their bodies or their purses.

SECTION II.

Of Purgatory.

THAT the doctrine of purgatory, as it is taught in the Roman church, is a novelty, and a part of their new religion, is sufficiently attested by the words of the Cardinal of Rochester, and Alphonsus à Castro; whose words I now add, that he who pleases, may see how these men would fain impose their new fancies upon the church, under pretence and title of ancient and catholic verities. The words of Roffensis in his eighteenth article against Luther are these[1]: "Legat qui velit, Græcorum veterum commentarios, et nullum, quantum opinor, aut quam rarissimum, de purgatorio sermonem inveniet. Sed neque Latini simul omnes, at sensim hujus rei veritatem conceperunt:"—"He that pleases, let him read the commentaries of the old Greeks, and, as I suppose, he shall find none, or very rare mention or speech of purgatory. But neither did all the Latins at one time, but by little and little, conceive the truth of this thing."—And again: "Aliquandiu incognitum fuit, serò cognitum universæ ecclesiæ. Deinde quibusdam pedetentim, partim ex Scripturis, partim ex revelationibus creditum fuit:" "For somewhile it was unknown; it was but lately known to the catholic church. Then it was believed by some, by little and little; partly from Scripture, partly from revelations."—And this is the goodly ground of the doctrine of purgatory, founded, no

[1] A Letter to a Friend touching Dr. Taylor, sect. 4. n. 26. p. 10. which if the reader please for his curiosity or his recreation to see, he shall find this pleasant passage, of deep learning and subtle observation: "Dr. Taylor had said that Roffensis and Polydore Virgil affirm, that whosoeareheth the writings of the Greek fathers, shall find that none, or very rarely any one of them, ever makes mention of purgatory. Whereas Polydore Virgil affirms no such thing; nor doth Roffensis say, that very rarely any one of them mentions it, but only, that in these ancient writers, he shall find none, or but very rare mention of it." If this man were in his wits when he made this answer (an answer which no man can unriddle, or tell how it opposes the objection), then it is very certain, that if this can pass among the answers to the Protestants' objections, the Papists are in a very great strait, and have very little to say for themselves: and the letter to a friend was written by compulsion, and by the shame of confutation: not of conscience or ingenuous persuasion. No man can be so foolish, as to suppose this fit to be given in answer to any sober discourse; or if there be such pitiful people in the church of Rome, and trusted to write books in defence of their religion; it seems they care not what any man says or proves against them; if the people be but cozened with a pretended answer; for that serves the turn, as well as a wiser.

question, upon tradition apostolical; delivered some hundreds of years indeed after they were dead; but the truth is, because it was forgotten by the apostles, and they having so many things in their heads, when they were alive, wrote and said nothing of it: therefore they took care to send some from the dead, who, by new revelations, should teach this old doctrine. This we may conjecture to be the equivalent sense of the plain words of Roffensis [k]. But the plain words are sufficient without a commentary.

Now for Polydore Virgil, his own words can best tell what he says; the words I have put into the margent[l], because they are many; the sense of them is this. 1. He finds no use of indulgences before the stations of St. Gregory; the consequent of that is, that all the Latin fathers did not receive them before St. Gregory's time; and, therefore, they did not receive them altogether. 2. The matter being so obscure, Polydore chose to express his sense in the testimony of Roffensis. 3. From him he affirms, that the use of indulgences is but new, and lately received amongst Christians. 4. That there is no certainty concerning their original. 5. They report, that, amongst the ancient Latins, there was some use of them: but it is but a report, for he knows nothing of it before St. Gregory's time; and for that also, he hath but a mere report. 6. Amongst the Greeks it is not to this day believed. 7. As long as there was no care of purgatory, no man looked after indulgences; because if you take away purgatory, there is no need of indulgences. 8. That the use of indulgences began, after men had awhile trembled at the torments of purgatory. This, if I understand Latin or common sense, is the doctrine of Polydore Virgil; and to

[k] Lib. 8. cap. 1. de Inven. Rerum.

[l] Ego vero originem quod mei est muneris, quæritans non reperio ante fuisse, quod sciam, quam D. Gregorius ad suas stationes id præmio proposuerit. Quapropter in re parum perspicuâ, utar testimonio Johannis Roffensis episcopi, qui in eo opere quod nuper in Lutherum scripsit, sic de ejusmodi veniarum initio prodit:— Motus fortasse movit indulgentiis istis non usque adeò fidere, quod earum usus in ecclesiâ videatur recentior, et admodum serò apud Christianos repertus. Quibus ego respondeo, non certò constare à quo primum tradi cœperint. Fuit tamen nonnullus earum usus (ut aiunt) apud Romanos vetustissimos, quod ex stationibus intelligi potest et subit. Nemo certe dubitat orthodoxus an purgatorium sit, de quo tamen apud priscos non nulla, vel quam rarissime, fiebat mentio. Sed et Græcis ad hunc usque diem, non est creditum esse: quamdiu enim nulla fuerat de purgatorio cura, nemo quæsivit indulgentias; nam ex illo pendet omnis indulgentiarum existimatio: si tollas purgatorium, quorsum indulgentiis opus erit? cœperunt igitur indulgentiæ, postquam ad purgatorii cruciatus aliquandiu trepidatum est.

him I add also the testimony of Alphonsus à Castro[m]: "De purgatorio fere nulla mentio, potissimum apud Græcos scriptores. Qua de causa, usque ad hodiernum diem, purgatorium non est à Græcis creditum." The consequent of these things is this; If purgatory was not known to the primitive church; if it was but lately known to the catholic church; if the fathers seldom or never make mention of it; if, in the Greek church especially, there was so great silence of it, that to this very day it is not believed amongst the Greeks; then this doctrine was not an apostolical doctrine, not primitive, nor catholic, but an innovation and of yesterday.

And this is of itself (besides all these confessions of their own parties) a suspicious matter, because the church of Rome does establish their doctrine of purgatory upon the ancient use of the church of praying for the dead. But this consequence of theirs is wholly vain; because all the fathers did pray for the dead, yet they never prayed for their deliverance out of purgatory, nor ever meant it. To this it is thus objected; "It is confessed that they prayed for them that God would shew them a mercy.—Now, mark well; if they be in heaven, they have a mercy, the sentence is given for eternal happiness. If in hell, they are wholly destitute of mercy; unless there be a third place, where mercy can be shewed them[n]:" I have, according to my order, 'marked it well;' but find nothing in it to purpose. For though the fathers prayed for the souls departed that God would shew them mercy; yet it was, that God would shew them mercy in the day of judgment; "in that formidable and dreadful day, then there is need of much mercy unto us,"—saith St. Chrysostom. And, methinks, this gentleman should not have made use of so pitiful an argument, and would not, if he had considered that St. Paul prayed for Onesiphorus, "that God would shew him a mercy in that day;" that is, in the day of judgment, as generally interpreters ancient and modern do understand it, and particularly St. Chrysostom now cited. The faithful departed are in the hands of Christ as soon as they die, and they are very well; and the souls of the wicked are where it pleases God to appoint them to be, tormented by a fearful expectation of the revelation of the day of judgment; but heaven

[m] Lib. 4. verb. Indul. vide etiam lib. 12. lib. Purgatorium.
[n] E. W. Truth will Out, chap. 3. p. 23.

and hell are reserved till the day of judgment; and the devils themselves are "reserved in chains of darkness unto the judgment of the great day," saith St. Jude[o]; and in that day they shall be sentenced, and so shall all the wicked, to everlasting fire, which, as yet, is but prepared for the devil and his angels for ever. But is there no mercy to be shewed to them, unless they be in purgatory? Some of the ancients speak of visitation of angels to be imparted to the souls departed; and the hastening of the day of judgment is a mercy; and the avenging of the martyrs upon their adversaries is a mercy, for which the "souls under the altar pray," saith St. John in the Revelation; and the Greek fathers speak of a fiery trial at the day of judgment, through which every one must pass; and there will be great need of mercy. And after all this; there is a remission of sins proper to this world, when God so pardons, that he gives the grace of repentance, that he takes his judgments off from us, that he gives us his Holy Spirit to mortify our sins, that he admits us to work in his laboratory, that he sustains us by his power, and promotes us by his grace, and stands by us favourably, while we work out our salvation with fear and trembling; and at last he crowns us with perseverance. But, at the day of judgment, there shall be a pardon of sins, that will crown this pardon; when God shall pronounce us pardoned before all the world; and when Christ shall actually and presentially rescue us from all the pains, which our sins have deserved; even from everlasting pain: and that is the final pardon, for which, till it be accomplished, all the faithful do night and day pray incessantly: although to many for whom they do pray, they friendly believe that it is now certain, that they shall then be glorified. "Sæpissime petuntur illa, quæ certo sciuntur eventura ut petuntur, et hujus rei plurima sunt testimonia," said Alphonsus à Castro[p]: and so also Medina[q] and Bellarmine[r] acknowledge. The thing is true, they say; but if it were not, yet we find, that, 'de facto,' they do pray, "Domine Jesu Christe, rex gloriæ, libera animas fidelium defunctorum de pœnis inferni, et de profundo lacu: libera eos de ore leonis, ne absorbeat eos Tartarus, ne cadant in obscurum." So it is

[o] Ver. 6.
[p] Contr. Hæres. lib. 12. tit. Purgator.
[q] Jo. Medina de Pœnit. tract. 6. q. 6. Cod. de Oratione.
[r] Bellar. de Purgat. lib. 2. cap. 5.

in the masses 'pro defunctis[s].'—And, therefore, this gentleman talking that in heaven all is remitted, and in hell nothing is forgiven, and from hence to conclude that there is no avoiding of purgatory, is too hasty a conclusion: let him stay till he comes to heaven, and the final sentence is past, and then he will, if he finds it to be so, have reason to say what he does; but by that time the dream of purgatory will be out; and, in the meantime, let him strive to understand his mass-book better. St. Austin thought he had reason to pray for pardon and remission for his mother; for the reasons already expressed, though he never thought his mother was in purgatory. It was upon consideration of the dangers of every soul that dies in Adam; and yet he affirms, she was even before her death alive unto Christ. And therefore she did not die miserable, nor did she die at all, said her son: "Hoc et documentis ejus morum, et fide non ficta, rationibus certis tenebamus[t];" and when he did pray for her; "Credo jam feceris quod te rogo, sed voluntaria oris mei approba, Domine:" which will yet give another answer to this confident gentleman; St. Austin prayed for pardon for his mother, and "did believe the thing was done already; but he prayed to God to approve that voluntary oblation of his mouth." So that now all the objection is vanished; St. Austin prayed, besides many other reasons, to manifest his kindness, not for any need she had. But after all this, was not St. Monica a saint? Is she not put in the Roman calendar, and the 4th of May appointed for her festival? And do saints, do canonized persons, use to go to purgatory? But let it be as it will, I only desire that this be remembered against a good time; that here it is confessed, that prayers were offered for a saint departed. I fear it will be denied by and by.

But, 2. The fathers made prayers for those, who, by the confession of all sides, never were in purgatory; for the patriarchs, apostles, &c. and especially for the blessed Virgin Mary; this is a direct and perfect overthrow of the Roman doctrine of purgatory: and therefore, if it can be made good, they have no probability left, upon the confidence of which they can plausibly pretend to purgatory. I have already[u] offered something in proof of this, which I shall now

[s] Vide Missam in Commemorationem omnium Defunctorum.
[t] Confess. lib. 9. cap. 12, 13. [u] Letter, pag. 11. n. 31.

review, and confirm fully. I begin with that of Durandus, whom I alleged as confessing that "they offered [x]" for the patriarchs, and prophets, and the blessed Virgin: I intend him for no more; for true it is, he denies that the church prayed for them, but that they communicated and offered sacrifice for them, even for the blessed Virgin Mary herself, this he grants. I have alleged him a little out of the order, because observing where Durandus and the Roman doctors are mistaken, and with what boldness they say, that 'offering' for them is only 'giving thanks,' and that the Greek fathers did only offer for them eucharists, but no prayers; I thought it fit first to reprove that initial error, viz. "that 'communicantes, et offerentes pro sanctis' is not prayer;" and then to make it clear that they did really pray for mercy, for pardon, for a place of rest, for eternal glory for them who were never in purgatory; for it is a great ignorance to suppose, that when it is said, the sacrifice or oblation is offered, it must mean only thanksgiving. For it is called in St. Dionysius, εὐχαριστήριος εὐχὴ, 'a eucharistical prayer;' and the Lord's supper is a sacrifice 'in genere orationis,' and by themselves is intended as propitiatory for the quick and dead. And St. Cyprian [y], speaking of bishops being made executors of testaments, saith, "Si quis hoc fecisset, non offerretur pro eo, nec sacrificium pro dormitione ejus celebratur. Neque enim ad altare Dei meretur nominari in sacerdotum prece, qui ab altari sacerdotes avocare voluit."—Where 'offerre' and 'celebrare sacrificium pro dormitione' is done 'sacerdotum prece,' it is the oblation and sacrifice of prayer: and St. Cyprian presently after joins them together, 'pro dormitione ejus oblatio aut deprecatio.' And if we look at the forms in the old Roman liturgy, used in the day of Pope Innocent the Third, we shall find this well expounded, "prosit huic sancto vel illi talis oblatio ad gloriam." They offered, but the offering itself was not eucharistical but deprecatory. And so it is also in the Armenian liturgy published at Cracow: "Per hanc etiam oblationem da æternam pacem omnibus, qui nos præcesserunt in fide Christi, sanctibus patribus, patriarchis, apos-

[x] But then it is to be remembered, that they made prayers, and offered for those who, by the confession of all sides, were never in purgatory: so we find in Epiphanius, St. Cyril, the canon of the Greeks, and so (viz. that they offered) is acknowledged by their own Durandus. Dissuasive, p. 27. line 30, &c. Lib. 2. de Ritibus, cap. 35.

[y] Lib. 1. epist. 9.

tolis, prophetis, martyribus," &c. which testimony does not only evince, that the offering sacrifices and oblation for the saints, did signify praying for them; but that this they did for all saints whatsoever. And concerning St. Chrysostom, that which Sixtus Senensis[a] says is material to this very purpose: "Et in liturgia divini sacrificii ab eo edita, et in variis homiliis ab eodem approbatis, conscripsit formulam precandi et offerendi; pro omnibus fidelibus, defunctis, et præcipue pro animabus beatorum, in hæc verba; Offerimus tibi rationalem hunc cultum pro in fide requiescentibus patribus, patriarchis, prophetis, apostolis, et martyribus," &c. By which confession it is acknowledged, not only that the church prayed for apostles and martyrs, but that they intended to do so, when they offered the sacramental oblations; 'offerimus' is 'offerimus tibi preces.' Now since it is so, I had advantage enough in the confession of their own Durandus, that he acknowledged so much, that the church offered sacrifice for saints. Now though he presently kicked this down with his foot, and denied that they prayed for saints departed; I shall yet more clearly convince him and all the Roman contradictors of their bold and unreasonable error in this affair. Epiphanius[a] is the first I mentioned as a witness; but because I cited no words of his, and my adversaries have cited them for me, but imperfectly, and left out the words where the argument lies, I shall set them down at length. "Καὶ γὰρ δικαίων ποιούμεθα τὴν μνήμην καὶ ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτωλῶν, &c. "We make mention of the just and of sinners; for sinners, that we may implore the mercy of God for them. For the just, the fathers, the patriarchs, the prophets, evangelists, and martyrs, confessors, bishops, and anchorets, that prosecuting the Lord Jesus Christ with a singular honour, we separate these from the rank of other men, and give due worship to his divine majesty, while we account that he is not to be made equal to mortal men, κἂν τε μυρία καὶ ἐπέκεινα ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ ὑπάρχῃ ἕκαστος ἀνθρώπων, although they had a thousand times more righteousness than they have." Now first here is mention made of all in their prayers and oblations, and yet no mention made that the church prays for one sort, and only gives thanks for the other; as these gentlemen the objectors[b] falsely pre-

[a] Lib. 6. Biblioth. Annot. 47. [a] Hæres. 75.
[b] Letter, p. 10. Truth will Out, p. 25.

tend. But here is a double separation made of the righteous departed; one is from the worser sort of sinners, the other from the most righteous Saviour. True it is, they believed they had more need to pray for some than for others; but if they did not pray for all, when they made mention of all, how did they honour Christ by separating their condition from his? Is it not lawful to give thanks for the life and death, for the resurrection, holiness, and glorification, of Christ? And if the church only gave thanks for the departed saints, and did not pray for mercy for them too, how are not the saints in this made equal to Christ? So that I think the testimony of Epiphanius is clear and pertinent: to which greater light is given by the words of St. Austin [c]; "Who is he for whom no man prays, but only he who intercedes for all men?" viz. our blessed Lord. And there is more light yet, by the example of St. Austin, who though he did most certainly believe his mother to be a saint, and the church of Rome believes so too, yet he prayed for pardon for her. Now by this it was that Epiphanius separated Christ from the saints departed, for he could not mean any thing else; and because he was then writing against Aerius, who did not deny it to be lawful to give God thanks for the saints departed, but affirmed it to be needless to pray for them, viz. he must mean this of the church's praying for all her dead, or else he had said nothing against his adversary, or for his own cause.

St. Cyril, though he be confidently denied [d] to have said what he did say, yet is confessed to have said these words; "Then we pray for the deceased fathers and bishops, and finally, for all who among us have departed this life. Believing it to be a very great help of the souls, for which is offered the obsecration of the holy and dreadful sacrifice [e]."—If St. Cyril means what his words signify, then the church did pray for departed saints; for they prayed for all the departed fathers and bishops, and it is hard if amongst them there were no saints: but suppose that, yet if there were any saints at all that died out of the militant church, yet the case is the same; for they prayed for all the departed: and, 2. They offered the dreadful sacrifice for them all. 3. They offered it for all in

[c] In Psal. xxxvi. Conc. 2. tom. 8. p. 120.
[d] A. L. p. 11.
[e] Mysta. Catech. 5.

the way of prayer. 4. And they believed this to be a great help to souls. Now, unless the souls of all saints that died, then went to purgatory (which I am sure the Roman doctors dare not own), the case is plain, that prayer and not thanksgivings only were offered by the ancient church for souls, who, by the confession of all sides, never went to purgatory; and therefore praying for the dead is but a weak argument to prove purgatory. Nicolaus Cabasilas hath an evasion from all this, as he supposes; for ὑπὲρ (which is the word used in the memorials of saints) does not always signify 'praying for one,' but it may signify 'giving of thanks:' this is true, but it is to no purpose; for whenever it is said δεόμεθα ὑπὲρ τοῦ δεῖνα 'we pray for such a one,' that must signify, to pray for, and not to give thanks, and that is our present case: and therefore no escape here can be made. The words of St. Cyril are very plain.

The third allegation is of the canon of the Greeks; which is so plain, evident, and notorious, and so confessed, even by these gentlemen and objectors, that I will be tried by the words, which the author of the Letter acknowledges. So it is in the liturgy of St. James; "Remember all orthodox, from Abel the just unto this day; make them to rest in the land of the living, in thy kingdom, and the delights of Paradise." —Thus far this gentleman quoted St. James; and I wonder, that he should urge a conclusion manifestly contrary to his own allegation. Did all the orthodox from Abel to that day go to purgatory? Certainly Abraham, and Moses, and Elias, and the blessed Virgin, did not, and St. Stephen did not, and the apostles that died before this liturgy was made, did not, and yet the church prayed for all orthodox, "prayed that they might rest in the land of the living," &c. and therefore they prayed for such, which, by the confession of all sides, never went to purgatory. In the other liturgies also, the gentleman sets down words enough to confute himself, as the reader may see in the Letter, if it be worth the reading. But because he sets down what he list, and makes breaches and rabbit-holes to pop in as he please, I shall for the satisfaction of the reader set down the full sense and practice of the Greek canon in this question.

And first, for St. James's liturgy (which, being merrily disposed and dreaming of advantage by it, he is pleased to

call the mass of St. James), Sixtus Senensis [f] gives this account of it; "James the apostle, in the liturgy of the divine sacrifice, prays for the souls of saints resting in Christ, so that he shews they are not yet arrived at the place of expected blessedness. But the form of the prayer is after this manner; 'Domine Deus noster,' &c. 'O Lord our God, remember all the orthodox, and them that believe rightly in the faith, from Abel the just unto this day. Make them to rest in the region of the living, in thy kingdom, in the delights of Paradise, in the bosom of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, our holy fathers; from whence are banished grief, sorrow, and sighing, where the light of thy countenance is president and perpetually shines.'"

In the liturgy of St. Basil [g], which he is said to have made for the churches of Syria, is this prayer; "Be mindful, O Lord, of them which are dead and departed out of this life, and of the orthodox bishops, which, from Peter and James the apostles unto this day, have clearly professed the right word of faith, and namely, of Ignatius, Dionysius, Julius, and the rest of the saints, of worthy memory." Nay, not only for these, but they pray for the very martyrs: "O Lord, remember them who have resisted (or stood) unto blood for religion, and have fed thy holy flock with righteousness and holiness." Certainly this is not giving thanks for them, or praying to them, but a direct praying for them, even for holy bishops, confessors, martyrs, that God (meaning in much mercy) would remember them, that is, make them to rest in the bosom of Abraham, in the region of the living, as St. James expresses it.

And in the liturgies of the churches of Egypt attributed to St. Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, and St. Cyril, the churches pray, "Be mindful, O Lord, of thy saints, vouchsafe to receive all thy saints, which have pleased thee from the beginning, our holy fathers, patriarchs, prophets, apostles, martyrs, confessors, preachers, evangelists, and all the souls of the just which have died in the faith, but chiefly, of the holy, glorious, and perpetual Virgin Mary the mother of God, of St. John Baptist the forerunner and martyr, St. Stephen the first deacon and first martyr, St. Mark, apostle, evangelist, and martyr."

[f] Biblioth. Sanct. lib. 6. annot. 345. sect. Jacob. Apostolus.
[g] Basilii ἀναφορὰ ab Andrea Masio ex Syriaco conversa.

Of the same spirit were all the ancient liturgies or missals, and particularly that under the name of St. Chrysostom is most full to this purpose: "Let us pray to the Lord for all, that before-time have laboured and performed the holy offices of priesthood: for the memory and remission of sins of them that built this holy house, and of all them that have slept in hope of the resurrection and eternal life in thy society: of the orthodox fathers and our brethren. Φιλάνθρωπε Κύριε, συγχώρησον, 'O thou lover of men, pardon them.'"—And again: "Moreover we offer unto thee this reasonable service for all that rest in faith, our ancestors, fathers, patriarchs, prophets, and apostles, preachers, evangelists, martyrs, &c. especially the most holy and unspotted Virgin Mary;" and after concludes with this prayer: "Remember them all who have slept in hope of resurrection to eternal life, and make them to rest where the light of thy countenance looks over them."—Add to these, if you please, the Greek mass of St. Peter: "To them, O Lord, and to all that rest in Christ, we pray that thou indulge a place of refreshing light and peace."—So that nothing is clearer, than that, in the Greek canon, they prayed for the souls of the best of all the saints, whom yet because no man believes they ever were in purgatory; it follows, that prayer for the dead used by the ancients, does not prove the Roman purgatory.

To these add the doctrine and practice of the Greek fathers: Dionysius[h] speaking of a person deceased, whom the ministers of the church had publicly pronounced to be a happy man, and verily admitted into the society of the saints that have been from the beginning of the world, yet the bishop prayed for him, "that God would forgive him all the sins, which he had committed through human infirmity, and bring him into the light and region of the living, into the bosoms of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, where pain and sorrow and sighing have no place." To the same purpose is that of St. Gregory Nazianzen[i], in his funeral oration upon his brother Cæsarius, of whom he had expressly declared his belief, that he was "rewarded with those honours which did befit a new-created soul;" yet he presently prays for his soul, "Now, O Lord, receive Cæsarius." I hope I have said enough concerning the Greek church, their doctrine, and

[h] Eccles. Hier. cap. 7. in Theoria. [i] Naz. in Funer. Cæsarii, orat. 10.

practice, in this particular: and I desire it may be observed, that there is no greater testimony of the doctrine of a church than their liturgy. Their doctors may have private opinions, which are not against the doctrine of the church; but what is put into their public devotions, and consigned in their liturgies, no man scruples it, but it is the confession and religion of the church.

But now that I may make my reader some amends for his trouble in reading the trifling objections of these Roman adversaries, and my defences; I shall also, for the greater conviction of my adversaries, shew, that they would not have opposed my affirmation in this particular, if they had understood their own mass-book; for it was not only thus from the beginning until now in the Greek church, but it is so to this very day in the Latin church. In the old Latin missal [k] we have this prayer; "Suscipe, sancta Trinitas, hanc oblationem, quam tibi offerimus pro omnibus in tui nominis confessione defunctis, ut, te dextram auxilii tui porrigente, vitæ perennis requiem habeant, et à pœnis impiorum segregati semper in tuæ laudis lætitia perseverent." And in the very canon of the mass, which these gentlemen, I suppose (if they be priests), cannot be ignorant in any part of, they pray, "Memento, Domine, famulorum famularumque tuarum, qui nos præcesserunt cum signo fidei, et dormiunt in somno pacis. Ipsis, Domine, et omnibus in Christo quiescentibus, locum refrigerii, lucis et pacis, ut indulgeas deprecamur." Unless all that are at rest in Christ, go to purgatory, it ispla in that the church of Rome prays for saints, who, by the confession of all sides, never were in purgatory. I could bring many more testimonies, if they were needful; but I sum up this particular with the words of St. Austin [l]: "Non sunt prætermittendæ supplicationes pro spiritibus mortuorum, quas faciendas pro omnibus in Christiana et catholica societate defunctis, etiam tacitis nominibus quorumque, sub generali commemoratione suscepit ecclesia."—The church prays for all persons that died in the Christian and catholic faith. And therefore I wonder how it should drop from St. Austin's pen [m], "Injuriam facit martyri, qui orat pro martyre." But I suppose, he meant it only in case the prayer was made for them,

[k] Missa Latina antiqua edit. Argentinæ, 1557. pag. 52.
[l] De Cura pro Mortuis, cap. 4. [m] De Verbis Apostoli, serm. 17.

as if they were in an uncertain state, and so it is probable enough; but else his words were not only against himself in other places, but against the whole practice of the ancient catholic church. I remember that when it was asked of Pope Innocent by the Archbishop of Lyons [n], why the prayer, —that was in the old missal for the soul of Pope Leo, "Annue nobis, Domine, *animæ* famuli tui Leonis hæc prosit oblatio," came to be changed into "Annue nobis, Domine, *ut intercessione*, famuli tui Leonis hæc prosit oblatio;" Pope Innocent answered him, that who changed it or when, he knew not; but he knew how, that is, he knew the reason of it, because 'the authority of the Holy Scripture said, he does injury to a martyr that prays for a martyr,' the same thing is to be done for the like reason concerning all other saints.—The good man had heard the saying some where; but being little used to the Bible, he thought it might be there, because it was a pretty saying. However, though this change was made in the mass-books, and prayer for the soul of St. Leo, was changed into a prayer to St. Leo [o]; and the doctors went about to defend it as well as they could, yet because they did it so pitifully, they had reason to be ashamed of it; and in the missal reformed by order of the council of Trent, it is put out again, and the prayer for St. Leo put in again [p], "that by these offices of holy atonement" (viz. the celebration of the holy sacrament), "a blessed reward may accompany him, and the gifts of thy grace may be obtained for us."

Another argument was used in the Dissuasive, against the Roman doctrine of purgatory, viz. How is purgatory a primitive and catholic doctrine, when generally the Greek and many of the Latin fathers taught, that the souls departed, in some exterior place, expect the day of judgment; but that no soul enters into the supreme heaven, or the place of eternal bliss, till the day of judgment: but at that day, say many of them, all must pass through the universal fire? To these purposes respectively the words of very many fathers are brought by Sixtus Senensis; to all which being so evident and apparent, the gentlemen [q] that write against the

[n] Sacramentarium Gregor. antiquum.

[o] Vide Missal. Roman. Paris, 1529. Cap. cum Marthæ. Extrav. de Celebrat. Missarum in Glossâ.

[p] Missale Rom. in decreto Concil. Trid. restit. in festo S. Leonis.

[q] Letter to a Friend, p. 12.

Dissuasive are pleased not to say one word, but have left the whole fabric of the Roman purgatory to shift for itself against the battery of so great authorities; only one of them, striving to find some fault, says, that the Dissuader quotes Sixtus Senensis, as saying, "that Pope John the Twenty-second not only taught and declared the doctrine (that before the day of judgment the souls of men are kept in certain receptacles), but commanded it to be held by all, as saith Adrian 'in 4. sent.' when Sixtus Senensis saith not so of Pope John, &c. but only reports the opinion of others." —To which I answer, that I did not quote Senensis as saying any such thing of his own authority. For besides that in the body of the discourse there is no mention at all of John the Twenty-second in the margent, also it is only said of Sixtus, "Enumerat S. Jacobum apostolum—et Johannem pontif. Rom.[r];" but I add of my own afterward, that Pope John not only taught and declared that sentence, but commanded it to be held by all men, as saith Adrian. Now although in his narrative of it, Adrian begins with "Novissime fertur," "It is reported," yet Senensis himself when he had said, "Pope John is said to have decreed this;" he himself adds, that Ocham and Pope Adrian are witnesses of this decree. 2. Adrian is so far a witness of it, that he gives the reason of the same, even because the university of Paris refused to give promotion to them, who denied, or did refuse to promise for ever, to cleave to that opinion. 3. Ocham is so fierce a witness of it, that he wrote against Pope John the Twenty-second for the opinion. 4. Though Senensis be not willing to have it believed; yet all that he can say against it, is, that "apud probatos scriptores non est undequaque certum." 5. Yet he brings not one testimony out of antiquity, against this charge against Pope John: only he says, that Pope Benedict the Eleventh affirms, that John being prevented by death, could not finish the decree. 6. But this thing was not done in a corner, the acts of the university of Paris and their fierce adhering to the decree, were too notorious. 7. And after all this, it matters not whether it be so or no, when it is confessed, that so many ancient fathers expressly teach the doctrine contrary to the Roman, as it is this day, and yet

[r] And these are the words of Senensis concerning Pope John XXII. and Pope Adrian.

the Roman doctors care not what they say, insomuch that St. Bernard having fully and frequently taught, "that no souls go to heaven till they all go, neither the saints without the common people, nor the spirit without the flesh; that there are three states of souls, one in the tabernacles (viz. of our bodies); a second, in 'atriis' or outward courts; and a third, in the house of God;" Alphonsus à Castro admonishes that this sentence is damned; and Sixtus Senensis[s] adds these words, "which thing also I do not deny; yet I suppose he ought to be excused 'ob ingentem numerum illustrium ecclesiæ patrum,' 'for the great number of the illustrious fathers of the church,' who before by their testimony did seem to give authority to this opinion."

But that the present doctrine of the Roman purgatory is but a new article of faith, is therefore certain, because it was no article of faith in St. Austin's time, for he doubted of it. And to this purpose I quoted in the margent two places of St. Austin[t]. The words I shall now produce, because they will answer for themselves. In the sixty-eighth chapter of his Manual to Laurentius, he takes from the church of Rome their best armour in which they trusted, and expounds the words of St. Paul[u], "He shall be saved, yet so as by fire," to mean only the loss of such pleasant things, as most delighted them in this world. And, in the beginning of the next chapter, he adds[x], "that such a thing may also be done after this life, is not incredible; and whether it be so or no it may be inquired, 'et aut inveniri aut latere,' 'and either be found or lie hid.'"—Now what is that which thus may or may not be found out? This; that "some faithful, by how much more or less they loved perishing goods, by so much sooner or later they shall be saved by a certain purgatory-fire." This is it which St. Austin says "is not incredible, only it may be inquired whether it be so or no." And if these be not the words of doubting, "it is not incredible, such a thing may be,—it may be inquired after,—it may be found to be so,—or it may never be found, but lie hid," then words signify nothing.—Yea 'but the doubting of St. Austin does not relate to the matter or question of purgatory, but

[s] Annot. 345. [t] Enchirid. cap. 68, 69. [u] 1 Cor. iii.

[x] Tale aliquid etiam post hanc vitam fieri incredibile non est, et utrum ita sit quæri potest.

to the manner of the particular punishment, viz. "Whether or no that pain of being troubled for the loss of their goods, "be not a part of the purgatory-flames[y]?" says E. W.—A goodly excuse! as if St. Austin had troubled himself with such an impertinent question, whether the poor souls, in their infernal flames, be not troubled that they left their lands and money behind them? Indeed it is possible, they might wish some of the waters of their springs or fish-ponds to cool their tongues: but St. Austin surely did not suspect that the tormented ghosts were troubled, they had not brought their best clothes with them, and money in their purses; this is too pitiful and strained an answer; the case being so evidently clear, that the thing St. Austin doubted of was, since there was to some of the faithful,—who yet were too voluptuous, or covetous persons,—a purgatory in this world, even the loss of their goods which they so loved; and therefore being lost so grieved for, whether or no they should not also meet with another purgatory after death: that is, whether, besides the punishment suffered here, they should not be punished after death: how? by grieving for the loss of their goods? Ridiculous! What then, St. Austin himself tells us, "By so much as they loved their goods more or less, by so much sooner or later they shall be saved." And what he said of this kind of sin, viz. too much worldliness, with the same reason he might suppose of others; this he thought possible, but of this he was not sure, and therefore it was not then an article of faith; and though now the church of Rome hath made it so, yet it appears that it was not so from the beginning, but is part of their new-fashioned faith. And E. W. striving so impossibly, and so weakly, to avoid the pressure of this argument, should do well to consider, whether he have not more strained his conscience, than the words of St. Austin. But this matter must not pass thus. St. Austin repeats this whole passage 'verbatim' in his answer to the eighth question of Dulcitius, quest. 1.; and still answers in this and other appendant questions of the same nature, viz. Whether prayers for the dead be available, &c. quest. 2. And whether, upon the instant of Christ's appearing, he will pass to judgment, quest. 3. "In these things which we have described, our and the infirmity of others

[y] E. W. p. 28.

may be so exercised and instructed, nevertheless that they pass not for canonical authority[z]." And in the answer to the first question, he speaks in the style of a doubtful person: "Whether men suffer such things in this life only, or also such certain judgments follow even after this life, this understanding of this sentence, is not, as I suppose, abhorrent from truth." The same words he also repeats in his book 'de Fide et Operibus,' chap. 16. There is yet another place of St. Austin, in which it is plain he still is a doubting person in the question of purgatory. His sense is this[a]: "After the death of the body until the resurrection, if, in the interval, the spirits of the dead are said to suffer that kind of fire, which they feel not, who had not such manners and loves in their life-time, that their wood, hay, and stubble, ought to be consumed; but others feel who brought such buildings along with them, whether there only, or whether here and there, or whether therefore here that it might not be there, that they feel a fire of a transitory tribulation burning their secular buildings (though escaping from damnation), I reprove it not; for peradventure it is true." So St. Austin's 'peradventure yea,' is always, 'peradventure nay;' and will the bigots of the Roman church be content with such a confession of faith as this of St. Austin in the present article? I believe not.

But now after all this, I will not deny but St. Austin was much inclined to believe purgatory-fire, and therefore I shall not trouble myself to answer these citations to that purpose, which Bellarmine and from him the transcribers bring out of this father, though most of them are drawn out of apocryphal, spurious, and suspected pieces, as his homilies "de Sacris Scripturis," &c. yet that which I urge is this;—that St. Austin did not esteem this to be a doctrine of the church, no article of faith, but a disputable opinion; and though he did incline to the wrong part of the opinion, yet it is very certain that he sometimes speaks expressly against this doctrine, and, other times, speaks things absolutely inconsistent with the opinion of purgatory, which is more than an argument of his confessed doubting; for it is a declaration that he understood nothing certain in this affair, but that the contrary to his opinion was the more probable. And this appears

[z] De octo quæst. Dulcit. qu. 3. [a] S. Aug. de Civit. Dei, lib. 21. cap. 26.

in these few following words. St. Austin hath these words [b]; "Some suffer temporary punishments in this life only, others after death, others both now and then:" Bellarmine, and from him Diaphanta, urges this as a great proof of St. Austin's doctrine. But he destroys it in the words immediately following, and makes it useless to the hypothesis of the Roman church; "This shall be, before they suffer the last and severest judgment;" meaning, as St. Austin frequently does such sayings, of the general conflagration at the end of the world. But whether he does so or no, yet he adds [c]; "But all of them come not into the everlasting punishments, which, after the judgment, shall be to them who after death suffer the temporary." By which doctrine of St. Austin, viz. that those who are in his purgatory, shall, many of them, be damned; and the temporary punishments, after death, do but usher in the eternal, after judgment; he destroys the salt of the Roman fire, who imagines that all that go to purgatory, shall be saved: therefore this testimony of St. Austin, as it is nothing for the avail of the Roman purgatory, so by the appendage it is much against it, which Coquæus, Torrensis, and especially Cardinal Perron, observing, have most violently corrupted these words, by falsely translating them. So Perron; "Tous ceux, qui souffrent des peines temporelles apres la mort, ne viennent pas aux peines eternelles, qui auront tien apres le jugement;" which reddition is expressly against the sense of St. Austin's words.

2. But another hypothesis there is in St. Austin to which, without dubitation he does peremptorily adhere, which I before intimated, viz. that although he admit of purgatory-pains after this life, yet none but such as shall be at the day of judgment: "Whoever therefore desires to avoid the eternal pains, let him be not only baptized, but also justified in Christ, and truly pass from the devil unto Christ. But let him not think that there shall be any purgatory-pains but before that last and dreadful judgment [d]:" meaning, not only that there shall be none to cleanse them after the day of judgment, but that then, at the approach of that day, the general fire shall try and purge: and so himself declares his

[b] De Civit. Dei, lib. 21. c. 13. [c] Ibid.

[d] Purgatorias autem pœnas nullas futuras opinetur, nisi ante illud ultimum tremendumque judicium. Cap. 16. in Psal. vi.

own sense: "All they that have not Christ in the foundation, are argued or reproved;" when? "In the day of judgment; but they that have Christ in the foundation are changed, that is, purged, who build upon this foundation wood, hay, stubble." So that, in the day of judgment, the trial and escape shall be; for then shall the trial and the condemnation be. But yet more clear are his words in other places[e]: "So, at the setting of the sun, that is, at the end (viz. of the world), the day of judgment is signified by that fire, dividing the carnal which are to be saved by fire, and those who are to be damned in the fire;" nothing is plainer than that St. Austin understood that those, who are to be saved so as by fire, are to be saved by passing through the fire at the day of judgment; that was his opinion of purgatory. And again: "Out of these things which are spoken, it seems more evidently to appear that there shall be certain purgatory pains of some persons in that judgment. For what thing else can be understood, where it is said, Who shall endure the day of his coming?" &c.

3. St. Austin speaks things expressly against the doctrine of purgatory: "Know ye, that when the soul is plucked from the body, presently it is placed in Paradise, according to its good deservings; or else, for her sins, is thrown headlong 'in inferni Tartara,' 'into the hell of the damned;'" for I know not well how else to render it[f]. And again: "The soul retiring is received by angels, and placed either in the bosom of Abraham, if she be faithful,—or in the custody of the infernal prison, if it be sinful, until the appointed day comes, in which she shall receive her body:" pertinent to which is that of St. Austin, if he be the author of that excellent book 'de Ecclesiæ Dogmatibus,' which is imputed to him: "After the ascension of our Lord to the heavens, the souls of all the saints are with Christ, and going from the body go unto Christ, expecting the resurrection of their body[g]."

But I shall insist no further upon these things; I suppose it very apparent, that St. Austin was no way confident of his fancy of purgatory, and that if he had fancied right, yet it was not the Roman purgatory that he fancied. There

[e] De Civit. Dei, lib. 16. c. 24. et lib. 20. c. 25.

[f] Aug. tom. 9. de Vanitate Sæculi, c. 1. et de Consolatione Mortuorum, serm. 2. cap. 1.

[g] De Dogmat. Eccles. cap. 79. Aut Augustini aut Gennadii.

is only one objection which I know of, which when I have cleared, I shall pass on to other things. St. Austin, speaking of such who have lived a middle kind of an indifferent pious life, saith, "Constat autem," &c. "But it is certain that such before the day of judgment being purged by temporal pains which their spirits suffer, when they have received their bodies, shall not be delivered to the punishment of eternal fire:"—here is a positive determination of the article, by a word of confidence, and a full certificate; and therefore, St. Austin in this article was not a doubting person.—To this I answer, It may be he was confident here, but it lasted not long; this fire was made of straw, and soon went out; for within two chapters after, he expressly doubts, as I have proved. 2. These words may refer to the purgatory-fire at the general conflagration of the world; and if they be so referred, it is most agreeable to his other sentiments. 3. This 'constat,' or decretory phrase, and some lines before or after it, are not in the old books of Bruges and Colein, nor in the copies printed at Friburg; and Ludovicus Vives[h] supposes they were a marginal note crept since into the text. Now this objection being removed, there remains no ground to deny, that St. Austin was a doubting person in the article of purgatory. And this Erasmus expressly affirmed of him; and the same is said of him by Hofmeister[i], but modestly; and against his doubting in his 'Enchiridion,' he brings only a testimony in behalf of prayer for the dead, which is nothing to the purpose; and this is also sufficiently noted by Alphonsus à Castro[k], and by Barnesius. Well! but suppose St. Austin did doubt of purgatory?—This is no warranty to the church of England, for she does not doubt of it as St. Austin did, but plainly condemns it:—so one of my adversaries objects; to which I answer, that the church of England may the rather condemn it, because St. Austin doubted of it; for if it be no Catholic doctrine, it is but a school-point, and, without prejudice to the faith, may be rejected. But, 2. I suppose the church of England would not have troubled herself with the doctrine, if it had been left as St. Austin left it; that is, but as a mere uncertain opinion: but when the wrong

[h] Contra Pharis. tit. 8.
[i] In Exposit. Precationis Missæ. advers. Hæres. lib. 12. tit. Purgatorium.
[k] In Cathol. Romano Pacifico 9. de Purgat.

end of the opinion was taken, and made an article of faith; and damnation threatened to them that believed it not.; she had reason to consider it, and finding it to be chaff, wholly to scatter it away. 3. The church of England is not therefore to be blamed, if in any case she see more than St. Austin did, and proceed accordingly; for it is certain the church of Rome does decree against divers things, of which St. Austin indeed did not doubt, but affirmed confidently; I instance in the necessity of communicating infants, and the matter of appeals to Rome.

The next authority to be examined is, that of Otho Frisingensis, concerning which there is a heavy quarrel against the Dissuasive, for making him to speak of a purgatory before, whereas he speaks of one after, the day of judgment, with a 'quidam asserunt,' 'some affirm it,' viz. that there is a place of purgatory after death; nay, but you are deceived, says E. W. and the rest of the adversaries; he means, that some affirm there is a place of purgatory after the day of judgment. Now truly, that is more than I said; but that Otho said it, is by these men confessed. But his words are these; "I think it ought to be searched, whether the judgment being passed, besides the lower hell, there remain a place for lighter punishments; for that there is below (or in hell) a purgatory-place, in which they, that are to be saved, are either affected ('afficiantur, *invested, punished)* with darkness only, or else are boiled in the fire of expiation, some do affirm[1]." What is or can be more plainly said of purgatory; for the places of Scripture brought to confirm this opinion are such, which relate to the interval between death and the last judgment; "Juxta illud patriarchæ, 'lugens descendam ad inferos;' et illud apostoli, 'ipse autem salvus erit, sic tamen quasi per ignem;'" I hope the Roman doctors will not deny, but these are meant of purgatory before the last day: and therefore so is the opinion for the proof of which these places are brought. 2. By 'post judicium' in the title, and 'transacto judicio' in the chapter, Otho means the particular judgment passing upon every one at their death: which he in a few lines after, calls "terminatis in judicio causis singulorum." 3. He must mean it to be before the last great day; because that which he says, "some

[1] Esse quippe apud inferos locum purgationum, in quo salvandi vel tenebris tantum afficiantur, vel expiationis igne decoquantur, quidam asserunt.

do affirm," "quidam asserunt;" is, that those which are 'salvandi,' 'to be saved hereafter,' are either in darkness or in a purgatory-fire; which therefore must be meant of the interval; for after the day of judgment is passed, and the books shut, and the sentence pronounced, none can be saved that are not then acquitted; unless Origen's opinion of the salvation of devils and damned souls be reintroduced, which the church, before Otho, many ages had exploded, and therefore so good and great a person would not have thought that fit to be then disputed: and it was not then a question, nor a thing undetermined in the church. 4. Whether Otho means it of a purgatory before or after the day of the last judgment, it makes very much against the present Roman doctrine; for Otho applies the question to the case of infants dying without baptism: now if their purgatory be before the day of judgment, then I quoted Otho according to my own sense and his; but if he means it to be after the day of judgment, then the 'limbus infantum' of the Roman church is vanished;—for the scruple was moved about infants. "Quid de parvulis, qui solo originali delicto tenentur, fiet?" And there is none such till after doomsday; so that, let it be as it will, the Roman church is a loser, and therefore let them take their choice on which side they will fall.

But now after St. Austin's time, especially in the time of St. Gregory, and since, there were many strange stories told of souls appearing after death, and telling strange things of their torments below: many of which being gathered together by the 'Speculum Exemplorum,' the Legend of Lombardy and others, some of them were noted by the Dissuasive to this purpose to shew, that in the time, when these stories were told, the fire of purgatory did not burn clear; but they found purgatory in baths, in eves of houses, and cold rains, upon spits roasting like pigs or geese, upon pieces of ice. Now to this there is nothing said; but that in the place quoted in the 'Speculum' there is no such thing: which saying as it was spoken invidiously, so it was to no purpose; for if the objector ever hath read the distinction which is quoted, throughout; he should have found the whole story at large. It is the 31st example, page 205, col. 1, printed at Doway, 1603. And the same words are exactly in an ancienter edition printed at the imperial town of Hagenaw, 1519, 'impensis

Johannis Rynman.'—But these gentlemen care not for the force of any argument, if they can any way put it off from being believed upon any foolish pretence.

But then, as to the thing itself, though learned men deny the Dialogues of St. Gregory, from whence many of the like stories are derived, to be his, as Possevine confesses, and Melchior Camus, though a little timorously, affirms; yet I am willing to admit them for his, but yet I cannot but note, that those Dialogues have in them many foolish, ridiculous, and improbable stories[m], but yet they and their like are made a great ground of purgatory; but then the right also may be done to St. Gregory, his doctrine of purgatory cannot consist with the present article of the church of Rome; so fond they are in the alleging of authorities, that they destroy their own hypothesis by their undiscerning quotations. For, 1. St. Gregory Pope affirms that which is perfectly inconsistent with the whole doctrine of purgatory. For[n] he says, "that it is a fruit of our redemption by the grace of Christ our author, that when we are drawn from our dwelling in the body, 'mox,' 'forthwith' we are led to celestial rewards;" and a little after speaking of those words of Job, "In profundissimum infernum descendunt omnia mea[o]," he says thus; "Since it is certain, that in the lower region the just are not in penal places, but are held in the superior bosom of rest, a great question arises, What is the meaning of blessed Job?" If purgatory can stand with this hypothesis of St. Gregory, then fire and water can be reconciled. This is the doctrine of St. Gregory in his own works; for whether the Dialogues under his name be his or no, I shall not dispute; but if I were studying to do honour to his memory, I should

[m] Post hoc apparuit eidem presbytero columna quædam jubaris immensi, cujus claritas ultra communem solis valentiam coruscare videbatur, de cœlo usque ad terram porrecta, per quam anima quædam angelico ductu ad sydera contendebat. Scisciante verò presbytero, quidnam hoc esset? Respondit alter, ipsa est anima Constantini quondam judicis et domini Turritani; hæc autem per novem annos ventis et pluviis et algoribus semper exposita, à die exitus sui usque nunc, in stillicidio domus suæ constitit, ibique suorum excessuum pœnas luit: sed qui misericors et liberalis in pauperes exstitit, et judicium injuriam patientibus fecit, insuper etiam de malis quæ commisit, confessa et pœnitens à corpore exivit, idcircò misericordiam à Deo consecuta, hodiernâ die meretur ab omnibus malis liberari, &c. Hæc et multa alia sacerdos ille vidit et audivit de secretis alterius vitæ.

[n] S. Greg. M. lib. 13. in Jobum, c. 15. c. 17.

[o] Cum constat quod apud inferos justi non in locis pœnalibus, sed in superiori quietis sinu tenerentur, magna nobis oboritur quæstio quidnam sit, quod B. Jobus asserit.

never admit them to be his, and so much the rather because the doctrine of the Dialogues contradicts the doctrine of his Commentaries, and yet even the purgatory which is in the Dialogues[p] is unlike that which was declared at Basil; for the Gregorian[q] purgatory supposed only an expiation of small and light faults, as immoderate laughter, impertinent talking, which nevertheless he himself says are expiable by fear of death; and, Victoria[r] and Jacobus de Graffis[s] say, are to be taken away by beating the breast, holy water, the bishop's blessing; and St. Austin says, they are to be taken off by daily saying the Lord's prayer; and therefore, being so easily, so readily, so many ways, to be purged here, it will not be worth establishing a purgatory for such alone, but he admits not of remaining punishment due to greater sins forgiven by the blood of Christ. But concerning St. Gregory I shall say no more, but refer the reader to the Apology of the Greeks, who affirm that St. Gregory admitted a kind of purgatory, but whether allegorically or no, or thinking so really, they know not; but what he said was κατ' οἰκονομίαν, and 'by way of dispensation,' and as it were, constrained to it by the arguments of those who would have all sins expiable after death, against whom he could not so likely prevail, if he had said that none was; and therefore he thought himself forced to go a middle way, and admit a purgatory only for little or venial sins, which yet will do no advantage to the church of Rome. And besides all this, St. Gregory, or whoever is the author of these Dialogues, hath nothing definite, or determined, concerning the time, manner, measure, or place; so wholly new was this doctrine then, that it had not gotten any shape or feature.

Next I am to account concerning the Greeks, whom I affirm always to have differed from the Latins, since they had forged this new doctrine of purgatory in the Roman laboratories: and to prove something of this, I affirmed that[t] in the council of Basil they published an Apology directly disapproving the doctrine of purgatory. Against this, up starts a man fierce and angry, and says 'there was no such Apology published in the council of Basil, for he had ex-

[p] Lib. 4. Dialog. c. 39. [q] Cap. 46. [r] In Summa Sacram.
[s] Eccles. n. 110. Decis. Cas. Conscient. part. 1. lib. 1. c. 6. n. 10.
[t] The Letter, p. 14.

amined it all over, and can find no such Apology.' I am sorry for the gentleman's loss of his labour, but if he had taken me along with him, I could have helped the learned man. This Apology was written by Marcus, metropolitan of Ephesus, as Sixtus Senensis [u] confesses, and that he offered it to the council of Basil. That it was given and read to the deputies of the council, June 14, 1438, is attested by Cusanus, and Martinus Crusius in his Turco-Græcia [x]. But it is no wonder, if this over-learned author of the Letter missed this Apology in his search of the council of Basil, for this is not the only material thing, that is missing in the editions of the council of Basil; for Linwood, that great and excellent English canonist, made an appeal in that council, and prosecuted it with effect in behalf of King Henry of England, "Cum in temporalibus non recognoscat superiorem in terris," &c. But nothing of this now appears, though it was then registered: but it is no new thing to forge or to suppress acts of councils: but besides this, I did not suppose he would have been so indiscreet as to have looked for that Apology in the editions of the council of Basil, but it was delivered to the council by the Greeks, and the council was wise enough not to keep that upon public record; however, if the gentleman please to see it, he may have it among the booksellers, if he will please to ask for the "Apologia Græcorum de Igne Purgatorio," published by Salmasius; it was supposed to be made by Mark, archbishop; but for saving the gentleman's charge or trouble, I shall tell him a few words out of that Apology, which will serve his turn: Διὰ ταῦτα νῦν καὶ τὸ προκείμενον δόγμα τοῦ καθαρτηρίου πυρὸς ἀποβλητέον ἂν εἴη τῆς ἐκκλησίας, &c. "For these reasons, the doctrine of a purgatory-fire is to be cast out of the church, as that which slackens the endeavours of the diligent, as persuading them not to use all means of contention to be purged in this life, since another purgation is expected after it." And it is infinitely to be wondered at, the confidence of Bellarmine [y] (for as for this objector, it matters not so much), that he should, in the face of all the world, say, that the Greek church never doubted of purgatory: whereas he hath not brought one single true and pertinent testimony out of the Greek fathers

[u] Biblioth. lib. 6. annot. 259. [x] Lib. 2. p. 186.
[y] De Purgatorio, lib. 1. c. 15. sect. Ad secundum dico.

for the Roman doctrine of purgatory, but is forced to bring in that crude allegation of their words, "for their dead," which is to no purpose, as all wise men know; indeed he quotes [a] the Alcoran for purgatory, an authentic author, it seems, to serve such an end. But besides this, two memorable persons of the Greek church, Nilus archbishop of Thessalonica, and Mark archbishop of Ephesus, have, in behalf of the Greek church, written against the Roman doctrine in this particular. And it is remarkable, that the Latins were and are so put to it to prove purgatory-fire from the Greek fathers, that they have forged a citation from Theodoret [a], which is not in him at all, but was first cited in Latin by Thomas Aquinas, either out of his own head or cozened by somebody else; and quoted so by Bellarmine [b], which to wise men cannot but be a very great argument of the weakness of the Roman cause in this question from the Greek fathers; and that Bellarmine saw it, but yet was resolved to run through it and outface it; but Nilus taking notice of it, says, that there are no such words in Theodoret in the many copies of his works, which they had. In Greek, it is certain they are not; and Gagneius first translated them into Greek to make the cheat more prevalent, but, in that translation, makes use of those words of the Wisdom of Solomon [c], ὡς χρυσεῖον ἐν χωνευτηρίῳ, "as gold in the furnace" (meaning it of the affliction of the righteous in this world); but unluckily he made use of that chapter, in the first verse of which, it is said, "The souls of the righteous are in the hands of God, and no torment shall touch them," which is a testimony more pregnant against the Roman purgatory, than all they can bring from the Greek fathers for it. And this gentleman confutes The Dissuasive, as he thinks, by telling the story according as his own church hath set it down, who as with subtle and potent arts they forced the Greeks to a seeming union, so they would be sure not to tell the world, in their own records, how unhandsomely they carried themselves. But besides this, the very answer which the Archbishop of Ephesus gave to the Latins in that council (and which words the objector here sets down and confesses), are a plain confutation of himself; for the Latins standing for a

[a] Bellar. lib. 1. c. 11. sect. de Mahumetanis.
[b] Lib. 1. de Purgat. c. 5. sect. ex Græcis.
[a] In 1 Cor. iii.
[c] Sap. iii. 6.

purgatory-fire temporary; as the Archbishop of Ephesus denies it, saying, "that the Italians confess a fire, both in the present world and purgatory by it (that is, *before the day of judgment*), and in the world to come; but not purgatory but eternal: but the Greeks hold a fire in the world to come only (*meaning eternal*), and a temporary punishment of souls; that is, that they go into a dark place, and of grief,—but that they are purged, that is, *delivered from the dark place*, by priests, prayers, and sacrifices, and by alms,—but not by fire." Then they fell on disputing about purgatory-fire, to which the Greeks delayed to answer; and afterward being pressed to answer, they refused to say any thing about purgatory, and when they, at the upshot of all, were 'utcunque' united, Joseph, the patriarch of Constantinople, made a most pitiful confession of purgatory in such general and crafty terms, as sufficiently shewed, that as the Greeks were forced to do something, so the Latins were content with any thing, for by those terms, the question between them was no way determined, "Romæ veteris Papam Domini nostri Jesu Christi vicarium esse concedere, atque animarum purgationem esse non inficior." He denied not that there is a purgatory. No, for the Greeks confessed it, in this world before death, and some of them acknowledged a dark place of sorrow after this life, but neither fire nor purgatory; for the purgation was made in this world,—and after this world by the prayers of the priests and the alms of the friends, the purgation was made; 'not by fire,' as I cited the words before. The Latins told them there should be no union without it; the Greek emperor refused, and all this the objector is pleased to acknowledge; but after a very great bustle made, they were forced to patch up a union, in hope to get assistance of the Latins: but in this also they were cozened; and having lost Constantinople, many of the Greeks attributed that fatal loss to their dissembling union made at Florence; and, on the other side, the Latins imputed it to their opinion of the procession of the Holy Ghost: however, the Greek churches never admitted that union, as is averred by Laonicus Chalcondylas, 'de Rebus Turcicis.' And it is a strange thing that this affair, of which all Europe was witness, should, with so little modesty, be shuffled up, and The Dissuasive accused for saying that

[d] Lib. 1. non longè ab initio.

which themselves acknowledge. But see what some of themselves say: "Unus est ex notissimis Græcorum et Armenorum erroribus quo docent nullum esse purgatorium quo, animæ ex hac luce migrantes purgentur sordibus quas in hoc corpore contraxerunt," saith Alphonsus à Castro [e]:" "It is one of the most known errors of the Greeks and Armenians, that they teach there is no purgatory:" and Aquinas, writing 'contra Græcorum errores,' labours to prove purgatory: and Archbishop Antoninus [f], who was present at the council of Florence, after he had rejected the epistle of Eugenius, adds, "Errabant Græci purgatorium negantes, quod est hæreticum." Add to these the testimony of Roffensis [g] and Polydore Virgil before quoted: "Usque ad hunc diem, Græcis non est creditum purgatorium:" and Gregory de Valentia saith [h], "Expresse autem purgatorium negarunt Waldenses hæretici, ut refert Guido Carmelita in summa de hæresi: item scismatici Græci recentiores, ut ex concilio Florentino apparet." And Alphonsus à Castro saith [i], "Unto this very day, purgatory is not believed by the Greeks." And no less can be imagined, since their prime and most learned prelate, besides what he did in the council, did also, after the council, publish an encyclical epistle against the definition of the council, as may be seen in Binius's Narrative of the council of Florence: by all which appears how notoriously scandalous is the imputation of falsehood laid upon The Dissuasive by this objector; who, by this time, is warm with writing, and grows uncivil, being like a baited bull, beaten into choler with his own tail, and angered by his own objections.

But the next charge is higher; it was not only doubted of in St. Austin's time, and since; but the Roman doctrine of purgatory, without any hesitation or doubting, is against the express doctrines delivered by divers of the ancient fathers; and to this purpose some were remarked in The Dissuasive, which I shall now verify, and add others very plain and very considerable.

St. Cyprian [k] exhorts Demetrianus to turn to Christ while this world lasts, saying "that after we are dead, there is no

[e] Lib. 12. tit. Purgatorium. [f] See Binius, tom. 4. Concil.
[g] Art. 18. contr. Luther.
[h] Disp. 11. qu. 1. punctum 1. sect. 5. De Locis Animarum post Mortem.
[i] Lib. 8. adv. Hæres. tit. Indulgentiæ. [k] Ad Demetrian. sect. 16. 22.

place of repentance, no place of satisfaction." To this the Letter answers[l]; It is not said 'when we are dead,' but 'when you are dead,' meaning that this is spoken to heathens, not to Christians. As if 'quando istinc excessum fuerit,' being spoken impersonally, does not mean indefinitely all the world, and certainly it may as well one as the other, Christians as well as heathens, for Christians may be in the state of deadly sin, and aversion from God as well as heathens, and then this admonition and reason fit them as well as the other. E. W. answers[m], that St. Cyprian means that 'after death there is no meritorious satisfaction;' he says true indeed, there is none that is meritorious, neither before nor after death, but this will not serve his turn, for St. Cyprian says, that after death there is none at all; 'no place of satisfaction,' of any kind whatsoever, no place of wholesome repentance. And therefore it is vain to say, that this council was only given to Demetrianus, who was a heathen; for if he had been a Christian, he would, or at least might, have used the same argument, not to put any part of his duty off upon confidence of any thing to be done or suffered after this life, For his argument is this, "This is the time of repentance[n], after death it is not; now you may satisfy (that is appease) the divine anger, after this life is ended, nothing of this can be done." For St. Cyprian does not speak this 'dispensativè,' or by relation to this particular case, but 'assertivè;' he affirms expressly, speaking to the same Demetrian, "that when this life is finished we are divided, either to the dwellings of death or of immortality. And that we may see this is not spoken of impenitent pagans only, as the 'Letter to a Friend' dreams, St. Cyprian [o] renews the same caution and advice to the lapsed Christains: "O ye, my brethren, let every one confess his sin, while he that hath sinned, is yet in this world, while his confession can be admitted, while satisfaction and pardon made by the priest are grateful with God." If there had been any thought of the Roman purgatory in St. Cyprian's time, he could not in better words have impugned it, than here he does. All that have sinned must here look

[l] P. 17. [m] P. 32.

[n] Donec ævi temporalis fine completo ad æternæ vel mortis vel immortalitatis hospitia dividamur. Ibid. sect. 16.

[o] Serm. de Lapsis. Confiteantur singulis vos fratres delictum suum, dum adhuc qui deliquit in sæculo est, dum admitti confessio ejus potest, dum satisfactio, et remissio facta per sacerdotes apud Dominum grata est.

to it, here they must confess, here beg pardon, here make amends and satisfy; afterward neither one nor the other shall be admitted. Now if to Christians also there is granted no leave to repent, no means to satisfy, no means of pardon after this life, these words are so various and comprehensive that they include all cases; and it is plain St. Cyprian speaks it indefinitely, there is no place of repentance, no place of satisfaction; none at all, neither to heathens nor to Christians.

But now let these words be set against the Roman doctrine, viz. that there is a place called purgatory, in which the souls tormented do satisfy, and 'come not out thence till they have paid (viz. by sufferings, or by suffrages) the utmost farthing,' and then see which we will follow: for they differ in all the points of the compass. And these men do nothing but betray the weakness of their cause by expounding St. Cyprian to the sense of new distinctions, made but yesterday in the forges of the schools. And indeed the whole affair upon which the answer of Bellarmine relies, which these men have translated to their own use, is unreasonable. For is it a likely business, that when men have committed great crimes, they shall be pardoned here by confession, and the ministries of the church, &c. and yet that the venial sins, though confessed in the general, and as well as they can be, and the party absolved, yet there should be prepared for their expiation the intolerable torments of hell-fire, for a very long time; and that for the greater sins, for which men have 'agreed with their adversary in the way,' and the adversary hath forgiven them, yet that for these also they should be cast into prison, from whence they shall not come, till the utmost farthing be paid? that is against the design of our blessed Saviour's counsel; for if that be the case, then, though we and our adversaries are agreed upon the main, and the debt forgiven, yet nevertheless we may be delivered to the tormentors. But then, concerning the sense of St. Cyprian in this particular, no man can doubt that shall have but read his excellent treatise of mortality: that he could not, did not, admit of purgatory after death before the day of judgment, for he often said it in that excellent treatise, which he made to comfort and strengthen Christians against the fear of death, that immediately after death we go to God or the devil; "and therefore it is for him only to fear to die, who is not willing

to go to Christ, and he only is to be unwilling to go to Christ who believes not that he begins to reign with Christ." "That we in the meantime die, we pass over by death to immortality." It is not a going forth, but a pass over, and when our temporal course is run, a going over to immortality." "Let us embrace that day, which assigns every one of us to our dwelling, and restores those which are snatched from hence, and are disentangled from the snares of the world, to Paradise, and the heavenly kingdom."—There are here many other things so plainly spoken to this purpose, that I wonder any Papist should read that treatise, and not be cured of his infirmity.

To the same purpose is that of St. Dionysius, calling death the end of holy agonies; and therefore it is to be supposed they have no more agonies to run through immediately after death. To this E. W. answers[o]; that St. Dionysius means, "that death is the end of all the agonies of this life." A goodly note! and never revealed till then and now; as if this were a good argument to encourage men to contend bravely, and not to fear death, because when they are once dead, they shall no more be troubled with the troubles of this life; indeed you may go to worse, and death may let you into a state of being as bad as hell, and of greater torments than all the pains of this world put together amount to. But to let alone such ridiculous subterfuges, see the words of St. Dionys: "They that live a holy life, looking to the true promises of God, as if they were to behold the truth itself in that resurrection, which is according to it, with firm and true hope, and in a divine joy, come to the sleep of death, as to an end of all holy contentions." Now certainly if the doctrine of purgatory were true, and that they who had contended here, and for all their troubles in this world, were yet in a tolerable condition, should be told, that now they shall go to worse, he that should tell them so would be but one of Job's comforters. No, the servant of God, 'coming to the end of his own troubles' (viz. by death), 'is filled with holy gladness, and with much rejoicing ascends to the way of divine regeneration,' viz. to immortality, which word can hardly mean, that they shall be tormented a great while in hell-fire.

[o] P. 32.

The words of Justin Martyr[p], or whoever is the author of those questions and answers imputed to him, affirms, that "presently after the departure of the soul from the body, a distinction is made between the just and the unjust, for they are brought by angels to places worthy of them; the souls of the just to Paradise, where they have the conversation and sight of angels and archangels, but the souls of the unrighteous to the places in hades, the invisible region or hell." Against these words, because they pinch severely, E. W.[q] thinks himself bound to say something; and therefore, 1. Whereas Justin Martyr says, after our departure presently there is a separation made, he answers, that Justin Martyr means here to speak of the two final states after the day of judgment, for so it seems he understands εὐθὺς, or 'presently after death,' to mean the 'day of judgment;' of the time of which neither men nor angels know any thing. And whereas Justin Martyr says, that presently the souls of the righteous go to Paradise, E. W. answers[r], 2. That Justin does not say, that all just souls are carried presently into heaven; no, Justin says, 'into Paradise:' true; but let it be remembered that it is so a part of heaven, as 'limbus infantum' is by themselves called a part of hell; that is, a 'place of bliss;' the region of the blessed. But, 3. Justin says, that presently there is a separation made, but he says not that the souls of the righteous are carried to Paradise. That is the next answer, which the very words of Justin do contradict: "There is presently a separation made of the just and unjust, for they are by the angels carried to the places they have deserved."—This is the separation which is made, one is carried to Paradise, the other to a place in hell. But these being such pitiful offers at answering, the gentleman tries another way, and says, 4. That this affirmative of Justin contradicts another saying of Justin, which I cited out of Sixtus Senensis, that Justin Martyr and many other of the fathers, affirmed that the souls of men are kept in secret receptacles, "reserved unto the sentence of the great day;" and that before then no man "receives according to his works done in this life." To this I answer, that one opinion does not contradict another; for though the fathers believed that "they who die in the Lord, rest from their labours," and are in blessed places, and have antepasts of joy and comforts, yet, in those places,

[p] Resp. ad quæst. 75. [q] P. 53. [r] Ibid.

they are reserved unto the judgment of the great day: the intermedial joy or sorrow respectively of the just and unjust does but antedate the final sentence; and as the comforts of God's Spirit in this life are indeed graces of God and rewards of piety; as the torments of an evil conscience are the wages of impiety; yet as these do not hinder, but that the great reward is given at doomsday and not before, so neither do the joys which the righteous have in the interval. They can both consist together, and are generally affirmed by very many of the Greek and Latin fathers. And methinks this gentleman[s] might have learned, from Sixtus Senensis, how to have reconciled these two opinions; for he quotes him, saying there is a double beatitude, the one imperfect of soul only, the other consummate and perfect of soul and body. The first the fathers called by the several names of 'Sinus Abrahæ,' 'Atrium Dei,' 'Sub Altare,' &c. The other, 'perfect joy,' 'the glory of the resurrection,' &c. But it matters not what is said, or how it be contradicted, so it seem but to serve a present turn. But at last, if nothing of this will do, these words are not the words of Justin, for he is not the author of the Questions and Answers 'ad Orthodoxos.'—To which I answer, It matters not whether they be Justin's or no: but they are put together in the collection of his works, and they are generally called his, and cited under his name, and made use of by Bellarmine[t], when he supposes them to be to his purpose. However, the author is ancient and orthodox, and so esteemed in the church, and in this particular speaks according to the doctrine of the more ancient doctors; well! but how is this against purgatory[u]? says E. W. for they may be in secret receptacles, after they have been in purgatory. To this I answer, that he dares not teach that for doctrine in the church of Rome, who believes that the souls delivered out of purgatory go immediately to the heaven of the blessed; and therefore if his book had been worth the perusing by the censors of books, he might have been questioned, and followed Mr. White's fortune. And he adds, 'it might be afterward according to Origen's opinion;' that is, purgatory might be after the day of judgment; for so Origen held, that all the fires are purgatory, and the devils themselves

[s] E. W. p. 36.
[t] Lib. de Baptis. c. 25, 26. lib. de Confirmat. c. 5. l. 3. de Euchar. c. 6.
[u] P. 36. line 29.

should be saved. Thus this poor gentleman, thinking it necessary to answer one argument against purgatory brought in the Dissuasive, cares not to answer by a condemned heresy, rather than reason shall be taught by any son of the church of England. But however, the very words of the fathers cross his slippery answers so, that they thrust him into a corner; for in these receptacles the godly have joy, and they enter into them as soon as they die, and abide there till the day of judgment.

St. Ambrose[x] is so full, pertinent, and material, to the question in hand, and so destructive of the Roman hypothesis, that nothing can be said against it. His words are these; "Therefore, in all regards, death is good, because it divides those that were always fighting, that they may not impugn each other, and because it is a certain port to them, who, being tossed in the sea of this world, require the station of faithful rest; and because it makes not our state worse, but such as it finds every one, such it reserves him to the future judgment, and nourishes him with rest, and withdraws him from the envy of present things, and composes him with the expectation of future things." E. W. thinking himself bound to say something to these words, answers, "It is an excellent saying, for worse he is not, but infinitely better, that, quit of the occasions of living here, is ascertained of future bliss hereafter,—which is the whole drift of the saint in that chapter: read it, and say afterward if I say not true[y]." It is well put off. But there are very many that read him, who never will or can examine what St. Ambrose says; and with all such he hopes to escape. But as to the thing: that death gives a man advantage, and, by its own fault, no disadvantage, is indeed not only the whole drift of that chapter, but of that whole book. But not for that reason only is a man the better for death, but because it makes him not worse in order to eternity; nay, it does not alter him at all as to that, for as death finds him, so shall the judgment find him (and therefore not purified by purgatory); for such he is reserved; and not only thus, but it cherishes him with rest, which would be very ill done if death carried him to purgatory. Now all these last words and many others, E. W. is pleased to take

[x] De Bono Mortis, cap. 4. [y] P. 34.

no notice of, as not being for his purpose. But he that pleases to see more, may read the twelfth and eighteenth chapters of the same treatise.

St. Gregory's[z] saying, that after this life there is no purgation, can no way be put off by any pretences. For he means it of the time after death before the day of judgment, which is directly opposed to the doctrine of the church of Rome; and unless you will suppose that St. Gregory believed two purgatories, it is certain he did not believe the Roman; for he taught, that the purgation which he calls 'baptism by fire,' and 'the saving, yet as by fire,' was to be performed at the day of judgment: and the curiosity of that trial is the fierceness of that fire, as Nicetas expounds St. Gregory's words in his oration 'in Sancta Lumina.' So that St. Gregory, affirming that this world is the place of purgation, and that after this world there is no purgation, could not have spoken any thing more direct against the Roman purgatory.

St. Hilary and St. Macarius speak of two states after death, and no more. True, says E. W.; "but they are the two final states." That is true too, in some sense, for it is either of eternal good, or evil; but to one of these states they are consigned and determined at the time of their death, at which time every one is sent either to the bosom of Abraham, or to a place of pain, where they are reserved to the sentence of the great day. St. Hilary's words are these; "There is no stay or delaying. For the day of judgment is either an eternal retribution of beatitude or of pain: but the time of our death hath every one in his laws, whiles either Abraham (viz. the bosom of Abraham) or pain reserves every one unto the judgment." These words need no commentary. He that can reconcile these to the Roman purgatory, will be a most mighty man in controversy. And so also are the words of St. Macarius[a]: "When they go out of the body, the choirs of angels receive their souls, and carry them to their proper place, εἰς τὴν καθαρὰν αἰῶνα, 'to a pure world,' and so lead them to the Lord."—Such words as these are often repeated by the holy fathers, and doctors

[z] S. Greg. Nazianz. orat. 15. in plagam grandinis. Μηδὲ ὑπὲς τὴν νύκτα ταύτην ἐστί τις κάθαρσις.

[a] Homil. 22. vide etiam homil. 26.

of the ancient church; I sum them up with the saying of St. Athanasius: Οὐκ ἔστι τοῖς δικαίοις θάνατος [b], &c. "It is not death that happens to the righteous, but a translation: for they are translated out of this world into everlasting rest. And as a man would go out of prison, so do the saints go out of this troublesome life, unto those good things which are prepared for them." Now let these and all the precedent words be confronted against the sad complaints made for the souls in purgatory by John Gerson in his 'Querela Defunctorum,' and Sir Thomas More in his 'Supplication of Souls,' and it will be found that the doctrine of the fathers differs from the doctrine of the church of Rome as much as heaven and hell, rest and labour, horrid torments and great joy. I conclude this matter of quotations by the saying of Pope Leo, which one of 'my adversaries [c]' could not find, because the printer was mistaken; it is the ninety-first epistle, so known and so used by the Roman writers in the question of confession, that if he be a man of learning, it cannot be supposed, but he knew where to find them. The words are these: "But if any of them, for whom we pray unto the Lord, being intercepted by any obstacle, falls from the benefit of the present indulgences, and, before he comes to the constituted remedies, shall end his temporal life by human condition (or frailty), that which abiding in the body he hath not received, being out of the flesh he cannot." Now against these words of St. Leo, set the present doctrine of the church of Rome; "that what is not finished of penances here, a man may pay in purgatory:"—and let the world judge, whether St. Leo was, in this point, a Roman Catholic. Indeed St. Leo forgot to make use of the late distinction of sins venial and mortal, of the punishment of mortal sins remaining after the fault is taken away; but I hope the Roman doctors will excuse the saint, because the distinction is but new and modern. But this testimony of St. Gregory must not go for a single testimony: "That, which abiding in the body, could not be received, out of the body cannot;" that is, when the soul is gone out of the body, as death finds them, so shall the day of judgment find them. And this was the sense of the whole church; for after death there is no change of state before the general trial: no passing from

[b] De Virgin. [c] Letter, p. 18.

pain to rest in the state of separation, and therefore either there are no purgatory-pains; or if there be, there is no ease of them before the day of judgment, and the prayers and masses of the church cannot give remedy to one poor soul; and this must of necessity be confessed by the Roman doctors, or else they must shew that ever any one catholic father did teach, that after death, and before the day of judgment, any souls are translated into a state of bliss out of a state of pain: that is, that from purgatory they go to heaven before the day of judgment. He that can shew this, will teach me what I have not yet learned; but he that cannot shew it, must not pretend, that the Roman doctrine of purgatory was ever known to the ancient fathers of the church.

SECTION III.

Of Transubstantiation.

THE purpose of The Dissuasive was to prove the doctrine of transubstantiation to be new, neither catholic nor apostolic. In order to which I thought nothing more likely to persuade or dissuade, than the testimonies of the parties against themselves. And although I have many other inducements (as will appear in the sequel), yet by so earnestly contending to invalidate the truth of the quotations, the adversaries do confess by implication; if these sayings be, as is pretended, then I have evinced my main point, viz. that the Roman doctrines, as differing from us, are novelties, and no parts of the catholic faith.

Thus therefore the author of The Letter begins[d]: "He quotes Scotus, as declaring that the doctrine of transubstantiation is not expressed in the canon of the Bible; which he saith not. To the same purpose he quotes Ocham, but I can find no such thing in him. To the same purpose he quotes Roffensis, but he hath no such thing." But in order to the verification of what I said, I desire it be first observed what I did say, for I did not deliver it so crudely as this gentleman sets it down: for, 1. These words—"the doctrine of

[d] P. 18.

transubstantiation is not expressed in the canon of the Bible"—are not the words of all them before named; they are the sense of them all, but the words but of one or two of them. 2. When I say that some of the Roman writers say, that transubstantiation is not expressed in the Scripture, I mean, and so I said plainly, "as without the church's declaration to compel us to admit of it." Now then, for the quotations themselves, I hope I shall give a fair account. 1. The words quoted, are the words of Biel: when he had first affirmed that Christ's body is contained truly under the bread, and that it is taken by the faithful (all which we believe and teach in the church of England), he adds; "Tamen quomodo ibi sit Christi corpus, an per conversionem alicujus in ipsum" (that is the way of transubstantiation), "an sine conversione incipiat esse corpus Christi cum pane, manentibus substantia et accidentibus panis, non invenitur expressum in canone Biblii:" and that is the way of consubstantiation;—so that here is expressly taught what I affirmed was taught, that the Scriptures did not express the doctrine of transubstantiation; and he adds, that concerning this, there were anciently divers opinions. Thus far the quotation is right: but of this man there is no notice taken. But what of Scotus? 'He saith no such thing;'—well, suppose that; yet I hope this gentleman will excuse me for Bellarmine's sake, who says the same thing of Scotus as I do, and he might have found it in the margent against the quotation of Scotus, if he had pleased. His words are these; "Secondly, *he* saith (viz. *Scotus)* that there is not extant any place of Scripture so express, without the declaration of the church, that it can compel us to admit of transubstantiation: and this is not altogether improbable: for though the scriptures which we brought above, seem so clear to us, that it may compel a man that is not wilful, yet whether it be so or no, it may worthily be doubted, since most learned and acute men (such as Scotus eminently was) believe the contrary[e]." Well! But the gentleman can find no such thing in Ocham: I hope he did not look far, for Ocham is not the man I mean; however, the printer might have mistaken, but it is easily pardonable, because from O. Cam. meaning Odo Cameracensis, it was easy for the printer or transcriber to write

[e] Lib. 3. de Euchar. c. 23. sect. Secundo dicit.

Ocam, as being of more public name; but the Bishop of Cambray is the man that followed Scotus in this opinion, and is acknowledged by Bellarmine to have said the same that Scotus did, he being one of his 'docti et acutissimi viri' there mentioned[f]. Now if Roffensis have the same thing too, this author of The Letter will have cause enough to be a little ashamed: and for this, I shall bring his words: speaking of the whole institution of the blessed sacrament by our blessed Saviour, he says, "Neque ullum hic verbum positum est, quo probetur in nostra missa veram fieri carnis et sanguinis Christi præsentiam[g]." I suppose I need to say no more to verify these citations; but yet I have another very good witness to prove that I have said true; and that is Salmeron[h], who says that Scotus, out of Innocentius, reckons three opinions, not of heretics, but of such men who all agreed in that which is the main; but he adds, "Some men and writers believe, that this article cannot be proved against a heretic, by Scripture alone, or reasons alone. And so Cajetan is affirmed by Suarez and Alanus to have said; and Melchior Canus[i]: "Perpetuam Mariæ virginitatem—conversionem panis et vini in corpus et sanguinem Christi—non ita expressa in libris canonicis invenies, sed adeo tamen certa in fide sunt, ut contrariorum dogmatum auctores ecclesia hæreticos judicarit." So that the Scripture is given up[k] for no sure friend in this question: the article wholly relies upon the authority of the church, viz. of Rome, who makes faith, and makes heresies as she please. But to the same purpose is that also which Chedzy said in his disputation at Oxford; "In what manner Christ is there, whether with the bread transelemented or transubstantiation, the Scripture, in open words, tells not.

But I am not likely so to escape, for E. W.[l] talks of a famous, or rather infamous, quotation out of Peter Lombard, and adds foul and uncivil words, which I pass by: but the thing is this; that I said, "Petrus Lombardus could not tell, whether there was a substantial change or no." I did say so, and I brought the very words of Lombard to prove it, and these very words E. W. himself acknowledges. "Si autem

[f] Ubi supra.
[g] Contra Captiv. Babyl. c. 1.
[h] Tom. 9. tract. 16. p. 108. 110.
[i] Lib. 1. de Euchar. c. 34.
[k] Pag. 37. vide Letter, p. 18.
[l] Pag. 38. See also the Letter to a Friend, p. 19.

quæritur qualis sit ista conversio, an formalis an substantialis, vel alterius generis, definire non sufficio:" "I am not able to define or determine, whether that change be formal or substantial:"—so far E. W. quotes him, but leaves out one thing very material, viz. "whether besides formal, or substantial, it be of another kind."—Now E. W. not being able to deny that Lombard said this, takes a great deal of useless pains, not one word of all that he says being to the purpose, or able to make it probable, that Peter Lombard did not say so, or that he did not think so. But the thing is this: Biel reckoned three opinions which, in Lombard's time, were in the church: the first of consubstantiation, which was the way, which long since then, Luther followed. The second, that the substance of bread is made the flesh of Christ, but ceases not to be what it was. But this is not the doctrine of transubstantiation; for that makes a third opinion, which is, that the substance of bread ceases to be, and nothing remains but the accident. "Quartam opinionem addit magister," that is, Peter Lombard "adds a fourth opinion;" that the substance of bread is not converted, but is annihilated: this is made by Scotus to be the second opinion. Now of these four opinions, all which were then permitted and disputed, Peter Lombard[m] seems to follow the second; but if this was his opinion, it was no more; for he could not determine, whether that that were the truth or no. But whether he does or no, truly, I think it is very hard for any man to tell: for this question was but in the forge, not polished, not made bright with long handling. And this was all that I affirmed out of the Master of Sentences; I told of no opinion of his at all; but that, in his time, they did not know whether it (viz. the doctrine of transubstantiation) were true or no, that is, the generality of the Roman Catholics did not know: and he himself could not define it. And this appears unanswerably by Peter Lombard's bringing their several sentiments in this article: and they that differ in their judgments about an article, and yet esteem the others catholic, may think what they please, but they cannot tell certainly what is truth. But then, as for Peter Lombard himself, all that I said of him was this, that he could not tell, he could not determine, whether there was any substantial change or no. If, in his after-discourse, he

[m] Ubi supra.

declares that the change is of substances, he told it for no other than as a mere opinion: if he did, let him answer for that, not I; for that he could not determine it, himself expressly said it, in the beginning of the eleventh distinction. And therefore these gentlemen would better have consulted with truth and modesty, if they had let this alone, and not have made such an outcry against a manifest truth. Now let me observe one thing, which will be of great use in this whole affair, and demonstrate the change of this doctrine. These three opinions were all held by Catholics, and the opinions are recorded not only by Pope Innocentius III.[n] but in the gloss of the canon law itself. For this opinion was not fixed and settled, nor as yet well understood, but still disputed, as we see in Lombard and Scotus: and although they all agreed in this (as Salmeron[o] observes of these three opinions, as he cites them out of Scotus), "that the true body of Christ is there, because to deny this were against the faith;" and therefore, this was then enough to cause them to be esteemed Catholics, because they denied nothing, which was then against the faith, but all agreed in that, yet now the case is otherwise; for whereas one of the opinions was, that the substance of bread remains,—and another opinion, that the substance of bread is annihilated, but is not converted into the body of Christ; now both of these opinions are made heresy; and the contrary to them, which is the third opinion, passed into an article of faith: "Quod vero ibi substantia panis non remanet, jam etiam ut articulus fidei definitum est, et conversionis sive transubstantiationis nomen evictum:" so Salmeron[p]. Now in Peter Lombard's time, if they who believed Christ's real presence, were good Catholics, though they believed no transubstantiation or consubstantiation, that is, did not descend into consideration of the manner, why may they not be so now? Is there any new revelation now of the manner? Or why is the way to heaven now made the narrower than in Lombard's time? For the church of England believes according to one of these opinions; and therefore is as good a catholic church as Rome was then, which had not determined the manner. Nay, if we use to value an article the more, by how much the more ancient it is, certainly it is more

[n] Innocent. de Offic. Mis. part. 3. cap. 18.
[o] Cap. cum Martha in gloss. Extrav. de Celebr. Miss. [p] Ubi supra.

honourable that we should reform to the ancient model, rather than conform to the new. However, this is also plainly consequent to this discourse of Salmeron: "The abettors of those three opinions, some of them do deny something that is of faith; therefore the faith of the church of Rome now is not the same it was in the days of Peter Lombard." Lastly, this also is to be remarked, that to prove any ancient author to hold the doctrine of transubstantiation, as it is at this day an article of faith at Rome, it is not enough to say, that Peter Lombard, or Durand, or Scotus, &c. did say, that where bread was before, there is Christ's body now; for they may say that and more, and yet not come home to the present article; and therefore E. W. does argue weakly, when he denies Lombard to say one thing, viz. 'that he could not define whether there was a substantial change or no' (which indeed he spake plainly), because he brings him saying something, as if he were resolved the change were substantial, which yet he speaks but obscurely. And the truth is, this question of transubstantiation is so intricate and involved amongst them, seems so contrary to sense and reason, and does so much violence to all the powers of the soul, that it is no wonder, if, at first, the doctors could not make any thing distinctly of it. However, whatever they did make of it, certain it is they more agreed with the present church of England, than with the present church of Rome; for we say as they said, Christ's body is truly there, and there is a conversion of the elements into Christ's body; for what before the consecration in all senses was bread, is, after consecration, in some sense, Christ's body: but they did not all of them say, that the substance of bread was destroyed; and some of them denied the conversion of the bread into the flesh of Christ; which whosoever shall now do, will be esteemed no Roman Catholic. And therefore it is a vain procedure to think they have proved their doctrine of transubstantiation out of the fathers also; "[q] If the fathers tell us, that bread is changed out of his nature into the body of Christ: that by holy invocation it is no more common bread: that as water in Cana of Galilee was changed into wine; so in the evangelist, wine is changed into blood: that bread is only bread before the sacramental words, but after consecration is made

[q] E. W. p. 37.

the body of Christ." For though I very much doubt, all these things in equal and full measures cannot be proved out of the fathers, supposing they were, yet all this comes not up to the Roman article of transubstantiation: all those words are true in a very good sense, and they are in that sense believed in the church of England; but that the bread is no more bread in the natural sense, and that it is naturally nothing, but the natural body of Christ; that the substance of one is passed into the substance of the other, this is not affirmed by the fathers; neither can it be inferred from the former propositions, if they had been truly alleged: and therefore all that is for nothing, and must be intended only to cosen and amuse the reader that understands not all the windings of this labyrinth.

In the next place I am to give an account of what passed in the Lateran council upon this article. For, says E. W.[r] the doctrine of transubstantiation "was ever believed in the church, though more fully and explicitly declared in the Lateran council." But in the Dissuasive[s] it was said, that it was 'but pretended to be determined in that council, where many things indeed came then in consultation, yet nothing could be openly decreed.' Nothing, says Platina; that is, says my adversary, 'nothing concerning the holy land, and the aids to be raised for it: but for all this, there might be a decree concerning transubstantiation.' To this I reply, that it is as true that nothing was done in this question, as that nothing was done in the matter of the holy war; for one was as much decreed as the other. For if we admit the acts of the council, that of giving aid to the Holy Land[t] was decreed in the sixty-ninth canon, alias seventy-first. So that this answer is not true: but the truth is, neither the one nor the other was decreed in that council. For that I may inform this gentleman in a thing, which possibly he never heard of; this council of Lateran was never published, nor any acts of it, till Cochlæus published them A. D. 1538. For three years before this, John Martin published the councils; and then there was no such thing as the acts of the Lateran council to be found. But you will say, How came Cochlæus by them? To this the answer is easy: There were read in the council

[r] P. 37. [s] Letter to a Friend, p. 18.

[t] Ad liberandum terram sanctam de manibus impiorum. Extrav. de Judæis et Saracenis. Cum sit.

sixty chapters, which to some did seem easy, to others burdensome; but these were never approved, but the council ended in scorn and mockery [u], and nothing was concluded, neither of faith, nor manners, nor war, nor aid for the Holy Land, but only the Pope got money of the prelates to give them leave to depart. But afterward Pope Gregory IX. put these chapters, or some of them, into the decretals; but doth not entitle any of these to the council of Lateran, but only to Pope Innocent in the council, which Cardinal Perron ignorantly or wilfully mistaking, affirms the contrary. But so it is that Platina affirms of the Pope, "Plurima decreta retulit, improbavit Joachimi libellum, damnavit errores Almerici." The Pope recited sixty heads of the decrees in the council, but no man says the council decreed those heads. Now these heads, Cochlæus says, he found in an old book in Germany. And it is no ways probable, that if the council had decreed those heads, that Gregory IX. who published his uncle's decretal epistles, which make up so great a part of the canon law, should omit to publish the decrees of this council; or that there should be no acts of this great council in the Vatican, and that there should be no publication of them till about three hundred years after the council, and that out of a blind corner, and an old unknown manuscript. But the book shews its original, it was taken from the decretals; for it contains just so many heads, viz. seventy-two; and is not any thing of the council, in which only were recited sixty heads, and they have the same beginnings and endings, and the same notes and observations in the middle of the chapters: which shews plainly they were a mere force of the decretals. The consequent of all which is plainly this, that there was no decree made in the council, but every thing was left unfinished, and the council was affrighted by the warlike preparations of them of Genoa and Pisa, and all retired. Concerning which affair, the reader that desires it, may receive further satisfaction, if he read the 'Antiquitates Britannicæ' in the life of Stephen Langton out of the lesser history of Matthew Paris; as also Sabellicus, and Godfride the monk [x]. But since it is become a question, what was

[u] Vide præfat. Later. Concil. secundum p. Crab.

[x] Vide Matt. Paris, ad A.D. 1215. et Naucleri generat. 41. ad eundem annum. Et Sabellicum Ennead. 9. lib. 6. et Godfridum Monachum ad A. D. 1215.

or was not determined in this Lateran council, I am content to tell them that the same authority, whether of Pope or council, which made transubstantiation an article of faith, made rebellion and treason to be a duty of subjects; for in the same collection of canons they are both decreed and warranted under the same signature, the one being the first canon, and the other the third.

The use I shall make of all is this; Scotus was observed above to say, that in Scripture there is nothing so express as to compel us to believe transubstantiation, meaning, that without the decree and authority of the church, the Scripture was of itself insufficient. And some others, as Salmeron[3] notes, affirm, that Scripture and reason are both insufficient to convince a heretic in this article; this is to be proved "ex conciliorum definitione, et patrum traditione," &c. "by the definition of councils, and tradition of the fathers," for it were easy to answer the places of Scripture which are cited, and the reasons. Now then, since Scripture alone is not thought sufficient, nor reasons alone,—if the definitions of councils also shall fail them, they will be strangely to seek for their new article. Now for this, their only castle of defence is the Lateran council. Indeed Bellarmine produces the Roman council under Pope Nicolas the Second, in which Berengarius was forced to recant his error about the sacrament, but he recanted it into a worse error, and such which the church of Rome disavows at this day: and therefore ought not to pretend it as a patron of that doctrine, which she approves not. And for the little council under Gregory VII. it is just so a general council, as the church of Rome is the catholic church, or a particular is a universal. But suppose it so for this once; yet this council meddled not with the 'modus,' viz. transubstantiation, or the ceasing of its being bread, but of the real presence of Christ under the elements, which is no part of our question. Berengarius denied it, but we do not, when it is rightly understood. Pope Nicolas himself did not understand the new article; for it was not fitted for publication until the time of the Lateran council, and how nothing of this was in that council determined, I have already made appear: and therefore, as Scotus said, the Scripture alone could not evict this article; so he also said in his argument made for the doctors that held the first opinion men-

[3] Tract. 16. tom. 9. p. 110.

tioned before out of Innocentius: "Nec invenitur ubi ecclesia istam veritatem determinet solenniter:" "Neither is it found where the church hath solemnly determined it." And for his own particular, though he was carried into captivity by the symbol of Pope Innocent III. for which by that time was pretended the Lateran council; yet he himself said, that, before that council, it was not an article of faith: and for this thing Bellarmine[z] reproves him, and imputes ignorance to him, saying, that it was because he had not read the Roman council under Gregory VII. nor the consent of the fathers. And to this purpose I quoted Henriquez, saying, that Scotus saith the doctrine of transubstantiation is not ancient[a]; the author of the Letter denies that he saith any such thing of Scotus: but I desire him to look once more, and my margent will better direct him.

What the opinion of Durandus was in this question, if these gentlemen will not believe me, let them believe their own friends. But first let it be considered what I said, "viz. that he maintained (viz. in disputation) that even after consecration, the very matter of bread remained. 2. That by reason of the authority of the church, it is not to be held. 3. That nevertheless it is possible it should be so. 4. That it is no contradiction, that the matter of bread should remain, and yet it be Christ's body too. 5. That this were the easier way of solving the difficulties."—That all this is true, I have no better argument than his own words, which are in his first question of the eleventh distinction in 'quartum num. 11. et n. 15.' For indeed the case was very hard with these learned men, who, being pressed by authority, did bite the file, and submitted their doctrine, but kept their reason to themselves: and what some in the council of Trent observed of Scotus, was true also of Durandus and divers other schoolmen, with whom it was usual to deny things with a kind of courtesy. And therefore Durandus in the places cited, though he disputes well for his own opinion, yet he says the contrary is 'modus tenendus de facto.' But besides that his words are, as I understand them, plain and clear to manifest his own hearty persuasion, yet I shall not desire to be believed upon my own account, for fear I be mistaken; but that I had

[z] Lib. 3. de Euchar. c. 23. sect. Unum tamen.

[a] Scotus negat doctrinam de conversione et transubst. esse antiquam. Henriquez lib. 8. c. 23. in marg. ad liter. H.

reason to say it, Henriquez [b] shall be my warrant: "Durandus, dist. qu. 3. ait esse probabile sed absque assertione," &c. He saith, "It is probable, but without assertion, that in the eucharist the same matter of bread remains without quantity." And a little after he adds out of Cajetan, Paludanus, and Soto, that this opinion of Durandus is erroneous, but after the council of Trent it seems to be heretical: and yet, he says, it was held by Ægidius and Euthymius, who had the good luck, it seems, to live and die before the council of Trent; otherwise they had been in danger of the inquisition for heretical pravity. But I shall not trouble myself further in this particular; I am fully vindicated by Bellarmine [c] himself, who spends a whole chapter in the confutation of this error of Durandus, viz. that the matter of bread remains, he endeavours to answer his arguments, and gives this censure of him; "itaque sententia Durandi hæretica est," "therefore the sentence of Durandus is heretical;" although he be not to be called a heretic, because he was ready to acquiesce in the judgment of the church. So Bellarmine: who, if they say true, that Durandus was ready to submit to the judgment of the church, then he does not say true when he says, the church before his time had determined against him: but however, that I said true of him, when I imputed this opinion to him, Bellarmine is my witness. Thus you see I had reason for what I said, and by these instances it appears how hardly, and how long, the doctrine of transubstantiation was, before it could be swallowed.

But I remember that Salmeron tells of divers, who, distrusting of Scripture and reason, had rather in this point rely upon the tradition of the fathers; and therefore I descended to take from them this armour, in which they trusted. And first, to ease a more curious inquiry, which in a short Dissuasive was not convenient, I used the abbreviature of an adversary's confession. For Alphonsus à Castro confessed that 'in ancient writers there is seldom any mention made of transubstantiation:' one of my adversaries [d] says, this is not spoken of the thing, but of the name of transubstantiation; but if à Castro meant this only of the word, he spake weakly when he said, that the 'name or word was

[b] Summa. l. 8. c. 23. p. 448. lit. C. in marg.
[c] Lib. 3. de Euchar. cap. 13. [d] Letter, p. 21.

seldom mentioned by the ancients.' 1. Because it is false that it was 'seldom' mentioned by the ancients; for the word was by the ancient fathers 'never' mentioned. 2. Because there was not any question of the word, where the thing was agreed; and therefore as this saying so understood had been false, so also if it had been true, it would have been impertinent. 3. It is but a trifling artifice to confess the name to be unknown, and by that means to insinuate that the thing was then under other names; it is a secret cozenage of an unwary reader to bribe him into peace and contentedness for the main part of the question by pleasing him in that part, which, it may be, makes the biggest noise, though it be less material. 4. If the thing had been mentioned by the ancients, they need not, would not, ought not to, have troubled themselves and others by a new word; to have still retained the old proposition under the old words, would have been less suspicious, more prudent and ingenious: but to bring in a new name is but the cover for a new doctrine; and therefore St. Paul left an excellent precept to the church to avoid "prophanas vocum novitates," "the profane newness of words," that is, it is fit that the mysteries, revealed in Scripture, should be preached and taught in the words of the Scripture, and with that simplicity, openness, easiness, and candour, and not with new and unhallowed words, such as is that of transubstantiation. 5. A Castro did not speak of the name alone; but of the thing also, "de transubstantiatione panis in corpus Christi," "of the transubstantiation of bread into Christ's body;" of this manner of conversion, that is, of this doctrine; now doctrines consist not in words but things; however, his last words are faint and weak and guilty; for being convinced of the weakness of his defence of the thing, he left to himself a subterfuge of words.

But let it be how it will with à Castro (whom I can very well spare, if he will not be allowed to speak sober sense, and as a wise man should), we have better and fuller testimonies in this affair; "that the fathers did not so much as touch the matter or thing of transubstantiation," said the Jesuits in prison, as is reported by the 'author of the Modest Discourse;' and the great Erasmus[*], who lived and died in the

[*] In priorem Epist. ad Corinthios: citante etiam Salmeron. tom. 9. tract. 16. p. 108.

communion of the church of Rome, and was as likely as any man of his age to know what he said, gave this testimony in the present question; "In synaxi transubstantiationem nero definivit ecclesia, et re et nomine veteribus ignotam:" "In the communion, the church hath but lately defined transubstantiation, which, both in the thing and in the name, was unknown to the ancients."

Now this was a fair and friendly inducement to the reader to take from him all prejudice, which might stick to him by the great noises of the Roman doctors, made upon their pretence of the fathers being on their side; yet I would not so rely upon these testimonies, but that I thought fit to give some little essay of this doctrine out of the fathers themselves [f].

To this purpose is alleged Justin Martyr's saying of the eucharist, that "it was a figure, which our Lord commanded to do in remembrance of his passion." These were quoted not as the words, but as the doctrine of that saint; and the Letter will needs suppose me to mean those words, which are, as I find, in p. 259, 260, of the Paris edition [g]. "The oblation of a cake was a figure of the eucharistical bread, which the Lord commanded to do in remembrance of his passion." These are Justin's words in that place, with which I have nothing to do, as I shall shew by and by: but because Cardinal Perron intends to make advantage of them, I shall wrest them first out of his hands, and then give an account of the doctrine of this holy man in the present article; both out of this place and others. Τῆς σμιδάλεως προσφορὰ, "The oblation of a cake was a figure of the bread of the eucharist, which our Lord delivered us to do;" therefore, says the Cardinal, the eucharistical bread is the 'truth,' since the cake was the 'figure' or the shadow.—To which I answer, that though the cake was a figure of the eucharistical bread, yet so might that bread be a figure of something else: just as baptism, I mean, the external right, which although itself be but the outward part, and is the τύπος, or 'figure' of the inward washing by the Spirit of grace, and represents our being buried with Christ in his death, yet it is an accomplishment, in some sense, of those many figures, by which (according

[f] Videat lector Picherelli exposit. verborum institutionis cœnæ Domini, et ejusdem dissertationem de Missâ.

[g] 1615.

to the doctrine of the fathers) it was prefigured. Such as, in St. Peter, the waters of the deluge; in Tertullian, were the waters of Jordan into which Naaman descended; in St. Austin, the waters of sprinkling: these were types, and to these baptism did succeed, and represented the same thing which they represented, and effected or exhibited the thing it did represent, and therefore, in this sense, they prefigured baptism: and yet that this is but a figure still, we have St. Peter's [h] warrant; "the like figure whereunto even baptism doth also now save us (not the putting away the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience towards God)." The waters of the flood were τύπος 'a type' of the waters of baptism; the waters of baptism were ἀντίτυπον, that is, 'a type answering to a type:' and yet even here there is a typical representing, and signifying part, and beyond that there is the 'veritas,' or the 'thing signified' by both. So it is in the oblation of the cake, and the eucharistical bread, that was a type of this, and this the ἀντίτυπον, or 'correspondent' of that; a type answering to a type, a figure to a figure; and both of them did and do respectively represent a thing yet more secret. For as St. Austin said, these and those are divers in the sign, but equal in the thing signified; divers in the visible species, but the same in the intelligible signification; those were promissive, and these demonstrative; or, as others express it, those were pronunciative, and these of the Gospel are contestative. So friar Gregory of Padua [i] noted in the council of Trent: and that this was the sense of Justin Martyr, appears to him that considers what he says. 1. He does not say the 'cake' is a type of the bread, but 'the oblation' of the cake; that is, that whole rite of offering a cake, after the leper was cleansed, in token of thankfulness, and for his legal purity, was a type of the bread of the eucharist, "which, for the remembrance of the passion, which he suffered for these men whose minds are purged from all perverseness, Jesus Christ our Lord commanded to make or do:" To do what?—To do bread? or to make bread? No, but to make bread to be eucharistical, to be a memorial of the passion, to represent the death of Christ: so that it is not the cake and the bread that are the type and the antitype; but the oblation of the cake was the figure, and the

[h] 1 Pet. iii. 21. [i] A. D. 1547.

celebration of Christ's memorial, and the eucharist, are the things presignified and prefigured; but then it remains, that the eucharistical bread is but the instrument of a memorial or recordation, which still supposes something beyond this, and by this to be figured and represented. For as the Apostle says, "Our fathers did eat of the same spiritual meat," that is, they ate Christ, but they ate him in figure, that is, in an external symbol: so do we: only theirs is abolished, and ours succeeds the old, and shall abide for ever. Nay, the very words used by Justin Martyr do evince this, it is ἄρτος εὐχαριστίας, when it is 'a eucharist, it is still but bread;' and therefore there is a body, of which this is but an outward argument, a vehicle, a channel and conveyance, and that is the body of Christ; for the eucharistical bread is both bread and Christ's body too. For it is a good argument to say, "This is bread eucharistical, therefore this is bread;" and if it be bread still, it must be a figure of the bread of life; and this is that which I affirmed to be the sense of Justin Martyr. The like expression to this is in his second Apology; "It is not common bread,"—meaning that it is sanctified and made eucharistical. But here, it may be, the argument will not hold; 'It is not common bread,—therefore it is bread:' for I remember that Cardinal Perron hath some instances against this way of arguing. For the dove that descended upon Christ's head, was not a common dove; and yet it follows not, therefore this was a dove. The three that appeared to Abraham, were not common men; therefore they were men, it follows not. This is the sophistry of the Cardinal, for the confutation of which I have so much logic left as to prove this to be a fallacy, and it will soon appear if it be reduced to a regular proposition. 'This bread is not common: therefore this bread is extraordinary bread;' but therefore 'this is bread still;'—here the consequence is good; and is so still, when the subject of the proposition is something real[k], and not in appearance only; because whatsoever is but in appearance and pretence, is a 'non ens' in respect of that real thing which it counterfeits. And therefore it follows not, 'this is not a common dove;

[k] A propositione tertii adjecti, ad propositionem secundi adjecti valet consequentia, si subjectum supponat realiter. Reg. Dialect.—Vide sect. 5. n. 10. of Christ's Real Presence and Spiritual.

therefore it is a dove;' because, if this be modelled into a right proposition, 'nihil supponit;' 'there is no subject in it,' for it cannot in this case be said, 'This dove is no common dove; but this, which is like a dove, is not a common dove; and these persons which look like men, are not common men.' And the rule for this and the reason too is, "Non entis nulla sunt prædicata."—To which also this may be added, that in the proposition, as Cardinal Perron expresses it, the negation is not the adjective, but the substantive part of the predicate; 'It is no common dove;' where the negative term relates to the dove, not to common; it is no dove; and the words 'not common' are also equivocal, and as it can signify 'extraordinary,' so it can signify 'natural.' But if the subject of the proposition be something real, then the consequent is good; as if you bring a pigeon from Japan, all red, you may say, 'This is no common pigeon,' and your argument is still good; therefore 'it is a pigeon.'—So if you take sugared bread, or bread made of Indian wheat, you—saying, 'This is no common bread,' do mean it is 'extraordinary' or 'unusual,' but it is 'bread still;' and so if it be said, 'This bread is eucharistical,' it will follow rightly, therefore 'this is bread.' For in this case the predicate is only an infinite or negative term, but the subject is supposed and affirmed. And this is also more apparent, if the proposition be affirmative, and the terms be not infinite, as it is in the present case; 'This bread is eucharistical.' I have now, I suppose, cleared the words of Justin Martyr, and expounded them to his own sense and the truth; but his sense will further appear in other words, which I principally rely upon in this quotation. For speaking that of the prophet Isaiah, "Panis dabitur ei, et aqua ejus fidelis," he hath these words; It appears sufficiently "that, in this prophecy he speaks of bread, which our Lord Christ hath delivered to us to do εἰς ἀνάμνησιν τοῦ σωματοποιήσασθαι, 'for a memorial that he is made a body' for them that believe in him, for whose sake he was made passible; and of the cup which, for the recordation of his blood, he delivered to them to do [that is, give thanks] or celebrate the eucharist." These are the words of Justin: where, 1. According to the first simplicity of the primitive church, he treats of this mystery according to the style of the evangelists and St. Paul, and indeed of our

blessed Lord himself, commanding all this whole mystery to be done 'in memory of him.' 2. If St. Justin had meant any thing of the new fabric of this mystery[l], he must have said, Χριστὸς παρέδωκεν τὸν ἄρτον σωματοποιηθέντα, 'the bread made his body;' though this also would not have done their work for them; but when he says he gave the bread only for the remembrance of his being made a body, the bread must needs be the sign, figure, and representation, of that body. 3. Still he calls it bread, even then when Christ gave it; still it is wine, when the eucharist is made, when the faithful have given thanks; and if it be bread still, we also grant it to be Christ's body, and then there is a figure and the things figured, the one visible and the other invisible; and this is it which I affirmed to be the sense of Justin Martyr. And it is more perfectly explicated by St. Gregory Nazianzen[m], calling the paschal lamb 'a figure of a figure,' of which I shall yet give an account in this section. But to make this yet more clear, οὐ γὰρ ὡς κοινὸν ἄρτον, οὐδὲ κοινὸν πότον ταῦτα λαμβάνομεν, &c. "We do not receive these as common bread or common drink; but as by the word of God, Jesus Christ our Lord was made flesh, and for our salvation had flesh and blood: so are we taught, that that very nourishment,—on which by the prayers of his word thanks are given, by which our flesh and blood are nourished by change,—is the flesh and blood of the incarnate Jesus." Here St. Austin compares the consecration of the eucharist by prayer to the incarnation of Christ, the thing with the thing, to shew it is not common bread, but bread made Christ's body; he compares not the manner of one with the manner of the other, as Cardinal Perron[n] would fain have it believed, for if it were so, it would not only destroy an article of Christian faith, but even of the Roman too; for if the changes were in the same manner, then either the man is transubstantiated into God, or else the bread is not transubstantiated into Christ's body; but the first cannot be, because it would destroy the hypostatical union, and make Christ to be one nature as well as one person; but for the latter part of the dilemma, viz. that the

[l] P. 296. [m] Oratio 2. in Pascha.

[n] Sic solemus loqui: sicut panis est vita corporis, ita verbum Dei est vita animæ. Non scil. eundem conversionis aut nutriendi modum connotando, sed similem et analogicum effectum utriusque nutrimenti observando.

bread is not transubstantiated, whether it be true or false, it cannot be affirmed from hence: and therefore the Cardinal labours to no purpose, and without consideration of what may follow. But now these words make very much against the Roman hypothesis, and directly prove the εὐχαριστηθεῖσα τροφὴ, 'the consecrated bread,' that is, after it is consecrated, to be natural nourishment of the body, and therefore to be Christ's body only spiritually, and sacramentally: unless it can be two substances at the same time; Christ's body and bread in the natural sense, which the church of Rome at this day will not allow; and if it were allowed, it would follow that Christ's body should be transubstantiated into our body, and suffer the very worst changes, which, in our eating and digestion and separation, happen to common bread. This argument relies upon the concurrent testimony of many of the ancient fathers besides Justin Martyr [o], especially St. Irenæus; and certainly destroys the whole Roman article of transubstantiation; if the eucharistical bread nourishes the body, then it is still the substance of bread: for accidents do not nourish, and quantity or quality is not the subject or term of nutrition; but reparation of substance by a substantial change of one into another. But of this enough.

Eusebius is next alleged in the 'Dissuasive;' but his words, though pregnant and full of proof against the Roman hypothesis, are by all the contra-scribers let alone; only one of them says [p], that the place of the quotation is not rightly marked, for the first three chapters are not extant: well! but the words are, and the last chapter is, which is there quoted; and to the tenth chapter the printer should have more carefully attended, and not omit the cipher; which I suppose he would, if he had foreseen he should have been written against by so learned an adversary. But to let them agree as well as they can, the words of Eusebius, out of his last chapter, I translated as well as I could; the Greek words I have set in the margent [q], that every one that under-

[o] Lib. 4. c. 34. lib. 5. c. 2. [p] A. L.

[q] Demonstr. Evang. lib. 2. c. ult. Τούτου δῆτα τοῦ θύματος τὴν μνήμην ἐπὶ τραπέζης ἐκτελεῖν διὰ συμβόλων τοῦτε σώματος αὐτοῦ, καὶ τοῦ σωτηρίου αἵματος κατὰ θεσμοὺς τῆς κοινῆς διαθήκης παρειληφότες. 'The apostles received a command according to the constitution of the New Testament to make a memory of this sacrifice upon the table by the symbols of his body and healthful blood.' So the words are translated in the Dissuasive. But the Letter translates them thus: 'Seeing therefore we have re-

stands, may see I did him right; and indeed to do my adversary right, when he goes about to change, not to mend the translation, he only changes the order of the words, but in nothing does he mend his own matter by it: for he acknowledges the main question, viz. that 'the memory of Christ's sacrifice is to be celebrated in certain signs on the table;' but then, that I may do myself right, and the question too; whosoever translated these words for this gentleman, hath abused him, and made him to render ἐκτελεῖν as if it were ἐκτελεῖσθαι, and hath made τὴν μνήμην to be governed by παρειληφότες, which is so far off it, and hath no relation to it, and not to be governed by ἐκτελεῖν with which it is joined; and hath made σώματος to be governed by τὴν μνήμην, when it hath a substantive of its own, συμβόλων; and he repeats τὴν μνήμην once more than it is in the words of Eusebius, only because he would not have the reader suppose, that Eusebius called the consecrated elements, 'the symbols of the body and blood.' But this fraud was too much studied to be excusable upon the stock of human infirmity, or an innocent persuasion. But that I may satisfy the reader in this question, so far as the testimony and doctrine of Eusebius can extend, he hath these words fully to our purpose: "First, our Lord and Saviour, and then after him his priests of all nations, celebrating the spiritual sacrifice according to the ecclesiastic laws, by the bread and the wine signify the mysteries of his body and healing blood."—And again: "By the wine, which is the symbol of his blood, he purges the old sins of them, who were baptized into his death, and believe in his blood." Again: "He gave to his disciples the symbols of the divine economy, commanding them to make the image (figure or representation) of his own body." And again: "He received not the sacrifices of blood, nor the slaying of divers beasts instituted in the law of Moses, but ordained we should use bread, the symbol of his own body[r]." So far I

ceived the memory of this sacrifice to be celebrated in certain signs on the table, and the memory of that body and healthful blood (as is the institute of the New Testament).'

[r] Lib. 5. c. 3. Πρῶτος μὲν αὐτὸς ὁ Σωτὴρ καὶ Κύριος ἡμῶν, ἔπειτα οἱ ἐξ αὐτοῦ πάντες ἱερεῖς ἀνὰ πάντα τὰ ἔθνη, τὴν πνευματικὴν ἐπιτελοῦντες, κατὰ τοὺς ἐκκλησιαστικοὺς θεσμοὺς, ἱερουργίαν οἴνου καὶ ἄρτου, τοῦ τε σώματος αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ σωτηρίου αἵματος αἰνίττονται τὰ μυστήρια. Et lib. 8. c. 1. Διὰ τοῦ οἴνου, ὅπερ ἦν τοῦ αἵματος αὐτοῦ σύμβολον, τοὺς εἰς τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ βαπτιζομένους, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ αἷμα αὐτοῦ πεπιστευκότας, τῶν πάλαι κακῶν ἀποκαθαίρει. Et paulo post: Πάλαι γὰρ αὐτὸς τὰ σύμβολα τῆς ἐνθέου οἰκονομίας τοῖς

thought fit to set down the words of Eusebius, to convince my adversary that Eusebius is none of theirs, but he is wholly ours in the doctrine of the sacrament.

St. Macarius[s] is cited in the Dissuasive in these words; "In the church is offered bread and wine, the antitype of his flesh and blood, and they that partake of the bread that appears, do spiritually eat of the flesh of Christ[t]." A. L. saith, 'Macarius saith not so, but rather the contrary, viz. bread and wine exhibiting the exemplar [or an antitype], his flesh and blood.' Now although I do not suppose many learned or good men will concern themselves with what this little man says; yet I cannot but note [that they who gave him this answer, may be ashamed], for here is a doublesatisfaction in this little answer. First, he puts in the word 'exhibiting,' of his own head; there being no such word in St. Macarius in the words quoted. 2. He makes σαρκὸς to be put with ἀντίτυπον, by way of apposition, expressly against the mind of St. Macarius, and against the very grammar of his words. And after all, he studies to abuse his author, and yet gets no good by it himself; for if it were in the words as he hath invented it, or somebody else for him, yet it makes against him as much, saying, 'Bread and wine exhibit Christ's body;' which is indeed true, though not here said by the saint, but is directly against the Roman article, because it confesses that to be bread and wine by which Christ's body is exhibited to us: but much more is the whole testimony of St. Macarius, which, in the Dissuasive, is translated exactly, as the reader may see by the Greek words cited in the margent.

There now only remains the authority of St. Austin, which this gentleman[u] would fain snatch from the church of England, and assert to his own party. I cited five places out of St. Austin, to the last of which but one, he gives this answer; that 'St. Austin hath no such words in that book, that is, in the tenth book against Faustus the Manichee.' Concerning which, I am to inform the gen-

αὐτοῦ παρεδίδου μαθηταῖς, τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἰδίου σώματος ποιεῖσθαι παρακελευόμενος.—Οὐκέτι τὰς δ' αἱμάτων θυσίας οὐδὲ τὰς παρὰ Μωσεῖ ἐν διαφόροις ζώων σφαγαῖς νενομοθετημένας προσίεται, ἄρτου δὲ χρῆσθαι συμβόλῳ τοῦ ἰδίου σώματος παρεδίδου. Ὅτι ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ προσφέρεται ἄρτος καὶ οἶνος, ἀντίτυπον τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἵματος, καὶ οἱ μεταλαμβάνοντες ἐκ τοῦ φαινομένου ἄρτου, πνευματικῶς τὴν σάρκα τοῦ Κυρίου ἐσθίουσιν.

[s] Macarius, homil. 27. [t] P. 22. [u] Ibid.

tleman a little better. These words, "that which by all men is called a sacrifice, is the sign of the true sacrifice,"—are in the tenth book of St. Austin 'de Civitate,' cap. 5. and make a distinct quotation, and ought by the printer to have been divided by a column, as the other. But the following words, "in which the flesh of Christ after his assumption is celebrated by the sacrament of remembrance," are in the 20th book, cap. 21, against Faustus the Manichee[x]. All these words and divers others of St. Austin I knit together in a close order, like a continued discourse; but all of them are St. Austin's words, as appears in the places set down in the margent. But this gentleman cared not for what was said by St. Austin, he was as well pleased that a figure was false printed; but to the words he hath nothing to say. To the first of the other four only he makes this crude answer; that 'St. Austin denied not the real eating of Christ's body in the eucharist, but only the eating in that gross, carnal, and sensible manner, as the Capharnaites conceived.' To which I reply, that it is true, that upon occasion of this error St. Austin did speak those words: and although the Roman error be not so gross and dull as that of the Capharnaites, yet it was as false, as unreasonable, and as impossible. And be the occasion of the words what they are, or can be, yet upon this occasion St. Austin spake words, which as well confute the Roman error as the Capharnaitical. For it is not only false which the men of Capernaum dreamt of, but the antithesis to this is that which St. Austin urges, and which comes home to our question, 'I have commended to you a sacrament, which being spiritually understood shall quicken you:' but because St. Austin was the most diligent expounder of this mystery among all the fathers, I will gratify my adversary, or rather indeed my unprejudicate readers, by giving some other very clear and unanswerable evidences of the doctrine of St. Austin, agreeing perfectly with that of our church[y]: "At this time, after manifest token of our liberty hath shined in the resurrection of our Lord Jesus, we are not burdened with the heavy operation of signs: but some few instead of many,—but those most easy to be done, and most

[x] Hujus sacrificii caro et sanguis ante adventum Christi per victimas similitudinum promittebatur: in passione Christi per ipsam veritatem reddebatur, post ascensum Christi per sacramentum memoriæ celebratur. Lib. 20. c. 21. contr. Faustum Manich. [y] De Doctr. Christ. lib. 3. cap. 9.

glorious to be understood, and most pure in their observation, our Lord himself, and the apostolical discipline, hath delivered: such is the sacrament of baptism, and the celebration of the body and blood of our Lord, which, when every one takes, he understands whither they may be referred, that he may give them veneration, not with carnal service, but with a spiritual liberty. For as to follow the letter, and to take the signs for the things signified by them, is a servile infirmity; so to interpret the signs unprofitably is an evil wandering error. But he that understands not what the sign signifies, but yet understandeth it to be a sign, is not pressed with servitude. But it is better to be pressed with unknown signs, so they be profitable, than, by expounding them unprofitably, to thrust our necks into the yoke of slavery, from which they were brought forth." All this St. Austin spake concerning the sacramental signs, the bread and the wine in the eucharist; and if by these words he does not intend to affirm, that they are the signs signifying Christ's body and blood; let who please to undertake it, make sense of them: for my part I cannot.

To the same purpose are these words of his[z]; "Christ is in himself once immolated, and yet in the sacrament he is sacrificed not only in the solemnities of Easter, but every day with the people. Neither indeed does he lie, who being asked, shall answer, that he is sacrificed: for if the sacraments have not a similitude of those things of which they are sacraments, they were altogether no sacraments; but commonly for this similitudethey take the names of the things themselves, 'sicut ergo secundum quendam modum,' &c. As 'therefore after a certain manner' the sacrament of the body of Christ is the body of Christ, the sacrament of the blood of Christ is the blood of Christ, so the sacrament of faith (viz. baptism) is faith."—Christ is but once immolated or sacrificed in himself, but every day in the sacrament; that properly, this in figure; that in substance, this in similitude; that naturally, this sacramentally and spiritually. But therefore we call this mystery a sacrifice, as we call the sacrament Christ's body, viz. by way of similitude or after a certain manner, for upon this account the names of the things are imputed to their very figures. This is St. Austin's sense:

[z] Epist. 23.

which indeed he frequently so expresses. Now I desire it may be observed, that oftentimes when St. Austin speaking of the eucharist, calls it the body and blood of Christ; he oftentimes adds, by way of explication, that he means it, in the sacramental, figurative sense; but whenever he calls it, the figure or the sacrament of Christ's body, he never offers to explain that by any words, by which he may signify such a real or natural being of Christ's body there, as the church of Rome dreams of; but he ought not, neither would he have given offence or umbrage to the church, by any such incurious and loose handling of things, if the church in his age had thought of it, otherwise, than that it was Christ's body in a sacramental sense.

Though I have remarked all that is objected by A. L. yet E. W.[a] is not satisfied with the quotation out of Gregory Nazianzen, not but that he acknowledges it to be right, for he sets down the words in Latin[b]; but they conclude nothing against transubstantiation. Why so? because, though the paschal was a type of a type, a figure of a figure, yet 'in St. Gregory's sense, Christ concealed under the species of bread may be rightly called a figure of its own self, more clearly hereafter to be shewed us in heaven.'—To this pitiful answer the reply is easy. St. Gregory clearly enough expresses himself, that in the immolation of the passover Christ was figured; that in the eucharist he still is figured; there more obscurely, here more clearly, but yet still but typically, or in figure; 'nunc quidem adhuc typicè;' 'here we are partakers of him typically.' Afterward we 'shall see him perfectly,' meaning, in his Father's kingdom.—So that the saint affirms Christ to be received by us in the sacrament, after a figurative or typical manner: and therefore, not after a substantial, as that is opposed to figurative. Now of what is this a type?—of himself to be more clearly seen in heaven hereafter.—It is very true, it is so; for this whole ceremony, and figurative, ritual receiving of Christ's body here, does prefigure our more excellent receiving and enjoying him hereafter; but then it follows that the very proper substance of Christ's body is not here; for figure or shadow and substance cannot be the same;

[a] P. 41.

[b] Orat. 2. in Pascha. Jam verò paschalis participes erimus, nunc quidem adhuc typicè, tametsi apertiùs licet quam in veteri; legale siquidem pascha (nec enim dicere verebor) figura erat obscurior.

to say a thing that is present, is a figure of itself hereafter, is to be said by no man but him that cares not what he says. 'Nemo est sui ipsius imago,' saith St. Hilary [c]; and yet if it were possible to be otherwise, it is a strange figure or sign of a thing, that what was invisible, should be a sign of what is visible. Bellarmine [d], being greatly put to it by the fathers calling the sacrament 'the figure of Christ's body,' says, it is in some sense a figure of Christ's body on the cross; and here E. W. would affirm out of Nazianzen that it is a figure of Christ's body glorified. Now suppose both those dreamers say right, then this sacrament, which whether you look forwards or backwards, is a figure of Christ's body,—cannot be that body of which so many ways it is a figure. So that the whole force of E. W.'s answer is this; that if that which is like be the same, then it is possible that a thing may be a sign of itself, and a man may be his own picture; and that which is invisible, may be a sign to give notice to come see a thing that is visible.

I have now expedited this topic of authority in this question. Amongst the many reasons I urged against transubstantiation (which I suppose to be unanswerable, and if I could have answered them myself, I would not have produced them), these gentlemen my adversaries are pleased to take notice but of one [e]; but by that it may be seen how they could have answered all the rest, if they had pleased. The argument is this: 'Every consecrated wafer (saith the church of Rome) is Christ's body; and yet this wafer is not that wafer, therefore either this or that is not Christ's body, or else Christ hath two natural bodies; for here are two wafers.' To this is answered, The multiplication of wafers does not multiply bodies to Christ, no more than head and feet infer two souls in a man, or conclude there are two Gods, one in heaven, and the other in earth, because heaven and earth are more distinct than two wafers. —To which I reply, that the soul of man is in the head and feet as in two parts of the body which is one and whole, and so is but in one place, and consequently is but one soul. But if the feet were parted from the body by other bodies intermedial, then indeed, if there were but one soul in feet and

[c] Lib. de Synod.

[d] De Euchar. lib. 2. c. 15. sect. Est igitur tertia.

[e] E. W. p. 42.

head, the gentleman had spoken to the purpose. But here these wafers are two entire wafers, separate the one from the other; bodies intermedial put between; and that which is here is not there; and yet of each of them it is affirmed, that it is Christ's body; that is, of two wafers, and of two thousand wafers, it is at the same time affirmed of every one that it is Christ's body. Now if these wafers are substantially not the same, not one, but many; and yet every one of these many is substantially and properly Christ's body, then these bodies are many, for they are many of whom it is said, 'Every one distinctly, and separately, and in itself, is Christ's body.' 2. For his comparing the presence of Christ in the wafer, with the presence of God in heaven, is spoken without common wit or sense; for does any man say that God is in two places, and yet be the same one God? Can God be in two places that cannot be in one? Can he be determined and numbered by places, that fills all places by his presence? or is Christ's body in the sacrament, as God is in the world, that is 'repletivè,' filling all things alike, spaces void and spaces full, and there where there is no place, where the measures are neither time nor place, but only the power and will of God. This answer, besides that it is weak and dangerous, is also to no purpose, unless the church of Rome will pass over to the Lutherans and maintain the ubiquity of Christ's body. Yea, but St. Austin[f] says of Christ "ferebatur in manibus suis," &c. "he bore himself in his own hands:" and what then?—'Then though every wafer be Christ's body, yet the multiplication of wafers does not multiply bodies: for then there would be two bodies of Christ, when he carried his own body in his hands.'—To this I answer, that concerning St. Austin's mind we are already satisfied, but that which he says here is true, as he spake and intended it; for by his own rule, the similitudes and figures of things are oftentimes called by the names of those things whereof they are similitudes: Christ bore his own body in his own hands, when he bore the sacrament of his body; for of that also it is true, that it is truly his body in a sacramental, spiritual, and real manner, that is, to all intents and purposes of the Holy Spirit of God. According to the words of St. Austin cited by P. Lombard: "We call that the body of

[f] In Ps. xxxiii.

Christ, which, being taken from the fruits of the earth, and consecrated by mystic prayer, we receive in memory of the Lord's passion; which when by the hands of men it is brought on to that visible shape, it is not sanctified to become so worthy a sacrament, but by the Spirit of God working invisibly [g]."—If this be good catholic doctrine, and if this confession of this article be right, the church of England is right; but then when the church of Rome will not let us alone in this truth and modesty of confession, but impose what is unknown in antiquity and Scripture, and against common sense, and the reason of all the world; she must be greatly in the wrong. But as to this question, I was here only to justify the Dissuasive; I suppose these gentlemen may be fully satisfied in the whole inquiry, if they please to read a book [h] I have written on this subject entirely, of which hitherto they are pleased to take no great notice.

SECTION IV.

Of the Half-Communion.

When the French ambassador in the council of Trent, A. D. 1561, made instance for restitution of the chalice to the laity, among other oppositions the Cardinal St. Angelo answered; 'that he would never give a cup full of such deadly poison to the people of France, instead of a medicine, and that it was better to let them die, than to cure them with such remedies.' The ambassador being greatly offended, replied; 'that it was not fit to give the name of poison to the blood of Christ, and to call the holy apostles poisoners, and the fathers of the primitive church, and of that which followed for many hundred years, who with much spiritual profit have ministered the cup of that blood to all the people:' this was a great and a public, yet but a single person, that gave so great offence.

One of the greatest scandals that ever was given to Christendom, was given by the council of Constance [i]; which

[g] Lib. 3. de Trin. c. 4. in fine P. Lombard dist. 11. lib. 4. ad finem lit. C.

[h] Christ's Real and Spiritual Presence in the Sacrament, against the Doctrine of Transubstantiation: printed at London by R. Royston.

[i] Sess. 13.

having acknowledged that Christ administered this venerable sacrament under both kinds of bread and wine, and that in the primitive church this sacrament was received of the faithful under both kinds, yet the council not only condemns them as heretics, and to be punished accordingly, who say it is unlawful to observe the custom and law of giving it in one kind only; but under pain of excommunication forbids all priests to communicate the people under both kinds. This last thing is so shameful and so impious, that A. L. directly denies that there is any such thing: which if it be not an argument of the self-conviction of the man, and a resolution to abide in his error, and to deceive the people even against his knowledge, let all the world judge: for the words of the council's decree, as they are set down by Carranza, at the end of the decree, are these; "Item præcipimus, sub pœna excommunicationis, quod nullus presbyter communicet populum sub utraque specie panis et vini[k]." I need say no more in this affair: to affirm it necessary to do in the sacraments what Christ did, is called heresy; and to do so is punished with excommunication. But we who follow Christ, hope we shall communicate with him, and then we are well enough; especially since the very institution of the sacrament, in both kinds, is a sufficient commandment to minister and receive it in both kinds. For if the church of Rome upon their supposition only, that Christ did barely institute confession, do therefore urge it as necessary, it will be a strange partiality, that the confessed institution by Christ of the two sacramental species, shall not conclude them as necessary, as the other upon an unproved supposition. And if the institution of the sacrament in both kinds be not equal to a command, then there is no command to receive the bread, or indeed, to receive the sacrament at all: but it is a mere act of supererogation, that the priests do it at all, and an act of favour and grace, that they give even the bread itself to the laity.

But besides this, it is not to be endured that the church of Rome only binds her subjects to observe the decree of abstaining from the cup 'jure humano,' and yet they shall be bound 'jure divino,' to believe it to be just, and specially since the causes of so scandalous an alteration are not set down in the decree of any council; and those which are set

[k] Lugduni. A. D. 1600. apud Horatium Cardon. p. 440.

down by private doctors, besides that they are no record of the church, they are ridiculous, weak, and contemptible. But as Granatensis[l] said in the council of Trent, 'This affair can neither be regulated by Scripture nor traditions (for surely it is against both), but by wisdom;' wherein because it is necessary to proceed to circumspection, I suppose the church of Rome will always be considering, whether she should give the chalice or no; and because she will not acknowledge any reason sufficient to give it, she will be content to keep it away without reason: and, which is worse, the church of Rome excommunicates[m] those priests that communicate the people in both kinds; but the primitive church excommunicates them that receive but in one kind. It is too much that any part of the church should so much as in a single instance administer the holy sacrament otherwise than it is in the institution of Christ; there being no other warrant for doing the thing at all, but Christ's institution, and therefore no other way of learning how to do it, but by the same institution by which all of it is done. And if there can come a case of necessity (as if there be no wine, or if a man cannot endure wine), it is then a disputable matter, whether it ought or not to be omitted; for if the necessity be of God's making, he is supposed to dispense with the impossibility: but if a man alters what God appointed, he makes to himself a new institution; for which, in this case, there can be no necessity, nor yet excuse. But suppose either one or other; yet so long as it is, or is thought, a case of necessity, the thing may be hopefully excused, if not actually justified; and because it can happen but seldom, the matter is not great: let the institution be observed always where it can. But then, in all cases of possibility, let all prepared Christians be invited to receive the body and blood of Christ according to his institution; or if that be too much, at least let all them that desire it, be permitted to receive it in Christ's way: but that men are not suffered to do so, that they are driven from it, that they are called heretic for saying it is their duty to receive it as Christ gave it and appointed it, that they should be excommunicated for desiring to communicate in Christ's

[l] A. D. 1562.

[m] Vide Preface to the Dissuasive, part 1. canon Comperimus de Consecrat. dist. 2.

blood, by the symbol of his blood, according to the order of him that gave his blood; this is such a strange piece of Christianity, that it is not easy to imagine what antichrist can do more against it, unless he take it all away. I only desire those persons, who are here concerned, to weigh well the words of Christ, and the consequents of them: "He that breaketh one of the least of my commandments, and shall teach men so," and what if he *compel* men so? "shall be called the least in the kingdom of God."

To the canon last mentioned it is answered, that the canon speaks not of receiving the sacrament by the communicants, but of the consummating the sacrifice by the priest. To this I reply, 1. That it is true that the canon was particularly directed to the priests, by the title which themselves put to it; but the canon meddles not with the consecrating or not consecrating in one kind, but of receiving; for that is the title of the canon. The priest ought not to 'receive' the body of Christ without the blood; and in the canon itself, "comperimus autem, quod quidam, sumpta corporis sacri portione, à calice sacrati cruoris abstineant." By which it plainly appears, that the consecration was entire; for it was 'calix sacrati cruoris,' 'the consecrated chalice,' from which out of a fond superstition some priests did abstain; the canon therefore relates to the sumption or receiving, not the sacrificing (as these men love to call it) or consecration; and the sanction itself speaks indeed of the reception of the sacrament, but not a word of it as it is, in any sense, a sacrifice; "aut integra sacramenta percipiant, aut ab integris arceantur." So that the distinction of 'sacrament' and 'sacrifice' in this question will be of no use to the church of Rome. For if Pope Gelasius (for it was his canon) knew nothing of this distinction, it is vainly applied to the expounding of his words; but if he did know of it, then he hath taken that part which is against the church of Rome; for of this mystery, as it is a sacrament, Gelasius speaks, which therefore must relate to the people as well as the priest. And this canon is to this purpose quoted by Cassander[a]. And, 2. No man is able to shew that ever Christ appointed one way of receiving to the priest, and another to the people. The law was all one, the example the same, the rule is simple and

[a] In Consult. de Sacra Commun.

uniform, and no appearance of difference in the Scripture, or in the primitive church: so that though the canon mentions only the priest, yet it must, by the same reason, mean all; there being at that time no difference known. 3. It is called sacrilege to divide one and the same mystery; meaning, that to receive one without the other, is to divide the body from the blood (for the dream of concomitancy was not then found out), and therefore the title of the canon is thus expressed; "Corpus Christi sine ejus sanguine sacerdos non debet accipere;" and that the so doing, viz. by receiving one without the other, cannot be without sacrilege. 4. Now suppose at last, that the priests only are concerned in this canon, yet even then also they are abundantly reproved, because even the priests in the church of Rome (unless they consecrate) communicate but in one kind. 5. It is also remarkable, that although in the church of Rome there is great use made of the distinction, of its being sometime 'a sacrifice,' sometime only 'a sacrament,' as friar Anthony Mondolphus said in the council of Trent, yet the arguments, by which the Roman doctors do usually endeavour to prove the lawfulness of the half-communion, do destroy this distinction, viz. that of Christ's ministering to the disciples at Emmaus, and St. Paul in the ship: in which either there is no proof or no consecration in both kinds, and consequently no sacrifice: for there is mention made only of 'blessing the bread,' for they received that which was blessed; and therefore either the consecration was imperfect, or the reception was entire.

To this purpose also the words of St. Ambrose are severe, and speak clearly of communicants without distinction of priest and people: which distinction, though it be in this article nothing to the purpose, yet I observe it to prevent such trifling cavils, which my adversaries put me often to fight with. His words are these: "He (viz. the apostle St. Paul) saith, that he is unworthy of the Lord, who otherwise celebrates the mystery than it was delivered by him. For he cannot be devout, that presumes otherwise than it was given by the author: therefore he before admonishes, that according to the order delivered, the mind of him that comes to the eucharist of our Lord, be devout; for there is a judgment to come, that as every one comes, so he may render an account in the day of our Lord Jesus Christ: because they who

come without the discipline of the delivery (or tradition), and of conversation, are guilty of the body and blood of our Lord[o]." One of my adversaries[p] says, these words of St. Ambrose are to be understood only of the priest: and it appears so, by the word 'celebrat,' not 'recipit;' he that 'celebrates' otherwise than is delivered by Christ. To this I answer, that first it is plain, and St. Ambrose so expresses his meaning, to be of all that receive it, for so he says, "that the mind of him that cometh to the eucharist of our Lord, ought to be devout." 2. It is an ignorant conceit, that St. Ambrose by 'celebrat,' means the priest only, because he only can celebrate. For however the church of Rome does now almost impropriate that word to the priest, yet in the primitive church it was no more than 'recipit' or 'accedit ad eucharistiam,' which appears not only by St. Ambrose's expounding it so here,—but in St. Cyprian[q], speaking to a rich matron, "Locuples et dives Dominicum celebrare te credis, et corban omnino non respicis?" "Dost thou, who art rich and opulent, suppose that you 'celebrate' the Lord's supper (or sacrifice), who regardest not the poor man's basket?" 'Celebrat' is the word, and 'receive' must needs be the signification: and so it is in St. Ambrose; and therefore I did, as I ought, translate it so. 3. It is yet objected, that I translate "aliter quam ab eo traditum est," "otherwise than he appointed;" whereas it should be, "otherwise than it was given by him." And this surely is a great matter, and the gentleman is very subtle. But if he be asked, whether or no Christ appointed it to be done as he did, to be given as he gave it; I suppose this deep and wise note of his will just come to nothing. But 'ab eo traditum est,' of itself signifies, 'appointed;' for this he delivered not only by his hands, but by his commandment of 'Hoc facite;' that was his 'appointment.' Now that all this relates to the whole institution and doctrine of Christ in this matter, and therefore to the duplication of the elements, the reception of the chalice, as well

[o] In Corinth. xi. Indignum dicit esse Domino, qui aliter mysterium celebrat quam ab eo traditum est. Non enim potest devotus esse, qui aliter præsumit quam datum est ab auctore. Ideoque præmonet, ut secundum ordinem traditum devota mens sit accedentis ad eucharistiam Domini: quoniam futurum est judicium, ut quemadmodum accedit unusquisque, reddat causas in die Domini Jesu Christi: quia sine disciplinâ traditionis et conversationis qui accedunt, rei sunt corporis et sanguinis Domini.

[p] A. L. p. 4. [q] Serm. 1. de Eleemos.

as the consecrated bread, appears, 1. By the general terms, "qui aliter mysterium celebrat," "he that celebrates otherwise than Christ delivered." 2. These words are a commentary upon that of St. Paul, "He that eats this bread, and drinks the cup of the Lord unworthily, is guilty of the body and blood of the Lord." Now hence St. Ambrose, arguing that all must be done, as our Lord delivered, says also 'that the bread must be eaten, and the cup drunk, as our Lord delivered: and he that does not do both, does not do what our Lord delivered.' 3. The conclusion of St. Ambrose is full to this particular: "They are guilty of the body and blood of Christ, who come without the discipline of the delivery and of conversation;" that is, they who receive without due preparation, and not after the manner it was delivered, that is, under the differing symbols of bread and wine. To which we may add that observation of Cassander[r], and of Vossius[s]; that the apostles represented the persons of all the faithful, and Christ saying to them, 'Take and eat,' he said also, '*Drink* ye all of this;' he said not, '*Eat* ye all of this;' and therefore if by virtue of these words, 'Drink ye all of this,' the laity be not commanded to drink, it can never be proved that the laity are commanded to eat; 'omnes' is added to 'bibite,' but it is not expressly added to 'accipite et comedite;' and therefore Paschasius Radbertus[s], who lived about eight hundred and twenty years after Christ's incarnation, so expounds the precept without any hesitation, "Bibite ex hoc omnes, i. e. tam ministri quam reliqui credentes," "Drink ye all of this, as well they that minister, as the rest of the believers."—And no wonder, since for their so doing they have the example and institution of Christ; by which as by an irrefragable and undeniable argument, the ancient fathers used to reprove and condemn all usages which were not according to it. For saith St. Cyprian[t], "If men ought not to break the least of Christ's commandments, how much less those great ones, which belong to the sacrament of our Lord's passion and redemption, or to change it into any thing but that which was appointed by him?" Now this was spoken against those who refused the hallowed wine, but took water instead of it; and it is of equal force against them, that give

[r] Disp. 5. de Sacra Cœna.
[s] Lib. de Corp. et Sang. Domini, cap. 15.
[t] Epist. 63.

to the laity no cup at all; but whatever the instance was or could be, St. Cyprian reproves it upon the only account of prevaricating Christ's institution. The whole epistle is worth reading for a full satisfaction to all wise and sober Christians: "Ab eo quod Christus magister et præcepit et gessit, humana et novella institutione decedere," "By a new and human institution to depart from what Christ our master commanded and did;" that the bishops would not do: "tamen quoniam quidam," &c. "because there are some who simply and ignorantly," "in calice Dominico sanctificando et plebi ministrando non hoc faciunt quod Jesus Christus Dominus et Deus noster, sacrificii hujus auctor et doctor, fecit et docuit," &c. "in sanctifying the cup of the Lord, and giving it to the people, do not do what Jesus Christ did and taught, viz. they did not give the cup of wine to the people;" therefore St. Cyprian calls them to return "ad radicem et originem traditionis Dominicæ," "to the root and original of the Lord's delivery." Now besides that St. Cyprian plainly says, that when the chalice was sanctified, it was also ministered to the people; I desire it to be considered, whether or no these words do not plainly reprove the Roman doctrine and practice, in not giving the consecrated chalice to the people: do they not recede from the root and original of Christ's institution? Do they do what Christ did? Do they teach what Christ taught? Is not their practice quite another thing than it was at first? Did not the ancient church do otherwise than these men do? and thought themselves obliged to do otherwise? They urged the doctrine and example of our Lord, and the whole economy of the mystery was their warrant and their reason: for they always believed, that a peculiar grace and virtue were signified by the symbol of wine; and it was evident that the chalice was an excellent representment and memorial of the effusion of Christ's blood for us, and the joining both the symbols signifies the entire refection and nourishment of our souls, bread and drink being the natural provisions; and they design and signify our redemption more perfectly, the body being given for our bodies, and the blood for the cleansing our souls, the life of every animal being in the blood: and finally, this, in the integrity, signifies and represents Christ to have taken body and soul for our redemption. For these reasons the 'church

of God always, in all her public communions, gave the chalice to the people for above a thousand years.' This was all I would have remarked in this so evident a matter, but that I observed, in a short spiteful passage of E. W. p. 44, a notorious untruth, spoken with ill intent concerning the holy communion as understood by Protestants. The words are these; "Seeing the fruit of Protestant communion is only to stir up faith in the receiver, I can find no reason why their bit of bread only, may not as well work that effect, as to taste of their wine with it." To these words, 1. I say, that although stirring up faith is one of the divine benefits and blessings of the holy communion, yet it is falsely said, that the fruit of the Protestant communion is only to stir up faith. For in the catechism of the church of England it is affirmed, that "the body and blood of Christ are verily and indeed taken and received of the faithful in the Lord's supper: and that our souls are strengthened and refreshed by the body and blood of Christ, as our bodies are by the bread and wine," and that of stirring up our faith is not at all mentioned: so ignorant, so deceitful, or deceived, is E. W., in the doctrine of the church of England. But then, as for his foolish sarcasm, calling the hallowed elements a 'bit of bread,' which he does in scorn; he might have considered, that if we had a mind to find fault whenever his church gives us cause, that the Papist's wafer is scarce so much as 'a bit of bread,' it is more like marchpane than common bread, and besides that (as Salmeron [u] acknowledges) anciently, "olim ex pane uno sua cuique particula frangi consueverat," that which we in our church do, was the custom of the church; out of a great loaf to give particles to every communicant, by which the communication of Christ's body to all the members is better represented; and that Durandus [x], affirming the same thing, says that the Grecians continue it to this day; besides this, I say, the author of the Roman order (says Cassander [y]) took it very ill, that the loaves of bread, offered in certain churches for the use of the sacrifice, should be brought from the form of true bread to so slight and slender a form, which he calls 'minutias nummulariarum oblatarum,' 'scraps of little pennies,'

[u] Salmer. in 2 Cor. x. disp. 17. p. 183.
[x] Durand. Ration. Divin. Offic. lib. 4. c. 53.
[y] Cassand. Liturg. c. 27. sect. Et cum mensa.

or pieces of money, and not worthy to be called bread; being such which no nation ever used at their meals for bread. But this is one of the innovations, which they have introduced into the religious rites of Christianity, and it is little noted, they having so many greater changes to answer for.

But it seems this section was too hot for them, they loved not much to meddle with it; and therefore I shall add no more fuel to their displeasure, but desire the reader, who would fully understand what is fit to be said in this question, to read it in a book of mine which I call 'Ductor Dubitantium,' or the 'Cases of Conscience[z];' only I must needs observe, that it is an unspeakable comfort to all Protestants, when so manifestly they have Christ on their side in this question against the church of Rome. To which I only add, that for above seven hundred years after Christ, it was esteemed sacrilege in the church of Rome to abstain from the cup, and that, in the 'ordo Romanus,' the communion is always described with the cup; how it is since, and how it comes to be so, is too plain. But it seems the church hath power to dispense in this affair, because St. Paul said, that the "ministers of Christ are dispensers of the mysteries of God:" as was learnedly urged in the council of Trent in the doctrine about this question.

SECTION V.

Of the Scriptures and Service in an unknown Tongue.

THE question being still upon the novelty of the Roman doctrines and practices; I am to make it good that the present article and practice of Rome are contrary to the doctrine and practice of the primitive church. To this purpose I alleged St. Basil in his sermon or book "de Variis Scripturæ locis:" but, say my adversaries, 'there is no such book[a].' Well! was there such a man as St. Basil? If so, we are well enough; and let these gentlemen be pleased to look into his works printed at Paris, 1547, by Carola Guillard, and in p. 130, he shall see this book, sermon, or ho-

[z] Lib. 2. chap. 3. rule 9. [a] E. W. p. 45. and A. L. p. 25.

mily, 'in aliquot scripturæ locos,' at the beginning of which he hath an exhortation in the words placed in the margent; there we shall find the lost sheep: the beginning of it is an exhortation to the people, congregated to "get profit and edification by the Scriptures read at morning-prayer, the monitions in the Psalms, the precepts of the Proverbs; search ye the beauty of the history, and the examples, and add to these the precepts of the apostles. But in all things join the words of the Gospel, as the crown and perfection; that receiving profit from them all, ye may at length turn to that to which every one is sweetly affected, and for the doing of which he hath received the grace of the Holy Spirit[a]."

Now this difficulty being over, all that remains for my own justification is, that I make it appear that St. Chrysostom, St. Ambrose, St. Austin, Aquinas, and Lyra, do respectively exhort to the study of the Scriptures, exhorting even the laity to do so, and testify the custom of the ancient church in praying in a known tongue, and commending this as most useful, and condemning the contrary as being useless and without edification. I shall in order set down the doctrine they deliver, in their own words; and then the impertinent cavils of the adversaries will of themselves come to nothing.

St. Chrysostom[b] commenting upon St. Paul's words concerning preaching and praying for edification, and so as to be understood; coming to those words of St. Paul, 'If I pray with my tongue, my spirit prayeth, but my mind is without fruit,'—"you see" (saith he) "how, a little extolling prayer, he shews, that he who is such a one (viz. as the Apostle there describes) is not only unprofitable to others, but also to himself, since his mind is without fruit."—Now if a man, praying what he understands not, does not, cannot profit himself; how can he that stands by, who understands no more, be profited by that which does him that speaks no good? For God understands though he does not; and yet he that so prays, reaps no benefit to himself, and therefore neither can any man that understands no more. The affirm-

[a] Recordemini, quæso, ex his spiritualibus sermonibus qui lecti sunt medicinæ. Reminiscamini earum, quæ sunt in psalmis, monitionum; proverbialia præcepta, historiæ pulchritudinem, exemplaque investigate. His addite apostolica mandata. In omnibus vero, tanquam coronida perfectionemque, verba evangelica conjungite, ut ex omnibus utilitatem capientes, ad id demum convertatis, et revertamini ad quod quisque jucundè est affectus, et ad quod obeundum gratiam è spiritu sancto accepit.

[b] 35. Homil. in 1 Cor. xiv. chap.

ation is plain, and the reason cogent. To the same purpose are the words of St. Chrysostom, which A. L. himself[c] quotes out of him; "If one speaks in only the Persian tongue, or some other strange tongue, but knows not what he saith, certainly he will be a barbarian even to himself, and not to another only, because he knows not the force of the words." This is no more than what St. Paul said before him; but they all say, that he who hears and understands not, whether it be the speaker or the scholar, is but a barbarian. Thus also St. Ambrose[d] in his commentary upon the words of St. Paul: "The Apostle says, It is better to speak a few words, that are open or understood, that all may understand, than to have a long oration in obscurity:" that is his sense for reading and preaching: now for prayer he adds, "The unskilful man, hearing what he understands not, knows not when the prayer ends, and answers not Amen, that is, 'So be it,' or 'It is true,' that the blessing may be established:" and a little after, "If ye meet together to edify the church, those things ought to be said, which the hearers may understand. For what profit is it to speak with a tongue, when he that hears, is not profited? Therefore he ought to hold his peace in the church, that they who can profit the hearers, may speak[e]."—St. Austin[f] compares "singing in the church without understanding to the chattering of parrots and magpies, crows and jackdaws. But to sing with understanding is by the will of God given to man. And we who sing the divine praises in the church, must remember that it is written, 'Blessed is the people that understands singing of

[c] P. 25. [d] In 1 Cor. xiv.

[e] Utilius dicit (Apostolus) paucis verbis in apertione sermonis loqui, quod omnes intelligant, quàm prolixam orationem habere in obscuro. Imperitus enim audiens quod non intelligit, nescit finem orationis, et non respondet Amen, id est, verum, ut confirmetur benedictio. Et in hæc verba 'Nam tu quidem bene gratias agis' de eo dicit qui cognita sibi loquitur, quia scit quid dicit: 'sed alius non ædificatur:' si utique ad ecclesiam ædificandam convenitis, ea debent dici quæ intelligant audientes. Nam quid prodest ut lingua loquatur quam solus scit, ut qui audit, nihil proficiat. Ideò tacere debet in ecclesiâ, ut si loquantur qui prosunt audientibus.

[f] St. August. in 2. Comment. in Ps. xviii. Deprecati Dominum ut ab occultis nostris mundet nos, et ab alienis parcat servis suis, quid hoc sit intelligere debemus, ut humanâ ratione, non quasi aviam voce, cantemus. Nam et Merulæ, et Psittaci, et Cornices, et Picæ, et hujusmodi volucres, sæpe ab hominibus docentur sonare quod nesciunt. Scienter autem cantare non avi sed homini Divinâ voluntate concessum est.—Et paulò post:—Nos autem qui in ecclesiâ divina eloquia cantare didicimus, illud etiam instare debemus esse quod scriptum est, 'Beatus populus qui intelligit jubilationem:' proinde charissimi quod consonâ voce cantavimus, sereno etiam corde nosse ac videre debemus.

praises.' Therefore, most beloved, what with a joined voice we have sung, we must understand and discern with a serene heart." To the same purpose are the words of Lyra and Aquinas[f], which I shall not trouble the reader withal here, but have set them down in the margent, that the strange confidence of these Romanists, outfacing notorious and evident words, may be made, if possible, yet more conspicuous.

In pursuance of this doctrine of St. Paul and the fathers, the primitive Christians in their several ages and countries were careful, that the Bible should be translated into all languages where Christianity was planted. That the Bibles were in Greek is notorious; and that they were used among the people St. Chrysostom[g] is witness, that it was so, or that it ought to be so. For he exhorts, "Vacemus ergo Scripturis, dilectissimi," &c. "Let us set time apart to be conversant in the Scripture, at least in the Gospels; let us frequently handle them to imprint them in our minds, which because the Jews neglected, they were commanded to have their books in their hands;—but let us not have them in our hands, but in our houses and in our hearts:" by which words we may easily understand, that all the churches of the Greek communion had the Bible in their vulgar tongue, and were called upon to use them as Christians ought to do, that is, to imprint them in their hearts: and speaking of St. John[h] and his Gospel, he says that the Syrians, Indians, Persians, and Ethiopians, and infinite other nations, *εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν μεταβαλόντες γλῶτταν τὰ περὶ τούτου δόγματα εἰσαχθέντα, ἔμαθον ἄνθρωποι βάρβαροι φιλοσοφεῖν*; 'they grew wise by translating his (St. John's) doctrines into their several languages.'—But it is more that St. Austin says: "The divine Scripture, by which help is supplied

[f] Tho. Aquin. in 1 Cor. xiv. Ille qui intelligit reficitur, et quantum ad intellectum et quantum ad affectum; sed mens ejus qui non intelligit, est sine fructu refectionis.—And again: Quantum ad fructum devotionis spiritualis, privatur qui non attendit ad ea quæ orat, seu non intelligit.—Lyra: Cæterum hic consequenter idem ostendit in oratione publicâ, quia si populus intelligat orationem seu benedictionem sacerdotis, melius reducitur in Deum et devotius Amen.—And again: Propter quod in ecclesiâ primitivâ benedictiones et cætera omnia lege communia fiebant in vulgari. For of 'common things,' that is, things in public the Dissuasive speaks, common prayers, common preachings, common eucharists and thanksgivings, common blessings. All these and all other public and common things being used in the vulgar tongue in the primitive; 'communia' and 'omnia' are equivalent, but 'communia' is Lyra's word.

[g] Homil. 1. in Joh. viii.

[h] Homil 1. in viii. Johan. Videat lector S. Basil. in Ascert. in 278. resp. in regul. brevior. et Cassidore.

to so great diseases, proceeded from one language which opportunely might be carried over the whole world, that, being by the various tongues of interpreters scattered far and wide, it might be made known to the nations for their salvation [i]." And Theodoret speaks yet more plainly [k]; "We have manifestly shewn to you the inexhausted strength of the apostolic and prophetic doctrine; for the universal face of the earth, whatsoever is under the sun, is now full of those words. For the Hebrew books are not only translated into the Greek idiom, but into the Roman tongue, the Egyptian, Persian, Indian, Armenian, Scythian, Sauromatic languages; and, that I may speak once for all, into all tongues, which at this day the nations use."—By these authorities of these fathers we may plainly see, how different the Roman doctrine and practice are from the sentiment and usages of the primitive church, and with what false confidence the Roman adversaries deny so evident truth, having no other way to make their doctrine seem tolerable, but by outfacing the known sayings of so many excellent persons; and especially of St. Paul, who could not speak his mind in apt and intelligible words, if he did not, in his Epistle to the Corinthians, exhort the church to pray [l] and prophesy so as to be understood by the catechumens, and by all the people; that is, to do otherwise than they do in the Roman church. Christianity is a simple, wise, intelligible, and easy religion; and yet if a man will resolve against any proposition, he may wrangle himself into a puzzle, and make himself not to understand it so, though it be never so plain: what is plainer than the testimony of their own Cajetan [m], "that it were

[i] De Doctrin. Christianâ, lib. 2. c. 5. Ex quo factum est, ut etiam scriptura divina, quâ tantis morbis humanarum voluntatum subvenitur, ab unâ linguâ profecta, quæ opportunè potuit per orbem terrarum disseminari, per varias interpretum linguas longe lateque diffusa innotesceret gentibus ad salutem.

[k] Theodoret. lib. 5. de Curand. Græc. affect. Nos autem verbis apostolicæ propheticæque doctrinæ inexhaustum robur manifestè ostendimus. Universa enim facies terræ, quantacunque soli subjicitur, ejusmodi verborum plena jam est. Hebræi verò libri non modo in Græcum idioma conversi sunt, sed in Romanam quoque linguam, Ægyptiam, Persicam, Indicam, Armenicamque et Scythicam, atque adeò Sauromaticam, semelque ut dicam, in linguas omnes quibus ad hunc diem nationes utuntur.

[l] Quamvis per se bonum sit ut officia divina celebrentur eâ linguâ quam plebs intelligat, id enim per se confert ad ædificationem, ut bene probat hic locus. Estius in 1. Ep. Cor. cap. xiv.

[m] Respon. ad artic. pacis. Magis fore ad ædificationem ecclesiæ, ut preces vulgari linguâ conciperentur. Ex hâc doctrinâ Pauli habetur quod melius ad ædificationem ecclesiæ est, orationes publicas, quæ audiente populo, dicuntur, dici linguâ communi clericis et populo, quàm dici Latinâ. Idem in 1 Cor. xiv.

more for the edification of the church, that the prayers were in the vulgar tongue?" He says no more than St. Paul says; and he could not speak it plainer. And indeed no man of sense can deny it, unless he affirms, at the same time, that it is better to speak what we understand not, than what we do; or that it were better to serve God without that noble faculty than with it; that is, that the way of a parrot and a jackdaw were better than the way of a man; and that, in the service of God, the priests and the people are to differ as a man and a bird.

But besides all this; was not Latin itself, when it was first used in divine service, the common tongue, and generally understood by many nations and very many colonies? And if it was then the use of the church to pray with the understanding, why shall it not be so now? However, that it was so then, and is not so now, demonstrates that the church of Rome hath in this material point greatly innovated: let but the Roman Pontifical be consulted, and there will be yet found a form of ordination of readers, in which it is said, 'that they must study to read distinctly and plainly, that the people may understand[m]:' but now it seems that labour is saved. And when a notorious change was made in this affair, we can tell by calling to mind the following story. The Moravians did say mass in the Sclavonian tongue; for which Pope John the Eighth severely reproved them, and commanded them to do so no more; but being better informed, he wrote a letter to their Prince Sfentoputero, in which he affirms, that it is not contrary to faith and sound doctrine to say mass and other prayers in the Sclavonian tongue, and adds this reason; because he that made Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, hath made the others also for his glory; and this also he confirms with the authority of St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians, and some other scriptures; only he commanded, for the decorum of the business, the Gospel should first be said in Latin, and then in the Sclavonian tongue. But just two hundred years after this, the tables were turned, and though formerly these things were permitted, yet so were many things in the primitive church; but upon better examination they have been corrected. And

[m] Studete verba Dei, viz. Lectiones sacras distinctè et apertè ad intelligentiam et ædificationem fidelium, absque omni mendacio falsitatis, proferre, &c.

therefore Pope Gregory the Seventh wrote to Vratislaus of Bohemia, that he could not permit the celebration of the divine offices in the Sclavonian tongue, and he commanded the prince to oppose the people herein with all his forces. Here the world was strangely altered, and yet St. Paul's Epistle was not condemned of heresy, and no council had decreed that all vulgar languages were profane; and no reason can yet be imagined why the change was made, unless it were to separate the priest from the people, by a wall of Latin, and to nurse stupendous ignorance in them, by not permitting to them learning enough to understand their public prayers, in which every man was greatly concerned. Neither may this be called a slight matter; for besides that Gregory the Seventh thought it so considerable, that it was a just cause of a war or persecution (for he commanded the Prince of Bohemia to oppose the people in it with all his forces); besides this, I say, to pray to God with the understanding, is much better, than praying with the tongue; that alone can be a good prayer, this alone can never; and then the loss of all those advantages which are in prayers truly understood, the excellency of devotion, the passion of desires, the ascent of the mind to God, the adherence to and acts of confidence in him, the intellectual conversation with God, most agreeable to a rational being, the melting affections, the pulses of the heart to and from God, to and from ourselves, the promoting and exercising of our hopes, all these and very many more (which can never be entire but in the prayers and devotions of the heart, and can never be in any degree but in the same, in which the prayers are acts of love and wisdom, of the will and the understanding) will be lost to the greatest part of the catholic church, if the mouth be set open, and the soul be gagged; so that it shall be the word of the mouth, but not the word of the mind.

All these things being added to what was said in this article by the Dissuasive, will more than make it clear, that in this article (the consequents of which are very great) the church of Rome hath causelessly troubled Christendom, and innovated against the primitive church, and against her own ancient doctrines and practices, and even against the Apostle: but they "care for none of these things." Some of their

own bigots profess the thing in the very worst of all these expressions; for so Reynolds and Gifford, in their 'Calvino Turcismus,' complain that such horrid and stupendous evils have followed the translation of Scriptures into vulgar languages, that they are of force enough "ad istas translationes penitus supprimendas, etiamsi divina vel apostolica auctoritate niterentur:" "although they did rely upon the authority apostolical or divine, yet they ought to be taken away." —So that it is to no purpose to urge Scripture, or any argument in the world, against the Roman church in this article; for if God himself commanded it to be translated, yet it is not sufficient; and therefore these men must be left to their own way of understanding; for beyond the law of God, we have no argument. I will only remind them, that it is a curse which God threatens to his rebellious people, "I will speak to this people with men of another tongue, and by strange lips, and they shall not understand [n]." This is the curse which the church of Rome contends earnestly for, in behalf of their people.

SECTION VI.

Of the Worship of Images.

THAT society of Christians will not easily be reformed, that think themselves obliged to dispute for the worship of images, the prohibition of which was so great a part of the Mosaic religion, and is so infinitely against the nature and spirituality of the Christian; a thing which every understanding can see condemned in the decalogue, and no man can excuse, but witty persons that can be bound by no words, which they can interpret to a sense contradictory to the design of the common: a thing for the hating of, and abstaining from which, the Jews were so remarked by all the world, and by which as by a distinct cognizance they were separated from all other nations, and which, with perfect resolution, they keep to this very day, and for the not observing of which they are intolerably scandalized at those societies of Christians, who, without any necessity in the thing, without any

[n] Isa. xxviii. 11.

pretence of any law of God, for no good, and for no wise end, and not without infinite danger, at least, of idolatry, retain a worship and veneration to some stocks and stones. Such men as these are too hard for all laws, and for all arguments; so certain it is, that faith is an obedience of the will in a conviction of the understanding; that if in the will and interests of men there be a perverseness and a non-compliance, and that it is not bent by prudent and wise flexures, and obedience to God, and the plain words of God in Scripture, nothing can ever prevail, neither David, nor his sling, nor all the worthies of his army.

In this question I have said enough in the Dissuasive, and also in the 'Ductor Dubitantium;' but to the arguments and fulness of the persuasion, they neither have nor can they say any thing that is material; but, according to their usual method, like flies they search up and down, and light upon any place which they suppose to be sore, or would make their proselytes believe so. I shall therefore first vindicate those few quotations which the epistles of his brethren except against (for there are many, and those most pregnant, which they take no notice of); as bearing in them too clear a conviction. 2. I shall answer such testimonies, which some of them steal out of Bellarmine, and which they esteem as absolutely their best. And, 3, I shall add something in confirmation of that truth of God, which I here have undertaken to defend.

First, for the questioned quotations against the worship of images; St. Cyril was named, in the Dissuasive, as denying that the Christians did give veneration and worship to the image even of the cross itself; but no words of St. Cyril were quoted; for the denial is not in express words, but in plain and direct argument; for being by Julian charged with worshipping the cross, St. Cyril, in behalf of the Christians, takes notice of their using the cross in a religious memory of all good things, to which, by the cross of Christ, we are ingaged; that is, he owns all that they did, and therefore taking no notice of any thing of worship, and making no answer to that part of the objection, it is certain that the Christians did not do it, or that he could not justify them in so doing. But because I quoted no words of St. Cyril, I shall now take notice of some words of his, which do most abundantly clear

this particular by a general rule: "Only the divine nature is capable of adoration, and the Scripture hath given adoration to no nature but to that of God alone;"—"that, and that alone, ought to be worshipped[o]." But to give a little more light to this particular; it may be noted, that, before St. Cyril's time, this had been objected by the pagans, particularly by Cæcilius, to which Minutius answers by directly denying it and saying, that the pagans did rather worship crosses, that is, the wooden parts of their gods. The Christians indeed were by Tertullian called 'religiosi crucis,' because they had it in thankful use and memory, and used it frequently in a symbolical confession of their not being ashamed, but of their glorying in the real cross of Christ: but they never worshipped the material cross, or the figure of it, as appears by St. Cyril's owning all the objections, excepting this only, of which he neither confessed the fact, nor offered any justification of it, when it was objected,—but professed a doctrine, with which such practice was inconsistent. And the like is to be said of some other of the fathers, who speak with great affections and veneration of the cross, meaning to exalt the passion of Christ; and, in the sense of St. Paul, to glory in the cross of Christ, not meaning the material cross, much less the image of it, which we blame in the church of Rome: and this very sense we have expressed in St. Ambrose: "Sapienter Helena egit, quæ crucem in capite regum levavit, ut Christi crux in regibus adoretur:" "The figure of the material cross was, by Helena, placed upon the heads of kings, that the cross of Christ in kings might be adored:" How so? He answers, "Non insolentia ista sed pietas est, cum defertur sacræ redemptioni:" "It is to the holy redemption, not to the cross materially taken; this were insolent, but the other is piety[p]."—In the same manner also St. Chrysostom is, by the Roman doctors, and particularly by Gretser and E. W.[q], urged for the worshipping Christ's cross. But the book 'de Cruce et Latrone,' whence the words are cited; Gretser and Possevine suspect it to be a spurious issue of some unknown person: it wants a father; and sometimes it goes to St. Austin, and is crowded into his sermons 'de Tempore[r]:'

[o] Nemo autem ignorat nulli prorsus naturæ, præterquam Dei, adorationem à scripturis contribui. Thesaur. lib. 2. c. 1. et alibi. Una natura est deitatis quam sólummodo adorare oportet.

[p] Orat. de Obitu Theodos. [q] E. W. p. 57. [r] Serm. 30.

but I shall not trouble my discourse any further with such counterfeit ware. What St. Chrysostom's doctrine was in the matter of images, is plain enough in his indubitate works, as is, and shall be remarked in their several places.

The famous testimony of Epiphanius, against the very use of images in churches, being urged in the Dissuasive as an irrefragable argument that the Roman doctrine is not primitive or catholic, the contra-scribers say nothing; but that "when St. Jerome translated that epistle of St. Epiphanius, it appears not that this story was in that epistle that St. Jerome translated; which is a great argument that that story was foisted into that epistle after St. Jerome's time[s]."—A likely matter! but spoken upon slight grounds. 'It appears not,' saith the objector, 'that this story was in it then.' To whom does it not appear? To Bellarmine indeed it did not, nor to this objector who writes after him. Alan Cope denied, that Epiphanius ever wrote any such epistle at all, or that St. Jerome ever translated any such; but Bellarmine, being ashamed of such unreasonable boldness, found out this more gentle answer, which here we have from our objector: well! but now the case is thus; that this story was put in the epistle? by some Iconoclast, is vehemently suspected by Bellarmine and Baronius. But this epistle vehemently burns their fingers, and the live coal sticks close to them, and they can never shake it off. For, 1. who should add this story to this epistle not any of the reformed doctors; for before Luther's time many ages, this epistle with this story was known, and confessed, and quoted, in the manuscript copies of divers nations. 2. This epistle was quoted, and set down as now it is, with this story by Charles the Great above eight hundred years ago. 3. And a little after by the fathers in the council of Paris; only they call the author John bishop of Constantinople instead of Jerusalem. 4. Sirmondus[t] the Jesuit cites this epistle as the genuine work of Epiphanius. 5. Marianus Victor, and Dionysius Petavius a jesuit, of great and deserved fame for learning, in their editions of Epiphanius, have published this whole epistle; and have made no note, given no censure, upon this story. 6. Before them Thomas Waldensis[u] and since him Alphonsus à Castro, acknowledge this whole epis-

[s] A. L. [t] Sirmond. Not. in Concil. Norbon. c. 15. lib. 1. Concil. Gal.
[u] Tom. 3. lit. 19. c. 157. et apud Bellarm. lib. 2. de Imag. c. 9.

tle as the proper issue of Epiphanius. 7. Who can be supposed to have put in this story? The Iconoclasts? Not the Greeks,—because, if they had, they would have made use of it for their advantage, which they never did in any of their disputations against images; insomuch that Bellarmine[x] makes advantage of it, because they never objected it. Not the Latins that wrote against images; for though they were against the worship of images, yet they were not Iconoclasts: indeed Claudius Taurinensis was, but he could not put this story in, for before his time it was in, as appears in the book of Charles the Great before quoted. These things put together are more than sufficient to prove, that this story was written by Epiphanius, and the whole epistle was translated by St. Jerome, as himself[y] testifies. But after all this, if there was any foul play in this whole affair, the cozenage lies on the other side; for some or other have destroyed the Greek original of Epiphanius, and only the Latin copies remain; and in all of them of Epiphanius's works, this story still remains. But how the Greek came to be lost, though it be uncertain, yet we have great cause to suspect the Greeks to be the authors of the loss: and the cause of this suspicion is the command made by the bishops in the seventh council[z], that all writings against images should be brought in to the bishop of Constantinople there to be laid up with the books of other heretics. It is most likely here it might go away: but however, the good providence of God hath kept this record to reprove the follies of the Roman church in this particular.

The authority of St. Austin, reprehending the worship of images, was urged from several places of his writings cited in the margent. In his first book 'de Moribus Ecclesiæ,' he hath these words, which I have now set down in the margent; in which, describing among other things the difference between superstition and true religion, he presses it on to issue: "Tell not me of the professors of the Christian name. Follow not the troops of the unskilful, who in true religion itself either are superstitious, or so given to lusts, that they have forgotten what they have promised to God. I know that there are many worshippers of sepulchres and pictures; I know that there are many who live luxuriously over [the

[x] Lib. 2. de Imag. cap. 9. sect. secundò quia hæretici.
[y] In Epist. 61 101. ad Pammach.
[z] Syn. 7. act. 8. can. 9.

graves of] the dead [a]." That St. Austin reckons these that are worshippers of pictures, among the superstitious and the vicious, is plain, and forbids us to follow such superstitious persons. But see what follows: "But how vain, how hurtful, how sacrilegious, they are, I have purposed to shew in another volume [b]." Then addressing himself to the Manichees, who, upon the occasion of these evil and superstitious practices of some Catholic, did reproach the Catholic church, he says, "Now I admonish you that at length you will give over the reproaching the Catholic church, by reproaching the manners of these men (viz. worshippers of pictures, and sepulchres, and livers riotously over the dead), whom she herself condemns, and whom as evil sons she endeavours to correct."—By these words now cited, it appears plainly, that St. Austin affirms, that those few Christians, who in his time did worship pictures, were not only superstitious, but condemned by the church. This the 'Letter-writer' denies St. Austin to have said; but that he did say so, we have his own words for witness. Yea, but, 2. 'St. Austin did not speak of worshippers of pictures alone:'—What then? Neither did he of them alone say they were superstitious, and their actions vain, hurtful, and sacrilegious. But does it follow that therefore he does not say so at all of these, because he says it of the others too?—'But, 3. Neither doth he formally call them superstitious;'—I know not what this offer of an answer means: certain it is, when St. Austin had complained that many Christians were superstitious, his first instance is of them that worship pictures and graves. But I perceive this gentleman found himself pinched beyond remedy, and like a man fastened by his thumbs at the whipping-post, he writhes his back and shrinks from the blow, though he knows he cannot get loose.

[a] Jam videbitis quid inter ostentationem et sinceritatem—postremo quid inter superstitionis Sirenas et portum religionis intersit. Nolite mihi colligere professores nominis Christiani, nec professionis suæ vim aut scientes aut exhibentes. Nolite consectari turbas imperitorum, qui vel in ipsâ verâ religione superstitiosi sunt, vel ita libidinibus dediti, ut obliti sint quid promiserint Deo. Novi multos esse sepulchrorum et picturarum adoratores, novi multos esse qui luxuriosissimè super mortuos vivant. C. 34.

[b] Sed et illa quàm vana sint, quàm noxia, quàm sacrilega, quemadmodum à magna parte vestrum, atque adeò penè ab omnibus vobis non observentur, alio volumine ostendere institui.—Nunc vos illud admoneo, ut aliquando ecclesiæ catholicæ maledicere desinatis, vituperando mores hominum quos et ipsa condemnat, et quos quotidie tanquam malos filios corrigere studet.

In the margent of the Dissuasive, there were two other testimonies of St. Austin [c] pointed at; but the [d] Letter says that, in these, St. Austin hath not a word to any such purpose: that is now to be tried. The purpose for which they were brought, is to reprove the doctrine and practice of the church of Rome in the matter of images: it was not intended that all these places should all speak or prove the same particular; but that which was affirmed in the text, being sufficiently verified by the first quotation in the margent, the other two are fully pertinent to the main inquiry, and to the condemnation of the Roman doctrine, as the first was of the Roman practice. The words are these; "Neither is it to be thought, that God is circumscribed in a human shape, that they who think of him, should fancy a right or a left side; nor that because the Father is said to sit, is it to be supposed, that he does it with bended knees, lest we fall into that sacrilege, for which the Apostle execrates them that change the glory of the incorruptible God into the similitude of a corruptible man. For, for a Christian to place such an image to God in the church is wickedness, but much more wicked is it to place it in our heart." So St. Austin. Now this testimony had been more properly made use of in the next section, as more relating to the proper matter of it, as being a direct condemnation of the picturing of God; but here it serves without any sensible error, and wherever it is, it throws a stone at them, and hits them. But of this more in the sequel.

But the third testimony [e] (however it pleases A. L. to deny it) does speak home to this part of the question, and condemns the Roman hypothesis: the words are these; "See that ye forget not the testimony of your God which he wrote, or that ye make shapes and images:" but it adds also saying, 'Your God is a consuming fire, and a zealous God.' These words from the Scripture Adimantus propounded; "Yet remember not only there, but also here concerning the zeal of God, he so blames the Scriptures, that he adds that which is commanded by our Lord God in those books, concerning the not worshipping of images; as if for nothing else he reprehends that zeal of God, but only because by

[c] De Fide et Symb. c. 7. contr. Adimant. c. 13.
[d] P. 27.
[e] Contr. Adimant. c. 13.

that very zeal we are forbidden to worship images. Therefore he would seem to favour images, which therefore they do that they might reconcile the good will of the Pagans to their miserable and mad sect;" meaning, the sect of the Manichees, who to comply with the Pagans, did retain the worship of images. And now the three testimonies are verified; and though this was an unnecessary trouble to me, and I fear it may be so to my reader, yet the church of Rome hath got no advantage but this, that in St. Austin's sense, that which Romanists do now, the Manichees did then; only these did it to comply with the heathens, and those out of direct and mere superstition. But to clear this point in St. Austin's doctrine, the reader may please to read his nineteenth book against Faustus the Manichee, chap. 18, and the 119th epistle against him, chap. 12, where he affirms that the Christians observe that, which the Jews did in this, viz. that which was written, 'Hear, O Israel, The Lord thy God is one God, thou shalt not make an idol to thee, and such-like things:' and in the latter place, he affirms that the second commandment is moral, viz. that all of the decalogue are so, but only the fourth. I add a third as pregnant as any of the rest: for in his first book 'de Consensu Evangelistarum,' speaking of some who had fallen into error upon occasion of the pictures of St. Peter and St. Paul, he says, "Sic nempe errare meruerunt, qui Christum et apostolos ejus non in sanctis codicibus sed in pictis parietibus quæsiverunt."

The council of Eliberis is of great concern in this question, and does great effort to the Roman practices. E. W.[f] takes notice of it, and his best answer to it is, that it hath often been answered already. He says true; it hath been answered both often and many ways. The council was, in the year 305, of nineteen bishops, who in the thirty-sixth canon decreed this; "Placuit picturas in ecclesiis esse non debere," "It hath pleased us that pictures ought not to be in churches;" that is the decree; the reason they give is, "ne quod colitur et adoratur, in parietibus depingatur," "lest that which is worshipped, be painted on the walls." So that there are two propositions; 1. Pictures ought not to be in churches. 2. That which is worshipped, ought not to be painted upon walls. E. W.[g] hath a very learned note upon

[f] P. 57. [g] Ibid.

this canon. "Mark, first the council supposeth worship and adoration due to pictures, 'ne quod colitur et adoratur.'" By which 'mark,' E. W. confesses, that pictures are the object of his adoration, and that the council took no care and made no provision for the honour of God (who is and ought to be worshipped and adored in churches, 'et illi soli servies'), but only were good husbands for the pictures for fear, 1. they should be spoiled by the moisture of the walls, or, 2. defaced by the heathen; the first of these is Bellarmine's, the latter is Perron's answer: but too childish to need a severer consideration. But how easy had it been for them to have commanded, that all their pictures should have been in frames, upon boards or cloth, as it is in many churches in Rome, and other places. 2. Why should the bishops forbid pictures to be in churches? for fear of spoiling one kind of them, they might have permitted others, though not these. 3. Why should any man be so vain as to think, that in that age, in which the Christians were in perpetual disputes against the heathens for worshipping pictures and images, they should be so curious to preserve their pictures, and reserve them for adoration. 4. But then to make pictures to be the subject of that caution, "ne quod colitur et adoratur," and not to suppose God and his Christ to be the subject of it, is so unlike the religion of Christians, the piety of those ages, the economy of the church, and the analogy of the commandment, that it betrays a refractory and heretical spirit in him, that shall so perversely invent an unreasonable commentary, rather than yield to so pregnant and easy testimony. But some are wiser, and consider, that the council takes not care that pictures be not spoiled, but 'that they be not in the churches:' and that what is adorable, 'be not there painted,' and not, 'be not there spoiled.' The not painting them is the utmost of their design, not the preserving them; for we see vast numbers of them every where painted on walls, and preserved well enough, and easily repaired upon decay, therefore this is too childish; to blot them out for fear they be spoiled, and not to bring them into churches for fear they be taken out. Agobardus, bishop of Lyons, above eight hundred years since, cited this canon in a book of his which he wrote 'de Picturis et Imaginibus,' which was published by Papirius Massonus; and thus illustrates it; "Recte (saith

he) nimirum ob hujusmodi evacuandam superstitionem ab orthodoxis patribus definitum est 'picturas in ecclesia fieri non debere; nec quod colitur et adoratur, in parietibus depingatur;'" where first he expressly affirms these fathers in this canon to have intended only rooting up this superstition, not the ridiculous preserving the pictures. So it was understood then. But then, 2. Agobardus reads it, "*nec*," not "*ne* quod colitur;" which reading makes the latter part of the canon, to be part of the sanction, and no reason of the former decree; 'Pictures must not be made in churches; neither ought that to be painted upon walls, which is worshipped and adored.' This was the doctrine and sentiment of the wise and good men above eight hundred years since. By which also the unreasonable supposition of Baronius, that the canon is not genuine, is plainly confuted; this canon not being only in all copies of that council, but owned for such by Agobardus so many ages before Baronius, and so many ages after the council. And he is yet further reproved by Cardinal Perron, who tells a story, that in Granada, in memory of this council, they use frames for pictures, and paint none upon the wall at this day. It seems they in Granada are taught to understand that canon according unto the sense of the patrons of images, and to mistake the plain meaning of the council. For the council did not forbid only to paint upon the walls, for that, according to the common reading, is but accidental to the decree; but the council commanded that no picture should be in churches. Now then let this canon be confronted with the council of Trent, "sess. 25. decret. de S. S. Invoc." "Imaginis Christi, Deiparæ virginis, et aliorum sanctorum, in templis præsertim, habendas et retinendas," "that the images of Christ, and of the Virgin-mother of God, and of other saints be had and kept especially in churches:" and in the world there cannot be a greater contradiction between two, than there is between Eliberis and Trent, the old and the new church: for the new church not only commands pictures and images to be kept in churches, but paints them upon walls, and neither fears thieves nor moisture. There are divers other little answers amongst the Roman doctors to this uneasy objection; but they are only such as venture at the telling the secret reasons why the council so decreed; as Alan Cope saith, it was so decreed,

lest the Christians should take them for gods, or lest the heathens should think the Christians worshipped them: so Sanders.—But it matters not for what reason they decreed: only if either of these say true, then Bellarmine and Perron are false in their conjectures of the reason. But it matters not; for suppose all these reasons were concentred in the decree, yet the decree itself is not observed at this day in the Roman church, but a doctrine and practice quite contrary introduced. And therefore my opinion is, that Melchior Canus answers best: "Aut nimis duras aut parum rationi consentaneas à conciliis provincialibus interdum editas, non est negandum. Qualis illa non impudenter modo, verum etiam impie, à concilio Elibertino de tollendis imaginibus[h]." By this we may see, not only how irreverently the Roman doctors use the fathers, when they are not for their turns; but we may also perceive, how the canon condemns the Roman doctrine and practice in the matter of images.

The next inquiry is concerning matter of history, relating to the second synod of Nice in the east, and that of Frankfort in the west. In the Dissuasive it was said, that Eginardus, Hincmarus, Aventinus, &c. affirmed, 1. That the bishops assembled at Frankfort, and condemned the synod of Nice. 2. That they commanded it should not be called a general council. 3. They published a book under the name of the Emperor, confuting that unchristian assembly. These things were said out of these authors, not supposing that every thing of this should be proved from every one of them, but the whole of it by its several parts from all these put together.

1. That the bishops of Frankfort condemned the synod of Nice or the seventh general. Whether the Dissuasive hath said this truly out of the authors quoted by him, we need no further proof, but the confession of Bellarmine. "Auctores antiqui omnes conveniunt in hoc, quod in concilio Francofordiensi sit reprobata synodus VII., quæ decreverat imagines adorandas. Ita Hincmarus, Aimonius, Rhegino, Ado, et alii passim docent[i]." So that if the objector blames the Dissuasive for alleging these authorities, let him first blame Bellarmine, who confesses that to be true, which the

[h] Loc. Theol. lib. 5. c. 4.
[i] Lib. 2. de Imagin. c. 14. sect. Secundò quia.

Dissuasive here affirms. Now, that by the seventh synod Bellarmine means the second Nicene, appears by his own words in the same chapter: "Videtur igitur mihi in synodo Francofordiensi vere reprobatam Nicænam II. synodum; sed per errorem, et materialiter[k]," &c. And Bellarmine was in the right; not only those which the Dissuasive quoted, but 'all the ancient writers,' saith Bellarmine. So the author of the Life of Charles the Great, speaking of the council of Frankfort; "Their queen Fastrada died. 'Pseudosynodus Græcorum, quam falso septimam vocabant pro imaginibus, rejecta est à pontificibus.'" The same is affirmed by the annals of the Franks[l]; by Adhelmus Benedictinus in his annals, in the same year; by Hincmarus Rhemensis[m] in an epistle to Hincmarus his nephew; by Strabus the monk of Fulda, Rhegino Prumiensis, Urspergensis, and Hermanus Contractus, in their annals and chronicles of the year 794. By Ado Viennensis[n]; "Sed pseudosynodus, quam septimam Græci appellant, pro adorandis imaginibus, abdicata penitus." The same is affirmed by the annals of Eginardus[o]; and by Aimonius[p]; and Aventinus. I could reckon many more, if more were necessary, but these are they whom the Dissuasive quoted, and some more; against this truth nothing material can be said, only that Hincmarus and Aimonius (which are two whom the Dissuasive quotes) do not say that the synod of Frankfort rejected the second Nicene, but the synod of Constantinople. But to this Bellarmine himself answers, that it is true they do so, but it is by mistake; and that they meant the council which was kept at Nice: so that the Dissuasive is justified by his greatest adversary. But David Blondel answers this objection, by saying, that Constantinople being the head of the eastern empire, these authors used the name of the imperial city for the provinces under it: which answer though it be ingenious, yet I rather believe that the error came first from the council of Frankfort, who called it the synod at Constantinople, and that after it, these authors took it up: but that error was not great, but always excusable, if not warrantable; because the second Nicene council was first appointed to be at Constantinople, but by reason of

[k] Sect. Neque obstat.
[l] Ad annum 794.
[m] Opusc. 55. n. cap. 20.
[n] Chron. ætat. 6. ad annum Christi eundem et 792.
[o] Ad eund. annum.
[p] Lib. 4. c. 85.

the tumults of the people, was translated to Nice. But to proceed; that Blondel (whom the Dissuasive also quotes) saith, the synod of Frankfort abrogated the seventh synod, the objector confesses, and adds, that it confuted the Felician heresy for taking away of images: concerning which, lest the less wary reader should suppose the synod of Frankfort to have determined for images, as Alan Cope, Gregory de Valentia, Vasquez, Suarez, and Binius, would fain have the world believe; I shall note, that the synod of Frankfort did at the same time condemn the heresy of Felix Urgetitanus, which was, 'that Christ was the adopted Son of God.' Now because in this synod were condemned the breakers of images, and the worshippers of images; some ignorantly (amongst which is this gentleman the objector) have supposed that the Felician heresy was that of the Iconoclasts.

2. Now for the second thing which the Dissuasive said from these authors; that the fathers of Frankfort commanded that the second Nicene should not be called a general council, that matter is sufficiently cleared in the proof of the first particular; for if they abrogated it, and called it 'pseudosynodum,' and decreed against it,—'hoc ipso,' they caused it should not be, or be called, a general synod. But I shall declare what the synod did in the words of Adhelmus Benedictinus[q]; "Synodus etiam, quæ paucos ante annos Constantinopoli sub Helena et Constantino filio ejus congregata, et ab ipsis non tantum septima, verum etiam universalis est appellata, ut nec septima nec universalis diceretur, haberetur que quasi supervacua, in totum ab omnibus abdicata est."

3. Now for the third thing, which the Dissuasive said, that they published a book under the name of the Emperor; I am to answer, that such a book about that time, within three or four years of it, was published in the name of the Emperor, is notoriously known, and there was great reason to believe it was written three or four years before the synod, and sent by the Emperor to the Pope; but that divers of the church of Rome did endeavour to persuade the world that the Emperor did not write it, but that it was written by the synod, and contains the acts of the synod, but published under the Emperor's name. Now this the Dissuasive affirmed by the authority of Hincmarus, who does affirm it, and of the same

[q] In annal.

opinion is Bellarmine: "Scriptum videtur in synodo Francofordiensi et acta continere synodi Francofordiensis: et enim asserit Hincmarus ejus temporis auctor[r]." So that by all this the reader may plainly see, how careful the Dissuasive was in what was affirmed, and how careless this gentleman is of what he objects: only this I add, that though it be said that this book contained the acts of the synod of Frankfort, though it might be partly true, yet not wholly. For this synod did indeed do so much against that of the Greeks, and was so decretory against the worship of images ("quod omnino ecclesia Dei execratur," said Hoveden, and Matthew of Westminster[s]), that it is vehemently suspected, that the patrons of images (the objector knows whom I mean) have taken a timely course with it, so that the monuments of it are not to be seen, nor yet a famous and excellent epistle of Alcuinus written against the Greek synod, though his other works are in a large volume carefully enough preserved.

It was urged as an argument 'à minori ad majus,' that in the primitive church, it was accounted unlawful to make images; and therefore it was impossible that the worship of images should then be the doctrine or practice of the Catholic church. To this purpose Clemens Alexandrinus, Tertullian, and Origen, were alleged[u]. First for Tertullian, of whom the Letter says, that he had said no such thing: sure it is, this man did not care what he said; supposing it sufficient to pass the common reader, to say Tertullian did not say for what he is alleged, for more will believe him, than examine him. But the words of Tertullian shall manifest the strange confidence of this person. The quotations out of Tertullian are only noted in the margent, but the words were not cited, but now they must, to justify me and themselves. 1. That reference to Tertullian's book of Idolatry[x], the objector takes no notice of, as knowing it would reproach him too plainly: see the words,—"the artificers of statues and images, and all kind of representations, the devil brought into the world[y]:" and when he had given the etymology of an idol, saying εἴδωλον is 'formula,' he adds, "Igitur omnis forma vel formula idolum se dici exposcit: Inde omnis idoli

[r] Vide supra sect. Primò quia.
[s] A. D. 793.
[u] A. L. p. 27.
[x] Cap. 3.
[y] Diabolum seculo intulisse artifices statuarum et imaginum et omnis generis simulacrorum.

artifex ejusdem et unius est criminis." And a little before: "Exinde jam caput facta est idololatriæ ars omnis, quæ idolum quoquo modo edit."—And in the beginning of the fourth chapter, "Idolum tam fieri quam coli Deus prohibet. Quanto præcedit ut fiat quod coli possit, tanto prius est ne fiat si coli non licet."—And again: "Toto mundo ejusmodi artibus interdixit servis Dei."—And a little after he brings in some or other objecting; "Sed ait quidam adversus similitudinis interdictæ propositionem, cur ergo Moses in eremo simulacrum serpentis ex ære fecit?" To this at last he answers; "Si eundem Deum observas 'habes legem ejus,' ne feceris similitudinem;' si et præceptum factæ postea similitudinis respicis, et tu imitare Moysen. Ne facias adversus legem simulacrum aliquod, nisi et tibi Deus jusserit." Now here is no subterfuge for any one: for Tertullian first says, the devil brought into the world all the artists and makers of statues, images, and all sorts of similitudes. 2. He makes all these to be the same with idols. And, 3. that God as well forbade the making of these and the worship of them, and that the maker is guilty of the same crime; and lastly I add, his definition of idolatry, "Idololatria est omnis circa omne idolum famulatus et servitus;" "Every image is an idol, and every service and obeisance about any or every idol is idolatry."—I hope all this put together will convince the gentleman that denied it, that Tertullian hath said some such thing as the Dissuasive quoted him for. Now for the other place quoted, the words are these; "Proinde et similitudinem vetans fieri omnium quæ in cœlo et in terra et in aquis, ostendit et causas, idololatriæ scilicet substantiam exhibentes[z]:" "God forbidding all similitude to be made of things in heaven and earth, and in the waters, shews the causes that restrain idolatry:" the causes of idolatry be more fully described in the forecited place: "Quando enim et sine idolo idololatria fiat:" for he supposes the making of the images to be the cause of their worshipping, and he calls this making statues and images "dæmoniis corpora facere."—But there is yet another place in his books against Marcion, where Tertullian[a] affirming that St. Peter knew Moses and Elias, on Mount Tabor, by a spiritual ecstasy, says it upon this reason; "Nec enim imagines eorum aut statuas populus habuis-

[z] Lib. 2. advers. Marc. 4. c. 22. [a] Lib. 4. c. 22.

set aut similitudines, lege prohibente." The same also is to be seen in his book 'de Spectaculis,' c. 23.; "Jam vero ipsum opus personarum, quæro, an Deo placeat, qui omnem similitudinem vetat fieri, quanto magis imaginis suæ." By this time I hope the gentleman thinks himself in some shame, for denying that Tertullian said the making of images to be unlawful.

Now let us see for the other two authors quoted by the Dissuasive: the objector in the Letter says[b], they only spake of making the images of Jupiter and the other heathen gods: but E. W.[c] says he cannot find those quotations out of Clemens of Alexandria, because the books quoted are too big, and he could not espy them. The author of the Letter never examined them, but took them for granted; but E. W. did search a little, but not exactly. However, he ought not to have looked in the sixth book of the 'Stromata' for the words there quoted, but in the 'Protrepticon,' as I shall shew by and by. That other quotation in the 'Stromata' is the sixth book, and is only referred to, as to the question in general against images, for so St. Clement calls it 'spiritual adultery' to make idols or images. Now to this E. W. says, although he did not find what he looked for, yet he knows beforehand, that the word, in the Latin translation, is 'simulacrum[d],' that is, εἴδωλον, 'an idol.'—It is indeed well guessed of E. W. for the word is ἀνειδωλοποιῶν, and if he had seen the place, he now tells us what answer we might have expected. But I am beforehand with him in this particular, and out of Tertullian, have proved 'idolum' to be the same with 'formula,' derived from εἶδος, and consequently means the same with an 'image.' And he hath a good warrant from the greatest master of the Latin tongue: "Imagines quæ idola nominant, quorum incursione non solum videamus, sed etiam cogitemus[e]," &c. said Cicero: and the same notion of εἴδωλον is in a great master of the Greek, St. Chrysostom, who, speaking of the statues and images with which they adorned their houses, calls them 'idols[f].' Οἰκίας κατασκῶμεν εἴδωλα πανταχοῦ καὶ ξόανα ἱστῶτες. But it matters not so much what Greek or Latin word is used in

[b] P. 27. [c] P. 54, 55. [d] Strom. lib. 6. p. 687. edit. Paris. 1629.
[e] Lib. 1. c. 6. de Fin. Bon. et Malor. Rath. p. 23.
[f] In cap. 3. Epist. ad Philip. hom. 10.

any translation; for in the Hebrew, in which the Spirit of God spake, when he forbade the worship of images, he used two words, פסל 'pesel' and תמונה 'themunah,' and the latter of these signifies always an image or similitude, and that most properly, and is always so translated; and the former of these is translated indifferently by γλυπτὸν, or εἴδωλον, and εἰκὼν, 'image,' 'carved image,' and 'idol;' for they are all one. And therefore proportionably Justin Martyr reciting this law of God, says, that God forbade every 'image and similitude,' εἰκόνα, καὶ ὁμοίωμα are the words. But suppose that 'idolum' and 'imago' were not the same; yet because the commandment forbids not only 'idolum' but 'imago,' not only 'pesel' but 'themunah;' they do not observe the commandment, who make to themselves, viz. for worship, either one or the other.—But to return to St. Clement, of whom our present inquiry is. And to deal most clearly in this affair, as in all things else, that out of the 'Stromata' of St. Clement, that I rather remark, is not this of the sixth book, but out of the fifth. St. Clement of Alexandria[s] saith; Πάλιν δ' αὖ δακτύλιον μὴ φορεῖν, μηδὲ εἰκόνας αὐτοῖς ἐγχαράσσειν θεῶν παρεγγυᾷ ὁ Πυθαγόρας· ὥσπερ Μωσῆς, προπάλαι διαῤῥήδην ἐνομοθέτησεν, μηδὲν δεῖν γλυπτὸν, ἢ χωνευτὸν, ἢ πλαστὸν, ἢ γραπτὸν ἄγαλμά τε καὶ ἀπεικόνισμα ποιεῖσθαι. "Pythagoras commanded that his disciples should not wear rings, or engrave them with the images of their gods; as Moses many ages before, made an express law, that no man should make any graven, cast, or painted image;" and of this he gives two reasons. 1. Ὡς μὴ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς προσανέχωμεν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ νοητὰ μετίωμεν, "that we may not attend to sensible things, but pass on to the things discernible by the understanding." 2. Ἐξευτελίζει γὰρ τὴν τοῦ Θείου σεμνότητα ἡ ἐν ἑτοίμῳ τῆς ὄψεως συνήθεια, καὶ τὴν νοητὴν οὐσίαν δι' ὕλης σεβάζεσθαι, ἀτιμάζειν ἐστὶν αὐτὴν δι' αἰσθήσεως. "The custom of seeing so readily causes, that the majesty of God becomes vile and contemptible, and by matter to worship that which is perceived intellectually, is to disesteem him by sensation." Now the reader may perceive that St. Clement speaks against the making of any images, not only of Jupiter and the heathen gods, but of the true God, of whatsoever intelligible being we ought to worship; and that upon such reasons which

[s] Lib. Strom. 5. p. 559. Paris. 1629. Gr. Lat.

will greatly condemn the Roman practices. But hence also it is plain, how careless and trifling this objector is, minding no truth but the number of objections.—See yet further out of St. Clement[h]: "Nobis enim est aperte vetitum fallacem artem exercere. Non facies enim (inquit Propheta) cujusvis rei similitudinem:" "We are forbidden to exercise that cozening art (viz. of making pictures or images); for (says the Prophet, meaning Moses), Thou shalt not make the likeness of any thing." E. W. it seems[i] could not find these words of St. Clement in his Parænetic: he should have said his Protreptic, for I know of no Parænetic that he hath written. But E. W. followed the printer's error in the margent of the Dissuasive, and very carefully turned over a book that was not, and compared it in bigness with a book that was. But I will not suppose this to be ignorance in him, but only want of diligence: however, the words are to be found in the forty-first page of this Protreptic, or his Admonition to the Gentiles, and now they are quoted, and the very page named; only I desire E. W. to observe, that in this place St. Clement uses not the word εἴδωλον but πάντος ὁμοίωμα, not 'simulacrum,' but 'cujusvis rei similitudinem.'

In the place which was quoted out of Origen[k] in his fourth book against Celsus, speaking of the Jews he hath these words: Οὐδεὶς τῶν εἰκόνας ποιούντων ἐπολιτεύετο· οὔτε γὰρ ζώγραφος, οὔτ' ἀγαλματοποιὸς ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ αὐτῶν ἦν. "All makers of images were turned from their commonwealth: for not a painter or a statuary was admitted, their laws wholly forbidding them, lest any occasion should be given to dull men, or that their mind should be turned from the worship of God to earthly things by these temptations." Then he quotes the law of God against making images, and adds, "By which law this was intended, that being content with the truth of things, they should beware of lying figments." There it is plain that Origen affirms the law of God to have forbidden the making images, any similitude of things in heaven, earth, or waters: which law also he in another place[l] affirms to be of a moral and eternal obligation,

[h] Vide etiam eundem in Protreptico, p. 41. Nobis enim est apertè vetitum fallacem artem exercere. Non facies enim (inquit Propheta) cujusvis rei similitudinem. Id. Stromat. lib. 6. p. 687.

[i] P. 55. [k] P. 181. edit. G. L. Cantab. 1658.

[l] Homil. 8. in Exod. apud Bellarm. Imagin. lib. 2. c. 7. sect. Sed hæc.

that is, not to be spoken to them only who came out of the terrestrial Egypt; and therefore is of Christian duty. And of the same mind are St. Irenæus [m], Tertullian [n], St. Cyprian [o], and St. Austin [p], affirming the whole decalogue, except the law of the sabbath, to be an unalterable, or natural law. But for the further verification of the testimony from Origen against the worship of images in the primitive church, I thought fit to add the concurrent words of the prudent and learned Cassander [q]: "Quantum autem veteres initio ecclesiæ ab omni veneratione imaginum abhorruerunt declarat unus Origenes adversus Celsum:" but of this I shall have occasion to speak yet once more. And so at last all the quotations are found to be exact, and this gentleman to be greatly mistaken.

From the premises I infer;—If in the primitive church it was accounted unlawful to make images, certainly it is unimaginable they should worship them; and the argument is the stronger, if we understand their opinion rightly: for neither the second commandment, nor yet the ancient fathers in their commentaries on them, did absolutely prohibit all making of images; but all that was made for religious worship, and in order to adoration, according as it is expressed in him, who among the Jews collected the negative precepts, which Arias Montanus translated into Latin [r]: the second of which is, "signum cultus causa ne facito;" the third, "simulacrum divinum nullo pacto conflato;" the fourth, "signa religiosa nulla ex materia facito."

The authorities of these fathers being rescued from slander, and proved very pungent and material; I am concerned in the next place to take notice of some authorities, which my adversaries [s] urge from antiquity, to prove that in the primitive church they did worship images. Concerning their general council, viz. the second Nicene, I have already made account in the preceding periods: the great St. Basil is with great solemnity brought into the Circus, and made to speak for images as apertly, plainly, and confidently, as Bellarmine or the council of Trent itself. His words are these [t]:

[m] Lib. 4. c. 31, 32. [n] Lib. de Idololat. cap. 5.
[o] Lib. 3. ad Quirinum, c. 59. et de Exhort. Martyrii, c 1.
[p] Lib. 15. contra Faustum, c. 4. 7. [q] Consult. de Imagin. et Simulacris.
[r] Lib. 4. de Generat. et Regeneratione Adam. [s] E. W. p. 49.
[t] Δίχομαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἁγίους ἀποστόλους, προφήτας, καὶ μάρτυρας, καὶ εἰς τὴν περὶ

"I admit the holy apostles, and prophets, and martyrs, and in my prayer made to God call upon them, that by their intercession God may be propitious unto me. Whereupon I honour and adore the characters of their images; and especially those things being delivered from the holy apostles, and not prohibited, but are manifested, or seen in all our churches." Now I confess these words are home enough, and do their business at the first sight; and if they prove right, St. Basil is on their side, and therefore E. W. with great noise and preface insults, and calls them unanswerable. The words he says are found in St. Basil's two hundred and fifth epistle 'ad Julianum.' I presently consulted St. Basil's works, such as I had with me in the country, of the Paris edition by Guillard, 1547, and there I found that St. Basil had not two hundred and five epistles in all; the number of all written by him and to him being but one hundred and eighty, of which, that to Julianus is one, viz. epistle one hundred and sixty-six, and in that there is not one word to any such purpose as is here pretended. I was then put to a 'melius inquirendum.' Bellarmine[u] (though both he and Lindan and Harding cry up this authority as irrefragable) quotes this authority not upon his own credit, but as taking it from the report of a book published 1596, called Synodus Parisiensis, which Bellarmine calls "unworthy to see the light." From hence arises this great noise; and the fountain being confessedly corrupt, what wholesome thing can be expected thence? But in all the first and voluminous disputations of Bellarmine upon this question, he made no use of this authority, he never saw any such thing in St. Basil's works, or it is not to be imagined that he would have omitted it. But the words are in no ancient edition of St. Basil, nor in any manuscript that is known in the world. 2. John Damascen, and Germanus bishop of Constantinople, who wrote for the worship of images, and are the most learned of all the Greeks that were abused in this question; yet they never urged this authority of St. Basil, which would have been more to their purpose than all that they said be-

Θεὸν ἱκετεύω τούτους ἐπικαλοῦμαι, τοῦ δι' αὐτῶν, ἤγουν διὰ τῆς μεσιτείας αὐτῶν, ἵλεών μοι γενέσθαι· ὅθεν καὶ τοὺς χαρακτῆρας τῶν εἰκόνων αὐτῶν τιμῶ καὶ προσκυνῶ· κατ' ἐξαίρετον τούτων παραδεδομένων ἐκ τῶν ἁγίων ἀποστόλων, καὶ οὐκ ἀπηγορευμένων ἀλλ' ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἡμῶν τούτων ἀνιστορουμένων.

[u] Appendix ad Tract. de Cultu Imaginum in procem. ante cap. 1. et in cap. 4.

side. 3. The first mention of this is in an epistle of Pope Adrian to the emperors in the seventh synod, and that makes the business more suspicious, that when the Greek writers knew nothing of it, a Latin bishop, a stranger, not very well skilled in antiquity, should find this out, which no man ever saw before him, nor since, in any copy of St. Basil's works: but in the second Nicene council such forgeries as these were many and notorious. St. Gregory the Great is there quoted as author of an epistle 'de Veneratione Imaginum;' when it is notorious, it was written by Gregory III. and there were many Basils, and any one of that name would serve to give countenance to the error of the second Nicene synod; but in St. Basil the great there is not one word like it. And therefore they who set forth St. Basil's works at Paris, 1618, who either could not or ought not to have been ignorant of so vile a cheat, were infinitely to blame to publish this as the issue of the right St. Basil, without any mark of difference, or note of inquiry.

There is also another saying of St. Basil, of which the Roman writers make much, and the words are by Damascen imputed to the great St. Basil; 'Imaginis honor exemplum transit,' which indeed St. Basil speaks only of the statues of the emperors, and of that civil honour, which by consent and custom of the world did pass to the Emperor, and he accepted it so; but this is no argument for religious images put up to the honour of God; he says not, the honour of any such image passes to God: for God hath declared against it (as will appear in the following periods), and therefore from hence the church of Rome can have no argument, no fair pretence; and yet upon this very account, and the too much complying with the heathen rites and manners, and the secular customs of the empire, the veneration of images came into churches. But suppose it be admitted to be true; yet although this may do some countenance to Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure's way of worshipping the image and the sampler with the same worship; yet this can never be urged by all those more moderate Papists, who make the worship to an image of a lower kind; for if it be not the same worship, then they that worship images, worship God and his saints by the image not as they deserve, but give to them no more than the image itself deserves: let them take

which part they please, so that they will but publicly own it. But let this be as it will, and let it be granted true, that the honour done to the image can pass to the sampler, yet this is but an arbitrary thing, and a king may esteem it so if he please; but if the king forbids any image to be made of him, and counts it a dishonour to him, then I hope it is; and that is the case now; for God hath forbidden any such way of passing honour to him by an image of him; and he hath forbidden it in the second commandment, and this is confessed by Vasquez[x]: so that upon this account, for all the pretence of the same motion to the image and the sampler, to pass such a worship to God, is no better than the doing as the heathen did, when they worshipped Mercury by throwing stones at him.

Another authority brought by E. W.[y] for veneration of images, is from Athanasius, but himself damns it in the margent, with and without ingenuity; for ingenuously saying, that he does not affirm it to be the great Athanasius, yet most disingenuously he adds, 'valeat quantum valere potest,' that is, they that will be cozened, let them. And indeed these questions and answers to Antiochus are notoriously spurious[z]; for in them are quoted St. Epiphanius, Gregory Nyssen, Chrysostom, Scala Johannis, Maximus, and Nicephorus, who were after Athanasius; and the book is rejected by Delrio, by Sixtus Senensis, and Possevine. But with such stuff as this the Roman doctors are forced to build their Babel; and E. W. in page fifty-six quotes the same book against me for worshipping the cross, together with another spurious piece 'de Cruce et Passione Domini,' which Nannius, a very learned man of their own and professor at Louvaine, rejects, as is to be seen in his 'Nuncupatory Epistle.'

Yea, but St. Chrysostom's liturgy is very clear, for it is said, that 'the priest turns himself to our Saviour's picture, and bows his head before the picture, and says this prayer;' —these words indeed are very plain; but it is not plain, that these are St. Chrysostom's words, for there are none such in St. Chrysostom's liturgy in the editions of it by Claudius de Saintes, or Morellus; and Claudius Espencæus acknowledges

[x] Tom. 3. comment. in 3. part. qu. 25. art. 3. disp. 94. c. 3.
[y] P. 50.
[z] Martinus Delrio Vindiciæ Areopag. c. 14.

with great truth and ingenuity, that this liturgy, begun and composed by St. Chrysostom, was enlarged by many things put into it, according to the variety of times. And it is evidently so, because divers persons are there commemorated, who lived after the death of Chrysostom, as Cyrillus, Euthymius, Sabas, and Johannes Eleemosynarius, whereof the last but one lived one hundred and twenty-six years, the last two hundred and thirteen years, after St. Chrysostom. Now how likely, nay how certain it is, that this very passage was not put in by St. Chrysostom, but is of later interpolation, let all the world judge by that known saying of St. Chrysostom [a]; "Quid enim est vilius atque humilius homine ante res inanimatas se incurvante et saxa venerante?" "What in the world is baser and more abject than to see a man worshipping stones, and bowing himself before inanimate things?" These are his great authorities, which are now come to nothing; what he hath from them who came after these, I shall leave to him to make his best of them: for, about the time of Gregory, some began to worship images, and some to break them; the latter of which he reproves, and the former he condemns; what it was afterward all the world knows.

But now having cleared the question from the trifling arguments of my adversaries, I shall observe some things fit to be considered in this matter of images. 1. It came at first from a very base and unworthy stock. I have already pointed at this, but now I shall explain it more fully; it came from Simon Magus and his crew; Theodoret says, that the followers of Simon brought in the worship of images, viz. of Simon in the shape of Jupiter, and Helena in the figure of Minerva; but St. Austin [b] says that Simon Magus himself "imagines et suam et cujusdam meretricis, quam sibi sociam scelerum fecerat, discipulis suis præbuisse adorandas."— E. W. [c] upon what confidence I know not, says, that Theodoret hath nothing like it, either under the title 'de Simone' or 'Corpocrate.' And he says true, but with a shameful purpose to calumniate me, and deceive his reader; as if I had quoted a thing that Theodoret said not, and therefore the reader ought not to believe me. But since in the Dissuasive, Theodoret was only quoted "lib. 5. Hæret. Fabul." and

[a] Comment. in Isai. c. 2. t. 3.
[b] De Hæres. ad quod vult Deum. paulò ab initio. hæres. 1.
[c] E. W. p. 51.

no title set down; if he had pleased to look to the next title, "Simonis Hæresis," where in reason all Simon's heresies were to be looked for, he should have found that which I referred to[d]. But why E. W. denies St. Austin to have reported that for which he is quoted, viz. that Simon Magus brought in some images to be worshipped, I cannot conjecture, neither do I think himself can tell; but the words are plain in the place quoted, according to the intention of the Dissuasive. But that he may yet seem to lay more load upon me, he very learnedly says that Irenæus, in the place quoted by me, says not a word of Simon Magus being author of images; and would have his reader believe that I mistook Simon Magus for Simon Irenæus[e]. But the good man I suppose wrote this after supper, and could not then read or consider that the testimony of Irenæus was brought in to no such purpose; neither did it relate to any Simon at all, but to the Gnostics or Carpocratians, who also were very early and very deep in this impiety; only they did not worship the pictures of Simon and Helena, but of Jesus and Paul, and Homer and Pythagoras, as St. Austin[f] testifies of them; but that which he remarks in them is this, that Marcellina, one of their sect, worshipped the pictures of Jesus, &c. "adorando, incensumque ponendo," "they did adore them, and put incense before them:" I wish the church of Rome would leave to do so, or acknowledge whose disciples they are in this thing. The same also is said by Epiphanius; and that the Carpocratians placed the image of Jesus with the philosophers of the world, "collocatasque adorant, et gentium mysteria perficiunt." But I doubt that both Epiphanius and St. Austin, who took this story from Irenæus, went further in the narrative than Irenæus; for he says only that they placed the images of Christ, &c. "et has coronant:" no more;—and yet even for this, for crowning the image of Christ with flowers[g], though they did not so much as is now-a-days done at Rome, St. Irenæus made an outcry, and reckoned them in the black catalogue of heretics, not for

[d] Cum ejus statuam in Jovis figuram construxissent, Helenæ autem in Minervæ speciem, eis thura adolebant, et libabant, et tanquam Deos adorabant, Simonianos seipsos nominantes. Theodoret. Hæret. Fab. lib. 1. tit. Simonis Hæresis in fin.

[e] Vide Irenæ. lib. 1. adv. Hæres. c. 23, 24. [f] Ubi suprà Hæres. 7.

[g] Iren. reliquam observationem circa eas similiter ut gentes faciunt, i. e. sicut cæterorum illustrium virorum imaginibus consueverunt facere.

joining Christ's image with that of Homer and Aristotle, Pythagoras and Plato, but even for crowning Christ's image with flowers and coronets, as they also did those of the philosophers; for though this may be innocent, yet the other was a thing not known in the religion of any, that were called Christians, till Simon and Carpocrates began to teach the world.

2. We find the wisest and the most sober of the heathens speaking against the use of images in their religious rites. So Varro, when he had said that the old Romans had for one hundred and seventy years worshipped the gods without picture or image, adds, "quod si adhuc mansisset, castius dii observarentur;" and gives this reason for it; "Qui primi simulacra deorum populis posuerunt, et civitatibus suis et metum dempsisse, et errorem addidisse:" "The making images of the gods took away fear from men and brought in error:" which place St. Austin quoting, commends and explicates it, saying, "he wisely thought that the gods might easily be despised in the blockishness of images[h]."—The same also was observed by Plutarch, and he gives this reason; "Nefas putantes augustiora exprimere humilioribus, neque aliter aspirari ad Deum quam mente posse:" "They accounted it impiety to express the great beings with low matter, and they believed there was no aspiring up to God but by the mind[i]." This is a philosophy, which the church of Rome need not be ashamed to learn.

3. It was so known a thing, that Christians did abominate the use of images in religion and in their churches, that Adrian the emperor was supposed to build temples to Christ, and to account him as God, because he commanded that churches without images should be made in all cities, as is related by Lampridius[k].

4. In all the disputations of the Jews against the Christians of the primitive church, although they were impatient of having any image, and had detested all use of them, especially ever since their return from Babylon, and still retained the hatred of them, even after the dissolution of their temple, "even unto superstition," says Bellarmine[l]; yet they

[h] Prudenter existimavit deos facile posse in simulacrorum stolidilate contemni.
[i] Plut. in Numâ.
[k] Ælius Lamprid. in Alexandro Severo. edit. Salmat. p. 120.
[l] De Imag. c. 7. sect. Ad primum.

never objected against Christians their having images in their churches, much less their worshipping them. And let it be considered, that in all that long disputation between Justin Martyr and Tryphon the Jew, in which the subtle Jew moves every stone, lays all the load he can at the Christian's door, makes all objections, raises all the envy, gives all the matter of reproach, he can against the Christians, yet he opens not his mouth against them concerning images. The like is to be observed in Tertullian's book against the Jews; no mention of images, for there was no such thing amongst the Christians, they hated them as the Jews did; but it is not imaginable they would have omitted so great a cause of quarrel. On the other side, when in length of time images were brought into churches, the Jews forbore not to upbraid the Christians with it. There was a dialogue written a little before the time of the seventh synod, in which a Jew is brought in saying to the Christians, "I have believed all ye say, and I do believe in the crucified Jesus Christ, that he is the Son of the living God; 'Scandalizor autem in vos Christianos, quia imagines adoratis,' 'I am offended at you Christians that ye worship images[m];' for the Scripture forbids us every where to make any similitude or graven image."—And it is very observable, that in the first and best part of the talmud of Babylon, called the Misna, published about the end of the second century, the Christians are not blamed about images; which shews they gave no occasion: but in the third part of the talmud, about the tenth and eleventh age after Christ, the Christians are sufficiently upbraided and reproached in this matter. In the Gemara, which was finished about the end of the fifth century, I find that learned men say the Jews called the Christian church 'the house of idolatry;' which though it may be expounded in relation to images, which about that time began in some churches to be placed and honoured; yet I rather incline to believe, that they meant it of our worshipping Jesus for the true God and the true Messias; for at this day they call all Christians 'idolaters,' even those that have none, and can endure no images in their religion or their churches. But now since these periods, it is plain that the case is altered, and when the learned Christians of the Roman communion write against the Jews, they

[m] Synod. 7. act. 5.

are forced to make apologies for the scandal they give to the Jews in their worshipping of images, as is to be seen (besides Leontius Neopolitanus of Cyprus's Apology, which he published for the Christians against the Jews) in Ludovicus Carretus's epistle, in Sepher Amana, and Fabianus Fioghus's Catechetical Dialogues. But I suppose this case is very plain, and is a great conviction of the innovation in this matter made by the church of Rome.

5. The matter of worshipping images looks so ill, so like idolatry, so like the forbidden practices of the heathens, that it was infinitely reasonable, that if it were the practice and doctrine of the primitive church, the primitive priests and bishops should at least have considered, and stated the question how far, and in what sense, it was lawful, and with what intention, and in what degrees, and with what caution and distinctions, this might lawfully be done; particularly when they preached, and wrote commentaries and explications upon the decalogue; especially since there was at least so great a semblance of opposition and contradiction between the commandment and any such practice; God forbidding any image and similitude to be made of himself, or any thing else in heaven, or in earth, or in the sea, and that with such threatenings and interminations of his severe judgments against them that did make them for worship, and this thing being so constantly objected by all those many that opposed their admission and veneration; it is certainly very strange that none of the fathers should take notice of any difficulty in this affair. They objected the commandment against the heathens for doing it; and yet that they should make no account, nor take notice how their worshipping saints and God himself by images, should differ from the heathen superstition that was the same thing to look upon: this indeed is very unlikely. But so it is; Justin Martyr and Clemens Alexandrinus speak plainly enough of this matter, and speak plain downright words against making and worshipping images; and so careless they were of any future chance, or the present concern of the Roman church, that they do not except the image of the true God, nor the images of saints and angels, no, not of Christ, or the blessed Virgin Mary herself. Nay, Origen[n] expounds the commandments, and St. Austin makes a pro-

[n] Homil. 8. in Exod.

fessed commentary upon them, but touched none of these things with the top of his finger, only told that they were all forbidden: we are not so careless now-a-days in the church of Rome; but carefully expound the commandments against the insufferable objections of the heretics of late, and the prophets and the fathers of old. But yet for all this, a suspicious man would conclude, that, in the first four hundred years, there was no need of any such explications, inasmuch as they had nothing to do with images, which only could make any such need.

6. But then, in the next place I consider, that the second commandment is so plain, so easy, so peremptory, against all the making and worshipping any image or likeness of any thing, that besides that every man naturally would understand all such to be forbidden, it is so expressed, that upon supposition that God did intend to forbid it wholly, it could not more plainly have been expressed. For the prohibition is absolute and universal, and therefore of all particulars; and there is no word or sign, by the virtue of which it can, with any probability, be pretended that any one of any kind is excepted. Now then to this when the church of Rome pretends to answer, they overdo it, and make the matter the more suspicious. Some of them answer by saying, that this is no moral commandment, not obligatory to Christians, but to the Jews only: others say, that by this commandment it is only forbidden to account an image to be very God; so Cajetan: others say, that an idol only is forbidden, and that an image is no idol. Others yet distinguish the manner of worshipping, saying, that the image is worshipped for the sampler's sake, not for its own. And this worship is by some called δουλεία or service; by others λατρεία; saying that the first is to images of saints, the other to God only. And yet with this difference; some saying that the image of God is adored with the same kind of adoration that God is; only it is to the image for God's sake; so St. Thomas of Aquine, and generally his scholars. Others say that it is a religious kind of worship due to images, but not at all divine; some say it is but a civil worship. And then it is for the image's sake, and so far is intransitive, but whatever is paid more to the image is transitive, and passes further. And whatsoever it be, it cannot be agreed how it ought to be

paid: whether properly or improperly, univocally or equivocally, for themselves or for something else, whether analogically or simply, whether absolutely or by reduction. And it is remarkable what Bellarmine answers to the question, With what kind of worship images may be adored? He answers with this proposition; "The worship which by itself and properly is due to images, is a certain imperfect worship, which analogically and reductively pertains to a kind of that worship, which is due to the exemplar[a]:" and a little after, "To the images a certain inferior worship is due, and that not all one, but various according to the variety of images." To the images of saints is due "dulia secundum quid;" which if you do not understand, Bellarmine in the next words explains most clearly; 'dulia secundum quid,' is, as a man may say, 'reductive and analogical.' But after all this we may be mistaken, and we cannot tell whom to follow nor what to do in the case. Thomas and his scholars warrant you to give the same worship to God's image as to God: and this is the easiest way indeed to be understood, and indeed may quickly be understood, to be direct idolatry. Bellarmine and others tell you, Stay, not so altogether; but there is a way to agree with St. Thomas, that it shall be the same worship, and not the same worship; for it is the same by reduction, that is, it is of the same kind, and therefore divine, but it is imperfectly divine;—as if there could be degrees in divine worship; that is, as if any worship could be divine, and yet not the greatest. But if this seems difficult, Bellarmine illustrates it by similitudes: "This worship of images is the same with the worship of the example, viz. of God, or of Christ, as it happens; just as a painted man is the same with a living man, and a painted horse with a living horse, for a painted man and a painted horse differ specifically; as the true man and the true horse do; and yet the painted man is no man, and the painted horse is no horse." The effect of which discourse is this, that the worship of images, is but the image of worship; hypocrisy and dissimulation all the way; nothing real, but imaginative and fantastical; and indeed though this gives but a very ill account of the agreement of Bellarmine, with their saints, Thomas and Bonaventure, yet it is the best way to avoid idolatry,

[a] Lib. 2. de Imagin. S. S. cap. 25.

because they give no real worship to images: but then on the other side, how do they mock God and Christ, by offering to them that which is nothing; by pretending to honour them by honouring their images; when the honour they do give to images, is itself but imaginary, and no more of reality in it, than there is of human nature in the picture of a man! However, if you will not commit downright idolatry, as some of their saints teach you, then you must be careful to observe these plain distinctions, and first be sure to remember that when you worship an image, you do it not materially but formally; not as it is of such a substance, but as it is a sign; next take care that you observe what sort of image it is, and then proportion your right kind to it, that you do not give 'latria' to that where 'hyperdulia' is only due; and be careful that if 'dulia' only be due, that your worship be not 'hyperdulical.' In the next place consider that the worship to your image is intransitive but in few cases, and according but to a few doctors; and therefore when you have got all these cases together, be sure that in all other cases it be transitive. But then when the worship is passed on to the exemplar, you must consider, that if it be of the same kind with that which is due to the example, yet it must be an imperfect piece of worship, though the kind be perfect; and that it is but analogical, and it is reductive, and it is not absolute, not simple, not by itself; not by an act to the image distinct from that which is to the example, but one and the same individual act, with one intention, as to the supreme kind, though with some little variety, if the kinds be differing. Now by these easy, ready, clear, and necessary distinctions, and rules, and cases, the people being fully and perfectly instructed, there is no possibility that the worship of images should be against the second commandment, because the commandment does not forbid any worship that is transitive, reduct, accidental, consequential, analogical, and hyperdulical, and this is all that the church of Rome does, by her wisest doctors, teach now-a-days. But now after all this, the easiest way of all certainly is to worship no images, and no manner of way, and trouble the people's heads with no distinction; for by these no man can ever be at peace, or understand the commandment, which without these laborious devices (by which they confess the guilt of

the commandment, does lie a little too heavy upon them) would most easily by every man and every woman be plainly and properly understood. And therefore I know not whether there be more impiety, or more fearful caution, in the church of Rome in being so curious, that the second commandment be not exposed to the eyes and ears of the people; leaving it out of their manuals, breviaries, and catechisms, as if when they teach the people to serve God, they had a mind they should not be tempted to keep all the commandments. And when at any time they do set it down, they only say thus, "Non facies tibi idolum," which is a word not used in the second commandment at all; and if the word which is there used be sometimes translated 'idolum,' yet it means no more than 'similitude;' or if the words be of distinct signification, yet because both are expressly forbidden in that commandment, it is very ill to represent the commandment so, as if it were observed according to the intention of that word, yet the commandment might be broken, by the not observing it according to the intention of the other word, which they conceal. But of this more by and by.

7. I consider that there is very great scandal and offence given to enemies and strangers to Christianity; the very Turks and Jews, with whom the worship of images is of very ill report, and that upon, at least, the most probable grounds in the world. Now the Apostle having commanded all Christians to pursue those things which are of good report, and to walk circumspectly and charitably towards them that are without, and that we "give no offence neither to the Jew nor to the gentile:" now if we consider, that if the Christian church were wholly without images, there would nothing perish to the faith or to the charity of the church, or to any grace which is in order to heaven; and that the spiritual state of the Christian church may as well want such baby-ceremonies as the synagogue did; and yet on the other side, that the Jews and Turks are the more, much more, estranged from the religion of Christ Jesus, by the image-worship[p] done by his pretended servants; the consequent will be, that to retain the worship of images is both against the faith and the charity of Christians, and puts limits, and retrenches the borders of the Christian pale.

[p] 1 Cor. viii. 13.

8. It is also very scandalous to Christians, that is, it makes many, and endangers more, to fall into the direct sin of idolatry. Polydore Virgil[q] observes out of St. Jerome, that "almost all the holy fathers damned the worship of images, for this very reason, for fear of idolatry;" and Cassander says, that all the ancients did abhor all adoration of images; and he cites Origen[r] as an instance great enough to verify the whole affirmative: "Nos vero ideo non honoramus simulacra, quia quantum possumus cavemus, ne quo modo incidamus in eam credulitatem, ut his tribuamus divinitatis aliquid."—This authority E. W. (p. 55) is not ashamed to bring in behalf of himself in this question, saying, that "Origen hath nothing against the use of images, and declares our Christian doctrine thus;" then he recites the words above quoted; than which, Origen could not speak plainer against the practice of the Roman church; and E. W. might as well have disputed for the Manichees with this argument: "The Scripture doth not say that God made the world, it only declares the Christian doctrine thus, In the beginning God made heaven and earth," &c. But this gentleman thinks any thing will pass for argument amongst his own people. And of this danger St. Austin[s] gives a rational account; "No man doubts but idols want all sense: but when they are placed in their seats, in an honourable sublimity, that they may be attended by them that pray and offer sacrifice, by the very likeness of living members and senses, although they be senseless and without life, they af-

[q] De Invent. Rerum lib. 6. c. 13. Eo insaniæ deventum est, ut hæc pietatis pars parum differat ab impietate. Sunt enim benè multi rudiores stupidioresque, qui saxeas vel ligneas, seu in parietibus pictas imagines colant, non ut figuras, sed perindè ac si ipsæ sensum aliquem habeant, et eis magis fidant quam Christo: Polyd. Virg. lib. 6. c. 13. de Invent. Rerum.—Lilius Giraldus in Syntag. de Diis Gentium loquens de excessu Romanæ ecclesiæ in negotio imaginum, præfatur, Satius esse ea Harpocrati et Angeronæ consignare. Illud certè non prætermittam, nos dico Christianos, ut aliquando Romanos fuisse sine imaginibus in primitivâ, quæ vocatur, ecclesia. Erasmus in catechesi ait, usque ad ætatem Hieronymi erant probatæ religionis viri, qui in templis nullam ferebant imaginem, nec pictam, nec sculptam, nec textam, ac ne Christi quidem.—Et ibid. Ut imagines sint in templis nulla præcepit vel humana constitutio; et ut facilius est, ita tutius quoque omnes imagines è templis submovere. Videatur etiam Cassandri consultatio, sub hoc titulo et Masius in Josuah, cap. 8. Sic autem queritur Ludovicus Vives Comment. in lib. 8. c. ult. de Civit. Dei. Divos divasque non alitèr venerantur, quàm Deum ipsum. Non video in multis quid discrimen sit inter eorum opinionem de sanctis, et id quod Gentiles putabant de Diis suis.—Didorus Siculus dixit de Mose, imaginem statuit nullam, ideo quod non crederet Deum homini similem esse: et Dion. lib. 36. Nullam effigiem in Hierosolymis habuere, quod Deum crederent ut ineffabilem, ita inaspicuum ἀειδῆ.

[r] Consul. de Imagin. ex Origene contr. Celsum, lib. 7. versus finem.

[s] *Epist.* 49. q. 3.

fect weak minds, that they seem to live and feel, especially when the veneration of a multitude is added to it, by which so great a worship is bestowed upon them." Here is the danger, and how much is contributed to it in the church of Rome, by clothing their images in rich apparel, and by pretending to make them nod their head, to twinkle the eyes, and even to speak, the world is too much satisfied. Some such things as these, and the superstitious talkings and actings of their priests, made great impressions upon my neighbours in Ireland; and they had such a deep and religious veneration for the image of our lady of Kilbrony, that a worthy gentleman, who is now with God, and knew the deep superstition of the poor Irish, did not distrain upon his tenants for his rents, but carried away the image of the female saint of Kilbrony; and instantly the priest took care that the tenants should redeem the lady, by a punctual and speedy paying of their rents; for they thought themselves unblessed as long as the image was away; and therefore they speedily fetched away their ark from the house of Obed-Edom, and were afraid that their saint could not help them, when her image was away. Now if St. Paul would have Christians to abstain from "meats sacrificed to idols," to avoid the giving offence to weak brethren, much more ought the church to avoid tempting all the weak people of her communion to idolatry, by countenancing, and justifying, and imposing, such acts, which all their heads can never learn to distinguish from idolatry.

I end this with a memorial out of the councils of Sens and Mentz, who command "moneri populum, ne imagines adorent:" "The preachers were commanded to admonish the people, that they should not adore images[t]." And for the novelty of the practice here in the British churches, it is evident in ecclesiastical story, that it was introduced by a synod of London, about the year 714, under Bonifacius the legate, and Bertualdus, archbishop of Dover; and that without disputation or inquiry into the lawfulness or unlawfulness of it, but wholly upon the account of a vision pretended to be seen by Egwin bishop of Worcester; the Virgin Mary appearing to him, and commanding that her image

[t] C. 14. c. 41. apud Bellarmin. lib. 2. de Imag. S. S. c. 22. sect. Secunda propositio.

should be set in churches and worshipped. That Austin the monk brought with him the banner of the cross, and the image of Christ, Beda tells; and from him Baronius and Binius affirm, that before this vision of Egwin, the cross and image of Christ were in use; but that they were at all worshipped or adored, Beda saith not; and there is no record, no monument of it, before this hypochondriacal dream of Egwin: and it further appears to be so, because Albinus or Alcuinus an Englishman[u], master of Charles the Great, when the King had sent to Offa the book of Constantinople, for the worship of images, wrote an epistle against it, "ex auctoritate Divina Scripturarum mirabiliter affirmatum;" and brought it to the King of France in the name of our bishops and kings, saith Hovedon[x].

SECTION VII.

Of Picturing God the Father, and the Holy Trinity.

AGAINST all the authorities almost, which are or might be brought to prove the unlawfulness of picturing God the Father, or the Holy Trinity, the Roman doctors generally give this one answer; that the fathers intended by their sayings, to condemn the picturing of the divine essence; but condemn not the picturing of those symbolical shapes or forms, in which God the Father, or the Holy Ghost, or the blessed Trinity, is supposed to have appeared. To this I reply, 1. That no man ever intended to paint the essence of any thing in the world. A man cannot well understand an essence, and hath no idea of it in his mind, much less can a painter's pencil do it. And therefore it is a vain and impertinent discourse to prove, that they do ill, who attempt to paint the divine essence[y]. This is a subterfuge which none, but men out of hope to defend their opinion otherwise, can make use of. 2. To picture God the Father in such symbolical forms in which he appeared, is to picture him in no form at all; for generally both the schools of the Jews and Christians consent in this, that God the Father never ap-

[u] A. D. circiter 792. [x] Annal. part. 1. sect. 7.
[y] Vide Plutarch. de Iside et Osir.

peared in his person; for as St. Paul affirms, he "is the invisible God, whom no eye hath seen or can see;" he always appeared by angels, or by fire, or by storm and tempest, by a cloud, or by a still voice; he spake by his prophets, and at last by his Son; but still the adorable majesty was reserved in the secrets of his glory. 3. The church of Rome paints the Holy Trinity in forms and symbolical shapes, in which she never pretends the blessed Trinity did appear, as in a face with three noses and four eyes, one body with three heads; and as an old man with a great beard, and a pope's crown upon his head, and holding the two ends of the transverse rafter of the cross with Christ leaning on his breast, and the Holy Spirit hovering over his head: and therefore they worship the images of God the Father, and the Holy Trinity, "figures which," as is said of Remphan and the heathen gods and goddesses, "themselves have made;" which therefore must needs be idols by their own definition of 'idolum;' 'simulacrum rei non existentis;' for never was there seen any such of the Holy Trinity in Unity, as they most impiously represent. And if when any thing is spoken of God in Scripture allegorically, they may of it make an image to God, they would make many more monsters than yet they have found out; for as Durandus[z] well observes, "If any one shall say, that because the Holy Ghost appeared in the shape of a dove, and the Father, in the Old Testament, under the corporal forms, that therefore they may be represented by images, we must say to this, that those corporal forms were not assumed by the Father and the Holy Spirit; and therefore a representation of them by images is not a representation of the divine person, but a representation of that form or shape alone. Therefore there is no reverence due to it, as there is none due to those forms by themselves. Neither were these forms to represent the divine persons, but to represent those effects, which those divine persons did effect." And therefore there is one thing more to be said to them that do so; "They have changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the similitude of a mortal man[a]." Now how will the reader imagine that the Dissuasive is confuted, and his testimonies from antiquity answered? Why, most clearly: E. W. saith[b], that "one principle of St. John Damascen doth it, it solves all

[z] In 3. Sent. dist. 9. q. 2. n. 15. [a] Rom. i. 23. [b] P. 60.

that the Doctor hath or can allege in this matter." Well! what is this principle? The words are these (and St. Austin[c] points at the same); "Quisnam est, qui invisibilis, et corpore vacantis, ac circumscriptionis et figuræ expertis, Dei simulacrum effingere queat? Extremæ itaque dementiæ atque impietatis fuerit divinum numen fingere et figurare."—This is the principle to confute the Doctor:—why, but the Doctor thinks, that, in the world, there cannot be clearer words for the reproof of picturing God and the Holy Trinity. For "to do so is madness and extreme impiety," so says Damascen:—But stay, says E. W.[d] these words of Damascen are "as who should say, he that goes about to express by any image the perfect similitude of God's intrinsical perfections or his nature" *(which is immense without body or figure)*, "would be both impious, and act the part of a madman." But how shall any man know that these words of Damascen are 'as much as to say' this meaning of E. W.? and where is this principle, as he calls it, of Damascen, by which the Doctor is so every where silenced? Certainly E. W. is a merry gentleman, and thinks all mankind are fools. This is the ridiculous commentary of E. W.: but Damascen was too learned and grave a person to talk such wild stuff. And Cardinal Cajetan gives a better account of the doctrine of Damascen[e]: "The authority of Damascen in the (very) letter of it condemns those images (viz. of God) of folly and impiety. And there is the same reason now concerning the Deity which was in the old law. And it is certain, that in the old law the images of God were forbidden." To the like purpose[f] is that of the famous Germanus, who though too favourable to pictures in churches for veneration, yet he is a great enemy to all pictures of God: "Neque enim invisibilis Deitatis imaginem, et similitudinem, vel schema, vel figuram aliquam formamus," &c. as who please may see in his epistle to Thomas, bishop of Claudiopolis. But let us consider when God forbade the children of Israel to make any likeness of him, did

[c] De Fide et Symbolo, c. 7. Damasc. lib. 4. Orthod. Fidei, cap. 17.

[d] P. 60.

[e] Auctoritas Damasceni in literâ damnat illas (imagines Dei) insipientiæ et impietatis. Et eadem est ratio nunc de Deitate, quæ erat in veteri lege quoad rem figurabilem vel non secundum se. Constat autem in veteri lege imagines Dei esse prohibitas.

[f] Videat (si placet) lector Lucum Fudensem adv. Albig. Error. lib. 2. c. 9. tom. 4. Bibl. p.p. part. 2. Apud. Nicen. Synod. 11. act. 5.

he only forbid them to express by any image the perfect similitude of his intrinsical perfections? Had the children of Israel leave to picture God in the form of a man walking in Paradise? Or to paint the Holy Trinity like three men talking to Abraham? Was it lawful for them to make an image or picture, or (to use E. W.'s expression) "to exhibit to their eyes those visible or circumscribed lineaments," which any man had seen? And when they had exhibited these forms to the eyes, might they then have fallen down and worshipped those forms, which themselves exhibited to their own and others' eyes? I omit to inquire how they can prove that God appeared in Paradise in the form of a man, which they can never do, unless they will use the friar's argument; "Faciamus hominem ad similitudinem nostram," &c. and so make fair way for the heresy of the Anthropomorphites.

But I pass on a little further: Did the Israelites, when they made a molten calf, and said, "These are thy gods, O Israel," did they imagine, that, by that image, they represented the true form, essence, or nature, of God? Or did the heathens ever pretend to make an image of the intrinsical perfections of any of their 'majores' or 'minores dii,' or any of their demons and dead heroes? And because they neither did nor could do that, may it therefore be concluded, that they made no images of their gods? Certain it is, the heathens have as much reason to say they did not picture their gods, meaning their nature and essence, but, by symbolical forms and shapes, represented those good things which they supposed them to have done. Thus the Egyptians pictured Joseph with a bushel upon his head, and called him their god Serapis; but they made no image of his essence, but symbolically represented the benefit he did the nation by preserving them in the seven years' famine. Thus Ceres is painted with a hook and a sheaf of corn, Pomona with a basket of apples, Hercules with a club, and Jupiter himself with a handful of symbolical thunderbolts; this is that which the popish doctors call picturing God, not in his essence, but in history, or in symbolical shapes: for of these three ways s

s Observandum est tribus modis posse aliquid pingi. Uno modo ad exprimendam perfectam similitudinem formulæ, et naturæ rei ipsius. Altero modo ad historiam aliquam oculis exhibendam. Tertio potest aliquid pingi extra historiam ad explicandam naturam rei, non per immediatam et propriam similitudinem, sed ana-

of picturing God, Bellarmine says, the two last are lawful. And therefore the heathens not doing the first, but the second, and the third only, are just so to be excused as the church of Rome is. But then neither these nor those must pretend that they do not picture God: for whatever the intention be, still an image of God is made: or else why do they worship God by that, which if it be no image of God, must by their own doctrine be an idol? And therefore Bellarmine's distinction is very foolish, and is only crafty to deceive; for besides the impertinency of it in answering the charge, only by declaring his intention, as being charged with picturing God; he tells he did it indeed, but he meant not to paint his nature, but his story or his symbolical significations, which I say is impertinent, it not being inquired with what purpose it is done, but whether or no; and an evil thing may be done with a good intention: besides this I say, that Bellarmine's distinction comes just to this issue: God may be painted or represented by an image, not to express a perfect similitude of his form or nature, but to express it imperfectly, or rather not to express it, but 'ad explicandam naturam,' to explain it, not to describe him truly, but historically; though that be a strange history, that does not express truly and as it is: but here it is plainly acknowledged, that besides the history, "the very nature of God may be explicated by pictures" or images, provided they be only metaphorical and mystical, as if the only reason of the lawfulness of painting God is, because it is done imperfectly and unlike him; or as if the metaphor made the image lawful; just as if to do Alexander honour, you should picture him like a bear, tearing and trampling every thing; or, to exalt Cæsar, you should hang upon a table the pictures of a fox and a cock and a lion, and write under it, This is Caius Julius Cæsar. But I am ashamed of these prodigious follies. But at last, why should it be esteemed madness and impiety to picture the nature of God, which is invisible, and not also be as great a madness to picture any shape of him, which no man ever saw? But he that is invested with a thick cloud, and encircled with an inaccessible glory, and never drew aside the curtains to be seen under any representment,

legiam, sive metaphoricas, mysticasque significationes. Bellarm. de Imag. lib. 2. c. 8. sect. Pro Solutione. Hoc modo pingimus Deum, ibid. sect. Hoc modo.

will not suffer himself to be exposed to vulgar eyes, by fantastical shapes, and ridiculous forms.

But it may be, the church of Rome does not use any such impious practice, much less own so mad a doctrine; for one of my adversaries says, that "the picturing the forms or appearances of God is all that some (in their church) allow," that is, some do, and some do not: so that it may be only a private opinion of some doctors, and then I am to blame to charge Popery with it. To this I answer that Bellarmine [h] indeed says, "Non esse tam certum in ecclesia an sint faciendæ imagines Dei sive Trinitatis, quam Christi et sanctorum;" "It is not so certain," viz. as to be an article of faith. But yet besides that Bellarmine allows it, and cites Cajetan, Catharinus, Payva, Sanders, and Thomas Waldensis, for it; this is a practice and doctrine brought in by an unproved custom of the church; "Constat quod hæc consuetudo depingendi angelos et Deum, modo sub specie Columbæ, modo sub figura Trinitatis, sit ubique inter catholicos recepta:" "The picturing angels, and God, sometimes under the shape of a dove, and sometimes under the figure of the Trinity, is every where received among the Catholics," said a great man [i] amongst them. And to what purpose they do this, we are told by Cajetan [k], speaking of images of God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, saying, "Hæc non solum pinguntur, ut ostendantur sicut cherubim olim in templo, sed ut adorentur:" "They are painted, that they may be worshipped," "ut frequens usus ecclesiæ testatur:" "This is witnessed by the frequent use of the church."—So that this is received every where among the Catholics, and these images are worshipped, and of this there is an ecclesiastical custom; and I add, in their mass-book lately printed, these pictures are not unfrequently seen. So that now it is necessary to shew that this, besides the impiety of it, is against the doctrine and practice of the primitive church, and is an innovation in religion, a propriety of the Roman doctrine, and of infinite danger and unsufferable impiety.

To some of these purposes the Dissuasive alleged Tertullian, Eusebius, and St. Jerome; but A. L. says [l], these

[h] Lib. 2. de Reliq. et Imagin. S. 8. cap. 8. sect. Ego dico tria.
[i] Pujol. de Adorat. disp. 3. sect. 4.
[k] In 3. part. tom. q. 25. a. 3.
[l] P. 28.

fathers have nothing to this purpose. This is now to be tried. These men were only named in the Dissuasive. Their words are these which follow.

1. For Tertullian[m]: A man would think it could not be necessary to prove that Tertullian thought it unlawful to picture God the Father, when he thought the whole art of painting and making images to be unlawful, as I have already proved. But however let us see. He is very curious that nothing should be used by Christians or in the service of God, which is used on, or by, or towards, idols; and because they did paint and picture their idols, cast, or carve them, therefore nothing of that kind ought to be "in rebus Dei," as Tertullian's phrase is. But the sum of his discourse is this; "The heathens use to picture their false gods, that indeed befits them, but therefore is unfit for God; and therefore we are to flee, not only from idolatry, but from idols; in which affair a word does change the case, and that, which, before it was said to appertain to idols, was lawful,—by that very word was made unlawful, and therefore much more by a shape or figure; and therefore flee from the shape of them; for it is an unworthy thing, that the image of the living God should be made the image of an idol or a dead thing. For the idols of the heathens are silver and gold, and have eyes without sight, and noses without smell, and hands without feeling." So far Tertullian[n] argues. And what can more plainly give his sense and meaning in this article? If the very image of an idol be unlawful, much more is it unlawful to make an image or idol of the living God, or represent him by a dead man.

But this argument is further and more plainly set down by Athanasius, whose book against the Gentiles is spent in reproving the images of God real or imaginary; insomuch that he affirms that the Gentiles dishonour even their false gods, by making images of them, and that they might better have passed for gods, if they had not represented them by visible images. And therefore, "That the religion of making images

[m] De Coronâ Milit.

[n] De Cor. Milit. Johannes 'Filioli' inquit, 'Custodite vos ab idolis,' non jam ab idololatriâ quasi ab officio, sed ab idolis, id est, ab ipsâ effigie eorum: indignum enim est ut imago divini, imago idoli et mortui fiat: si enim verbo nudo conditio pollutur, ut apostolus docet, 'si quis dixerit idolothytum est, non contigeris,' multo magis eam habitu, et ritu, et apparatu, &c. Quid enim tam dignum Deo quàm quod indignum idolo?

of their gods, is not piety, but impious. For to know God we need no outward thing; the way of truth will direct us to him. And if any man ask which is that way, viz. to know God, I shall say, It is the soul of a man, and that understanding which is planted in us; for by that alone God can be seen and understood[o]." The same father does discourse many excellent things to this purpose; "as that a man is the only image of God; Jesus Christ is the perfect image of his glory, and he only represents his essence; and man is made in the likeness of God, and therefore he also, in a less perfect manner, represents God: besides these, if any man desires to see God, let him look in the book of the creature; and all the world is the image and lively representment of God's power, and his wisdom, his goodness, and his bounty. But to represent God in a carved stone, or a painted table, does depauperate our understanding of God, and dishonours him below the painter's art; for it represents him lovely only by that art, and therefore less than him that painted it." But that which Athanasius adds is very material, and gives great reason of the command, why God should severely forbid any image of himself: "Calamitati enim et tyrannidi servientes homines unicum illud nulli communicabile Dei, nomen lignis lapidibusque imposuerunt:" "Some in sorrow for their dead children, made their images and fancied that presence; some desiring to please their tyrannous princes, put up their statues, and at a distance by a fantastical presence flattered them with honours. And in process of time, these were made gods; and the incommunicable name was given to wood and stones."—Not that the heathens thought that image to be very God, but that they were imaginarily present in them, and so had their name. "Hujusmodi igitur initiis idolorum inventio, Scriptura teste, apud homines cœpit," "Thus idolatry began, saith the Scripture, and thus it was promoted;" and the event was, they made pitiful concep-

[o] 'Nam si, ut dicitis, literarum instar Dei præsentiam signant, atque adeò, ac si Deum significantia, Divinis dignæ censentur honoribus, certè qui ea sculpsit, eisque effigiem dedit, multo magis hos promerebatur honores.' Et paulò post: 'Quocirca hujusmodi religio, Deorumque fictio non pietatis est, sed iniquitatis invectio. Veritatis via ad eum, qui verus Deus est, diriget. Ad eum verò cognoscendum et exactissimè intelligendum, nullius extra nos positæ rei opem necessariam habemus. Quod si quis interrogat quænam ista sit? Uniuscujusque animam esse dixerim, atque insitam illam intelligentiam; per ipsam enim solam Deus inspici, et intelligi potest.' Orat. contr. Gentiles.

tions of God, they confined his presence to a statue, they worshipped him with the lowest way imaginable, they descended from all spirituality and the noble ways of understanding, and made wood and stone to be as it were a body to the Father of spirits, they gave the incommunicable name not only to dead men, and angels, and demons, but to the images of them; and though it is great folly to picture angelical spirits, and dead heroes, whom they never saw, yet by these steps when they had come to picture God himself, this was the height of the Gentile impiety, and is but too plain a representation of the impiety practised by too many in the Roman church.

But as we proceed further, the case will be yet clearer. Concerning the testimony of Eusebius, I wonder that any writer of Roman controversies should be ignorant, and being so, should confidently say, Eusebius had nothing to this purpose, viz. to condemn the picturing of God, when his words are so famous, that they are recorded in the seventh synod [p]; and the words were occasioned by a solemn message sent to Eusebius by the sister of Constantius and wife of Licinius, lately turned from being pagan to be Christian, desiring Eusebius to send her the picture of our Lord Jesus; to which he answers: "Quia vero de quadam imagine, quasi Christi, scripsisti, hanc volens tibi à nobis mitti, quam dicis; et qualem, hanc, quam perhibes, Christi imaginem? Utrum veram et incommutabilem, et natura characteres suos portantem? An istam, quam propter nos suscepit, servi formæ schemate circumamictus? Sed de forma quidem Dei nec ipse arbitror te quærere semel ab ipso edoctam, quoniam neque patrem quis novit nisi filius, neque ipsum filium novit quis aliquando digne, nisi solus pater qui eum genuit." And a little after; "Quis ergo hujusmodi dignitatis et gloriæ vibrantes et præfulgentes splendores exarare potuisset, mortuis et inanimatis coloribus et scripturis umbraticis?" And then speaking of the glory of Christ in Mount Tabor, he proceeds; "Ergo si tunc incarnata ejus forma tantam virtutem sortita est ab inhabitante in se divinitate mutata, quid oportet dicere cum mortalitate exutus, et corruptione ablutus, speciem servilis formæ in gloriam Domini et Dei commutavit?" Where besides that Eusebius thinks it unlawful to

[p] Synod. 7. act. 6.

make a picture of Christ, and therefore consequently, much more to make a picture of God; he also tells Constantia, he supposes she did not offer at any desire of that.—Well, for these three of the fathers we are well enough; but for the rest, the objector says, that they "speak only against representing God as in his own essence, shape, or form." To this I answer, that God hath no shape or form; and therefore these fathers could not speak against making images of a thing that was not; and as for the images of his essence, no Christian, no heathen, ever pretended to it; and no man or beast can be pictured so: no painter can paint an essence. And therefore although this distinction was lately made in the Roman schools, yet the fathers knew nothing of it, and the Roman doctors can make nothing of it, for the reasons now told. But the gentleman saith, that 'some of their church allow only and practise the picturing those forms, wherein God hath appeared.' It is very well they do no more; but I pray, in what forms did God the Father ever appear, or the holy and mysterious Trinity? Or suppose they had, does it follow they may be painted? We saw but now out of Eusebius, that it was not esteemed lawful to picture Christ, though he did appear in a human body: and although it is supposed that the Holy Ghost did appear in the shape of a dove, yet it is forbidden by the sixth general council[q] to paint Christ like a lamb, or the Holy Spirit like a dove. Add to this, where did ever the holy and blessed Trinity appear like three faces joined in one, or like an old man with Christ crucified, leaning on his breast, and a dove hovering over them? and yet however the objector is pleased to mince the matter, yet the doing this is "ubique inter Catholicos recepta;" and that not only to be seen, but to be adored, as I proved a little above by testimonies of their own.

The next charge is concerning St. Jerome, that he says no such thing; which matter will soon be at an end, if we see the commentary[r] he makes on these words of Isaiah, "Cui ergo similem fecisti Deum?" "To whom do you liken God?" Or "what image will ye make for him, who is a spirit, and

[q] Concil. Constantinop. can. 82.

[r] In cap. xl. Isai. Aut quam imaginem ponetis ei, qui spiritus est, et in omnibus est, et ubique discurrit, et terram quasi pugillo continet? Simulque irridet stultitiam nationum, quod artifex sive faber ærarius, aut aurifex aut argentarius Deum sibi faciat.

is in all things, and runs every where, and holds the earth in his fist? And he laughs at the folly of the nations, that an artist, or a brazier, or a goldsmith, or a silversmith, makes a god, viz. by making the image of God." But the objector adds, that it would be long to set down the words of the other fathers quoted by the Doctor: and truly the Doctor thought so too at first; but because the objector says they do not make against what some of his church own and practise, I thought it might be worth the reader's pains to see them.

The words of St. Austin in this question are very plain and decretory: "For a Christian to place such an image to God" (viz. with right and left hand, sitting with bended knees, that is, in the shape of a man), "is wickedness; but much more wicked is it to place it in our hearts[s]." But of this I have given account in the preceding section.

Theodoret, Damascen, and Nicephorus, do so expressly condemn the picturing God, that it is acknowledged by my adversaries: only they fly for succour to the old 'mumpsimus;' they condemn the picturing the essence of God, but not his forms and appearances; a distinction which those good old writers never thought of, but directly they condemned all images of God and the holy Trinity. And the bishops in the seventh synod, though they were worshippers of images, yet they thinking that angels were corporeal, believed they might be painted, but denied it of God expressly. And indeed it were a strange thing that God in the Old Testament should so severely forbid any image to be made of him, upon this reason, because he is invisible; and he presses it passionately, by calling it to their memory, that they heard a voice, but saw no shape; and yet that both he had formerly and did afterward shew himself, in shapes and forms which might be painted, and so the very reason of the commandment be wholly void. To which add this consideration, that although the angels did frequently appear, and consequently had forms possible to be represented in imagery, yet none of the ancients did suppose it lawful to paint angels, but they that thought them to be corporeal. Τὸν ἀόρατον εἰκονογραφεῖν ἢ διαπλάσσειν οὐκ ὅσιον, said Philo[t]. To which purpose is that

[s] De Fide et Symb. c. 7. Tale enim simulacrum Deo nefas est Christiano in templo collocare, multò magis in corde nefarium est, ubi verè templum est.

[t] Lib. de Legat.

of Seneca, "Effugit oculos, cogitatione visendus est[u]:" and Antiphanes said of God, Ὀφθαλμοῖς οὐχ ὁρᾶται, οὐδενὶ ἔοικε, διότερ αὐτὸν ἐκμαθεῖν ἐξ εἰκόνος οὐδεὶς δύναται: "God is not seen with eyes, he is like to no man; therefore no man can by an image know him." By which it appears plainly to be the general opinion of the ancients, that whatever was incorporeal was not to be painted, no, though it had appeared in symbolical forms, as confessedly the angels did. And of this the second synod of Nice[x] itself is a sufficient witness; the fathers of which did all approve the epistle of John, bishop of Thessalonica, in which he largely discourses against the picturing of any thing that is incorporeal. He that pleases to see more of this affair, may find much more, and to very great purpose, in a little book 'de Imaginibus[y],' in the first book of the Greek and Latin 'Bibliotheca Patrum;' out of which I shall only transcribe these words: "Non esse faciendum imagines Dei: imo si quis quid simile attentaverit, hunc extremis suppliciis, veluti Ethnicis communicantem dogmatis, subjici." Let them translate it that please, only I remember that Aventinus[z] tells a story, that Pope John the Twenty-second caused to be burnt for heretics, those persons who had painted the holy Trinity; which I urge for no other reason, but to shew how late an innovation of religion this is in the church of Rome. The worship of images came in by degrees, and it was long resisted,—but until of late, it never came to the height of impiety as to picture God, and to worship him by images: but this was the state and last perfection of this sin, and hath spoiled a great part of Christianity, and turned it back to Ethnicism.

But that I may sum up all; I desire the Roman doctors to weigh well the words of one of their own popes, Gregory II.[a]: to the question, 'Cur tamen Patrem Domini nostri Jesu Christi non oculis subjicimus?' 'Why do we not subject the Father of our Lord Jesus to the eyes?' he answers, "Quoniam Dei natura spectanda proponi non potest ac fingi:" "The nature of God cannot be exposed to be beheld, nor yet feigned." He did not conclude, that therefore we cannot make the image of his essence, but none at all, nothing

[u] Natur. q. 8. 30.
[x] Act. 5.
[y] P. 734, &c.
[z] Annal. Biorum, lib. 7.
[a] In Epistolâ quam Baronius Græcè edidit tom. 9. Annal. ad A. D. 726. in margine.

of him to be exposed to the sight. And that this is his direct and full meaning, besides his own words, we may conclude from the note which Baronius makes upon it. "Postea in usu venisse, ut pingatur in ecclesia Pater et Spiritus Sanctus:" "Afterward it became a use in the church (viz. the Roman) to paint the Father and the Holy Ghost." And therefore besides the impiety of it, the church of Rome is guilty of innovation in this particular also, which was the thing I intended to prove.

TWO LETTERS

TO

PERSONS CHANGED IN THEIR RELIGION.

ALSO

THREE LETTERS

TO A

GENTLEMAN THAT WAS TEMPTED TO THE COMMUNION OF

THE ROMISH CHURCH.

Ὁπόσους ἄν τις ᾖ πεπτημένος ἰταίρους, τοσούτους μὲν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἃ δεῖ βλέπει.
Dion. Orat. 1. de Regno.

TWO LETTERS,

&c.

LETTER I.

To a Gentlewoman seduced to the Church of Rome.

M. B.

I WAS desirous of an opportunity in London to have discoursed with you concerning something of nearest concernment to you; but the multitude of my little affairs hindered me, and have brought upon you this trouble to read a long letter; which yet I hope you will be more willing to do, because it comes from one, who hath a great respect to your person, and a very great charity to your soul. I must confess I was on your behalf troubled, when I heard you were fallen from the communion of the church of England, and entered into a voluntary, unnecessary schism, and departure from the laws of the king, and the communion of those with whom you have always lived in charity; going against those laws, in the defence and profession of which your husband died; going from the religion in which you were baptized, in which for so many years you lived piously and hoped for heaven; and all this without any sufficient reason, without necessity or just scandal ministered to you: and to aggravate all this, you did it in a time when the church of England was persecuted, when she was marked with the characterisms of her Lord, the marks of the cross of Jesus, that is, when she suffered for a holy cause and a holy conscience, when the church of England was more glorious than at any time before; even when she could shew more martyrs and confessors than any church this day in Christendom; even then when a king died in the profession of her religion, and thousands of priests, learned and pious men, suffered the spoiling of their goods rather than they would forsake one article of so excellent a religion: so that seriously it is

not easily to be imagined that any thing should move you, unless it be that which troubled the perverse Jews, and the heathen Greek, 'scandalum crucis,' 'the scandal of the cross.' You stumbled at that rock of offence; you left us because we were afflicted, lessened in outward circumstances, and wrapped in a cloud: but give me leave only to remind you of that sad saying of the Scripture, that you may avoid the consequent of it; "They that fall on this stone, shall be broken in pieces; but they on whom it shall fall, shall be grinded to powder." And if we should consider things but prudently, it is a great argument that the sons of our church are very conscientious and just in their persuasions, when it is evident, that we have no temporal end to serve, nothing but the great end of our souls; all our hopes of preferment are gone, all secular regards; only we still have truth on our sides, and we are not willing, with the loss of truth, to change from a persecuted to a prosperous church, from a reformed to a church that will not be reformed; lest we give scandal to good people that suffer for a holy conscience, and weaken the hands of the afflicted; of which if you had been more careful, you would have remained much more innocent.

But I pray, give me leave to consider for you, because you, in your change, considered so little for yourself. What fault, what false doctrine, what wicked and dangerous proposition, what defect, what amiss, did you find in the doctrine and liturgy and discipline of the church of England?

For its doctrine, it is certain it professes the belief of all that is written in the Old and New Testament, all that which is in the three creeds, the apostolical, the Nicene, and that of Athanasius, and whatsoever was decreed in the four general councils, or in any other truly such; and whatsoever was condemned in these, our church hath legally declared it to be heresy. And upon these accounts, above four whole ages of the church went to heaven; they baptized all their catechumens into this faith, their hopes of heaven were upon this and a good life, their saints and martyrs lived and died in this alone, they denied communion to none that professed this faith. 'This is the catholic faith,' so saith the creed of Athanasius; and unless a company of men have power to alter the faith of God, whosoever live and die in this faith, are entirely catholic and Christian. So that the church of

England hath the same faith without dispute that the church had for four or five hundred years; and therefore there could be nothing wanting here to saving faith, if we live according to our belief.

For the liturgy of the church of England, I shall not need to say much, because the case will be very evident; 1. Because the disputers of the church of Rome have not been very forward to object any thing against it, they cannot charge it with any evil: 2. Because for all the time of King Edward the Sixth, and till the eleventh year of Queen Elizabeth, your people came to our churches, and prayed with us, till the bull of Pius the Fifth came out upon temporal regards, and made a schism by forbidding the Queen's subjects to pray as by law was here appointed, though the prayers were good and holy, as themselves did believe. That bull enjoined recusancy, and made that, which was an act of rebellion, and disobedience, and schism, to be the character of your Roman Catholics. And after this, what can be supposed wanting in order to salvation? We have the word of God, the faith of the apostles, the creeds of the primitive church, the articles of the four first general councils, a holy liturgy, excellent prayers, perfect sacraments, faith and repentance, the ten commandments, and the sermons of Christ, and all the precepts and counsels of the Gospel. We teach the necessity of good works, and require and strictly exact the severity of a holy life; we live in obedience to God, and are ready to die for him, and do so when he requires us so to do; we speak honourably of his most holy name, we worship him at the mention of his name, we confess his attributes, we love his servants, we pray for all men, we love all Christians, even our most erring brethren: we confess our sins to God and to our brethren whom we have offended, and to God's ministers in cases of scandal or of a troubled conscience: we communicate often, we are enjoined to receive the holy sacrament thrice every year at least: our priests absolve the penitent, our bishops ordain priests, and confirm baptized persons, and bless their people and intercede for them; and what could here be wanting to salvation? what necessity forced you from us? I dare not suspect it was a temporal regard that drew you away, but I am sure it could be no spiritual.

But now that I have told you, and made you to consider from whence you went; give me leave to represent to you, and tell you whither you are gone, that you may understand the nature and conditions of your change: for do not think yourself safe, because they tell you that you are come to the church; you are indeed gone from one church to another, from a better to a worse, as will appear in the induction, the particulars of which before I reckon, give me leave to give you this advice: if you mean in this affair to understand what you do, it were better you inquired what your religion is, than what your church is; for that which is a true religion to-day, will be so to-morrow and for ever; but that which is a holy church to-day, may be heretical at the next change, or may betray her trust, or obtrude new articles in contradictions to the old, or by new interpretations may elude ancient truths, or may change your creed, or may pretend to be the spouse of Christ when she is idolatrous, that is, adulterous to God: your religion is that which you must, and therefore may, competently understand; you must live in it, and grow in it, and govern all the actions of your life by it; and in all questions concerning the church, you are to choose your church by the religion, and therefore this ought first and last to be inquired after.

Whether the Roman church be the catholic church, must depend upon so many uncertain inquiries,—is offered to be proved by so long, so tedious a method,—hath in it so many intrigues and labyrinths of question,—and is, like a long line, so impossible to be perfectly straight, and to have no declination in it when it is held up by such a hand as yours; that unless it be by material inquiries into the articles of the religion, you can never hope to have just grounds of confidence. In the meantime you can consider this; if the Roman church were the catholic, that is, so as to exclude all that are not of her communion, then the Greek churches had as good turn Turks as remain damned Christians; and all that are in the communion of all the other patriarchal churches in Christendom, must also perish like heathens; which thing before any man can believe, he must have put off all reason, and all modesty, and all charity. And who can with any probability think that 'the communion of saints' in the Creed is nothing but 'the communion of Roman subjects,' and the

article of the 'catholic church' was made up to dispark the enclosures of Jerusalem, but to turn them into the pale of Rome, and the church is as limited as ever it was, save only that the synagogue is translated to Rome, which I think you will easily believe was a proposition the apostles understood not. But though it be hard to trust to it, it is also so hard to prove it, that you shall never be able to understand the measures of that question, and therefore your salvation can never depend upon it. For no good or wise person can believe that God hath tied our salvation to impossible measures, or bound us to an article that is not by us cognoscible, or intends to have us conducted by that which we cannot understand.

And when you shall know that learned men, even of the Roman party, are not agreed concerning the catholic church that is infallibly to guide you; some saying that it is the virtual church, that is, the Pope; some, that it is the representative church, that is, a council; some, that it is the Pope and the council, the virtual church and the representative church together; some, that neither of these, nor both together, are infallible; but only, the essential church, or the diffusive church, is the catholic, from whom we must at no hand dissent; you will quickly find yourself in a wood, and uncertain whether you have more than a word in exchange for your soul, when you are told you are in the catholic church.

But I will tell you what you may understand, and see and feel, something that yourself can tell whether I say true or no concerning it. You are now gone to a church that protects itself by arts of subtilty and arms, by violence and persecuting all that are not of their minds,—to a church in which you are to be a subject of the king so long as it pleases the Pope: in which you may be absolved from your vows made to God, your oaths to the king, your promises to men, your duty to your parents in some cases: a church in which men pray to God, and to saints in the same form of words in which they pray to God, as you may see in the offices of saints, and particularly of our lady: a church in which men are taught by most of the principal leaders to worship images with the same worship with which they worship God and Christ, or him or her whose image it is, and in which

they usually picture God the Father, and the holy Trinity, to the great dishonour of that sacred mystery, against the doctrine and practice of the primitive church, against the express doctrine of Scripture, against the honour of a divine attribute, I mean, the immensity and spirituality of the divine nature; you are gone to a church that pretends to be infallible, and yet is infinitely deceived in many particulars, and yet endures no contradiction, and is impatient her children should inquire into any thing her priests obtrude. You are gone from receiving the whole sacrament to receive it but half; from Christ's institution to a human invention, from Scripture to uncertain traditions, and from ancient traditions to new pretences, from prayers which ye understood to prayers which ye understand not, from confidence in God to rely upon creatures, from entire dependance upon inward acts to a dangerous temptation of resting too much in outward ministries, in the external work of sacraments and of sacramentals. You are gone from a church whose worshipping is simple, Christian, and apostolical, to a church where men's consciences are laden with a burden of ceremonies greater than that in the days of the Jewish religion (for the Ceremonial of the church of Rome is a great book in folio), greater I say than all the ceremonies of the Jews contained in Leviticus, &c. You are gone from a church where you were exhorted to read the word of God, the Holy Scriptures, from whence you found instruction, institution, comfort, reproof, a treasure of all excellences, to a church that seals up that fountain from you, and gives you drink by drops out of such cisterns as they first make, and then stain and then reach out. And if it be told you that some men abuse Scripture, it is true; for if your priests had not abused Scripture, they could not thus have abused you: but there is no necessity they should, and you need not, unless you list; any more than you need to abuse the sacraments or decrees of the church, or the messages of your friend, or the letters you receive, or the laws of the land; all which are liable to be abused by evil persons, but not by good people and modest understandings. It is now become a part of your religion to be ignorant, to walk in blindness, to believe the man that hears your confessions, to hear none but him, not to hear God speaking but by him, and so

you are liable to be abused by him, as he please, without remedy. You are gone from us, where you were only taught to worship God through Jesus Christ, and now you are taught to worship saints and angels with a worship at least dangerous, and in some things proper to God; for your church worships the Virgin Mary with burning incense and candles to her, and you give her presents, which by the consent of all nations used to be esteemed a worship peculiar to God, and it is the same thing which was condemned for heresy in the Collyridians, who offered a cake to the Virgin Mary; a candle and a cake make no difference in the worship; and your joining God and the saints in your worship and devotions, is like the device of them that fought for king and parliament, the latter destroys the former. I will trouble you with no more particulars, because if these move you not to consider better, nothing can.

But yet I have two things more to add of another nature, one of which at least may prevail upon you, whom I suppose to have a tender and a religious conscience.

The first is, That all the points of difference between us and your church are such as do evidently serve the ends of covetousness and ambition, of power and riches; and so stand vehemently suspected of design and art, rather than truth of the article, and designs upon heaven. I instance in the Pope's power over princes and all the world; his power of dispensation, the exemption of the clergy from jurisdiction of princes, the doctrine of purgatory and indulgences, which was once made means to raise a portion for a lady, the niece of Pope Leo the Tenth; the priests' power advanced beyond authority of any warrant from Scripture, a doctrine apt to bring absolute obedience to the Papacy: but because this is possibly too nice for you to suspect or consider, that which I am sure ought to move you, is this:

That you are gone to a religion in which (though through God's grace prevailing over the follies of men, there are, I hope and charitably suppose, many pious men that love God and live good lives, yet) there are very many doctrines taught by your men, which are very ill friends to a good life. I instance in your indulgences and pardons, in which vicious men put a great confidence, and rely greatly upon them. The doctrine of purgatory, which gives countenance to a sort of

Christians who live half to God and half to the world, and for them this doctrine hath found out a way that they may go to hell and to heaven too. The doctrine that the priests' absolution can turn a trifling repentance into a perfect and a good, and that suddenly too, and at any time, even on our death-bed, or the minute before our death, is a dangerous heap of falsehoods, and gives license to wicked people, and teaches men to reconcile a wicked debauched life, with the hopes of heaven. And then for penances and temporal satisfaction, which might seem to be as a plank after the shipwreck of the duty of repentance, to keep men in awe and to preserve them from sinking in an ocean of impiety, it comes to just nothing by your doctrine; for there are so many easy ways of indulgences and getting pardons, so many confraternities, stations, privileged altars, little offices, Agnus Dei-s, amulets, hallowed devices, swords, roses, hats, churchyards, and the fountain of these annexed indulgences the Pope himself, and his power of granting what, and when, and to whom, he list; that he is a very unfortunate man that needs to smart with penances; and after all, he may choose to suffer any at all, for he may pay them in purgatory if he please, and he may come out of purgatory upon reasonable terms, in case he should think it fit to go thither: so that all the whole duty of repentance seems to be destroyed with devices of men that seek power and gain, and find error and folly; insomuch that if I had a mind to live an evil life, and yet hope for heaven at last, I would be of your religion above any in the world.

But I forget I am writing a letter: I shall therefore desire you to consider upon the premises, which is the safer way. For surely it is lawful for a man to serve God without images; but that to worship images is lawful, is not so sure. It is lawful to pray to God alone, to confess him to be true, and every man a liar, to call no man master upon earth, but to rely upon God teaching us; but it is at least hugely disputable, and not at all certain, that any man, or society of men, can be infallible, that we may put our trust in saints, in certain extraordinary images, or burn incense and offer consumptive oblations to the Virgin Mary, or make vows to persons, of whose state, or place, or capacities, or condition, we have no certain revelation. We are sure we do well, when

in the holy communion we worship God and Jesus Christ our Saviour; but they who also worship what seems to be bread, are put to strange shifts to make themselves believe it to be lawful. It is certainly lawful to believe what we see and feel; but it is an unnatural thing, upon pretence of faith, to disbelieve our eyes, when our sense and our faith can better be reconciled, as it is in the question of the real presence, as it is taught by the church of England.

So that unless you mean to prefer a danger before safety, temptation to unholiness before a severe and a holy religion: unless you mean to lose the benefit of your prayers by praying what you perceive not, and the benefit of the sacrament in great degrees by falling from Christ's institution, and taking half instead of all: unless you desire to provoke God to jealousy by images, and man to jealousy in professing a religion in which you may in many cases have leave to forfeit your faith and lawful trust: unless you will still continue to give scandal to those good people with whom you have lived in a common religion, and weaken the hearts of God's afflicted ones: unless you will choose a catechism without the second commandment, and a faith that grows bigger or less as men please, and a hope that in many degrees relies on men and vain confidences, and a charity that damns all the world but yourselves: unless you will do all this, that is, suffer an abuse in your prayers, in the sacrament, in the commandments, in faith, in hope, in charity, in the communion of saints, and your duty to your supreme, you must return to the bosom of your mother, the church of England, from whence you have fallen, rather weakly than maliciously; and I doubt not but you will find the comfort of it all your life, and in the day of your death, and in the day of judgment. If you will not, yet I have freed mine own soul, and done an act of duty and charity, which at least you are bound to take kindly, if you will not entertain it obediently.

Now let me add this, That although most of these objections are such things which are the open and avowed doctrines or practices of your church, and need not to be proved, as being either notorious or confessed; yet if any of your guides shall seem to question any thing of it, I will bind myself to verify it to a tittle, and in that too which I intend them, that is, so as to be an objection obliging you to return,

under the pain of folly or heresy, or disobedience, according to the subject-matter. And though I have propounded these things now to your consideration, yet, if it be desired, I shall represent them to your eye, so that even yourself shall be able to give sentence in the behalf of truth. In the meantime give me leave to tell you of how much folly you are guilty, in being moved by such mock-arguments as your men use, when they meet with women and tender consciences and weaker understandings.

The first is; 'Where was your church before Luther?' Now if you had called upon them to speak something against your religion from Scripture, or right reason, or universal tradition, you had been secure as a tortoise in her shell; a cart pressed with sheaves could not have oppressed your cause or person; though you had confessed you understood nothing of the mysteries of succession doctrinal or personal. For if we can make it appear, that our religion was that, which Christ and his apostles taught, let the truth suffer what eclipses or prejudices can be supposed, let it be hid like the holy fire in the captivity; yet what Christ and his apostles taught us, is eternally true, and shall, by some means or other, be conveyed to us; even the enemies of truth have been conservators of that truth by which we can confute their errors. But if you still ask where it was before Luther, I answer, it was there where it was after,—even in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament; and I know no warrant for any other religion: and if you will expect I should shew any society of men who professed all the doctrines which are now expressed in the confession of the church of England; I shall tell you it is unreasonable; because some of our truths are now brought into our public confessions that they might be opposed against your errors; before the occasion of which there was no need of any such confessions, till you made many things necessary to be professed, which are not lawful to be believed. For if we believe your superinduced follies, we shall do unreasonably, unconscionably, and wickedly; but the questions themselves are so useless, abstracting from the accidental necessity which your follies have brought upon us, that it had been happy if we had never heard of them more than the saints and martyrs did in the first ages of the church. But because your clergy have in-

vaded the liberty of the church, and multiplied the dangers of damnation, and pretend new necessities, and have introduced new articles, and affright the simple upon new pretensions, and slight the very institution and the commands of Christ and of the apostles, and invent new sacramentals, constituting ceremonies of their own head, and promise grace along with the use of them, as if they were not ministers but lords of the Spirit, and teach for doctrines the commandments of men, and make void the commandment of God by their tradition, and have made a strange body of divinity; therefore it is necessary that we should immure our faith by the refusal of such vain and superstitious dreams: but our faith was completed at first, it is no other than that which was delivered to the saints, and can be no more for ever.

So that it is a foolish demand to require, that we should shew before Luther a system of articles declaring our sense in these questions: it was long before they were questions at all; and when they were made questions, they remained so, a long time; and when by their several pieces they were determined, this part of the church was oppressed with a violent power; and when God gave opportunity, then the yoke was broken; and this is the whole progress of this affair. But if you will still insist upon it, then let the matter be put into equal balances, and let them shew any church, whose confession of faith was such as was obtruded upon you at Trent: and if your religion be Pius the Fourth's creed at Trent, then we also have a question to ask, and that is, 'Where was your religion before Trent?'

The council of Trent determined, That the souls departed before the day of judgment enjoy the beatifical vision. It is certain this article could not be shewn in the confession of any of the ancient churches; for most of the fathers were of another opinion. But that which is the greatest offence of Christendom, is not only that these doctrines which we say are false were yet affirmed, but that those things which the church of God did always reject, or held as uncertain, should be made articles of faith, and so become parts of your religion; and of these it is that I again ask the question which none of your side shall ever be able to answer for you: 'Where was your religion before Trent?'

I could instance in many particulars, but I shall name

one to you, which because the thing of itself is of no great consequence, it will appear the more unreasonable and intolerable that your church should adopt it into the things of necessary belief, especially since it was only a matter of fact, and they took the false part too. For in the 21st sess. chap. 4. it is affirmed, that "although the holy fathers did give the sacrament of the eucharist to infants, yet they did it without any necessity of salvation," that is, they did not believe it necessary to their salvation: which is notoriously false, and the contrary is marked out with the blacklead of every man almost that reads their works; and yet your council says, this is 'sine controversiâ credendum,' 'to be believed without all controversy;' and all Christians forbidden to believe or teach otherwise. So that here it is made an article of faith amongst you, that a man shall neither believe his reason nor his eyes: and who can shew any confession of faith in which all the Trent doctrine was professed and enjoined under pain of damnation?

And before the council of Constance, the doctrine touching the Pope's power was so new, so decried, that as Gerson[a] says, he hardly should have escaped the note of heresy that would have said so much as was there defined: so that in that article, which now makes a great part of your belief, where was your religion before the council of Constance? And it is notorious that your council of Constance determined the doctrine of the half-communion with a 'non obstante' to Christ's institution, that is, with a defiance to it, or a noted, observed neglect of it, and with a profession it was otherwise in the primitive church. Where then was your religion before John Huss and Jerome of Prague's time, against whom that council was convened? But by this instance it appears most certainly that your church cannot shew her confessions immediately after Christ, and therefore if we could not shew ours immediately before Luther, it were not half so much; for since you receded from Christ's doctrine, we might well recede from yours; and it matters not who, or how many, or how long, they professed your doctrine, if neither Christ nor his apostles did teach it: so that if these articles constitute your church, your church was invisible at the first; and if ours was invisible afterward, it

[a] De Potest. Eccles. cons. 12.

matters not; for yours was invisible in the days of light, and ours was invisible in the days of darkness. For our church was always visible in the reflections of Scripture; and he that had his eyes of faith and reason, might easily have seen these truths all the way which constitute our church. But I add yet further, that our church, before Luther, was there where your church was, in the same place, and in the same persons: for divers of the errors which have been amongst us reformed, were not the constituent articles of your church before Luther's time; for before the last councils of your church a man might have been of your communion upon easier terms; and indulgences were indeed a practice, but no article of faith, before your men made it so, and that very lately, and so were many other things besides. So that although your men cozen the credulous and the simple by calling yours 'the old religion,' yet the difference is vast between truth and their affirmative, even as much as between old errors and new articles. For although ignorance and superstition had prepared the ore, yet the councils of Constance and Basil, and Trent especially, were the forges and the mint.

Lastly, If your men had not, by all the vile and violent arts of the world, stopped the mouths of dissenters, the question would quickly have been answered, or our articles would have been so confessed, so owned, and so public, that the question could never have been asked: but in despite of all opposition, there were great numbers of professors who did protest and profess and practise our doctrines contrary to your articles; as it is demonstrated by the divines of Germany in Illyricus's 'Catalogus Testium Veritatis,' and in Bishop Morton's 'Appeal.'

But with your next objection you are better pleased, and your men make most noise with it. For you pretend that by our confession salvation may be had in your church, but your men deny it to us; and therefore by the confession of both sides you may be safe, and there is no question concerning you; but of us there is great question, for none but ourselves say that we can be saved.

I answer, 1. That salvation may be had in your church, is it ever the truer because we say it? If it be not, it can add no confidence to you; for the proposition gets no strength

by our affirmative. But if it be, then our authority is good, or else our reason; and if either be, then we have more reason to be believed speaking of ourselves; because we are concerned to see that ourselves may be in a state of hope; and therefore we would not venture on this side if we had not greater reason to believe well of ourselves than of you. And therefore believe us when it is more likely that we have greater reason, because we have greater concernments, and therefore greater considerations.

2. As much charity as your men pretend us to speak of you, yet it is a clear case our hope of your salvation is so little, that we dare not venture ourselves on your side. The burger of Oldwater, being to pass a river in his journey to Daventry, bade his man try the ford; telling him he hoped he should not be drowned; for though he was afraid the river was too deep, yet he thought his horse would carry him out, or at least the boats would fetch him off. Such a confidence we may have of you, but you will find that but little warranty, if you remember how great an interest it is that you venture.

3. It would be remembered that though the best ground of your hope is not the goodness of your own faith, but the greatness of our charity; yet we that charitably hope well of you, have a fulness of assurance of the truth and certainty of our own way; and however you can please yourselves with images of things, as having no firm footing for your trifling confidence, yet you can never with your tricks outface us of just and firm adherences; and if you were not empty of supports, and greedy of bulrushes, snatching at any thing to support your sinking cause, you would with fear and trembling consider the direct dangers which we demonstrate to you to be in your religion, rather than flatter yourselves with collateral, weak, and deceitful hopes of accidental possibilities, that some of you may escape.

4. If we be more charitable to you than you are to us, acknowledge in us the beauty and essential form of Christian religion, be sure you love as well as make use of our charity: but if you make our charity an argument against us, remember that you render us evil in exchange for good; and let it be no brag to you that you have not that charity to us; for therefore the Donatists were condemned for heretics and

schismatics, because they damned all the world, and afforded no charity to any that was not of their communion.

5. But that our charity may be such indeed, that is, that it may do you a real benefit, and not turn into wormwood and coloquintida, I pray take notice in what sense it is that we allow salvation may possibly be had in your church. We warrant it not to any, we only hope it for some; we allow it to them as to the Sadducees in the Law, and to the Corinthians in the Gospel, who denied the resurrection; that is, till they were sufficiently instructed, and competently convinced, and had time and powers to outwear their prejudices, and the impresses of their education and long persuasion. But to them amongst you who can and do consider and yet determine for error and interest, we have a greater charity, even so much as to labour and pray for their conversion, but not so much fondness as to flatter them into boldness and pertinacious adherences to matters of so great danger.

6. But in all this affair, though your men are very bold with God, and leap into his judgment-seat before him, and give wild sentences concerning the salvation of your own party and the damnation of all that disagree; yet that which is our charity to you, is indeed the fear of God, and the reverence of his judgments. We do not say that all Papists are certainly damned, we wish and desire vehemently that none of you may perish. But then this charity of judgment relates not to you, nor is derived from any probability which we see in your doctrines that differ from ours: but because we know not what rate and value God puts upon the article; it concerns neither you nor us to say, this or that man shall be damned for his opinion: for besides that this is a bold intrusion into that secret of God which shall not be opened till the day of judgment; and besides that we know not what allays and abatements are to be made by the good meaning and the ignorance of the man; all that can concern us is to tell you that you are in error, that you depart from Scripture, that you exercise tyranny over souls, that you leave the divine institution, and prevaricate God's commandment, that you divide the church without truth and without necessity, that you tie men to believe things under pain of damnation, which cannot be made very probable, much less certain; and therefore that you sin against God, and are in danger of

his eternal displeasure. But in giving the final sentence, as we have no more to do than your men have, yet so we refuse to follow your evil example; and we follow the glorious precedent of our blessed Lord; who decreed and declared against the crime, but not against the criminal before the day. He that does this, or that, is in danger of the council, or in danger of judgment, or liable and obnoxious to the danger of hell-fire: so we say of your greatest errors, they put you in the danger of perishing; but that you shall or shall not perish, we leave it to your Judge; and if you call this charity, it is well, I am sure it is piety and the fear of God.

7. Whether you may be saved, or whether you shall be damned for your errors, does neither depend upon our affirmative nor your negative, but according to the rate and value which God sets upon things. Whatever we talk, things are as they are, not as we dispute, or grant, or hope; and therefore it were well if your men would leave abusing you and themselves with these little arts of indirect support. For many men that are warranted, yet do eternally perish; and you in your church damn millions, who, I doubt not, shall reign with Jesus eternally in the heavens.

8. I wish you would consider, that if any of our men say, salvation may be had in your church, it is not for the goodness of your new propositions, but only because you do keep so much of that which is our religion, that upon the confidence of that, we hope well concerning you. And we do not hope any thing at all that is good of you or your religion as it distinguishes from us and ours. We hope that the good which you have common with us, may obtain pardon directly or indirectly, or may be an antidote of the venom, and an amulet against the danger of your very great errors: so that if you can derive any confidence from our concession, you must remember where it takes root; not upon any thing of yours, but wholly upon the excellency of ours: you are not at all safe or warranted for being a Papist; but we hope well of some of you, for having so much of the Protestant: and if that will do you any good, proceed in it, and follow it whithersoever it leads you.

9. The safety that you dream of, which we say to be on your side, is nothing of allowance or warranty, but a hope that is collateral, indirect, and relative.

We do not say any thing, whereby you can conclude yours to be safer than ours; for it is not safe at all, but extremely dangerous: we affirm those errors in themselves to be damnable, some to contain in them impiety, some to have sacrilege, some idolatry, some superstition, some practices to be conjuring and charming and very like to witchcraft, as in your hallowing of water, and baptizing bells, and exorcising demoniacs; and what safety there can be in these, or what you can fancy we should allow to you, I suppose you need not boast of. Now because we hope some are saved amongst you, you must not conclude yours to be safe; for our hope relies upon this: there are many of your propositions in which we differ from you, that thousands amongst you understand and know nothing of; it is to them as if they were not; it is to them now as it was before the council, they hear not of it. And though your priests have taken a course that the most ignorant do practise some of your abominations most grossly, yet we hope this will not be laid upon them who, as St. Austin's expression is, "cautâ sollicitudine quærunt veritatem, corrigi parati cum invenerint;" "do, according as they are able, warily and diligently seek for truth, and are ready to follow it when they find it;" men who live good lives, and repent of all their evils known and unknown. Now if we are not deceived in our hopes, these men shall rejoice in the eternal goodness of God, which prevails over the malice of them that misguide you: but if we be deceived in our hopes of you, your guides have abused you, and the blind leaders of the blind will fall together. For,

10. If you will have the secret of this whole affair, this it is. The hopes we have of any of you, as it is known, principally rely upon the hopes of your repentance. Now we say that a man may repent of an error which he knows not of; as he,—that prays heartily for pardon of all sins and errors known and unknown,—by his general repentance may obtain many degrees and instances of mercy. Now thus much also your men allow to us; these who live well, and die in a true, though but general, repentance of their sins and errors even amongst us, your best and wisest men pronounce to be in a savable condition. Here then we are equal, and we are as safe by your confession as you are by ours. But because

there are some bigots of your faction, fierce and fiery, who say that a general repentance will not serve our turns, but it must be a particular renunciation of Protestancy; these men deny not only to us but to themselves too, all that comfort which they derive from our concession, and indeed which they can hope for from the mercies of God. For be you sure we think as ill of your errors as you can suppose of our articles; and therefore if for errors, be they on which side it chances, a general repentance will not serve the turn without an actual dereliction, then flatter not yourselves by any thing of our kindness to your party; for you must have a particular, if a general be not sufficient. But if it be sufficient for you it is so for us, in case we be in error, as your men suppose us; but if it will not suffice us for remedy to those errors you charge us with, neither will it suffice you; for the case must needs be equal as to the value of repentance and malignity of the error: and therefore these men condemn themselves and will not allow us to hope well of them: but if they will allow us to hope, it must be by affirming the value of a general repentance; and if they allow that, they must hope as well of ours as we of theirs: but if they deny it to us, they deny it to themselves; and then they can no more brag of any thing of our concession. This only I add to this consideration; that your men do not, cannot charge upon us any doctrine that is in its matter and effect impious; there is nothing positive in our doctrine, but is either true or innocent; but we are accused for denying your superstructures: ours therefore, if we be deceived, is but like a sin of omission; yours are sins of commission, in case you are in the wrong (as we believe you to be), and therefore you must needs be in the greater danger than we can be supposed, by how much sins of omission are less than sins of commission.

11. Your very way of arguing from our charity is a very fallacy, and a trick that must needs deceive you if you rely upon it. For whereas your men argue thus; 'The Protestants, say we Papists, may be saved; and so say we too; but we Papists say that you Protestants cannot, therefore it is safest to be a Papist:' consider that of this argument, if it shall be accepted, any bold heretic can make use, against any modest Christian of a true persuasion. For, if he can but outface the modesty of the good man, and tell him he shall be

damned; unless that modest man say as much of him, you see impudence shall get the better of the day. But it is thus in every error. Fifteen bishops of Jerusalem in immediate succession were circumcised, believing it to be necessary so to be: with these other Christian churches, who were of the uncircumcision, did communicate: suppose now that these bishops had not only thought it necessary for themselves, but for others too; this argument you see was ready; you of the uncircumcision who do communicate with us, think that we may be saved though we are circumcised; but we do not think that you who are not circumcised can be saved, therefore it is the safest way to be circumcised:—I suppose you would not have thought their argument good, neither would you have had your children circumcised. But this argument may serve the Presbyterians as well as the Papists. We are indeed very kind to them in our sentences concerning their salvation; and they are many of them as unkind to us. If they should argue so as you do, and say, 'You episcopal men think we Presbyterians, though in errors, can be saved, and we say so too: but we think you episcopal men are enemies of the kingdom of Jesus Christ; and therefore we think you in a damnable condition; therefore it is safer to be a Presbyterian:' I know not what your men would think of the argument in their hands, I am sure we had reason to complain that we are used very ill on both hands for no other cause but because we are charitable. But it is not our case alone; but the old Catholics were used just so by the Donatists in this very argument, as we are used by your men. The Donatists were so fierce against the Catholics, that they would rebaptize all them who came to their churches from the other: but the Catholics, as knowing the Donatists did give right baptism, admitted their converts to repentance, but did not rebaptize them. Upon this score, the Donatists triumphed, saying, You Catholics confess our baptism to be good, and so say we: but we Donatists deny your baptism to be good; therefore it is safer to be of our side than yours. Now what should the Catholics say or do? should they lie for God and for religion, and, to serve the ends of truth, say, the Donatists' baptism was not good? That they ought not. Should they damn all the Donatists, and make the rent wider? it was too great already. What then? They were quiet, and knew that

the Donatists sought advantages by their own fierceness, and trampled upon the others' charity; but so they hardened themselves in error, and became evil, because the others were good.

I shall trouble you no further now, but desire you to consider of these things with as much caution, as they were written with charity.

Till I hear from you, I shall pray to God to open your heart and your understanding, that you may return from whence you are fallen, and repent, and do your first works. Which that you may do, is the hearty desire of

Your very affectionate

Friend and Servant,

JER. TAYLOR.

LETTER II.

To a Person newly converted to the Church of England.

MADAM,

I BLESS God I am safely arrived, where I desired to be after my unwilling departure from the place of your abode and danger: and now because I can have no other expression of my tenderness, I account that I have a treble obligation to signify it by my care of your biggest and eternal interest. And because it hath pleased God to make me an instrument of making you to understand in some fair measure the excellences of a true and holy religion, and that I have pointed out such follies and errors in the Roman church, at which your understanding, being forward and pregnant, did of itself start as at imperfect ill-looking propositions, give me leave to do that now which is the purpose of my charity, that is, teach you to turn this to the advantage of a holy life, that you may not only be changed but converted. For the church of England, whither you are now come, is not in condition to boast herself in the reputation of changing the opinion of a single person, though never so excellent; she hath no temporal ends to serve, which must stand upon fame and noises; all that she can design, is to serve God, to advance the honour of the Lord, and the good of souls, and to rejoice in the cross of Christ.

First; therefore I desire you to remember, that as now you are taught to pray both publicly and privately, in a language understood, so it is intended your affections should be forward, in proportion to the advantages which your prayer hath in the understanding part. For though you have been often told and have heard, that ignorance is the mother of devotion; you will find that the proposition is unnatural, and against common sense and experience; because it is impossible to desire that of which we know nothing, unless the desire itself be fantastical and illusive: it is necessary that in the same proportion in which we understand any good thing, in the same we shall also desire it; and the more particular and minute your notices are, the

more passionate and material also your affections will be towards it: and if they be good things for which we are taught to pray, the more you know them, the more reason you have to love them. It is monstrous to think that devotion, that is, passionate desires of religious things, and the earnest prosecutions of them, should be produced by any thing of ignorance or less perfect notices in any sense. Since therefore you are taught to pray, so that your understanding is the precentor or the master of the choir, and you know what you say; your desires are made human, religious, express, material (for these are the advantages of prayers and liturgies well understood): be pleased also to remember, that now if you be not also passionate and devout for the things you mention, you will want the spirit of prayer, and be more inexcusable than before. In many of your prayers before (especially the public), you heard a voice, but saw and perceived nothing of the sense; and what you understood of it was like the man in the Gospel that was half blind, he saw men walking like trees, and so you possibly might perceive the meaning of it in general; you knew when they came to the Epistle, when to the Gospel, when the 'Introit, when the 'Pax,' when any of the other more general periods were; but you could have nothing of the spirit of prayer, that is, nothing of the devotion and the holy affections to the particular excellences, which could or ought there to have been represented; but now you are taught how you may be really devout, it is made facile and easy, and there can want nothing but your consent and observation.

2. Whereas now you are taken off from all human confidences, from relying wholly and almost ultimately upon the priest's power and external act, from reckoning prayers by numbers, from forms and outsides; you are not to think that the priest's power is less, that the sacraments are not effective, that your prayers may not be repeated frequently: but you are to remember, that all outward things and ceremonies, all sacraments and institutions, work their effect in the virtue of Christ, by some moral instrument: the priests in the church of England can absolve you as much as the Roman priests could fairly pretend; but then we teach that you must first be a penitent and a returning person, and our absolution does but manifest the work of God, and comfort

and instruct your conscience, direct and manage it: you shall be absolved here, but not unless you live a holy life; so that in this you will find no change but to the advantage of a strict life; we will not flatter you and cozen your dear soul by pretended ministries, but we so order our discourses and directions, that all our ministrations may be really effective. And when you receive the holy sacrament of the eucharist or the Lord's supper, it does more good here than they do there; because if they consecrate rightly, yet they do not communicate you fully; and if they offer the whole representative sacrifice, yet they do not give you the whole sacrament; only we enjoin that you come with so much holiness, that the grace of God in your heart may be the principal, and the sacrament in our hands may be the ministering and assisting part. We do not promise great effects to easy trifling dispositions, because we would not deceive, but really procure to you great effects; and therefore you are now to come to our offices with the same expectations as before, of pardon, of grace, of sanctification; but you must do something more of the work yourself, that we may not do less in effect than you have in your expectation; we will not, to advance the reputation of our power, deceive you into a less blessing.

3. Be careful that you do not flatter yourself, that in our communion you may have more ease and liberty of life: for though I know your pious soul desires passionately to please God and to live religiously, yet I ought to be careful to prevent a temptation, lest it at any time should discompose your severity: therefore as to confession to a priest (which how it is usually practised among the Roman party, yourself can very well account, and you have complained sadly, that it is made an ordinary act, easy and transient, sometime matter of temptation, oftentimes impertinent, but), suppose it free from such scandal to which some men's folly did betray it, yet the same severity you will find among us: for though we will not tell a lie to help a sinner, and say that is necessary which is only appointed to make men do themselves good; yet we advise and commend it, and do all the work of souls to all those people that will be saved by all means, to devout persons, that make religion the business of their lives; and they that do not so in the churches of the Roman communion, as they find but little advantage by pe-

riodical confessions, so they feel but little awfulness and severity by the injunction. You must confess to God all your secret actions, you must advise with a holy man in all the affairs of your soul, you will be but an ill friend to yourself if you conceal from him the state of your spiritual affairs. We desire not to hear the circumstance of every sin, but when matter of justice is concerned, or the nature of the sin is changed, that is, when it ought to be made a question; and you will find that though the church of England gives you much liberty from the bondage of innumerable ceremonies and human devices, yet in the matter of holiness you will be tied to very great service, but such a service as is perfect freedom, that is, the service of God and the love of the holy Jesus, and a very strict religious life: for we do not promise heaven, but upon the same terms it is promised us, that is 'repentance towards God, and faith in our Lord Jesus:' and as in faith we make no more to be necessary than what is made so in Holy Scripture, so in the matter of repentance we give you no easy devices, and suffer no lessening definitions of it, but oblige you to that strictness which is the condition of being saved, and so expressed to be by the infallible word of God; but such as in the church of Rome they do not so much stand upon.

Madam, I am weary of my journey, and although I did purpose to have spoken many things more, yet I desire that my not doing it may be laid upon the account of my weariness; all that I shall add to the main business is this.

4. Read the Scripture diligently, and with an humble spirit, and in it observe what is plain, and believe and live accordingly. Trouble not yourself with what is difficult, for in that your duty is not described.

5. Pray frequently and effectually; I had rather your prayers should be often than long. It was well said of Petrarch, "Magno verborum fræno uti decet, cum superiore colloquentem:" "When you speak to your superior, you ought to have a bridle upon your tongue;" much more when you speak to God. I speak of what is decent in respect of ourselves and our infinite distances from God: but if love makes you speak, speak on, so shall your prayers be full of charity and devotion: "Nullus est amore superior; ille te coget ad veniam, qui me ad multiloquium;" love makes

God to be our friend, and our approaches more united and acceptable; and therefore you may say to God, "The same love which made me speak, will also move thee to hear and pardon:" love and devotion may enlarge your litanies, but nothing else can, unless authority does interpose.

6. Be curious not to communicate but with the true sons of the church of England, lest if you follow them that were amongst us, but are gone out from us (because they were not of us), you be offended, and tempted to impute their follies to the church of England.

7. Trouble yourself with no controversies willingly, but how you may best please God by a strict and severe conversation.

8. If any Protestant live loosely, remember that he dishonours an excellent religion, and that it may be no more laid upon the charge of our church, than the ill lives of most Christians may upon the whole religion.

9. Let no man or woman affright you with declamations and scaring words of 'heretic,' and 'damnation,' and 'changeable;' for these words may be spoken against them that return to light, as well as to those that go to darkness; and that which men of all sides can say, it can be of effect to no side upon its own strength or pretension.

THREE LETTERS

WRITTEN TO A

GENTLEMAN THAT WAS TEMPTED TO THE COMMUNION

OF THE

ROMISH CHURCH.

LETTER I.

SIR,

You needed not to make the preface of an excuse for writing so friendly and so necessary a letter of inquiry. It was your kindness to my person which directed your addresses hither; and your duty which engaged you to inquire somewhere.

I do not doubt but you, and very many other ingenious and conscientious persons, do every day meet with the tempters of the Roman church, who, like the Pharisees, compass sea and land to get a proselyte; at this I wonder not; for as Demetrius said, 'by this craft they get their living:' but I wonder that any ingenious person, and such as I perceive you to be, can be shaken by their weak assaults: for their batteries are made up with impossible propositions, and weak and violent prejudices respectively; and when they talk of their own infallibility, they prove it with false mediums, say we, with fallible mediums,—as themselves confess; and when they argue us of an uncertain faith, because we pretend to no infallibility, they are themselves much more uncertain, because they build their pretence of infallibility upon that which not only can, but will deceive them: and since they can pretend no higher for their infallibility than prudential motives, they break in pieces the staff upon which they lean, and with which they strike us.

But, Sir, you are pleased to ask two questions. 1. Whether the apostles of our blessed Lord did not orally deliver many things necessary to salvation which were not committed to writing? To which you add this 'assumentum,' in

which because you desire to be answered, I suppose you meant it for another question: viz. whether in those things which the church of Rome retains, and we take no notice of, she be an innovator, or a conserver of tradition; and whether any thing which she so retains, was or was not esteemed necessary?

The answer to the first part, will conclude the second. I therefore answer, that whatsoever the apostles did deliver as necessary to salvation, all that was written in the Scriptures: and that to them who believe the Scriptures to be the word of God, there needs no other magazine of divine truths but the Scripture. And this the fathers of the first and divers succeeding ages do unanimously affirm. I will set down two or three so plain that either you must conclude them to be deceivers, or that you will need no more but their testimony.

The words of St. Basil are these; Δεῖ πᾶν ῥῆμα ἢ πρᾶγμα πιστοῦσθαι τῇ μαρτυρίᾳ τῆς θεοπνεύστου γραφῆς, &c. "Every word and every thing ought to be made credible, or believed by the testimony of the divinely-inspired Scripture: both for the confirmation of good things, and also for the reproof of the evil."

St. Cyril of Jerusalem, "catech. 12. Illuminat." saith, "Attend not to my inventions, for you may possibly be deceived: but trust no word unless thou dost learn it from the divine Scriptures: and in "catech. 4. Illum." Δεῖ γὰρ περὶ τῶν θείων καὶ ἁγίων τῆς πίστεως μυστηρίων, &c. "For it behoves us not to deliver so much as the least thing μηδὲ τὸ τύχον, of the divine and holy mysteries of faith without the divine Scriptures, nor to be moved with probable discourses: neither give credit to me speaking, unless what is spoken, be demonstrated by the Holy Scriptures. For that is the security of our faith, σωτηρία τῆς πίστεως ἡμῶν, which is derived not from witty inventions, but from the demonstration of divine Scriptures."

"Omne quod loquimur, debemus affirmare de Scripturis Sanctis:" so St. Jerome in Psalm lxxxix. And again: "Hoc quia de Scripturis auctoritatem non habet, eâdem facilitate contemnitur quâ probatur;" in Matt. xxiii.

[b] Ethic. Definit. 26.

"Si quid dicitur absque Scripturâ, auditorum cogitatio claudicat." So St. Chrysostom in Psal. xcv. Homil.

Theodoret (dial. 1. cap. 6.) brings in the orthodox Christian saying to Eranistes, "Bring not to me your logisms, Ἐγὼ γὰρ μόνῃ πείθομαι τῇ θείᾳ γραφῇ, I rely only upon Scriptures."—I could reckon very, very many more, both elder and later: and if there be a universal tradition consigned to us by the universal testimony of antiquity, it is this, that the Scriptures are a perfect repository of all the will of God, of all the faith of Christ: and this I will engage myself to make very apparent to you, and certain against any opposer.

Upon the supposition of which it follows, that whatever the church of Rome obtrudes as necessary to salvation, and an article of faith that is not in Scripture, is an innovation in matter of faith, and a tyranny over consciences: which whosoever submits to, prevaricates the rule of the Apostle, commanding us, that we 'stand fast in the liberty, with which Christ hath set us free.'

To the other question; whether an ecclesiastical tradition be of equal authority with divine, I answer negatively: and I believe I shall have no adversary in it, except peradventure some of the Jesuited bigots. An ecclesiastical tradition, viz. a positive constitution of the church delivered from hand to hand, is in the power of the church to alter, but a divine is not. Ecclesiastical traditions in matters of faith there are none, but what are also divine; as for rituals ecclesiastical descending by tradition, they are confessedly alterable: but till they be altered by abrogation, or desuetude, or contrary custom, or a contrary reason, or the like, they do oblige by virtue of that authority whatsoever it is that hath power over you. I know not what Mr. G. did say, but I am confident they who reported it of him, were mistaken: he could not say or mean what is charged upon him.

I have but two things more to speak to. One is, you desire me to recite what else might impede your compliance with the Roman church. I answer, truth and piety hinder you. For you must profess the belief of many false propositions, and certainly believe many uncertain things, and be uncharitable to all the world but your own party, and make

Christianity a faction, and you must yield your reason a servant to men, and you must plainly prevaricate an institution of Christ, and you must make an apparent departure from the church in which you received your baptism and the Spirit of God, if you go over to Rome. But, Sir, I refer you to the two letters I have lately published at the end of my 'Discourse of Friendship;' and I desire you to read my treatise of the 'Real Presence:' and if you can believe the doctrine of transubstantiation, you can put off your reason and your sense, and your religion, and all the instruments of credibility, when you please: and these are not little things; in these you may perish: an error in these things is practical; but our way is safe, as being upon the defence, and entirely resting upon Scripture, and the apostolical churches.

The other thing I am to speak to is, the report you have heard of my inclinations to go over to Rome. Sir, that party which needs such lying stories for the support of their cause, proclaim their cause to be very weak, or themselves to be very evil advocates. Sir, be confident, they dare not tempt me to do so, and it is not the first time they have endeavoured to serve their ends by saying such things of me. But I bless God for it; it is perfectly a slander, and it shall, I hope, for ever prove so. Sir, if I may speak with you, I shall say very many things more for your confirmation. Pray to God to guide you; and make no change suddenly: for if their way be true to-day, it will be so to-morrow; and you need not make haste to undo yourself. Sir, I wish you a settled mind and a holy conscience; and that I could serve you in the capacity of

Your very loving Friend and Servant
In our blessed Lord,

Monday, Jan. 11, 1657. JER. TAYLOR.

LETTER II.

SIR,

I PERCEIVE that you are very much troubled; and I see also that you are in great danger; but that also troubles me, because I see they are little things, and very weak and falla-

cious, that move you. You propound many things in your letter in the same disorder, as they are in your conscience: to all which I can best give answers when I speak with you; to which because you desire, I invite you, and promise you a hearty endeavour to give you satisfaction in all your material inquiries. Sir, I desire you to make no haste to change, in case you be so miserable as to have it in your thoughts: for to go over to the church of Rome is like death, there is no recovery from thence without a miracle; because unwary souls (such are they who change from us to them) are, with all the arts of wit and violence, strangely entangled and ensured, when they once get the prey. Sir, I thank you for the paper you enclosed. The men are at a loss, they would fain say something against that book, but know not what. Sir, I will endeavour if you come to me, to restore you to peace and quiet; and if I cannot effect it, yet I will pray for it; and I am sure, God can. To his mercy I commend you; and rest

Your very affectionate Friend

Feb. 1, In our blessed Lord,

1657—8. JER. TAYLOR.

LETTER III.

SIR,

THE first letter which you mention in this latter, of the 10th of March, I received not; I had not else failed to give you an answer; I was so wholly unknowing of it, that I did not understand your servant's meaning when he came to require an answer. But to your question which you now propound, I answer.

Quest. Whether, without all danger of superstition or idolatry, we may not render divine worship to our blessed Saviour, as present in the blessed sacrament, or host, according to his human nature in that host?

Answ. We may not render divine worship to him (as present in the blessed sacrament according to his human nature) without danger of idolatry: because he is not there according to his human nature, and therefore, you give divine worship to a 'non ens,' which must needs be idolatry. For "Idolum ni-

bil est in mundo," saith St. Paul; and Christ as present by his human nature in the sacrament, is a 'non ens;' for it is not true, there is no such thing. He is present there by his divine power, and his divine blessing, and the fruits of his body, the real effective consequents of his passion: but for any other presence, it is 'idolum,' it is nothing in the world. Adore Christ in heaven; for the heavens must contain him till the time of restitution of all things. And if you in the reception of the holy sacrament worship him whom you know to be in heaven; you cannot be concerned in duty to worship him in the host (as you call it) any more than to worship him in the host at Nôtre Dame when you are at St. Peter's in Rome: for you see him no more in one place than in another; and if to believe him to be there in the host at Nôtre Dame be sufficient to cause you to worship him there, then you are to do so to him at Rome, though you be not present: for you believe him there; you know as much of him by faith in both places, and as little by sense in either. But however, this is a thing of infinite danger. God is a jealous God: he spake it in the matter of external worship and of idolatry; and therefore do nothing that is like worshipping a mere creature, nothing that is like worshipping that which you are not sure is God: and if you can believe the bread when it is blessed by the priest, is God Almighty, you can if you please, believe any thing else.

To the other parts of your question, viz. Whether the same body be present really and substantially, because we believe it to be there; or whether do we believe it to be there because God hath manifestly revealed it to be so, and therefore we revere and adore it accordingly?

I answer, 1. I do not know whether or no you do believe him to be there really and substantially. 2. If you do believe it so, I do not know what you mean by really and substantially. 3. Whatsoever you do mean by it, if you do believe it to be there really and substantially in any sense, I cannot tell why you believe it to be so: you best know your own reasons and motives of belief; for my part, I believe it to be there really in the sense I have explicated in my book; and for those reasons which I have there alleged; but that we are to adore it upon that account, I no way understand. If it be transubstantiated and you are sure of it: then you

may pray to it, and put your trust in it; and believe the holy bread to be coeternal with the Father, and with the Holy Ghost. But it is strange, that the bread, being consecrated by the power of the Holy Ghost, should be turned into the substance and nature of God, and of the Son of God: if so, does not the Son at that time proceed from the Holy Ghost, and not the Holy Ghost from the Son? But I am ashamed of the horrible proposition. Sir, I pray God keep you from these extremest dangers. I love and value you, and will pray for you, and be, dear Sir,

Your very affectionate Friend to serve you,

JER. TAYLOR.

March 13,
1657—8.

ΧΡΙΣΙΣ ΤΕΛΕΙΩΤΙΚΗ.

A

DISCOURSE

OF

CONFIRMATION.

Εἰ Πνεῦμα Ἅγιον ἐλάβετε πιστεύσαντες.

Acts, ix. 2.

TO HIS GRACE,

JAMES, DUKE OF ORMONDE,

LORD LIEUTENANT GENERAL,

AND GENERAL GOVERNOR OF HIS MAJESTY'S KINGDOM OF

IRELAND,

ONE OF THE LORDS OF HIS MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL OF HIS MAJESTY'S KINGDOMS OF ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, AND IRELAND, &c. AND KNIGHT OF THE MOST NOBLE ORDER OF THE GARTER.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR GRACE,

It is not any confidence that I have dexterously performed this charge, that gives me the boldness to present it to your Grace. I have done it as well as I could, and for the rest, my obedience will bear me out: for I took not this task upon myself, but was entreated to it by them, who have power to command me. But yet it is very necessary that it should be addressed to your Grace, who are, as Sozomen said of Theodosius, "certaminum magister, et orationum judex constitutus:" "You are appointed the great master of our arguings, and are most fit to be the judge of our discourses;" especially when they do relate and pretend to public influence and advantages to the church. We all are witnesses of your zeal to promote true religion, and every day find you to be a great patron to this very poor church, which groans under the

calamities and permanent effects of a war acted by intervals for above four hundred years; such which the intermedial sunshines of peace could but very weakly repair. Our churches are still demolished, much of the revenues irrecoverably swallowed by sacrilege, and digested by an unavoidable impunity; religion infinitely divided, and parted into formidable sects; the people extremely ignorant, and wilful by inheritance; superstitiously irreligious, and incapable of reproof. And amidst these and very many more inconveniences, it was greatly necessary that God should send us such a king, and he send us such a viceroy, who weds the interests of religion, and joins them to his heart.

For we do not look upon your Grace only as a favourer of the church's temporal interest, though even for that the souls of the relieved clergy do daily bless you: neither are you our patron only as the Cretans were to Homer, or the Alcnadæ to Simonides, Philip to Theopompus, or Severus to Oppianus; but as Constantine and Theodosius were to Christians; that is, desirous that true religion should be promoted, that the interest of souls should be advanced, that truth should flourish, and wise principles should be entertained, as the best cure against those evils which this nation hath too often brought upon themselves. In order to which excellent purposes it is hoped, that the reduction of the holy rite of confirmation into use and holy practice may con-

tribute some very great moments. For besides that the great usefulness of this ministry will greatly endear the episcopal order, to which (that I may use St. Jerome's words) if "there be not attributed a more than common power and authority, there will be as many schisms as priests;" it will also be a means of endearing the persons of the prelates to their flocks, when the people shall be convinced that there is, or may be, if they please, a perpetual intercourse of blessings and love between them; when God by their holy hands refuses not to give to the people the earnest of an eternal inheritance, when by them he blesses; and that the grace of our Lord Jesus, and the love of God, and the communication of his Spirit, is conveyed to all persons capable of the grace, by the conduct, and on the hands and prayers of their bishops.

And indeed not only very many single persons, but even the whole church of Ireland, hath need of confirmation. We have most of us contended for false religions and unchristian propositions: and now that, by God's mercy and the prosperity and piety of his sacred Majesty, the church is broken from her cloud, and many are reduced to the true religion and righteous worship of God, we cannot but call to mind, how the holy fathers of the primitive church often have declared themselves in councils, and by a perpetual discipline, that such persons who are returned from sects and heresies into the bosom

of the church should not be rebaptized, but that the bishops should impose hands on them in confirmation. It is true, that this was designed to supply the defect of those schismatical conventicles, who did not use this holy rite: for this rite of confirmation hath had the fate to be opposed only by the schismatical and puritan parties of old, the Novatians or Cathari, and the Donatists; and of late by the Jesuits, and new Cathari, the Puritans and Presbyterians; the same evil spirit of contradiction keeping its course in the same channel, and descending regularly amongst men of the same principles. But therefore in the restitution of a man, or company of men, or a church, the holy primitives, in the council of Constantinople, Laodicea, and Orange, thought that to confirm such persons was the most agreeable discipline; not only because such persons did not in their little and dark assemblies use this rite, but because they always greatly wanted it. For it is a sure rule in our religion, and is of an eternal truth, that "they who keep not the unity of the church, have not the Spirit of God;" and therefore it is most fit, should receive the ministry of the Spirit, when they return to the bosom of the church, that so indeed they may "keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace." And therefore Asterius bishop of Amasia compares confirmation to the ring, with which the father of the prodigal adorned his returning son: "Datur nempe prodigo post stolam et annulus,

nempe symbolum intelligibile signaculi Spiritûs." And as the Spirit of God, the holy dove, extended his mighty wings over the creation, and hatched the new-born world, from its seminal powers, to light and operation, and life and motion; so in the regeneration of the souls of men, he gives a new being, and heat and life, and procedure and perfection, wisdom and strength: and because that this was ministered by the bishops' hands in confirmation, was so firmly believed by all the primitive church, therefore it became a law, and a universal practice in all those ages, in which men desired to be saved by all means. The Latin church and the Greek always did use it; and the blessings of it, which they believed consequent to it, they expressed in a holy prayer, which in the Greek 'Euchologion' they have very anciently and constantly used: "Thou, O Lord, the most compassionate and great King of all, graciously impart to this person the seal of the gift of thy holy, almighty, and adorable Spirit [a]." For, as an ancient Greek said truly and wisely, "The Father is reconciled, and the Son is the reconciler; but to them who are by baptism and repentance made friends of God, the Holy Spirit is collated as a gift [b]." They well knew what they received in this ministration, and therefore wisely laid hold of it, and would not let it go.

[a] Αὐτὸς δέσποτα, παμβασιλεῦ, εὐσπλαγχνε, χαρίσαι αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν σφραγῖδα τῆς δωρεᾶς τοῦ ἁγίου, καὶ παντοδυνάμου, καὶ προσκυνητοῦ σου Πνεύματος.

[b] Ὁ μὲν Πατὴρ διήλλακται, ὁ δὲ Υἱὸς διήλλαξε, τὸ δὲ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον φίλοις ἤδη καθίστασι δῶρον.

This was anciently ministered by apostles, and ever after by the bishops, and religiously received by kings and greatest princes; and I have read that St. Sylvester confirmed Constantine the emperor: and when they made their children servants of the holy Jesus, and soldiers under his banner, and bondsmen of his institution, then they sent them to the bishop to be confirmed; who did it sometimes by such ceremonies, that the solemnity of the ministry might with greatest religion addict them to the service of their great Lord. We read in Adrovaldus*, that Charles Martel, entering into a league with Bishop Luitprandus, sent his son Pepin to him, "ut, more Christianorum fidelium, capillum ejus primus attonderet, ac Pater illi Spiritualis existeret," "that he might, after the manner of Christians, first cut his hair" (in token of service to Christ), "and" in confirming him "he should be his spiritual father." And something like this we find concerning William earl of Warren and Surrey, who, when he had dedicated the church of St. Pancratius and the priory of Lewes, received confirmation, and gave seizure "Per capillos capitis mei" (says he in the charter) "et fratris mei Radulphi de Warrena, quos abscidit cum cultello de capitibus nostris Henricus episcopus Wintoniensis;" "By the hairs of my head and of my brother's, which Henry bishop of Winchester cut off before the altar:" meaning (according to the ancient custom) in

* De Miraculis S. Benedict. lib. 1. c. 1. 14.

confirmation, when they by that solemnity addicted themselves to the free servitude of the Lord Jesus. The ceremony is obsolete and changed, but the mystery can never. And indeed that is one of the advantages in which we can rejoice concerning the ministration of this rite in the church of England and Ireland; that whereas it was sometimes clouded, sometimes hindered, and sometimes hurt, by the appendage of needless and useless ceremonies; it is now reduced to the primitive and first simplicity amongst us, and the excrescences used in the church of Rome are wholly pared away, and by holy prayers and the apostolical ceremony of imposition of the bishops' hands, it is worthily and zealously administered. The Latins used to send chrism to the Greeks, when they had usurped some jurisdiction over them, and the Pope's chaplains went with a quantity of it to Constantinople, where the Russians usually met them for it; for that was then the ceremony of this ministration: but when the Latins demanded fourscore pounds of gold besides other gifts, they went away and changed their custom, rather than pay an unlawful and ungodly tribute. "Non quærimus vestra, sed vos;" we require nothing but leave to impart God's blessings with pure intentions and a spiritual ministry. And as the bishops of our churches receive nothing from the people for the ministration of this rite, so they desire nothing but love and just obedience in spiritual and ecclesiastical duties; and

we offer our flocks spiritual things without mixture of temporal advantages from them; we minister the rituals of the Gospel without the inventions of men, religion without superstition, and only desire to be believed in such things, which we prove from Scripture expounded by the catholic practice of the church of God.

Concerning the subject of this discourse, "the Rite of Confirmation;" it were easy to recount many great and glorious expressions which we find in the sermons of the holy fathers of the primitive ages: so certain it is, that in this thing we ought to be zealous, as being desirous to persuade our people to give us leave to do them great good. But the following pages will do it, I hope, competently: only we shall remark, that when they had gotten a custom anciently, that in cases of necessity they did permit deacons and laymen sometimes to baptize, yet they never did confide in it much; but with much caution and curiosity commanded that such persons should, when that necessity was over, be carried to the bishop to be confirmed, so to supply all precedent defects relating to the past imperfect ministry, and future necessity and danger; as appears in the council of Eliberis. And the ancients had so great estimate and veneration to this holy rite, that as in heraldry they distinguish the same thing by several names, when they relate to persons of great eminency, and they blazon the arms of the gentry by

metals, of the nobility by precious stones, but of kings and princes by planets: so when they would signify the unction which was used in confirmation, they gave it a special word, and of more distinction and remark; and therefore the oil used in baptism they called ἔλαιον, but that of confirmation was μύρον καὶ χρίσμα· and they who spake properly, kept this difference of words, until, by incaution and ignorant carelessness, the names fell into confusion, and the thing into disuse and disrespect. But it is no small addition to the honour of this ministration, that some wise and good men have piously believed, that when baptized Christians are confirmed, and solemnly blessed by the bishop, that then it is, that a special angel-guardian is appointed to keep their souls from the assaults of the spirits of darkness. Concerning which, though I shall not interpose mine own opinion, yet this I say, that the piety of that supposition is not disagreeable to the intention of this rite: for since by this the Holy Spirit of God (the Father of spirits) is given, it is not unreasonably thought by them, that the other good spirits of God, the angels, who are "ministering spirits, sent forth to minister to the good of them that shall be heirs of salvation," should pay their kind offices in subordination to their prince and fountain; that the first in every kind might be the measure of all the rest. But there are greater and stranger things than this that God does

for the souls of his servants, and for the honour of the ministries which himself hath appointed.

We shall only add that this was ancient, and long before Popery entered into the world, and that this rite has been more abused by Popery than by any thing: and to this day the bigots of the Roman church are the greatest enemies to it; and from them the Presbyterians. But besides that the church of England and Ireland does religiously retain it, and hath appointed a solemn officer for the ministry; the Lutheran and Bohemian churches do observe it carefully, and it is recommended and established in the harmony of the Protestant confessions.

And now, may it please your Grace to give me leave to implore your aid and countenance for the propagating this so religious and useful a ministry, which, as it is a peculiar of the bishop's office, is also a great enlarger of God's gifts to the people. It is a great instrument of union of hearts, and will prove an effective deletory to schism, and an endearment to the other parts of religion; it is the consummation of baptism, and a preparation to the Lord's supper: it is the virtue from on high, and the solemnity of our spiritual adoption. But there will be no need to use many arguments to inflame your zeal in this affair, when your Grace shall find, that to promote it will be a great service to God; for this alone will conclude your Grace, who are so ready, by laws and

executions, by word and by example, to promote the religion of Christ, as it is taught in these churches. I am not confident enough to desire your Grace, for the reading this discourse, to lay aside any one hour of your greater employments, which consume so much of your days and nights: but I say that the subject is greatly worthy of consideration: "Nihil enim inter manus habui, cui majorem sollicitudinem præstare deberem." And for the book itself, I can only say what Secundus did to the wise Lupercus, "Quoties ad fastidium legentium deliciasque respicio, intelligo nobis commendationem ex ipsa mediocritate libri petendam[b]:" I can commend it because it is little, and so not very troublesome. And if it could have been written according to the worthiness of the thing treated in it, it would deserve so great a patronage: but because it is not, it will therefore greatly need it; but it can hope for it on no other account, but because it is laid at the feet of a princely person, who is great and good, and one who not only is bound by duty, but by choice hath obliged himself to do advantages to any worthy instrument of religion. But I have detained your Grace so long in my address, that your pardon will be all the favour which ought to be hoped for by

Your Grace's most humble
And obliged Servant,
JER. DUNENSIS.

[b] Lib. 2. ep. 5. 4. Gierig. vol. 1. p. 124.

A

DISCOURSE

OF

CONFIRMATION.

THE INTRODUCTION.

NEXT to the incarnation of the Son of God, and the whole economy of our redemption wrought by him in an admirable order and conjugation of glorious mercies, the greatest thing that ever God did to the world, is the giving to us the Holy Ghost: and possibly this is the consummation and perfection of the other. For in the work of redemption Christ indeed made a new world; we are wholly a new creation, and we must be so: and therefore when St. John began the narrative of the Gospel, he began in a manner and style very like to Moses in his history of the first creation; "In the beginning was the Word," &c. "All things were made by him; and without him, was not any thing made, that was made." But as in the creation the matter was first (there were indeed heavens, and earth, and waters; but all this was rude and 'without form,' till 'the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters),' so it is in the new creation. We are a new mass, redeemed with the blood of Christ, rescued from an evil portion, and made candidates of heaven and immortality; but we are but an embryo in the regeneration, until the Spirit of God enlivens us and moves again upon the waters: and then every subsequent motion and operation is from the Spirit of God. "We cannot say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost." By him we live, in him we walk, by his aids we pray, by his emotions we desire: we breathe, and sigh, and groan, by him: he 'helps us in all our infirmities,' and he gives us all our strengths; he reveals mysteries to us, and teaches us all our duties; he

stirs us up to holy desires, and he actuates those desires; he 'makes us to will and to do of his good pleasure.'

For the Spirit of God is that in our spiritual life, that a man's soul is in his natural: without it, we are but a dead and lifeless trunk. But then, as a man's soul, in proportion to the several operations of life, obtains several appellatives (it is vegetative and nutritive, sensitive and intellective, according as it operates); so is the Spirit of God. He is the the Spirit of regeneration in baptism, of renovation in repentance; the Spirit of love, and the Spirit of holy fear; the Searcher of the hearts, and the Spirit of wisdom, and the Spirit of prayer. In one mystery he illuminates, and in another he feeds us: he begins in one, and finishes and perfects in another. It is the same Spirit working divers operations. For he is all this now reckoned, and he is every thing else that is the principle of good unto us; he is the beginning and the progression, the consummation and perfection, of us all: and yet every work of his is perfect in its kind, and in order to his own designation; and from the beginning to the end is perfection all the way. Justifying and sanctifying grace is the proper entitative product in all; but it hath divers appellatives and connotations in the several rites: and yet even then also, because of the identity of the principle, the similitude and general consonancy in the effect, the same appellative is given, and the same effect imputed to more than one; and yet none of them can be omitted, when the great master of the family hath blessed it, and given it institution. Thus St. Dionysius calls baptism τὴν ἱερὰν τῆς θεογονίας τελείωσιν, 'the perfection of the divine birth;' and yet the baptized person must receive other mysteries, which are more signally perfective: ἡ τοῦ μύρου χρῖσις τελειωτική' confirmation is yet more perfective, and is properly 'the perfection of baptism.'

By baptism we are heirs, and are adopted to the inheritance of sons, admitted to the covenant of repentance, and engaged to live a good life; yet this is but the solemnity of the covenant, which must pass into after-acts by other influences of the same divine principle. Until we receive the spirit of obsignation or confirmation, we are but babes in Christ, in the meanest sense, infants that can do nothing,

that cannot speak, that cannot resist any violence, exposed to every rudeness, and perishing by every temptation.

But therefore, as God at first appointed us a ministry of a new birth; so also hath he given to his church the consequent ministry of a new strength. The Spirit moved a little upon the waters of baptism, and gave us the principles of life; but in confirmation he makes us able to move ourselves. In the first he is the Spirit of life; but in this he is the Spirit of strength and motion. "Baptisma est nativitas, unguentum verò est nobis actionis instar et motus," said Cabasilas.—"In baptism we are entitled to the inheritance: but because we are in our infancy and minority, the father gives unto his sons a tutor, a guardian and a teacher in confirmation," said Rupertus[c]: that as we are baptized into the death and resurrection of Christ; so in confirmation we may be renewed in the inner man, and strengthened in all our holy vows and purposes, by the Holy Ghost ministered according to God's ordinance.

The holy right of confirmation is a divine ordinance, and it produces divine effects, and is ministered by divine persons, that is, by those whom God hath sanctified and separated to this ministration. At first, all that were baptized, were also confirmed: and ever since, all good people that have understood it, have been very zealous for it; and time was in England, even since the first beginnings of the reformation, when confirmation had been less carefully ministered for about six years, when the people had their first opportunities of it restored, they ran to it in so great numbers, that churches and church-yards would not hold them; insomuch that I have read[d] that the Bishop of Chester was forced to impose hands on the people in the fields, and was so oppressed with multitudes, that he had almost been trod to death by the people, and had died with the throng, if he had not been rescued by the civil power.

But men have too much neglected all the ministries of grace, and this most especially, and have not given themselves to a right understanding of it, and so neglected it yet more. But because the prejudice, which these parts of the Christian church have suffered for want of it, is very great

[c] De Divin. Offic. lib. 5. c. 17.
[d] Vindic. Ecclesiast. Hierarch. per Franc. Hallier.

(as will appear by enumeration of the many and great blessings consequent to it), I am not without hope, that it may be a service acceptable to God, and a useful ministry to the souls of my charges, if by instructing them that know not, and exhorting them that know, I set forward the practice of this holy rite, and give reasons why the people ought to love it and to desire it, and how they are to understand and practise it, and consequently, with what duteous affections they are to relate to those persons, whom God hath in so special and signal manner made to be, for their good and eternal benefit, the ministers of the Spirit and salvation.

St. Bernard in the life of St. Malachias, my predecessor in the see of Down and Connor, reports that it was the care of that good prelate to renew the rite of confirmation in his diocess, where it had been long neglected and gone into desuetude. It being too much our case in Ireland, I find the same necessity, and am obliged to the same procedure, for the same reason, and in pursuance of so excellent an example: "Hoc enim est evangelizare Christum (said St. Austin[e]), non tantùm docere quæ sunt dicenda de Christo, sed etiam quæ observanda ei, qui accedit ad compagem corporis Christi;" "For this is to preach the Gospel, not only to teach those things which are to be said of Christ, but those also which are to be observed by every one who desires to be confederated into the society of the body of Christ," which is his church: that is, not only the doctrines of good life, but the mysteries of godliness, and the rituals of religion, which issue from a divine fountain, are to be declared by him who would fully preach the Gospel.

In order to which performance I shall declare,

1. The divine original, warranty, and institution, of the holy rite of confirmation.

2. That this rite was to be a perpetual and never-ceasing ministration.

3. That it was actually continued and practised by all the succeeding ages of the purest and primitive churches.

4. That this rite was appropriate to the ministry of bishops.

5. That prayer and imposition of the bishops' hands did make the whole ritual; and though other things were added,

[e] Cap. 9. de Fide et Operibus.

yet they were not necessary, or any thing of the institution.

6. That many great graces and blessings were consequent to the worthy reception and due ministration of it.

7. I shall add something of the manner of preparation to it, and reception of it.

SECTION I.

Of the divine Original, Warranty, and Institution, of the holy Rite of Confirmation.

In the church of Rome, they have determined confirmation to be a sacrament, 'proprii nominis,' proper and really; and yet their doctors have, some of them at least, been 'paulô iniquiores,' 'a little unequal and unjust' to their proposition; insomuch that from themselves we have had the greatest opposition in this article. Bonacina[f] and Henriquez allow the proposition, but make the sacrament to be so unnecessary, that a little excuse may justify the omission and almost neglect of it. And Loemilius and Daniel à Jesu, and generally the English Jesuits, have, to serve some ends of their own family and order, disputed it almost into contempt, that by representing it as unnecessary, they might do all the ministries ecclesiastical in England without the assistance of bishops their superiors, whom they therefore love not, because they are so. But the theological faculty of Paris have condemned their doctrine as temerarious, and savouring of heresy; and in the later schools have approved rather the doctrine of Gamachæus, Estius, Kellison, and Bellarmine, who indeed do follow the doctrine of the most eminent persons in the ancient school, Richard of Armagh, Scotus, Hugo Cavalli, and Gerson the learned chancellor of Paris; who following the old Roman order, Amalarius and Albinus, do all teach confirmation to be of great and pious use, of divine original, and to many purposes necessary, according to the doctrine of Scriptures and the primitive church.

Whether confirmation be a sacrament or no, is of no use to dispute; and if it be disputed, it can never be proved to

[f] De Sacram. disp. 3. q. Unic. Punct. 3. 2. lib. 3. de Sacram.

be so as baptism and the Lord's supper, that is "as generally necessary to salvation:" but though it be no sacrament, it cannot follow that it is not of very great use and holiness: and as a man is never the less tied to repentance, though it be no sacrament; so neither is he nevertheless obliged to receive confirmation, though it be (as it ought) acknowledged to be of a use and nature inferior to the two sacraments of divine, direct, and immediate institution. It is certain that the fathers, in a large, symbolical, and general sense, call it 'a sacrament;' but mean not the same thing by that word when they apply it to confirmation, as they do when they apply it to baptism and the Lord's supper. That it is an excellent and divine ordinance to purposes spiritual, that it comes from God, and ministers in our way to God, that is all we are concerned to inquire after: and this I shall endeavour to prove not only against the Jesuits, but against all opponents of what side soever.

My first argument from Scripture is what I learn from Optatus and St. Cyril. Optatus writing against the Donatists hath these words: "Christ descended into the water,—not that in him, who is God, was any thing that could be made cleaner, but that the water was to precede the future unction, for the initiating and ordaining and fulfilling the mysteries of baptism. He was washed, when he was in the hands of John; then followed the order of the mystery, and the Father finished what the Son did ask, and what the Holy Ghost declared: the heavens were opened, God the Father anointed him, the spiritual unction presently descended in the likeness of a dove, and sat upon his head, and was spread all over him, and he was called 'the Christ,' when he was 'the anointed of the Father.' To whom also, lest imposition of hands should seem to be wanting, the voice of God was heard from the cloud, saying, 'This is my Son in whom I am well pleased, hear ye him.'"—That which Optatus says is this; that, upon and in Christ's person, baptism, confirmation, and ordination, were consecrated and first appointed. He was baptized by St. John; he was confirmed by the Holy Spirit, and anointed with spiritual unction in order to that great work of obedience to his Father's will; and he was consecrated by the voice of God from heaven. In all things Christ is the head, and the first-fruits: and in these things was the

fountain of the sacraments and spiritual grace, and the great exemplar of the economy of the church. For Christ was 'nullius pœnitentiæ debitor:' baptism of repentance was not necessary to him, who never sinned; but so it became him to fulfil all righteousness, and to be a pattern to us all. But we have need of these things, though he had not; and in the same way in which salvation was wrought by him for himself and for us all, in the same way he intended[s] we should walk. He was baptized, because his Father appointed it so: we must be baptized, because Christ hath appointed it, and we have need of it too. He was consecrated to be the great prophet and the great priest, because 'no man takes on him this honour, but he that was called of God, as was Aaron:' and all they who are to minister in his prophetical office under him, must be consecrated and solemnly set apart for that ministration, and after his glorious example. He was anointed with a spiritual unction from above after his baptism; for 'after Jesus was baptized,' he ascended up from the waters, and then the Holy Ghost descended upon him. It is true, he received the fulness of the Spirit; but we receive him by measure; but "of his fulness we all receive, grace for grace:" that is, all that he received in order to his great work, all that in kind, one for another, grace for grace, we are to receive according to our measures and our necessities. And as all these he received by external ministrations; so must we: God the Father appointed his way, and he, by his example first, hath appointed the same to us; that we also may follow him in the regeneration, and work out our salvation by the same graces in the like solemnities. For if he needed them for himself, then we need them much more. If he did not need them for himself, he needed them for us, and for our example, that we might follow his steps, who, by receiving these exterior solemnities and inward graces, became "the author and finisher of our salvation," and the great example of his church.—I shall not need to make use of the fancy of the Murcosians and Colobarsians, who turning all mysteries into numbers, reckoned the numeral letters of περιστερὰ, and made them coincident to the *a* and *ω*; but they intended to say, that Christ, receiving the holy dove after his baptism, became all in all to us, the beginning and the per-

[s] 1 John, ii. 8.

fection of our salvation; here he was confirmed, and received the ω to his α, the consummation to his initiation, the completion of his baptism and of his headship in the Gospel. But that which I shall rather add, is what St. Cyril [h] from hence argues: "When he truly was baptized in the river of Jordan, he ascended out of the waters, and the Holy Ghost substantially descended upon him, like resting upon like. And to you also in like manner, after ye have descended from the waters of baptism, the unction is given, which bears the image or similitude of him by whom Christ was anointed—that as Christ after baptism and the coming of the Holy Spirit upon him, went forth to battle (in the wilderness) and overcame the adversary; so ye also, after holy baptism and the mystical unction (or confirmation), being vested with the armour of the Holy Spirit, are enabled to stand against the opposite powers."—Here then is the first great ground of our solemn receiving the Holy Spirit, or the unction from above after baptism, which we understand and represent by the word confirmation, denoting the principal effect of this unction, spiritual strength. Christ, who is the head of the church, entered this way upon his duty and work: and he who was the first of all the church, the head and great example, is the measure of all the rest; for we can go to heaven no way but in that way in which he went before us.

There are some, who from this story would infer the descent of the Holy Ghost after Christ's baptism not to signify, that confirmation was to be a distinct rite from baptism, but a part of it,—yet such a part as gives fulness and consummation to it. St. Jerome, Chrysostom, Euthymius, and Theophylact, go not so far, but would have us by this to understand that the Holy Ghost is given to them that are baptized. But reason and the context are both against it. 1. Because the Holy Ghost was not given by John's baptism; that was reserved to be one of Christ's glories; who also, when by his disciples he baptized many, did not give them the Holy Ghost; and when he commanded his apostles to baptize all nations, did not at that time so much as promise the Holy Ghost: he was promised distinctly, and given by another ministration. 2. The descent of the Holy Spirit was a distinct ministry from the baptism: it was not only after

[h] Catech. 3. Πνεύματος ἁγίου οὐσιώδης ἐπιφοίτησις αὐτῶν ἐγίνετο.

Jesus ascended from the waters of baptism; but there was something intervening, and by a new office or ministration: for there was a prayer joined in the ministry. So St. Luke observes; "while Jesus was praying, the heavens were opened," and the Holy Spirit descended: for so Jesus was pleased to consign the whole office and ritual of confirmation. Prayer for invocating the Holy Spirit, and giving him by personal application; which as the Father did immediately, so the bishops do by imposition of hands. 3. St. Austin observes that the apparition of the Holy Spirit like a dove was the visible or ritual part; and the voice of God was the word to make it to be sacramental; "accedit verbum ad elementum, et fit sacramentum [i]:" for so the ministration was not only performed on Christ, but consigned to the church by similitude and exemplar institution. I shall only add, that the force of this argument is established to us by more of the fathers. St. Hilary upon this place hath these words [k]: "The Father's voice was heard, that from those things which were consummated in Christ, we might know, that, after the baptism of water, the Holy Spirit from the gates of heaven flies unto us; and that we are to be anointed with the unction of a celestial glory, and be made the sons of God by the adoption of the voice of God; the truth by the very effects of things, prefigured unto us the similitude of a sacrament."—So St. Chrysostom [l]: "In the beginnings always appear the sensible visions of spiritual things for their sakes, who cannot receive the understanding of an incorporeal nature; that if afterward they be not so done (that is, after the same visible manner), they may be believed by those things which were already done."—But more plain is that of Theophylact [m]: "The Lord had not need of the descent of the Holy Spirit, but he did all things for our sakes; and himself is become the first-fruits of all things, which we afterward were to receive, that he might become the first-fruits among many brethren." The consequent is this, which I express in the words of St. Austin, affirming, "Christi in baptismo columbam unctionem nostram præfigurâsse," "The dove in Christ's baptism did represent and prefigure our unction from above," that is, the descent of the Holy Ghost upon us in the rite of

[i] Tract. 80. in Joan.
[l] In Matthæum.
[k] S. Hilar. can. 4. in fine.
[m] Ibid.

confirmation. Christ was baptized, and so must we. But after baptism he had a new ministration for the reception of the Holy Ghost: and because this was done for our sakes, we also must follow that example. And this being done immediately before his entrance into the wilderness to be tempted of the devil, it plainly describes to us the order of this ministry, and the blessing designed to us: after we are baptized, we need to be strengthened and confirmed "propter pugnam spiritualem;" we are to fight against the flesh, the world, and the devil, and therefore must receive the ministration of the Holy Spirit of God: which is the design and proper work of confirmation. For (they are the words of the excellent author of the imperfect work upon St. Matthew, imputed to St. Chrysostom [n]) "The baptism of water profits us, because it washes away the sins we have formally committed, if we repent of them. But it does not sanctify the soul, nor precedes the concupiscences of the heart and our evil thoughts, nor drives them back, nor represses our carnal desires. But he therefore who is (only) so baptized, that he does not also receive the Holy Spirit, is baptized in his body, and his sins are pardoned; but in his mind he is yet but a catechumen: for so it is written, 'He that hath not the Spirit of Christ, is none of his:' and therefore afterward out of his flesh will germinate worse sins, because he hath not received the Holy Spirit conserving him (in his baptismal grace), but the house of his body is empty; wherefore that wicked spirit finding it swept with the doctrines of faith, as with besoms, enters in, and in a sevenfold manner dwells there." Which words, besides that they well explicate this mystery, do also declare the necessity of confirmation, or receiving the Holy Ghost after baptism, in imitation of the divine precedent of our blessed Saviour.

2. After the example of Christ, my next argument is from his words spoken to Nicodemus in explication of the prime mysteries evangelical; "Unless a man be born of water and of the Holy Spirit, he shall not enter into the kingdom of God [o]." These words are the great argument, which the church uses for the indispensable necessity of baptism; and having in them so great effort, and not being rightly understood, they have suffered many convulsions (shall I call

[n] Homil. 4. [o] John, iii. 5.

them?) or interpretations. Some serve their own hypothesis by saying that water is the symbol, and the Spirit is the baptismal grace: others, that it is a ἓν διὰ δυοῖν, one is only meant, though here be two signatures. But others conclude, that water is only necessary, but the Spirit is superadded as being afterward to supervene and move upon these waters: and others yet affirm, that by water is only meant a spiritual ablution, or the effect produced by the Spirit; and still they have entangled the words so that they have been made useless to the Christian church, and the meaning too many other things makes nothing to be understood. But truth is easy, intelligible, and clear, and without objection, and is plainly this:

Unless a man be baptized into Christ, and confirmed by the Spirit of Christ, he cannot enter into the kingdom of Christ; that is, he is not perfectly adopted into the Christian religion, or fitted for the Christian warfare. And if this plain and natural sense be admitted, the place is not only easy and intelligible, but consonant to the whole design of Christ and analogy of the New Testament.

For, first, Our blessed Saviour was catechizing of Nicodemus, and teaching him the first rudiments of the Gospel, and like a wise master-builder, first lays the foundation, "the doctrine of baptism and laying on of hands;" which afterward St. Paul put into the Christian catechism, as I shall shew in the sequel. Now these also are the first principles of the Christian religion taught by Christ himself, and things which at least to the doctors might have been so well known, that our blessed Saviour upbraids the not knowing them as a shame to Nicodemus. St. Chrysostom and Theophylact, Euthymius and Rupertus, affirm, that this generation by water and the Holy Spirit might have been understood by the Old Testament, in which Nicodemus was so well skilled. Certain it is, the doctrine of baptisms was well enough known to the Jews, and the ἐπιφοίτησις τοῦ Πνεύματος τοῦ Θεοῦ, "the illumination and irradiations of the Spirit of God" was not new to them, who believed the visions and dreams, the daughter of a voice, and the influences from heaven upon the sons of the prophets: and therefore although Christ intended to teach him more than what he had distinct notice of, yet the things themselves had foundation in the

law and the prophets: but although they were high mysteries, and scarce discerned by them who either were ignorant or incurious of such things; yet to the Christians they were the very rudiments of their religion, and are best expounded by observation of what St. Paul placed in the very foundation. But,

2. Baptism is the first mystery, that is certain; but that this of 'being born of the Spirit' is also the next, is plain in the very order of the words: and that it does mean a mystery distinct from baptism, will be easily assented to by them who consider, that although Christ baptized and made many disciples by the ministry of his apostles, yet they who were so baptized into Christ's religion, did not receive this baptism of the Spirit till after Christ's ascension.

3. The baptism of water was not peculiar to John the Baptist, for it was also of Christ, and ministered by his command; it was common to both; and therefore the baptism of water is the less principal here. Something distinct from it is here intended. Now if we add to these words, that St. John tells of another baptism which was Christ's peculiar, "He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire;" that these words were literally verified upon the apostles in Pentecost, and afterward upon all the baptized in spiritual effect (who, besides the baptism of water, distinctly had the baptism of the Spirit in confirmation); it will follow, that of necessity this must be the meaning and the verification of these words of our blessed Saviour to Nicodemus, which must mean a double baptism: "Transibimus per aquam et ignem, antequam veniemus in refrigerium," "We must pass through water and fire, before we enter into rest;" that is, we must first be baptized with water, and then with the Holy Ghost, who first descended in fire; that is, the only way to enter into Christ's kingdom is by these two doors of the tabernacle, which God hath pitched, and not man,—first by baptism, and then by confirmation; first by water, and then by the Spirit.

The primitive church had this notion so fully amongst them, that the author of the Apostolical Constitutions attributed to St. Clement[p], who was St. Paul's scholar, affirms, That a man is made a perfect Christian (meaning ritually and

[p] S. Clem. Ep. 4. Constit. Apost.

sacramentally, and by all exterior solemnity) by the water of baptism and confirmation of the bishop: and from these words of Christ now alleged, derives the use and institution of the rite of confirmation. The same sense of these words is given to us by St. Cyprian[q], who, intending to prove the insufficiency of one without the other, says, "Tunc enim plenè sanctificari et esse Dei filii possunt, si sacramento utroque nascantur, cùm scriptum sit, 'Nisi quis natus fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu, non potest intrare in regnum Dei'" "Then they may be fully sanctified, and become the sons of God, if they be born with both the sacraments, or rites; for it is written, 'Unless a man be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.'"—The same also is the commentary of[r] Eusebius Emissenus; and St. Austin[s] tells, that although some understand these words only of baptism, and others of the Spirit only, viz. in confirmation; yet others (and certainly much better) understand "utrumque sacramentum," "both the mysteries," of confirmation as well as baptism. Amalarius Fortunatus[t] brings this very text to reprove them that neglect the episcopal imposition of hands: "Concerning them who by negligence lose the bishop's presence, and receive not the imposition of his hands, it is to be considered, lest in justice they be condemned, in which they exercise justice negligently, because they ought to make haste to the imposition of hands; because Christ said, 'Unless a man be born again of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God:' and as he said this, so also he said, 'Unless your righteousness exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.'"

To this I foresee two objections may be made. 1. That Christ did not institute confirmation in this place, because confirmation being for the gift of the Holy Ghost, who was to come upon none of the apostles till Jesus was glorified, these words seem too early for the consigning an effect that was to be so long after, and a rite that could not be practised till many intermedial events should happen. So said the Evangelist[u]; "the Holy Ghost was come upon none of them, because Jesus was not yet glorified;" intimating that this

[q] Ad Stephanum.
[r] Homil. in Dominic. prim. post. Ascens.
[s] Epist. 108. ad Seleucianum.
[t] Lib. c. 27.
[u] John, vii. 39.

great effect was to be in after-time: and it is not likely that the ceremony should be ordained before the effect itself was ordered and provided for; that the solemnity should be appointed before provisions were made for the mystery; and that the outward, which was wholly for the inward, should be instituted, before the inward and principal had its abode amongst us.

To this I answer, 1. That it is no unusual thing; for Christ gave the sacrament of his body, before his body was given; the memorial of his death was instituted before his death. 2. Confirmation might here as well be instituted as baptism; and by the same reason that the church from these words concludes the necessity of one, she may also infer the designation of the other; for the effect of baptism was at that time no more produced than that of confirmation. Christ had not yet purchased to himself a church, he had not wrought remission of sins to all that believe on him; the death of Christ was not yet past, into which death the Christian church was to be baptized. 3. These words are so an institution of confirmation, as the sixth chapter of St. John is of the blessed eucharist: it was 'designativa,' not 'ordinativa,' it was in design, not in present command; here it was preached, but not reducible to practice till its proper season. 4. It was like the words of Christ to St. Peter; "When thou art converted, confirm thy brethren." Here the command was given, but that confirmation of his brethren was to be performed in a time relative to a succeeding accident. 5. It is certain that long before the event, and grace was given, Christ did speak of the Spirit of confirmation, that Spirit which was to descend in Pentecost, which all they were to receive who should believe on him, which whosoever did receive, "out of his belly should flow rivers of living waters," as is to be read in that place of St. John[x] now quoted. 6. This predesignation of the Holy Spirit of confirmation was presently followed by some little antepast and 'donariola,' or 'little givings' of the Spirit; for our blessed Saviour gave the Holy Ghost three several times. First, ἀμυδρῶς, 'obscurely,' and by intimation and secret virtue, then when he sent them to heal the sick, and anoint them with oil in the name of the Lord. Secondly, ἐκτυποτέρως, 'more express-

[x] Chap. vii. 38.

ly' and signally after the resurrection, when he took his leave of them, and said, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost:" and this was to give them a power of ministering remission of sins, and therefore related to baptism and the ministries of repentance. But, thirdly, he gave it τελειοτέρως, 'more perfectly,' and this was the Spirit of confirmation; for he was not at all until now, οὔπω γὰρ ἦν πνεῦμα ἅγιον, says the text: "the Holy Ghost was not yet:" so almost all the Greek copies, printed and manuscript; and so St. Chrysostom, Athanasius, Cyril, Ammonius in the Catena of the Greeks, Leontius, Theophylact, Euthymius, and all the Greek fathers, read it; so St. Jerome[y] and St. Austin[z] among the Latins, and some Latin translations, read it. Our translations read it, "the Holy Ghost was not yet given," was not ἐν αὐτοῖς, "in them," as some few Greek copies read it: but the meaning is alike, confirmation was not yet actual,—the Holy Spirit, viz. of confirmation, was not yet come upon the church: but it follows not but he was long before promised, designed and appointed, spoken of and declared. The first of these collations had the ceremony of chrism or anointing joined with it, which the church in process of time transferred into her use and ministry: yet it is the last only that Christ passed into an ordinance for ever; it is this only which is the sacramental consummation of our regeneration in Christ; for in this the Holy Spirit is not only ἐνεργείᾳ παρὸν 'present by his power,' but present οὐσιωδῶς, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις συγγινόμενόν τε καὶ πολιτευόμενον, as St. Gregory Nazianzen expresses it, to dwell with us, to converse with us, and to abide for ever; οὗ ἐξέχεε ἐφ' ἡμᾶς πλουσίως· so St. Paul describes this Spirit of confirmation, the Spirit, "which he hath poured forth upon us richly or plentifully," that is, in great measures, and to the full consummation of the first mysteries of our regeneration. Now because Christ is the great fountain of this blessing to us, and he it was who sent his Father's Spirit upon the church, himself best knew his own intentions, and the great blessings he intendedt o communicate to his church; and therefore it was most agreeable that from his sermons we should learn his purposes, and his blessing, and our duty. Here Christ declared 'rem sacramenti,' 'the spiritual grace,' which he would afterward impart to his church by exterior

[y] Qu. 9. ad Hedibiam. [z] In Joan. tract. 72.

ministry, in this as in all other graces, mysteries, and rituals evangelical: " Nisi quis, ' unless a man' be born both of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God."

But the next objection is yet more material. 2. For if this be the meaning of our blessed Saviour, then confirmation is as necessary as baptism, and without it ordinarily no man can be saved. The solution of this will answer a case of conscience, concerning the necessity of confirmation; and in what degree of duty and diligence we are bound to take care that we receive this holy rite. I answer therefore, that ' entering into the kingdom of God,' is being admitted into the Christian church and warfare, to become sons of God, and soldiers of Jesus Christ. And though this be the outward door, and the first entrance into life, and consequently the king's highway, and the ordinary means of salvation; yet we are to distinguish the external ceremony from the internal mystery: the ' Nisi quis' is for this, not for that; and yet that also is the ordinary way. ' Unless a man be baptized,' that is, unless he be indeed regenerate, he cannot be saved: and yet baptism, or the outward washing, is the solemnity and ceremony of its ordinary ministration; and he that neglects this, when it may be had, is not indeed regenerate; he is not renewed in the spirit of his mind, because he neglects God's way, and therefore can as little be saved as he who, having received the external sacrament, puts a bar to the intromission of the inward grace. Both cannot always be had; but when they can, although they are not equally valuable in the nature of the thing, yet they are made equally necessary by the divine commandment. And in this there is a great, but general mistake, in the doctrine of the schools, disputing concerning what sacraments are necessary ' necessitate medii,' that is, as ' necessary means,' and what are necessary by the necessity of precept, or divine commandment. For although a less reason will excuse from the actual susception of some than of others, and a less diligence for the obtaining of one will serve than in obtaining of another, and a supply in one is easier obtained than in another; yet no sacrament hath in it any other necessity than what is made merely by the divine commandment. But the grace of every sacrament, or rite, or mystery, which is of divine ordi-

nance is necessary indispensably, so as without it no man can be saved. And this difference is highly remarkable in the words of Christ recorded by St. Mark[g]; "He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved: but he that believeth not, shall be damned." Baptism itself, as to the external part, is not necessary, 'necessitate medii,' or indispensably; but baptismal faith for the remission of sins in persons capable, that indeed is necessary: for Christ does not say that the want of baptism damns as the want of faith does; and yet both baptism and faith are the ordinary way of salvation, and both necessary; baptism because it is so by the divine commandment, and faith as a necessary means of salvation, in the very economy and dispensation of the Gospel. Thus it is also in the other sacrament; "Unless we eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, we have no life in us[h]:" and yet God forbid that every man that is not communicated, should die eternally. But it means plainly, that without receiving Christ, as he is by God's intention intended we should receive him in the communion, we have no life in us. Plainly thus, without the internal grace we cannot live; and the external ministry is the usual and appointed means of conveying to us the internal: and therefore although without the external it is possible to be saved, when it is impossible to be had; yet with the wilful neglect of it we cannot. Thus therefore we are to understand the words of Christ declaring the necessity of both these ceremonies: they are both necessary, because they are the means of spiritual advantages and graces, and both minister to the proper ends of their appointment, and both derive from a divine original: but the ritual or ceremonial part in rare emergencies is dispensable; but the grace is indispensable. Without the grace of baptism we shall die in our sins; and without the grace or internal part of confirmation we shall never be able to resist the devil, but shall be taken captive by him at his will. Now the external or ritual part is the means, the season, and opportunity, of this grace; and therefore is at no hand to be neglected, lest we be accounted despisers of the grace, and tempters of God to ways and provisions extraordinary. For although when without our fault we receive not the sacramental part, God can and will supply it to us out of his own

[g] xvi. 16. [h] John, vi. 53.

stores, because no man can perish without his own fault; and God can permit to himself what he pleases, as being Lord of the grace and of the sacrament: yet to us he hath given a law and a rule; and that is the way of his church, in which all Christians ought to walk. In short, the use of it is greatly profitable; the neglect is inexcusable; but the contempt is damnable. "Tenentur non negligere, si patet opportunitas," said the bishops in a synod at Paris: "If there be an opportunity, it must not be neglected."—"Obligantur suscipere, aut saltem non contemnere," said the synod at Sens: "They are bound to receive it, or at least not to despise it."—Now he despises it, that refuses it when he is invited to it, or when it is offered, or that neglects it without cause. For 'causelessly' and 'contemptuously' are all one. But these answers were made by gentle casuists: he only values the grace that desires it, that longs for it, that makes use of all the means of grace, that seeks out for the means, that refuses no labour, that goes after them as the merchant goes after gain: and therefore the old 'ordo Romanus'[j] admonishes more strictly; "Omnino præcavendum esse, ut hoc sacramentum confirmationis non negligatur, quia tunc omne baptisma legitimum Christianitatis nomine confirmatur:" "We must by all means take heed, that the rite of confirmation be not neglected, because, in that, every true baptism is ratified and confirmed."—Which words are also to the same purpose made use of by Albinus Flaccus[k]. No man can tell to what degrees of diligence and labour, to what sufferings on journeyings, he is obliged for the procuring of this ministry: there must be 'debita sollicitudo,' a real, providential, zealous care to be where it is to be had, is the duty of every Christian according to his own circumstances; but they who will not receive it unless it be brought to their doors, may live in such places and in such times, where they shall be sure to miss it, and pay the price of their neglect of so great a ministry of salvation. "Turpissima est jactura, quæ per negligentiam fit," "He is a fool that loses his good by carelessness[l]:" but no man is zealous for his soul, but he who not only omits no opportunity of doing it advantage when it is ready for him, but makes and seeks and contrives

[j] In Offic. Sab. Pasch. post orat. quæ dicitur data confirm.
[k] De Offic. Divin. in Sabb. S. Pasch. [l] Seneca.

opportunities. "Si non necessitate, sed incuriâ et voluntate remanserit," as St. Clement's expression is; If a man wants it by necessity, it may, by the overflowings of the divine grace, be supplied; but not so if negligence or choice cause the omission.

3. Our way being made plain, we may proceed to other places of Scripture to prove the divine original of confirmation. It was a plant of our Heavenly Father's planting, it was a branch of the vine, and how it springs from the root Christ Jesus we have seen; it is yet more visible as it was dressed and cultivated by the apostles. Now as soon as the apostles had received the Holy Spirit, they preached and baptized, and the inferior ministers did the same, and St. Philip particularly did so at Samaria, the converts of which place received all the fruits of baptism; but Christians though they were, they wanted a τελείωσις, 'something to make them perfect.' The other part of the narrative I shall set down in the words of St. Luke[m]: "Now when the apostles which were at Jerusalem, heard that Samaria had received the word of God, they sent unto them Peter and John; who, when they were come down, prayed for them that they might receive the Holy Ghost: for as yet he was fallen upon none of them, only they were baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus. Then laid they their hands on them, and they received the Holy Ghost." If it had not been necessary to have added a new solemnity and ministration, it is not to be supposed the apostles Peter and John would have gone from Jerusalem to impose hands on the baptized at Samaria. "Id quod deerat à Petro et Joanne factum est, ut, oratione pro eis habitâ et manu impositâ, invocaretur et infunderetur super eos Spiritus Sanctus," said St. Cyprian[n]: "It was not necessary that they should be baptized again, only that which was wanting was performed by Peter and John, that by prayer and imposition of hands the Holy Ghost should be invocated and poured upon them."—The same also is, from this place, affirmed by Pope Innocentius the First[o], St. Jerome[p], and many others: and in the Acts of the Apostles we find another instance of the celebration of this ritual and mystery, for it is signally expressed of the baptized Christians at Ephesus,

[m] Acts, viii. 14—17.
[n] Ad Jubaian.
[o] Epist. 1. c. 3.
[p] Adv. Luciferian.

that St. Paul first baptized them, and then laid his hands on them, and they received the Holy Ghost. And these testimonies are the great warranty for this holy rite. "Quod nunc in confirmandis neophytis manûs impositio tribuit singulis, hoc tunc Spiritûs Sancti descensio in credentium populo donavit universis," said Eucherius Lugdunensis, in his homily of Pentecost: "The same thing that is done now in imposition of hands on single persons, is no other than that which was done upon all believers in the descent of the Holy Ghost;" it is the same ministry, and all deriving from the same authority.

Confirmation or imposition of hands for the collation of the Holy Spirit, we see, was actually practised by the apostles, and that even before and after they preached the Gospel to the Gentiles; and therefore Amalarius, who entered not much into the secret of it, reckons this ritual as derived from the apostles 'per consuetudinem,' 'by catholic custom;' which although it is not perfectly spoken as to the whole αὐθεντία or 'authority' of it, yet he places it in the apostles, and is a witness of the catholic succeeding custom and practice of the church of God. Which thing also Zanchius observing, though he followed the sentiment of Amalarius, and seemed to understand no more of it, yet says well; "Interim" (says he) "exempla apostolorum et veteris ecclesiæ vellem pluris æstimari:" "I wish that the example of the apostles and the primitive church were of more value amongst Christians."—It were very well indeed they were so; but there is more in it than mere example. These examples of such solemnities productive of such spiritual effects are, as St. Cyprian calls them, "apostolica magisteria," "the apostles are our masters" in them, and have given rules and precedents for the church to follow. This is a Christian law, and 'written, as all Scriptures are, for our instruction,' But this I shall expressly prove in the next paragraph.

4. We have seen the original from Christ, the practice and exercise of it in the apostles and the first converts in Christianity: that which I shall now remark is, that this is established and passed into a Christian doctrine. The warranty for what, I say, are the words of St. Paul[q], where the holy rite of confirmation, so called from the effect of this minis-

[q] Heb. vi. 1, 2.

tration, and expressed by the ritual part of it, "imposition of hands," is reckoned a fundamental point, θεμέλιος ἐπιθέσεως χειρῶν· "Not laying again the foundation of repentance from dead works, and of faith towards God, of the doctrine of baptisms, and of laying on of hands, of resurrection from the dead, and eternal judgment." Here are six fundamental points of St. Paul's catechism, which he laid as the foundation or the beginning of the institution of the Christian church; and amongst these, imposition of hands is reckoned as a part of the foundation, and therefore they who deny it, dig up foundations. Now that this "imposition of hands" is that, which the apostles used in confirming the baptized, and invocating the Holy Ghost upon them, remains to be proved.

For it is true that imposition of hands signifies all Christian rites except baptism and the Lord's supper; not the sacraments, but all the sacramentals of the church: it signifies confirmation, ordination, absolution, visitation of the sick, blessing single persons (as Christ did the children brought to him), and blessing marriages; all these were usually ministered by imposition of hands. Now the three last are not pretended to be any part of this foundation; neither reason, authority, nor the nature of the thing, suffers any such pretension: the question then is between the first three.

First, 'Absolution of penitents' cannot be meant here, not only because we never read that the apostles did use that ceremony in their absolutions; but because the Apostle, speaking of the foundation in which baptism is, and is reckoned one of the principal parts in the foundation, there needed no absolution but baptismal, for they and we believing "one baptism for the remission of sins [r]," this is all the absolution that can be at first and in the foundation. The other was "secunda post naufragium tabula," it came in after, when men had made a shipwreck of their good conscience, and were, as St. Peter says, λήθην λαβόντες τοῦ καθαρισμοῦ τῶν πάλαι αὐτῶν ἁμαρτιῶν, "forgetful of the former cleansing and purification and washing of their old sins [s]."

Secondly, It cannot be meant of 'ordination;' and this is also evident. 1. Because the Apostle says he would thenceforth leave to speak of the foundation, and 'go on to

[r] Symbol. Nicæn. et Constantinop. [s] 2 Pet. i. 9.

perfection,' that is, to higher mysteries. Now in rituals, of which he speaks, there is none higher than ordination. 2. The Apostle saying he would speak no more of imposition of hands, goes presently to discourse of the mysteriousness of the evangelical priesthood, and the honour of that vocation; by which it is evident he spake nothing of ordination in the catechism or narrative of fundamentals. 3. This also appears from the context, not only because 'laying on of hands' is immediately set after 'baptism,' but also because in the very next words of his discourse he does enumerate and apportion to baptism and confirmation their proper and proportioned effects: to baptism, illumination, according to the perpetual style of the church of God, calling baptism φωτισμὸν, 'an enlightening;' and to confirmation he reckons 'tasting the heavenly gift,' and 'being made partakers of the Holy Ghost,' by the thing signified declaring the sign, and by the mystery the rite. Upon these words St. Chrysostom discoursing, says, "that all these are fundamental articles; that is, that we ought to repent from dead works, to be baptized into the faith of Christ, and be made worthy of the gift of the Spirit, who is given by imposition of hands, and we are to be taught the mysteries of the resurrection and eternal judgment. This catechism (says he) is perfect: so that if any man have faith in God, and being baptized is also confirmed, and so tastes the heavenly gift, and partakes of the Holy Ghost, and by hope of the resurrection tastes of the good things of the world to come,—if he falls away from this state, and turns apostate from this whole dispensation, digging down and turning up these foundations, he shall never be built again, he can never be baptized again, and never be confirmed any more; God will not begin again, and go over with him again, he cannot be made a Christian twice: if he remains upon these foundations, though he sins, he may be renewed διὰ μετάνοιαν, 'by repentance,' and by a resuscitation of the Spirit, if he have not wholly quenched him; but if he renounce the whole covenant, disown and cancel these foundations, he is desperate, he can never be renewed εἰς μετάνοιαν, to the title and economy of repentance." This is the full explication of this excellent place, and any other ways it cannot reasonably be explicated: but therefore into this place any notice of

ordination cannot come, no sense, no mystery, can be made of it or drawn from it; but by the interposition of confirmation the whole context is clear, rational, and intelligible.

This then is that imposition of hands, of which the Apostle speaks. "Unus hic locus abunde testatur," &c. saith Calvin: "This one place doth abundantly witness that the original of this rite or ceremony was from the apostles:" *οὕτω γὰρ τὸ πνεῦμα ἐλάμβανον*, saith St. Chrysostom[t]; "for by this rite of imposition of hands they received the Holy Ghost."—For though the Spirit of God was given extraregularly, and at all times, as God was pleased to do great things; yet this imposition of hands was *διακονία πνεύματος*, this was "the ministry of the Spirit." For so we receive Christ, when we hear and obey his word: we eat Christ by faith, and we live by his Spirit; and yet the blessed eucharist is *διακονία σώματος καὶ αἵματος*, "the ministry of the body and blood of Christ." Now as the Lord's supper is appointed ritually to convey Christ's body and blood to us; so is confirmation ordained ritually to give unto us the Spirit of God. And though, by accident and by the overflowings of the Spirit, it may come to pass, that a man does receive perfective graces alone, and without ministries external: yet such a man without a miracle is not a perfect Christian 'ex statuum vitæ dispositione;' but in the ordinary ways and appointment of God, and until he receive this imposition of hands, and be confirmed, is to be accounted an imperfect Christian. But of this afterward.

I shall observe one thing more out of this testimony of St. Paul. He calls it "the doctrine of baptisms and laying on of hands:" by which it does not only appear to be a lasting ministry, because no part of the Christian doctrine could change or be abolished; but hence also it appears to be of divine institution. For if it were not, St. Paul had been guilty of that which our blessed Saviour reproves in the Scribes and Pharisees, and should have "taught for doctrines the commandments of men." Which because it cannot be supposed, it must follow, that this doctrine of confirmation or imposition of hands is apostolical and divine. The argument is clear, and not easy to be reproved.

[t] In hunc locum.

SECTION II.

The Rite of Confirmation is a perpetual and never-ceasing Ministry.

YEA, but what is this to us? It belonged to the days of wonder and extraordinary: the Holy Ghost breathed upon the apostles and apostolical men; but then he breathed his last: "recedente gratiâ, recessit disciplina;" when the grace departed, we had no further use of the ceremony. In answer to this I shall ψιλαῖς ἐπινοίαις, by divers particulars evince plainly, that this ministry of confirmation was not temporary and relative only to the acts of the apostles, but was to descend to the church for ever. This indeed is done already in the preceding section; in which it is clearly manifested, that Christ himself[u] made the baptism of the Spirit to be necessary to the church. He declared the fruits of this baptism, and did particularly relate it to the descent of the Holy Spirit upon the church at and after that glorious Pentecost. He sanctified it, and commended it by his example; just as in order to baptism he sanctified the flood Jordan, and all other waters, to the mystical washing away of sin, viz. by his great example, and fufilling this righteousness also. This doctrine the apostles first found in their own persons and experience, and practised to all their converts after baptism by a solemn and external rite; and all this passed into an evangelical doctrine, the whole mystery being signified by the external rite in the words of the Apostle, as before it was by Christ expressing only the internal; so that there needs no more strength to this argument. But that there may be wanting no moments to this truth, which the Holy Scripture affords, I shall add more weight to it: and,

1. The perpetuity of this holy rite appears, because this great gift of the Holy Ghost was promised "to abide with the church for ever." And when the Jews heard the apostles speak with tongues at the first and miraculous descent of the Spirit in Pentecost, to take off the strangeness of the wonder and the envy of the power, St. Peter[x] at that very time tells them plainly, "Repent and be baptized every one

[u] John, iii. 5. [x] Acts, ii. 38, 39.

of you,—and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost:" ἕκαστος ὑμῶν· not the meanest person amongst you all but shall receive this great thing which ye observe us to have received; and not only you, but your children too; not your children of this generation only, "sed nati natorum, et qui nascentur ab illis," but your children for ever: "for the promise is to you, and to your children, and to all that are afar off, even to as many as the Lord our God shall call." Now then let it be considered,

1. This gift is by promise; by a promise not made to the apostles alone, but to all; to all for ever.

2. Consider here at the very first as there is a 'verbum,' 'a word' of promise, so there is 'sacramentum' too (I use the word, as I have already premonished, in a large sense only, and according to the style of the primitive church): it is a rite partly moral, partly ceremonial; the first is prayer, and the other is laying on of the hands: and to an effect that is but transient and extraordinary, and of a little abode, it is not easy to be supposed that such a solemnity should be appointed. I say, 'such a solemnity;' that is, it is not imaginable that a solemn rite annexed to a perpetual promise should be transient and temporary, for by the nature of relatives they must be of equal abode. The promise is of a thing for ever; the ceremony or rite was annexed to the promise, and therefore this also must be for ever.

3. This is attested by St. Paul, who reduces this argument to this mystery, saying, "In whom after that ye believed, 'signati estis Spiritu Sancto promissionis,' 'ye were sealed by that Holy Spirit of promise.'" He spake it to the Ephesians[y], who well understood his meaning by remembering what was done to themselves by the apostles but awhile before[z], who, after they had baptized them, did lay their hands upon them, and so they were sealed, and so they received the Holy Spirit of promise; for here the very matter of fact is the clearest commentary on St. Paul's words: the Spirit which was promised to all Christians, they then received, when they were consigned, or had the ritual seal of confirmation by imposition of hands. One thing I shall remark here, and that is, that this and some other words of Scripture relating to the sacraments or other rituals of religion, do principally

[y] Ephes. i. 13. [z] Acts, xix. 6.

mean the internal grace, and our consignation is by a secret power, and the work is within; but it does not therefore follow, that the external rite is not also intended: for the rite is so wholly for the mystery, and the outward for the inward, and yet by the outward God so usually and regularly gives the inward, that as no man is to rely upon the external ministry, as if the 'opus operatum' would do the whole duty; so no man is to neglect the external, because the internal is the more principal. The mistake in this particular hath caused great contempt of the sacraments and rituals of the church, and is the ground of the Socinian errors in these questions.

But, 4. What hinders any man from a quick consent at the first representation of these plain reasonings and authorities? Is it because there were extraordinary effects accompanying this ministration, and because now there are not, that we will suppose the whole economy must cease? If this be it, and indeed this is all that can be supposed in opposition to it, it is infinitely vain.

1. Because these extraordinary effects did continue even after the death of all the apostles. St. Irenæus [a] says they did continue even to his time, even the greatest instance of miraculous power: "Et in fraternitate, sæpissime propter aliquid necessarium, eâ quæ est in quoquo loco, universâ ecclesiâ postulante per jejunium et supplicationem multam, reversus est spiritus," &c. When God saw it necessary, and the church prayed and fasted much, they did miraculous things, even of reducing the spirit to a dead man.

2. In the days of the apostles the Holy Spirit did produce miraculous effects, but neither always, nor at all, in all men: "Are all workers of miracles? do all speak with tongues? do all interpret? can all heal [b]?" No, "the Spirit bloweth where he listeth," and as he listeth; he gives gifts to all, but to some after this manner, and to some after that.

These gifts were not necessary at all times any more than to all persons; but the promise did belong to all, and was made to all, and was performed to all. In the days of the apostles there was an effusion of the Spirit of God, it ran over, it was for themselves and others, it wet the very ground they trod upon, and made it fruitful; but it was not to all in like manner, but there was also then, and since

[a] Lib. 2, cap. 57. [b] 1 Cor. xii. 29.

then, a diffusion of the Spirit, 'tanquam in pleno.' St. Stephen was full of the Holy Ghost, "he was full of faith and power[c]:" the Holy Ghost was given to him to fulfil his faith principally; the working miracles was but collateral and incident. But there is also an infusion of the Holy Ghost, and that is to all, and that is for ever: "the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal," saith the Apostle[d]. And therefore if the grace be given to all, there is no reason that the ritual ministration of that grace should cease, upon pretence that the Spirit is not given extraordinarily.

4. These extraordinary gifts were indeed at first necessary: "In the beginnings always appear the sensible visions of spiritual things for their sakes, who cannot receive the understanding of an incorporeal nature; that if afterward they be not so done, they may be believed by those things which were already done," said St. Chrysostom[e] in the place before quoted; that is, these visible appearances were given at first by reason of the imperfection of the state of the church, but the greater gifts were to abide for ever: and therefore it is observable that St. Paul says that the gift of tongues is one of the least and most useless things; a mere sign, and not so much as a sign to believers, but to infidels and unbelievers; and before this he greatly prefers the gift of prophesying or preaching, which yet, all Christians know, does abide with the church for ever.

To every ordinary and perpetual ministry at first there were extraordinary effects and miraculous consignations. We find great parts of nations converted at one sermon. Three thousand converts came in at one preaching of St. Peter, and five thousand at another sermon: and persons were miraculously cured by the prayer of the bishop in his visitation of a sick Christian; and devils cast out in the conversion of a sinner; and blindness cured at the baptism of St. Paul; and Æneas was healed of a palsy at the same time he was cured of his infidelity; and Eutychus was restored to life at the preaching of St. Paul. And yet that now we see no such extraordinaries, it follows not that the visitation of the sick, and preaching sermons, and absolving penitents, are not ordinary and perpetual ministrations: and therefore to

[c] Acts, vi. 8. [d] 1 Cor. xii. 7. [e] In Matthæum.

fancy that invocation of the Holy Spirit and imposition of hands is to cease when the extraordinary and temporary contingencies of it are gone, is too trifling a fancy to be put in balance against so sacred an institution relying upon so many scriptures.

6. With this objection some vain persons would have troubled the church in St. Austin's time; but he considered it with much indignation, writing against the Donatists. His words are these[f]: "At the first times the Holy Spirit fell upon the believers, and they spake with tongues which they had not learned, according as the Spirit gave them utterance. They were signs fitted for the season; for so the Holy Ghost ought to have signified in all tongues, because the Gospel of God was to run through all the nations and languages of the world; so it was signified, and so it passed through. But is it therefore expected that they upon whom there is imposition of hands that they might receive the Holy Ghost, that they should speak with tongues? Or when we lay hands on infants, does every one of you attend to hear them speak with tongues? And when he sees that they do not speak with tongues, is any of you of so perverse a heart as to say, they have not received the Holy Ghost; for if they had received him, they would speak with tongues, as it was done at first? But if by these miracles there is not now given any testimony of the presence of the Holy Spirit, how doth any one know that he hath received the Holy Ghost? 'Interroget cor suum, Si diliget fratrem, manet Spiritus Dei in illo.'" It is true, the gift of tongues doth not remain, but all the greater gifts of the Holy Spirit remain with the church for ever; sanctification and power, fortitude and hope, faith and love. Let every man search his heart, and see if he belongs to God; whether the 'love of God be not spread in his heart by the Spirit of God:' let him see if he be not patient in troubles, comforted in his afflictions, bold to confess the faith of Christ crucified, zealous of good works. These are the miracles of grace, and the mighty powers of the Spirit, according to that saying of Christ[g], "These signs shall follow them that believe: in my name shall they cast out devils, they shall speak with new tongues, they shall tread on ser-

[f] Tract. 6. in Canonicam Joan. circa med. et lib. 3. contr. Donatist. c. 6.
[g] Mark, xvi. 17.

pents, they shall drink poison, and it shall not hurt them; and they shall lay their hands on the sick, and they shall recover." That which we call the miraculous part, is the less power; but to cast out the devil of lust, to throw down the pride of Lucifer, to tread on the great dragon, and to triumph over our spiritual enemies, to cure a diseased soul, to be unharmed by the poison of temptation, of evil examples and evil company: these are the true signs that shall follow them, that truly and rightly believe on the name of the Lord Jesus; this is 'to live in the Spirit,' and 'to walk in the Spirit;' this is more than to receive the Spirit to a power of miracles and supernatural products in a natural matter: for this is from a supernatural principle to receive supernatural aids to a supernatural end in the diviner spirit of a man; and this being more miraculous than the other, it ought not to be pretended that the discontinuance of extraordinary miracles should cause the discontinuance of an ordinary ministration; and this is that which I was to prove.

7. To which it is not amiss to add this observation, that Simon Magus offered to buy this power of the apostles, that he also, by laying on of hands, might thus minister the Spirit. Now he began this sin in the Christian church, and it is too frequent at this day; but if all this power be gone, then nothing of that sin can remain; if the subject-matter be removed, then the appendant crime cannot abide, and there can be no simony, so much as by participation; and whatever is or can be done in this kind, is no more of this crime than drunkenness is of adultery; it relates to it, or may be introductive of it, or be something like it. But certainly since the church is not so happy as to be entirely free from the crime of simony, it will be hard to say that the power (the buying of which was the principle of this sin, and therefore the rule of all the rest) should be removed, and the house stand without a foundation, the relative without the correspondent, the accessary without the principal, and the accident without the subject. This is impossible, and therefore it remains that still there abides in the church this power, that, by imposition of hands of fit persons, the Holy Ghost is ministered. But this will be further cleared in the next section.

SECTION III.

The holy Rite of Imposition of Hands for the giving the Holy Spirit, or Confirmation, was actually continued and practised by all the succeeding Ages of the purest and primitive Church.

NEXT to the plain words of Scripture, the traditive interpretation and practice of the church of God is the best argument in the world for rituals and mystical ministrations; for the tradition is universal, and all the way acknowledged to be derived from Scripture. And although in rituals, the tradition itself, if it be universal and primitive, as this is, were alone sufficient, and is so esteemed in the baptism of infants, in the priests' consecrating the holy eucharist, in public liturgies, in absolution of penitents, the Lord's day, communicating of women, and the like; yet this rite of confirmation being all that, and evidently derived from the practice apostolical, and so often recorded in the New Testament, both in the ritual and mysterious part, both in the ceremony and spiritual effect, is a point of as great certainty as it is of usefulness and holy designation.

Theophilus Antiochenus lived not long after the death of St. John[h], and he derives the name of Christian, which was first given to the disciples in his city, from this chrism or spiritual unction, this confirmation of baptized persons; Ἡμεῖς τούτου εἵνεκεν καλούμεθα Χριστιανοὶ, ὅτι χριόμεθα ἐλαίῳ Θεοῦ, "We are therefore called Christians, because we are anointed with the unction of God." These words will be best understood by the subsequent testimonies, by which it will appear that confirmation (for reasons hereafter mentioned) was for many ages called chrism or unction. But he adds the usefulness of it: "For who is there that enters into the world, or that enters into contention or athletic combats, but is anointed with oil?" By which words he intimates the unction anciently used in baptism, and in confirmation both: for in the first, we have our new birth; in the second, we are prepared for spiritual combat.

Tertullian[i] having spoken of the rites of baptism, proceeds; "Dehinc" (saith he) "manus imponitur, per bene-

[h] A. D. 170. [i] A. D. 200.

dictionem advocans et invitans Spiritum Sanctum. Tunc ille Sanctissimus Spiritus super emundata et benedicta corpora libens à Patre descendit [k]:" "After baptism the hand is imposed, by blessing, calling, and inviting, the Holy Spirit. Then that most Holy Spirit willingly descends from the Father upon the bodies that are cleansed and blessed;" that is, first baptized, then confirmed. And again [l]; "Caro signatur, ut anima muniatur. Caro manûs impositione adumbratur, ut anima Spiritu illuminetur:" "The flesh is consigned, or sealed" (that also is one of the known primitive words for confirmation), "that the soul may be guarded or defended: and the body is overshadowed by the imposition of hands, that the soul may be enlightened by the Holy Ghost." Nay, further yet, if any man objects that baptism is sufficient, he answers [m], "It is true, it is sufficient to them that are to die presently; but it is not enough for them that are still to live and to fight against their spiritual enemies. For in baptism we do not receive the Holy Ghost" (for although the apostles had been baptized, yet the Holy Ghost was come upon none of them until Jesus was glorified); "sed in aqua emundati, sub angelo Spiritui Sancto præparamur;" "but being cleansed by baptismal water, we are disposed for the Holy Spirit, under the hand of the angel of the church," under the bishop's hand. And a little after he expostulates the article: "Non licebit Deo in suo organo per manus sanctas sublimitatem modulari spiritualem?" "Is it not lawful for God, by an instrument of his own, under holy hands to accord the heights and sublimity of the Spirit?" for indeed this is the divine order: and therefore Tertullian reckoning the happiness and excellency of the church of Rome at that time, says [n], "She believes in God, she signs with water, she clothes with the Spirit" (viz. in confirmation), "she feeds with the eucharist, she exhorts to martyrdom; and against this order or institution she receives no man."

St. Cyprian [o], in his epistle [p] to Jubaianus, having urged that of the apostles going to Samaria to impose hands on those whom St. Philip had baptized, adds, "quod nunc quoque apud nos geritur, ut qui in ecclesiam baptizantur, per

[k] De Baptismo, c. 6.
[l] De Resur. Carn. cap. 8.
[m] Ubi suprà de Bapt.
[n] De Præscript. cap. 36.
[o] A. D. 250.
[p] Epist. 73.

præpositos ecclesiæ offerantur, et per nostram orationem ac manûs impositionem Spiritum Sanctum consequantur, et signaculo Dominico consummentur:" "which custom is also descended to us, that they who are baptized might be brought by the rulers of the church, and by our prayer and the imposition of hands (said the martyr bishop) may obtain the Holy Ghost, and be consummated with the Lord's signature." And again[q]: "Ungi necesse est eum qui baptizatus est," &c. "Et super eos qui in ecclesiam baptizati erant, et ecclesiasticum et legitimum baptismum consecuti fuerant, oratione pro iis habitâ, et manu impositâ, invocaretur et infunderetur Spiritus Sanctus:" "It is necessary that every one who is baptized, should receive the unction, that he may be Christ's anointed one, and may have in him the grace of Christ. They who have received lawful and ecclesiastical baptism, it is not necessary they should be baptized again; but that which is wanting must be supplied, viz. that prayer being made for them, and hands imposed, the Holy Ghost being invocated and poured upon them."

St. Clement[r] of Alexandria, a man of venerable antiquity and admirable learning, tells[s] that a certain young man was by St. John delivered to the care of a bishop, who having baptized him, "postea verò sigillo Domini, tanquam[t] perfectâ tutâque ejus custodiâ, eum obsignavit;" "afterward sealed him with the Lord's signature" (the church-word for confirmation) "as with a safe and perfect guard."

Origen[u] in his seventh homily of Ezekiel, expounding certain mystical words of the prophet, saith, "Oleum est quo vir sanctus ungitur, oleum Christi, oleum sanctæ doctrinæ. Cùm ergò aliquis accepit hoc oleum quo ungitur sanctus, id est, Scripturam Sanctam instituentem quomodo oporteat baptizari, in nomine Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, et pauca commutans unxerit quempiam, et quodammodo dixerit, Jam non es catechumenus, consecutus es lavacrum secundæ generationis; talis homo accipit oleum Dei," &c. "The unction of Christ, of holy doctrine, is the oil by which the holy man is anointed, having been instructed in the Scriptures, and taught how to be baptized; then changing a few things he says to him, Now you are no longer a catechumen, now you are regenerated in bap-

[q] Epist. 70. 73. [r] A. D. 200. [s] Apud Euseb. lib. 3. c. 17.
[t] Τὸ τέλειον φυλακτήριον. [u] A. D. 210.

tism: such a man receives the unction of God," viz. he then is to be confirmed.

St. Dionysius, commonly called the Areopagite, in his excellent book of Ecclesiastical Hierarchy [x], speaks most fully of the holy rite of confirmation or chrism. Having described at large the office and manner of baptizing the catechumens, the trine immersion, the vesting them in white garments, he adds, "Then they bring them again to the bishop, and he consigns him" (who had been so baptized) θεουργικωτάτῳ μύρῳ, "with the most divinely-operating unction," and then gives himthe most holy eucharist. And afterward he says [y], "But even to him who is consecrated in the most holy mystery of regeneration, τοῦ μύρου τελειωτικὴ χρίσις, the perfective unction of chrism gives to him the advent of the Holy Spirit." And this rite of confirmation, then called chrism, from the spiritual unction then effected, and consigned also and signified by the ceremony of anointing externally, which was then the ceremony of the church, he calls it τὴν ἱερὰν τῆς θεογενεσίας τελείωσιν, "the holy consummation of our baptismal regeneration;" meaning, that without this, there is something wanting to the baptized persons.

And this appears fully in that famous censure of Novatus [z] by Cornelius bishop of Rome, reported by [a] Eusebius. Novatus had been baptized in his bed, being very sick and like to die: "but when he recovered, he did not receive those other things, which by the rule of the church he ought to have received; 'neque Domini sigillo ab episcopo consignatus est,' 'he was not consigned with the Lord's signature by the hands of the bishop,' he was not confirmed: 'quo non impetrato, quomodo Spiritum Sanctum obtinuisse putandus est?' 'which having not obtained, how can he be supposed to have received the Holy Spirit?'" The same also is something more fully related by Nicephorus [b], but wholly to the same purpose.

Melchiades [c], in his epistle to the bishops of Spain, argues excellently about the necessity and usefulness of the holy rite of confirmation. "What does the mystery of confirmation profit me after the mystery of baptism? Certainly

[x] De Eccles. Hier. c. 2.
[y] Et cap. 4.
[z] A. D. 260.
[a] Lib. 6. Hist. Eccles. c. 43.
[b] Lib. 6. cap. 3.
[c] A. D. 320.

we did not receive all in our baptism, if, after that lavatory, we want something of another kind. Let your charity attend. As the military order requires that when the general enters a soldier into his list, he does not only mark him, but furnishes him with arms for the battle: so in him that is baptized, this blessing is his ammunition. You have given (Christ) a soldier, give him also weapons. And what will it profit him, if a father gives a great estate to his son, if he does not take care to provide a tutor for him? Therefore the Holy Spirit is the guardian of our regeneration in Christ, he is the comforter, and he is the defender."

I have already[d] alleged the plain testimonies of Optatus and St. Cyril in the first section. I add to them the words of St. Gregory Nazianzen[e] speaking of confirmation or the Christian signature; "Hoc et vivénti tibi maximum est tutamentum: ovis enim quæ sigillo insignita est, non facilè patet insidiis; quæ verò signata non est, facilè à furibus capitur:" "This signature is your greatest guard while you live; For a sheep, when it is marked with the master's sign, is not so soon stolen by thieves; but easily, if she be not."—The same manner of speaking is also used by St. Basil, who was himself together with Eubulus confirmed by Bishop Maximinus: "Quomodo curam geret tanquam ad se pertinentis angelus? Quomodo eripiat ex hostibus, si non agnoverit signaculum?" "How shall the angel know what sheep belong unto his charge? How shall he snatch them from the enemy, if he does not see their mark and signature?"—Theodoret[f] also and Theophylact speak the like words: and, so far as I can perceive, these and the like sayings are most made use of by the schoolmen to be their warranty for an indelible character imprinted in confirmation. I do not interest myself in the question, but only recite the doctrine of these fathers in behalf of the practice and usefulness of confirmation.

I shall not need to transcribe hither those clear testimonies, which are cited from the epistles of St. Clement, Urban the First, Fabianus, and Cornelius; the sum of them is in those plainest words of Urban the First: "Omnes fideles per manûs impositionem episcoporum, Spiritum Sanctum

[d] A. D. 370. [e] Adhort. ad S. Lavacrum.
[f] In cap. 1. ad Ephes.

post baptismum accipere debent;" "All faithful people ought to receive the Holy Spirit by imposition of the bishop's hands after baptism." Much more to the same purpose is to be read, collected by Gratian "de Consecrat. dist. 4. Presbyt. et de Consecrat. dist. 5. Omnes Fideles, et ibid. Spiritus Sanctus."

St. Jerome[m] brings in a Luciferian asking, 'why he that is baptized in the church, does not receive the Holy Ghost, but by imposition of the bishop's hands?' The answer is, "Hanc observationem ex Scripturæ auctoritate ad sacerdotii honorem descendere," "This observation for the honour of the priesthood did descend from the authority of the Scriptures;" adding withal, "it was for the prevention of schisms, and that the safety of the church did depend upon it. 'Exigis ubi scriptum est?' 'If you ask where it is written,' it is answered, 'In Actis Apostolorum,' 'It is written in the Acts of the Apostles.' But if there were no authority of Scripture for it, 'totius orbis in hanc partem consensus instar præcepti obtineret,' 'the consent of the whole Christian world in this article ought to prevail as a commandment.'" But here is a twofold cord, Scripture and universal tradition; or rather Scripture expounded by a universal traditive interpretation. The same observation is made from Scripture by St. Chrysostom[n]: the words are very like those now recited from St. Jerome's Dialogue, and therefore need not to be repeated.

St. Ambrose[o] calls confirmation "spirituale signaculum quod post fontem superest, ut perfectio fiat," "a spiritual seal remaining after baptism, that perfection be had."—Œcumenius calls it τελειότητα, 'perfection.'—"Lavacro peccata purgantur, chrismate Spiritus Sanctus superfunditur; utraque verò ista manu et ore antistitis impetramus," said Pacianus[p] bishop of Barcinona: "In baptism our sins are cleansed, in confirmation the Holy Spirit is poured upon us; and both these we obtain by the hands and mouth of the bishop." And again: "Vestræ plebi unde Spiritus, quam non consignat unctus sacerdos[q]?" The same with that of Cornelius in the case of Novatus before cited.

[m] Dial. adv. Lucifer.
[n] Homil. 18. in Act.
[o] Lib. 3. de Sacram. c. 2.
[p] In Heb. vi.
[q] Lib. 3. contr. Novat.

I shall add no more, lest I overset the article, and make it suspicious by too laborious a defence: only after these numerous testimonies of the fathers, I think it may be useful to represent, that this holy rite of confirmation hath been decreed by many councils.

The council[r] of Eliberis, celebrated in the time of Pope Sylvester the First, decreed, that whosoever is baptized in his sickness, if he recover, "ad episcopum eum perducat, ut per manûs impositionem perfici possit;" "let him be brought to the bishop, that he may be perfected by the imposition of hands." To the same purpose is the seventy-seventh canon: "Episcopus eos per benedictionem perficere debebit," "The bishop must perfect those, whom the minister baptized by his benediction."

The council of Laodicea[s] decreed ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς φωτιζομένους κατὰ τὸ βάπτισμα χρίεσθαι χρίσματι ἐπουρανίῳ, καὶ μετόχους εἶναι τῆς βασιλείας τοῦ Χριστοῦ· "all that are baptized, must be anointed with the celestial unction, and (so) be partakers of the kingdom of Christ." All that are so, that is, are confirmed; for this celestial unction is done by holy prayers and the invocation of the Holy Spirit: so Zonaras upon this canon: all such who have this unction shall reign with Christ, unless by their wickedness they preclude their own possessions. This canon was put into the code of the Catholic church, and makes the one hundred and fifty-second canon.

The council of Orleans affirms expressly, that he who is baptized, cannot be a Christian (meaning according to the usual style of the church, a full and perfect Christian), "nisi confirmatione episcopali fuerit chrismatus," "unless he have the unction of episcopal confirmation[t]."

But when the church had long disputed concerning the rebaptizing of heretics, and made canons for and against it, according as the heresies were, and all agreed that if the first baptism had been once good, it could never be repeated; yet they thought it fit that such persons should be confirmed by the bishop, all supposing confirmation to be the perfection and consummation of the less perfect baptism. Thus the first council of Arles[u] decreed concerning the Arians, that if they had been baptized in the name of the Father,

[r] Can. 38. [s] Can. eod.
[t] Habetur apud Gratian. de Consecrat. dist. 5. cap. Jejun. [u] Cap. 8.

Son, and Holy Ghost, they should not be rebaptized. "Manus tantùm eis imponatur, ut accipiant Spiritum Sanctum;" that is, "Let them be confirmed, let there be imposition of hands, that they may receive the Holy Ghost." The same is decreed by the second council of Arles[x] in the case of the Bonasiaci. But I also find it in a greater record, in the general council[y] of Constantinople; where heretics are commanded upon their conversion to be received, "secundûm constitutum officium;" there was 'an office appointed' for it; and it is in the Greek Euchologion, 'sigillatos, primò scilicet unctos unguento chrismatis,' &c. "et signantes eos dicimus, sigillum doni Spiritus Sancti." It is the form of confirmation used to this day in the Greek church.

So many fathers testifying the practice of the church, and teaching this doctrine, and so many more fathers as were assembled in six councils, all giving witness to this holy rite, and that in pursuance also of Scripture, are too great a cloud of witnesses to be despised by any man that calls himself a Christian.

SECTION IV.

The Bishops were always and the only Ministers of Confirmation.

Saint Chrysostom[z] asking the reason why the Samaritans, who were baptized by Philip, could not from him and by his ministry receive the Holy Ghost, answers, 'Perhaps this was done for the honour of the apostles,' to distinguish the supereminent dignity which they bore in the church from all inferior ministrations: but this answer not satisfying, he adds, "Hoc donum non habebat, erat enim ex septem illis, id quod magis videtur dicendum. Unde, meâ sententiâ, hic Philippus unus ex septem erat, secundus à Stephano; ideo et baptizans Spiritum Sanctum non dabat, neque enim facultatem habebat, hoc enim donum solorum apostolorum erat:" "This gift they had not, who baptized the Samaritans, which thing is rather to be said than the other: for Philip was one

[x] Can. 17. [y] Can. 7. [z] Homil. 18. in Acta.

of the seven, and in my opinion next to St. Stephen; therefore though he baptized, yet he gave not the Holy Ghost; for he had no power so to do, for this gift was proper only to the apostles." "Nam virtutem quidem acceperant (diaconi) faciendi signa, non autem dandi aliis Spiritum Sanctum; igitur hoc erat in apostolis singulare, unde et præcipuos, et non alios, videmus hoc facere." "The ministers that baptized had a power of doing signs and working miracles, but not of giving the Holy Spirit; therefore this gift was peculiar to the apostles, whence it comes to pass that we see the [a] chiefs in the church, and no other, to do this."

St. Dionysius says [b], Χρεία τοῦ ἀρχιερέως ἔσται, "There is need of a bishop to confirm the baptized," αὐτὴ γὰρ ἦν ἡ ἀρχαία συνήθεια, "for this was the ancient custom of the church:" and 'this was wont to be done by the bishops, for conservation of unity in the church of Christ,' said St. Ambrose [c]; "a solis episcopis," "by bishops only," said St. Austin;—for "the bishops succeeded in the place and ordinary office of the apostles," said St. Jerome. And therefore in his dialogue against the Luciferians it is said "that this observation for the honour of the priesthood did descend, that the bishops only might by imposition of hands confer the Holy Ghost; that it comes from Scripture, that it is written in the Acts of the Apostles, that it is done for the prevention of schisms; that the safety of the church depends upon it."

But the words of Pope Innocentius I. in his first epistle and third chapter, and published in the first tome of the councils, are very full to this particular. "De consignandis infantibus, manifestum est non ab alio quàm ab episcopo fieri licere: nam presbyteri, licèt sint sacerdotes, pontificatûs tamen apicem non habent: hæc autem pontificibus solis deberi, ut vel consignent, vel Paracletum Spiritum tradant, non solùm consuetudo ecclesiastica demonstrat, verùm et illa lectio Actuum Apostolorum, quæ asserit Petrum et Johannem esse directos, qui jam baptizatis traderent Spiritum Sanctum:" "Concerning confirmation of infants, it is manifest, it is not lawful to be done by any other than by the bishop; for although the presbyters be priests, yet they have not the summity of episcopacy: but that these things are only due to bishops, is not only demonstrated by the custom

[a] Τοὺς κορυφαίους. [b] Cap. 5. Eccles. Hier. [c] In Heb. vi. q. 44. in N. T.

of the church, but by that of the Acts of the Apostles, where Peter and John were sent to minister the Holy Ghost to them that were baptized."—Optatus [d] proves Macarius to be no bishop, because he was not conversant in the episcopal office, and imposed hands on none that were baptized. "Hoc unum à majoribus fit, id est, à summis pontificibus, quod à minoribus perfici non potest," said P. Melchiades [e]: "This (of confirmation) is only done by the greater ministers, that is, by the bishops, and cannot be done by the lesser."—This was the constant practice and doctrine of the primitive church, and derived from the practice and tradition of the apostles [f] and recorded in their Acts written by St. Luke. For this is our great rule in this case, what they did in rituals and consigned to posterity is our example and our warranty: we see it done thus, and by these men, and by no others, and no otherwise, and we have no other authority, and we have no reason to go another way. The ἄνδρες ἡγούμενοι in St. Luke, the κορυφαῖοι in St. Chrysostom, the πρόεδρος in Philo, and the πρεσβύτατος, 'the chief governor' in ecclesiasticals, his office is τὰ μὴ γνώριμα ἐν τοῖς βίβλοις ἀναδιδάσκειν, "to teach such things as are not set down in books;" their practice is a sermon, their example in these things must be our rule, or else we must walk irregularly, and have no rule but chance and humour, empire and usurpation; and therefore much rather, when it is recorded in holy writ, must this observation be esteemed sacred and inviolable.

But how if a bishop be not to be had, or not ready? St. Ambrose [g] is pretended to have answered, "Apud Ægyptum presbyteri consignant, si præsens non sit episcopus," "A presbyter may consign, if the bishop be not present;" and Amalarius [h] affirms, "Sylvestrum Papam, prævidentem quantum periculosum iter arriperet qui sine confirmatione maneret, quantum potuit subvenisse, et propter absentiam episcoporum, necessitate addidisse, ut à presbytero ungeretur," "that Pope Sylvester, foreseeing how dangerous a journey

[d] Contr. Parmen. lib. 7.

[e] Epist. ad Episc. Hispan.

[f] Voluit Deus dona illa admiranda non contingere baptizatis nisi per manus apostolorum, ut auctoritatem testibus suis conciliaret quàm maximam; quod ipsum simul ad retinendam ecclesiæ unitatem pertinebat: Grotius.—Videtur ergò fuisse peculiare apostolorum munus dare Spiritum Sanctum: Isidor.—Clarius in 8. Actuum Apostolorum.

[g] In Eph. iv.

[h] De Offic. Eccles. cap. 27.

he takes who abides without confirmation, brought remedy as far as he could, and commanded that in the absence of bishops they should be anointed by the priest:" and therefore it is by some supposed that "factum valet, fieri non debuit," "the thing ought not to be done but in the proper and appointed way;" but when it is done, it is valid; just as in the case of baptism by a layman or woman. Nay, though some canons say it is 'actio irrita,' 'the act is null,' yet for this there is a salvo pretended; for sometimes an action is said to be 'irrita' in law, which yet nevertheless is of secret and permanent value, and ought not to be done again. Thus if a priest be promoted by simony, it is said, "sacerdos non est, sed inaniter tantum dicitur," "he is but vainly called a priest, for he is no priest[i]." So Sixtus II. said, 'that if a bishop ordain in another's diocess, the ordination is void;' and in the law it is said, 'that if a bishop be consecrated without his clergy and the congregation, the consecration is null:' and yet these later and fiercer constitutions do not determine concerning the natural event of things, but of the legal and canonical approbation.

To these things I answer, that St. Ambrose's saying that 'in Egypt, the presbyters consign in the bishops' absence,' does not prove that they ever did confirm or impose hands on the baptized for the ministry of the Holy Spirit; because that very passage being related by St. Austin[k], the more general word of 'consign' is rendered by the plainer and more particular 'consecrant,' 'they consecrate,' meaning the blessed eucharist; which was not permitted primitively to a simple priest to do in the bishop's absence without leave; only in Egypt it seems they had a general leave, and the bishop's absence was an interpretative consent. But besides this, 'consignant' is best interpreted by the practice of the church, of which I shall presently give an account; they might, in the absence of the bishop, consign with oil upon the top of the head, but not in the forehead; much less impose hands, or confirm, or minister the Holy Spirit: for the case was this.

It was very early in the church, that, to represent the

[i] 1 Qu. 1. cap. Qui vult 1. et 2 Epist. 2. de Episc. Ordinante. 1 qu. 2. c. In multis. Clement. de Elect. cap. In plerisque.

[k] Qu. V. et N. T. qu. 101.

grace which was ministered in confirmation, the unction from above, they used oil and balsam; and so constantly used this in their confirmations, that from the ceremony it had the appellation: "sacramentum chrismatis," St. Austin[l] calls it;—ἐν μύρῳ τελείωσις, so Dionysius. Now because at the baptism of the adult Christians, and (by imitation of that) of infants, confirmation and baptism were usually ministered at the same time; the unction was not only used to persons newly baptized, but another unction was added as a ceremony in baptism itself, and was used immediately before baptism; and the oil was put on the top of the head, and three times was the party signed. So it was then, as we find in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy. But besides this unction with oil in baptismal preparations, and pouring oil into the baptismal water, we find another unction after the baptism was finished. For they bring the baptized person "again to the bishop (saith St. Dionysius[m]), who signing the man with hallowed chrism, gives him the holy eucharist." This they called χρίσιν τελειωτικὴν, "the perfective or consummating unction;" this was that which was used when the bishop confirmed the baptized person: "for to him who is initiated by the most holy initiation of the divine generation (that is, to him who hath been baptized, saith Pachimeres, the paraphrast of Dionysius), the perfective unction of chrism gives the gift of the Holy Ghost."—This is that which the Laodicean[n] council calls χρίεσθαι μετὰ τὸ βάπτισμα, "to be anointed after baptism." Both these unctions were intimated by Theophilus Antiochenus: Τίς δὲ ἄνθρωπος εἰσελθὼν εἰς τόνδε τὴν βίον, ἢ τίς ἀθλητῶν, οὐ χρίεται ἐλαίῳ; "Every man that is born into the world, and every man that is a champion, is anointed with oil:" that to baptism, this alluding to confirmation.

Now this chrism was frequently ministered immediately after baptism, in the cities where the bishop was present: but in villages and little towns where the bishop was not present, it could not be; but bishops were forced at their opportunities to go abroad and perfect what was wanting, as it was in the example of Peter and John to the Samaritans. "Non quidem abnuo hanc esse ecclesiarum consuetudinem, ut ad eos qui longè in minoribus urbibus per presbyteros et diaco-

[l] Lib. 2. contr. Liter. Petiliani, c. 104. [m] Eccles. Hier. cap. 2. [n] Can. 48.

nos baptizati sunt, episcopus ad invocationem Sancti Spiritûs manum impositurus excurrat:" "It is the custom of the church, that when persons are in lesser cities baptized by priests and deacons, the bishop uses to travel far, that he may lay hands on them for the invocation of the Holy Spirit[o]." But because this could not always be done, and because many baptized persons died before such an opportunity could be had; the church took up a custom, that the bishop should consecrate the chrism, and send it to the villages and little cities distant from the metropolis, and that the priests should anoint the baptized with it. But still they kept this part of it sacred and peculiar to the bishop: 1. That no chrism should be used but what the bishop consecrated; 2. That the priests should anoint the head of the baptized, but at no hand the forehead, for that was still reserved for the bishop to do when he confirmed them. And this is evident in the epistle of Pope Innocentius the First, above quoted. "Nam presbyteris, seu extra episcopum seu præsente episcopo baptizant, chrismate baptizatos ungere licet; sed quod ab episcopo fuerit consecratum; non tamen frontem ex eodem oleo signare, quod solis debetur episcopis, cùm tradunt Spiritum Paracletum." Now this the bishops did, not only to satisfy the desire of the baptized, but by this ceremony to excite the 'votum confirmationis,' that they who could not actually be confirmed, might at least have it 'in voto' 'in desire,' and in ecclesiastical representation. This, as some think, was first introduced by Pope Sylvester: and this is the consignation which the priests of Egypt used in the absence of the bishop; and this became afterward the practice in other churches.

But this was no part of the holy rite of confirmation, but a ceremony annexed to it ordinarily; from thence transmitted to baptism, first by imitation, afterward by way of supply and in defect of the opportunities of confirmation episcopal. And therefore we find in the first Arausican council[p], in the time of Leo the First and Theodosius junior, it was decreed, "that in baptism every one should receive chrism: 'de eo autem qui in baptismate, quâcunque necessitate faciente, chrismatus non fuerit, in confirmatione sacerdos commonebitur:' 'if the baptized by any intervening

[o] S. Hieron. adv. Lucifer. ante Med. [p] Cap. 1.

accident or necessity was not anointed, the bishop should be advertised of it in confirmation;'" meaning, that then it must be done. For the chrism was but a ceremony annexed, no part of either rite essential to it; but yet they thought it necessary, by reason of some opinions then prevailing in the church. But here the rites themselves are clearly distinguished; and this of confirmation was never permitted to mere presbyters. Innocentius the Third, a great canonist and of great authority, gives a full evidence in this particular: "Per frontis chrismationem manûs impositio designatur, quia per eam Spiritus Sanctus per augmentum datur et robur. Unde cùm cæteras unctiones simplex sacerdos vel presbyter valeat exhibere, hanc non nisi summus sacerdos vel presbyter valeat exhibere, id est, episcopus conferre:" "By anointing of the forehead the imposition of hands is designed, because by that the Holy Ghost is given for increase and strength: therefore when a single priest may give the other unctions, yet this cannot be done but by the chief priest, that is, the bishop."—And therefore to the question, What shall be done if a bishop may not be had? the same Innocentius answers, "It is safer and without danger wholly to omit it, than to have it rashly and without authority ministered by any other; 'cùm umbra quædam ostendatur in opere, veritas autem non subeat in effectu;' 'for it is a mere shadow without truth or real effect,' when any one else does it but the person whom God hath appointed to this ministration." And no approved man of the church did ever say to the contrary, till Richard, primate of Armagh, commenced a new opinion, from whence, Thomas of Walden says, that Wickliffe borrowed his doctrine to trouble the church in this particular.

What the doctrine of the ancient church was in the purest times, I have already, I hope, sufficiently declared; what it was afterward, when the ceremony of chrism was as much remarked as the rite to which it ministered, we find fully declared by Rabanus Maurus[q]: "Signatur baptizatus cum chrismate per sacerdotem in capitis summitate, per Pontificem verò in fronte; ut priori unctione significetur Spiritûs Sancti super ipsum descensio ad habitationem Deo consecrandam; in secunda quoque, ut ejus Spiritûs Sancti septi-

[q] De Instit. Cleric. lib. 1. c. 30.

formis gratia, cum omni plenitudine sanctitatis et scientiæ et virtutis, venire in hominem declaretur: tunc enim ipse Spiritus Sanctus post mundata et benedicta corpora atque animas liberè à Patre descendit, ut unà cum sua visitatione sanctificaret et illustraret; et nunc in hominem ad hoc venit, ut signaculum fidei, quod in fronte suscepit, faciat cum donis cœlestibus repletum, et suâ gratiâ confortatum, intrepidè et audacter coram regibus et potestatibus hujus seculi portare, ac nomen Christi liberâ voce prædicare:" "In baptism the baptized was anointed on the top of the head, in confirmation on the forehead: by that was signified that the Holy Ghost was preparing a habitation for himself; by this was declared the descent of the Holy Spirit, with his sevenfold gifts, with all fulness of knowledge and spiritual understanding." These things were signified by the appendant ceremony; but the rites were ever distinguished, and did not only signify and declare, but effect, these graces by the ministry of prayer and imposition of hands.

The ceremony the church instituted and used as she pleased, and gave in what circumstances they would choose; and new propositions entered, and customs changed, and deputations were made; and the bishops, in whom by Christ was placed the fulness of ecclesiastical power, concredited to the bishops and deacons so much as their occasions and necessities permitted: and because in those ages and places where the external ceremony was regarded, it may be, more than the inward mystery or the rite of divine appointment, they were apt to believe that the chrism or exterior unction, delegated to the priests' ministry after the episcopal consecration of it, might supply the want of episcopal confirmation; it came to pass that new opinions were entertained, and the regulars, the friars and the Jesuits, who were always too little friends to the episcopal power, from which they would fain have been wholly exempted, publicly taught (in England especially), that chrism ministered by them with leave from the Pope did do all that which ordinarily was to be done in episcopal confirmation. For, as Tertullian complained in his time, "Quibus fuit propositum aliter docendi, eos necessitas coegit aliter disponendi instrumenta doctrinæ;". "They who had purposes of teaching new doctrines, were constrained otherwise to dispose of the instruments and ri-

tuals appertaining to their doctrines." These men, to serve ends, destroyed the article, and overthrew the ancient discipline and unity of the primitive church. But they were justly censured by the theological faculty at Paris, and the censure well defended by Hallier, one of the doctors of the Sorbonne; whither I refer the reader that is curious in little things.

But for the main: it was ever called 'confirmatio episcopalis, et impositio manuum episcoporum;" which our English word well expresses, and perfectly retains the use; we know it by the common name of "bishopping of children." I shall no further insist upon it, only I shall observe that there is a vain distinction brought into the schools and glosses of the canon law, of a minister ordinary, and extraordinary; all allowing that the bishop is appointed the ordinary minister of confirmation, but they would fain innovate, and pretend, that in some cases others may be ministers extraordinary. This device is of infinite danger to the destruction of the whole sacred order of the ministry, and disparks the enclosures, and lays all in common, and makes men supreme controllers of the orders of God, and lies upon a false principle; for in true divinity, and by the economy of the Spirit of God, as there can be no minister of any divine ordinance but he that is of divine appointment, there can be none but the ordinary minister. I do not say that God is tied to this way; he cannot be tied but by himself: and therefore Christ gave a special commission to Ananias to baptize and to confirm St. Paul, and he gave the Spirit to Cornelius even before he was baptized, and he ordained St. Paul to be an apostle without the ministry of man. But this I say, that though God can make ministers extraordinary, yet man cannot; and they that go about to do so, usurp the power of Christ, and snatch from his hand what he never intended to part with. The apostles admitted others into a part of their care and of their power; but when they intended to employ them in any ministry, they gave them so much of their order as would enable them; but a person of a lower order could never be deputed minister of actions appropriate to the higher: which is the case of confirmation, by the practice and tradition of the apostles, and by the universal practice and doctrine of the primitive catholic church, by which

bishops only, the successors of the apostles, were alone the ministers of confirmation: and therefore if any man else usurp it, let them answer it; they do hurt indeed to themselves, but no benefit to others, to whom they minister shadows instead of substances.

SECTION V.

The whole Procedure or Ritual of Confirmation is by Prayer and Imposition of Hands.

THE heart and the eye are lift up to God to bring blessings from him, and so is the hand too; but this also falls upon the people, and rests there, to apply the descending blessing to the proper and prepared suscipient. God governed the people of Israel by the hand of Moses and Aaron:

——— et calidæ fecêre silentia turbæ
Majestate manûs:

and both under Moses and under Christ, whenever the president of religion did bless the people, he lifted up his hand over the congregation; and when he blessed a single person, he laid his hand upon him. This was the rite used by Jacob and the patriarchs, by kings and prophets, by all the eminently religious in the synagogue, and by Christ himself when he blessed the children which were brought to him, and by the apostles when they blessed and confirmed the baptized converts; and whom else can the church follow? The apostles did so to the Christians of Samaria, to them of Ephesus; and St. Paul describes this whole mystery by the ritual part of it, calling it "the foundation of the imposition of hands[r]." It is the solemnity of blessing, and the solemnity and application of paternal prayer. Τίνι γὰρ ἐπιτίθησι χεῖρα; τίνα δὲ εὐλογήσει; said Clement[s] of Alexandria; "Upon whom shall he lay his hands? whom shall he bless?" —"Quid enim aliud est impositio manuum, nisi oratio super hominem?" said St. Austin; "The bishop's laying his hands on the people, what is it but the solemnity of prayer for them?" that is, a prayer made by those sacred persons who

[r] Heb. vi. 2. [s] Pelag. lib. 3. c. 11.

by Christ are appointed to pray for them, and to bless in his name: and so indeed are all the ministries of the church, baptism, consecration of the blessed eucharist, absolution, ordination, visitation of the sick; they are all 'in genere orationis,' they are nothing but solemn and appointed 'prayer' by an intrusted and a gracious person, specificated by a proper order to the end of the blessing then designed. And therefore, when St. James commanded that the sick persons should "send for the elders of the church," he adds, "and let them pray over them;" that is, lay their hands on the sick, and pray for them; that is praying over them: it is 'adumbratio dextræ' (as Tertullian calls it), 'the right hand of him that ministers, overshadows' the person, for whom the solemn prayer is to be made.

This is the office of the rulers of the church; for they in the divine eutaxy are made your superiors: they are indeed 'your servants for Jesus's sake,' but they 'are over you in the Lord,' and therefore are from the Lord appointed to bless the people; for "without contradiction," saith the Apostle, "the less is blessed of the greater [t];" that is, God hath appointed the superiors in religion to be the great ministers of prayer, he hath made them the gracious persons, them he will hear, those he hath commanded to convey your needs to God, and God's blessings to you, and to ask a blessing is to desire them to pray for you; them, I say, "whom God most respecteth for their piety and zeal that way, or else regardeth for that their place and calling bind them above others to do this duty, such as are natural and spiritual fathers [u]."

It is easy for profane persons to deride these things, as they do all religion which is not conveyed to them by sense or natural demonstrations: but the economy of the Spirit and "the things of God are spiritually discerned."—"The Spirit bloweth where it listeth, and no man knows whence it comes, and whither it goes;" and the operations are discerned by faith, and received by love and by obedience. "Date mihi Christianum, et intelligit quod dico;" "None but true Christians understand and feel these things." But of this we are sure, that in all the times of Moses's law, while the synagogue was standing, and in all the days of

[t] Heb. vii. 7. [u] Hooker's Eccl. Pol. lib. 5. sect. 66.

Christianity, so long as men loved religion, and walked in the Spirit, and minded the affairs of their souls, to have the prayers and the blessing of the fathers of the synagogue and the fathers of the church, was esteemed no small part of their religion, and so they went to heaven. But that which I intend to say is this, that prayer and imposition of hands were the whole procedure in the Christian rites: and because this ministry was most signally performed by this ceremony, and was also by St. Paul called and noted by the name of the ceremony, 'imposition of hands;' this name was retained in the Christian church, and this manner of ministering confirmation was all that was in the commandment or institution.

But because, in confirmation, we receive the unction from above, that is, then we are most signally 'made kings and priests unto God, to offer up spiritual sacrifices,' and to enable us to 'seek the kingdom of God and the righteousness of it,' and that the giving of the Holy Spirit is in Scripture called 'the unction from above;' the church of God in early ages made use of this allegory, and passed it into an external ceremony and representation of the mystery, to signify the inward grace.

> Post inscripta oleo frontis signacula, per quæ
> Unguentum regale datum est, et chrisma perenne[x].

"We are consigned on the forehead with oil, and a royal unction and an eternal chrism are given to us:" so Prudentius[y] gives testimony of the ministry of confirmation in his time. Τοῦτο φυλάξατε ἄσπιλον· πάντων γάρ ἐστι τοῦτο διδακτικόν, καθὼς ἀρτίως ἠκούσατε τοῦ μακαρίου Ἰωάννου λέγοντος καὶ πολλὰ περὶ τούτου χρίσματος φιλοσοφοῦντος, said St. Cyril: "Preserve this unction pure and spotless: for it teaches you all things, as you have heard the blessed St. John speaking and philosophizing many things of this holy chrism[z]." Upon this account the holy fathers used to bless and consecrate oil and balsam, that, by an external signature, they might signify the inward unction effected in confirmation. Μύρον τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι ψιλὸν, οὐδ' ὡς ἄν τις εἴποι κοινὸν κατ' ἐπίκλησιν, ἀλλὰ Χριστοῦ χάρισμα, καὶ Πνεύματος ἁγίου παρουσία, τῆς αὐτῆς θεότητος ἐνεργητικὸν γινόμενον, "This chrism is not simple or common when it is blessed, but the gift of

[x] Prudent. in ψυχομαχίᾳ. [y] A.D. 400. [z] Catech. Mystag. 3.

Christ, and the presence of his Holy Spirit, as it were effecting the divinity itself;" the body is indeed anointed with visible ointment, but is also sanctified by the holy and quickening Spirit: so St. Cyril. I find in him and in some late synods[a] other pretty significations and allusions made by this ceremony of chrisms. "Nos autem pro igne visibili, qui die Pentecostes super apostolos apparuit, oleum sanctum, materiam nempe ignis ex apostolorum traditione, ad confirmandum adhibemus:" "This using of oil was instead of the baptism with fire, which Christ baptized his apostles with in Pentecost; and oil, being the most proper matter of fire, is therefore used in confirmation."

That this was the ancient ceremony is without doubt, and that the church had power to do so hath no question, and I add, it was not unreasonable; for if ever the Scripture expresses the mysteriousness of a grace conferred by an exterior ministry (as this is, by imposition of hands), and represents it besides in the expression and analogy of any sensible thing, that expression drawn into a ceremony will not improperly signify the grace, since the Holy Ghost did choose that for his own expression and representment. In baptism we are said to be "buried with Christ." The church does according to the analogy of that expression, when she immerges the catechumen in the font; for then she represents the same thing which the Holy Ghost would have to be represented in that sacrament: the church did but the same thing when she used chrism in this ministration. This I speak in justification of that ancient practice: but because there was no command for it, λόγος γεγραμμένος οὐκ ἔστι, said St. Basil[b]; "concerning chrism there is no written word," that is, of the ceremony there is not; he said it not of the whole rite of confirmation; therefore though to this we are all bound,—yet as to the anointing, the church is at liberty, and hath with sufficient authority omitted it in our ministrations.

In the liturgy of King Edward the Sixth, the bishops used the sign of the cross upon the foreheads of them that were to be confirmed. I do not find it since forbidden, or revoked by any expression or intimation, saving only that it is omit-

[a] Synodus Bituricensis, apud Bochel. lib. 1. decret. Eccl. Gal. tit. 5.
[b] Lib. de Spir. S. cap. 17.

ted in our later offices; and therefore it may seem to be permitted to the discretion of the bishops, but yet not to be used unless where it may be for edification, and where it may be by the consent of the church, at least by interpretation; concerning which I have nothing else to interpose, but that neither this, nor any thing else which is not of the nature and institution of the rite, ought to be done by private authority, nor ever at all but according to the Apostle's rule, εὐσχημόνως καὶ κατὰ τάξιν, 'whatsoever is decent, and whatsoever is according to order,' that is to be done, and nothing else: for prayer and imposition of hands for the invocating and giving the Holy Spirit, are all that are in the foundation and institution.

SECTION VI.

Many great Graces and Blessings are consequent to the worthy Reception and due Ministry of Confirmation.

It is of itself enough, when it is fully understood, what is said in the Acts of the Apostles at the first ministration of this rite; "they received the Holy Ghost;" that is, according to the expression of our blessed Saviour himself to the apostles, when he commanded them in Jerusalem to expect the verification of his glorious promise, "they were endued with virtue from on high;" that is, with strength to perform their duty: which although it is not to be understood exclusively to the other rites and ministries of the church of divine appointment, yet it is properly and most signally true, and as it were in some sense appropriate to this. For, as Aquinas[c] well discourses, the grace of Christ is not tied to the sacraments; but even this spiritual strength and virtue from on high can be had without confirmation: as without baptism remission of sins may be had; and yet we believe one baptism for the remission of sins; and one confirmation for the obtaining this virtue from on high, this strength of the Spirit. But it is so appropriate to it by promise and peculiarity of ministration, that as, without the desire of baptism, our sins are not pardoned, so without at least the desire of

[c] Part. 3. qu. 72. art. 6. ad prim.

confirmation, we cannot receive this virtue from on high, which is appointed to descend in the ministry of the Spirit. It is true, the ministry of the holy eucharist is greatly effective to this purpose; and therefore in the ages of martyrs the bishops were careful to give the people the holy communion frequently. "Ut quos tutos esse contra adversarium volebant, munimento Dominicæ saturitatis armarent," as St. Cyprian[d] with his colleagues wrote to Cornelius; "that those whom they would have to be safe against the contentions of their adversaries, they should arm them with the guards and defences of the Lord's fulness." But it is to be remembered that the Lord's supper is for the more perfect Christians, and it is for the increase of the graces received formerly, and therefore it is for remission of sins, and yet is no prejudice to the necessity of baptism, whose proper work is remission of sins; and therefore neither does it make confirmation unnecessary: for it renews the work of both the precedent rites, and repairs the breaches, and adds new energy, and proceeds in the same dispensations, and is renewed often, whereas the others are but once.

Excellent therefore are the words of John Gerson,[e] the famous chancellor of Paris, to this purpose: "It may be said that in one way of speaking confirmation is necessary, and in another it is not. Confirmation is not necessary as baptism and repentance, for without these salvation cannot be had. This necessity is absolute; but there is a conditional necessity. Thus if a man would not become weak, it is necessary that he eat his meat well. And so confirmation is necessary, that the spiritual life and the health, gotten in baptism, may be preserved in strength against our spiritual enemies. For this is given for strength. Hence is that saying of Hugo de St. Victore; 'What does it profit that thou art raised up by baptism, if thou art not able to stand by confirmation?' Not that baptism is not of value unto salvation without confirmation; but because he who is not confirmed, will easily fall, and too readily perish." The Spirit of God comes which way he pleases, but we are tied to use his own economy, and expect the blessings appointed by his own ministries: and because to prayer is promised we shall receive whatever we ask, we may as well omit the receiving the holy

[d] Epist. 54. [e] In Opusc. Aur. de Confirmat.

eucharist, pretending that prayer alone will procure the blessings expected in the other,—as well, I say, as omit confirmation, because we hope to be strengthened and receive virtue from on high by the use of the supper of the Lord. Let us use all the ministries of grace in their season; for "we know not which shall prosper, this or that, or whether they shall be both alike good:" this only we know, that the ministries which God appoints, are the proper seasons and opportunities of grace.

This power from on high, which is the proper blessing of confirmation, was expressed, not only in speaking with tongues and doing miracles,—for much of this they had before they received the Holy Ghost,—but it was effected in spiritual and internal strengths; they were not only enabled for the service of the church, but were endued with courage, and wisdom, and Christian fortitude, and boldness, to confess the faith of Christ crucified, and unity of heart and mind, singleness of heart, and joy in God; when it was for the edification of the church, miracles were done in confirmations; and St. Bernard, in the life of St. Malachias, tells that St. Malchus, bishop of Lismore in Ireland, confirmed a lunatic child, and at the same time cured him: but such things as these are extra-regular and contingent. This which we speak of, is a regular ministry, and must have a regular effect.

St. Austin said that the Holy Spirit in confirmation was given "ad dilatanda ecclesiæ primordia," "for the propagating Christianity in the beginnings of the church."—St. Jerome says, it was "propter honorem sacerdotii," "for the honour of the priesthood,"—Ambrose says, it was "ad confirmationem unitatis in ecclesia Christi;" "for the confirmation of unity in the church of Christ."—And they all say true: but the first was by the miraculous consignations, which did accompany this ministry; and the other two were by reason that the mysteries were τὰ προτελεσθέντα ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπισκόπου, they were appropriated to the ministry of the bishop, who is 'caput unitatis,' 'the head,' the last resort, the firmament' of unity' in the church. These effects were regular indeed, but they were incident and accidental: there are effects yet more proper, and of greater excellency.

Now if we will understand in general what excellent fruits are consequent to this dispensation, we may best re-

ceive the notice of them from the fountain itself, our blessed Saviour. "He that believes, out of his belly (as the Scripture saith [f]) shall flow rivers of living waters. But this he spake of the Spirit, which they that believe on him should receive."—This is evidently spoken of the Spirit, which came down in Pentecost, which was promised to all that should believe in Christ, and which the apostles ministered by imposition of hands, the Holy Ghost himself being the expositor; and it can signify no less, but that a spring of life should be put into the heart of the confirmed, to water the plants of God; that they should become 'trees,' not only 'planted by the water-side' (for so it was in David's time, and in all the ministry of the Old Testament); but having 'a river of living water' within them to make them 'fruitful of good works,' and 'bringing their fruit in due season, fruits worthy of amendment of life.'

1. But the principal thing is this: confirmation is the consummation and perfection, the corroboration and strength, of baptism and baptismal grace; for in baptism we undertake to do our duty, but in confirmation we receive strength to do it; in baptism others promise for us, in confirmation we undertake for ourselves, we ease our godfathers and godmothers of their burden, and take it upon our own shoulders, together with the advantage of the prayers of the bishop and all the church made then on our behalf; in baptism we give up our names to Christ, but in confirmation we put our seal to the profession, and God puts his seal to the promise. It is very remarkable what St. Paul says of the beginnings of our being Christians, ὁ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ λόγος, "the word of the beginning of Christ [g]:" Christ begins with us, he gives us his word, and admits us, and we by others, hands are brought in, τύπος διδαχῆς εἰς ὃν παρεδόθητε, it is the "form of doctrine, unto which ye were delivered." Cajetan observes right, that this is a new and emphatical way of speaking: we are wholly immerged in our fundamentals; other things are delivered to us, but we are delivered up unto these. This is done in baptism and catechism; and what was the event of it? "Being then made free from sin, ye became the servants of righteousness [h]." Your baptism was for the remission of sins there, and then ye were made

[f] John, vii. 38. [g] Rom. vi. 17. [h] Ver. 18.

free from that bondage: and what then? why then in the next place, when ye came to consummate this procedure, when the baptized was confirmed, then he became a servant of righteousness, that is, then the Holy Ghost descended upon you, enabled you to walk in the Spirit; then the seed of God was thrown into your hearts by a celestial influence. "Spiritus Sanctus in baptisterio plenitudinem tribuit ad innocentiam, sed in confirmatione augmentum præstat ad gratiam," said Eusebius Emissenus[i]: "In baptism we are made innocent, in confirmation we receive the increase of the Spirit of grace;" in that we are regenerated unto life, in this we are strengthened unto battle. "Dono sapientiæ illuminamur, ædificamur, erudimur, instruimur, confirmamur, ut illam Sancti Spiritûs vocem audire possimus, Intellectum tibi dabo, et instruam te in hac vitâ quâ gradieris," said P. Melchiades[k]; "We are enlightened by the gift of wisdom, we are built up, taught, instructed, and confirmed; so that we may hear that voice of the Holy Spirit, I will give unto thee an understanding heart, and teach thee in the way wherein thou shalt walk:" for so,

> Signari populos effuso pignore sancto,
> Mirandæ virtutis opus ———[l];

"It is a work of great and wonderful power, when the holy pledge of God is poured forth upon the people."—This is that power from on high, which first descended in Pentecost and afterward was ministered by prayer and imposition of the apostolical and episcopal hands, and comes after the other gift of remission of sins. "Vides quòd non simpliciter hoc fit, sed multâ opus est virtute, ut detur Spiritus Sanctus. Non enim idem est assequi remissionem peccatorum, et accipere virtutem illam," said St. Chrysostom[m]: "You see that this is not easily done, but there is need of much power from on high to give the Holy Spirit; for it is not all one to obtain remission of sins, and to have received this virtue or power from above."—"Quamvis enim continuò transituris sufficiant regenerationis beneficia, victuris tamen necessaria sunt confirmationis auxilia," said Melchiades: "Although to them that die presently, the benefits of regeneration (baptismal)

[i] Serm. de Pentecoste.
[k] Habetur apud Gratian. de Consecrat. dist. 5. c. Spiritus S.
[l] Tertul. advers. Marcion. lib. 1. Car. c. 3. [m] Homil. 18. in Acta.

are sufficient, yet to them that live the auxiliaries of confirmation are necessary."—For, according to that saying of St. Leo, in his epistle to Nicetas the bishop of Aquileia, commanding that heretics returning to the church should be confirmed with invocation of the Holy Spirit and imposition of hands, "they have only received the form of baptism 'sine sanctificationis virtute,' 'without the virtue of sanctification;'" meaning, that this is the proper effect of confirmation. For, in short, "although the newly-listed soldiers in human warfare are enrolled in the number of them that are to fight, yet they are not brought to battle till they be more trained and exercised. So although by baptism every one is ascribed into the catalogue of believers, yet he receives more strength and grace for the sustaining and overcoming the temptations of the flesh, the world, and the devil, only by imposition of the bishops' hands:"—They are words which I borrowed from a late synod at Rheims.—That is the first remark of blessing, in confirmation we receive strength to do all that which was for us undertaken in baptism: for the apostles themselves (as the holy fathers observe) were timorous in the faith until they were confirmed in Pentecost; but after the reception of the Holy Ghost they waxed valiant in the faith, and in all their spiritual combats.

2. In confirmation we receive the Holy Ghost as the earnest of our inheritance, as the seal of our salvation: *Καλοῦμεν σφραγίδα, ὡς συντήρησιν καὶ τῆς δεσποτείας σημείωσιν*, saith Gregory Nazianzen; "We therefore call it a seal or signature, as being a guard and custody to us, and a sign of the Lord's dominion over us."—The confirmed person is *πρόβατον ἐσφραγισμένον*, 'a sheep that is marked,'—which thieves do not so easily steal and carry away. To the same purpose are those words of Theodoret*: *Ἀνάμνησον σεαυτὸν τῆς ἱερᾶς μυσταγωγίας, ἐν ᾗ οἱ τελούμενοι, μετὰ τὴν ἄρνησιν τοῦ τυράννου, καὶ τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως ὁμολογίαν, οἱονεὶ σφραγίδα τινὰ βασιλικὴν δέχονται τοῦ Πνευματικοῦ μύρου τὸ χρίσμα, ὡς ἐν τύπῳ τῷ μύρῳ τὴν ἀόρατον τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος χάριν ὑποδεχόμενοι.* "Remember that holy mystagogy, in which they who were initiated, after the renouncing that tyrant" (the devil and all his works), "and the confession of the true king" (Jesus Christ), "have received the chrism of spiritual

* Comment. in Cantic. c. 1. A.

unction like a royal signature, by that unction, as in a shadow, perceiving the invisible grace of the most Holy Spirit."—That is, in confirmation we are sealed for the service of God and unto the day of redemption; then it is that the seal of God is had by us, 'the Lord knoweth who are his.'—"Quomodo verò dices, Dei sum, si notas non produxeris?" said St. Basil°; "How can any man say, I am God's sheep, unless he produce the marks?"—"Signati estis Spiritu promissionis per sanctissimum divinum Spiritum, Domini grex effecti sumus," said Theophylact: "When we are thus sealed by the most holy and divine Spirit of promise, then we are truly of the Lord's flock, and marked with his seal:" that is, when we are rightly confirmed, then he descends into our souls; and though he does not operate, it may be, presently, but as the reasonable soul works in its due time, and by the order of nature, by opportunities and new fermentations and actualities; so does the Spirit of God; when he is brought into use, when he is prayed for with love and assiduity, when he is caressed tenderly, when he is used lovingly, when we obey his motions readily, when we delight in his words greatly,—then we find it true, that the soul had a new life put into her, a principle of perpetual actions: but the tree planted by the water-side does not presently bear fruit, but 'in its due season.' By this Spirit we are then sealed; that whereas God hath laid up an inheritance for us in the kingdom of heaven, and in the faith of that we must live and labour, to confirm this faith God hath given us this pledge, the Spirit of God is a witness to us, and tells us by his holy comforts, by the peace of God, and the quietness and refreshments of a good conscience, that God is our Father, that we are his sons and daughters, and shall be coheirs with Jesus in his eternal kingdom. In baptism we are made the sons of God, but we receive the witness and testimony of it in confirmation. This is ὁ Παράκλητος the Holy Ghost 'the Comforter,' this is he whom Christ promised and did send in Pentecost, and was afterward ministered and conveyed by prayer and imposition of hands: and by this Spirit he makes the confessors bold, and the martyrs valiant, and the tempted strong, and the virgins to persevere, and widows to sing his praises and his glories. And this is

° In Adhort. ad Baptis.

that excellency which the church of God called 'the Lord's seal,' and teaches to be imprinted in confirmation: τὸ τέλειον φυλακτήριον, τὴν σφραγῖδα τοῦ Κυρίου, 'a perfect phylactery' or guard, even 'the Lord's seal;' so Eusebius calls it.

I will not be so curious as to enter into a discourse of the philosophy of this: but I shall say, that they who are curious in the secrets of nature, and observe external signatures in stones, plants, fruits, and shells, of which naturalists make many observations and observe strange effects, and the more internal signatures in minerals and living bodies, of which chemists discourse strange secrets, may easily, if they please, consider that it is infinitely credible, that in higher essences, even in spirits, there may be signatures proportionable, wrought more immediately and to greater purposes by a divine hand. I only point at this, and so pass it over, as, it may be, fit for every man's consideration.

And now if any man shall say, we see no such things as you talk of, and find the confirmed people the same after as before, no better and no wiser, not richer in gifts, not more adorned with graces, nothing more zealous for Christ's kingdom, not more comforted with hope, or established by faith, or built up with charity; they neither speak better, nor live better; what then? Does it therefore follow that the Holy Ghost is not given in confirmation? Nothing less. For is not Christ given us in the sacrament of the Lord's supper? Do not we receive his body and his blood? Are we not made all one with Christ, and he with us? And yet it is too true, that when we arise from that holy feast, thousands there are that find no change. But there are in this two things to be considered.

One is, that the changes which are wrought upon our souls are not, after the manner of nature, visible, and sensible, and with observation. "The kingdom of God cometh not with observation:" for it is within you, and is only discerned spiritually, and produces its effects by the method of heaven, and is first apprehended by faith, and is endeared by charity, and at last is understood by holy and kind experiences. And in this there is no more objection against confirmation than against baptism, or the Lord's supper, or any other ministry evangelical.

The other thing is this: if we do not find the effects of

the Spirit in confirmation, it is our faults. For he is received by moral instruments, and is intended only as a help to our endeavours, to our labours and our prayers, to our contentions and our mortifications, to our faith and to our hope, to our patience and to our charity. "Non adjuvari dicitur, qui nihil facit," "He that does nothing, cannot be said to be helped." Unless we in these instances do our part of the work, it will be no wonder, if we lose his part of the co-operation and supervening blessing. He that comes under the bishop's hands to receive the gift of the Holy Ghost, will come with holy desires and a longing soul, with an open hand and a prepared heart; he will purify the house of the Spirit for the entertainment of so divine a guest; he will receive him with humility, and follow him with obedience, and delight him with purities: and he that does thus, let him make the objection if he can, and tell me, does he 'say that Jesus is the Lord?' He cannot say this 'but by the Holy Ghost.'—Does he love his brother? If he does, then 'the Spirit of God abides in him.'—Is Jesus Christ formed in him? Does he live by the laws of the Spirit? Does he obey his commands? Does he attend his motions? Hath he no earnest desires to serve God? If he have not, then in vain hath he received either baptism or confirmation. But if he have, it is certain that of himself he cannot do these things: he 'cannot of himself think a good thought.' Does he therefore think well? That is from the Holy Spirit of God.

To conclude this inquiry: "the Holy Ghost is promised to all men to profit withal[p];" that is plain in Scripture. Confirmation, or prayer and imposition of the bishop's hand, is the solemnity and rite used in Scripture for the conveying of that promise, and the effect is felt in all the sanctifications and changes of the soul; and he that denies these things hath not faith, nor the true notices of religion, or the Spirit of Christianity. Hear what the Scriptures yet further say in this mystery: "Now he which confirmeth or stablisheth us with you in Christ, and hath anointed us, is God: who hath also sealed us, and given the earnest of the Spirit in our hearts[q]." Here is a description of the whole mysterious part of this rite. God is the author of the grace: the apostles and all Christians are the suscipients, and receive

[p] 1 Cor. xii. 7. [q] 2 Cor. i. 21, 22.

this grace: by this grace we are adopted and incorporated into Christ: God hath anointed us; that is, he hath given us this unction from above, "he hath sealed us by his Spirit," made us his own, bored our ears through, made us free by his perpetual service, and hath done all these things in token of a greater; he hath given us his Spirit to testify to us that he will give us of his glory. These words of St. Paul, besides that they evidently contain in them the spiritual part of this ritual, are also expounded of the rite and sacramental itself by St. Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Theophylact, that I may name no more. For in this mystery, "Christos nos efficit, et misericordiam Dei nobis annunciat per Spiritum Sanctum," said St. John Damascen[r]; "he makes us his anointed ones, and by the Holy Spirit he declares his eternal mercy towards us."—"Nolite tangere Christos meos," "Touch not mine anointed ones."—For when we have this signature of the Lord upon us, the devils cannot come near to hurt us, unless we consent to their temptations, and drive the Holy Spirit of the Lord from us.

SECTION VII.

Of Preparation to Confirmation, and the Circumstances of receiving it.

If confirmation have such gracious effects, why do we confirm little children, whom in all reason we cannot suppose to be capable and receptive of such graces? It will be no answer to this, if we say, that this very question is asked concerning the baptism of infants, to which as great effects are consequent, even pardon of all our sins, and the new birth and regeneration of the soul unto Christ: for in these things the soul is wholly passive, and nothing is required of the suscipient but that he put in no bar against the grace; which because infants cannot do, they are capable of baptism; but it follows not, that therefore they are capable of confirmation, because this does suppose them such as to need new assistances, and is a new profession, and a personal undertaking, and therefore requires personal abilities, and cannot

[r] Lib. 4. de Fide, cap. 10.

be done by others, as in the case of baptism. The aids given in confirmation are in order to our contention and our danger, our temptation and spiritual warfare; and therefore it will not seem equally reasonable to confirm children as to baptize them.

To this I answer, that, in the primitive church, confirmation was usually administered at the same time with baptism; for we find many records, that when the office of baptism was finished, and the baptized person divested of the white robe, the person was carried again to the bishop to be confirmed, as I have already shewn out of[s] Dionysius and divers others. The reasons why anciently they were ministered immediately after one another is, not only because the most of them that were baptized, were of years to choose their religion, and did so, and therefore were capable of all that could be consequent to baptism, or annexed to it, or ministered with it, and therefore were also at the same time communicated as well as confirmed;—but also because the solemn baptisms were at solemn times of the year, at Easter only and Whitsuntide, and only in the cathedral or bishops' church in the chief city; whither when the catechumens came, and had the opportunity of the bishop's presence, they took the advantage "ut sacramento utroque renascantur," as St. Cyprian's expression is, "that they might be regenerated by both the mysteries," and they also had the third added, viz. the holy eucharist.

This simultaneous ministration hath occasioned some few of late to mistake confirmation for a part of baptism, but no distinct rite, or of distinct effect, save only that it gave ornament and complement or perfection to the other. But this is infinitely confuted by the very first ministry of confirmation in the world: for there was a great interval between St. Philip's baptizing and the apostles confirming' the Samaritans; where also the difference is made wider by the distinction of the minister; and a deacon did one, none but an apostle and his successor a bishop could do the other: and this being of so universal a practice and doctrine in the primitive church, it is a great wonder that any learned men could suffer an error in so apparent a case. It is also clear in

[s] Cap. 4. part. 3. de Eccles. Hier. Melchiad. Epist. ad Episc. Hispan. Ordo Rom. cap. de Die Sabbati S. Pasch. Alcuin. de Divin. Offic. c. 19.

two other great remarks of the practice of the primitive church. The one is of them who were baptized in their sickness, the οἱ ἐν νόσῳ παραλαμβάνοντες, καὶ εἶτα ἀναστάντες, when they recovered they were commanded to address themselves to the bishop to be confirmed; which appears in the thirty-eighth canon of the council of Eliberis, and the forty-sixth canon of the council of Laodicea, which I have before cited upon other occasions: the other is, that of heretics returning to the church, who were confirmed not only long after baptism, but after their apostasy and their conversion.

For although episcopal confirmation was the enlargement of baptismal grace, and commonly administered the same day, yet it was done by interposition of distinct ceremonies, and not immediately in time. Honorius Augustodunensis [t] tells that when the baptized on the eighth day had laid aside their mitres, or proper habit used in baptism, then they were usually confirmed, or consigned with chrism in the forehead by the bishop. And when children were baptized irregularly, or besides the ordinary way, in villages and places distant from the bishop, confirmation was deferred, said Durandus. And it is certain, that this affair did not last long without variety: sometimes they ministered both together; sometimes at greater, sometimes at lesser distances; and it was left indifferent in the church to do the one or the other, or the third, according to the opportunity and the discretion of the bishop.

But afterward in the middle and descending ages it grew to be a question, not whether it were lawful or not, but which were better, to confirm infants, or to stay to their childhood or to their riper years. Aquinas, Bonaventure, and some others, say, it is best that they be confirmed in their infancy, "quia dolus non est, nec obicem ponunt," "they are then without craft, and cannot hinder" the descent of the Holy Ghost upon them. And indeed it is most agreeable with the primitive practice, that if they were baptized in infancy, they should then also be confirmed; according to that of the famous epistle of Melchiades to the bishops of Spain, "Ità conjuncta sunt hæc duo sacramenta, ut ab invicem, nisi morte præveniente, non possint separari, et unum sine altero ritè perfici non potest." Where although he expressly affirms the rites to be two, yet unless it be in cases of neces-

[t] Vide Cassandrum Schol. ad Hym. Eccl.

sity, they are not to be severed, and one without the other is not perfect; which, in the sense formerly mentioned, is true, and so to be understood,—that to him who is baptized and is not confirmed, something very considerable is wanting, and therefore they ought to be joined, though not immediately, yet εὐχρόνως, according to reasonable occasions and accidental causes. But in this there must needs be a liberty in the church, not only for the former reasons, but also because the apostles themselves were not confirmed till after they had received the sacrament of the Lord's supper.

Others therefore say, that to confirm them of riper years is with more edification. The confession of faith is more voluntary, the election is wiser, the submission to Christ's discipline is more acceptable, and they have more need, and can make better use of their strength then derived by the Holy Spirit of God upon them: and to this purpose it is commanded in the canon law, that they who are confirmed should be 'perfectæ ætatis,' 'of full age;' upon which the gloss[a] says, "Perfectam vocat fortè duodecim annorum;" "Twelve years old was a full age, because, at those years, they might then be admitted to the lower services in the church."—But the reason intimated and implied by the canon is, because of the preparation to it; "they must come fasting, and they must make public confession of their faith."—And indeed that they should do so is matter of great edification, as also are the advantages of choice, and other preparatory abilities and dispositions above mentioned. They are matter of edification, I say, when they are done; but then the delaying of them so long before they be done, and the wanting the aids of the Holy Ghost conveyed in that ministry, are very prejudicial, and are not matter of edification.

But therefore there is a third way, which the church of England and Ireland follows, and that is, that after infancy, but yet before they understand too much of sin, and when they can competently understand the fundamentals of religion, then it is good to bring them to be confirmed, that the Spirit of God may prevent their youthful sins, and Christ by his word and by his Spirit may enter and take possession at the same time. And thus it was in the church of England long since provided and commanded by the laws of King Ed-

[a] De Consecrat. dist. 5. ut Jejuni.

gar[x], cap. 15. "ut nullus ab episcopo confirmari diu nimium detrectârit," "that none should too long put off his being confirmed by the bishop;" that is, as is best expounded by the perpetual practice almost ever since, as soon as ever, by catechism and competent instruction, they were prepared, it should not be deferred. If it have been omitted (as of late years it hath been too much), as we do in baptism, so in this also, it may be taken at any age, even after they have received the Lord's supper; as I observed before in the practice and example of the apostles themselves, which in this is an abundant warrant: but still the sooner the better: I mean, after that reason begins to dawn: but ever it must be taken care of, that the parents and godfathers, the ministers and masters, see that the children be catechised and well instructed in the fundamentals of their religon.

For this is the necessary preparation to the most advantageous reception of this holy ministry. "In ecclesiis potissimùm Latinis non nisi adultiore ætate pueros admitti videmus, vel hanc certè ob causam; ut parentibus, susceptoribus et ecclesiarum præfectis occasio detur pueros de fide, quam in baptismo professi sunt, diligentiùs instituendi et admonendi," said the excellent Cassander[y]. In the Latin churches they admit children in some ripeness of age, that they may be more diligently taught and instructed in the faith. And to this sense agree St. Austin[z], Walafridus Strabo, Ruardus Lovaniensis, and Mr. Calvin.

For this was ever the practice of the primitive church, to be infinitely careful of catechising those who came and desired to be admitted to this holy rite; they used exorcisms or catechisms to prepare them to baptism and confirmation. I said exorcisms or catechisms, for they were the same thing; if the notion be new, yet I the more willingly declare it, not only to free the primitive church from the suspicion of superstition in using charms or exorcisms (according to the modern sense of the word), or casting of the devil out of innocent children, but also to remonstrate the perpetual practice of catechising children in the eldest and best times of the church. Thus the Greek scholiast upon Harmenopulus renders the word ἐφορκιστὰς by κατηχητὰς, the primitive 'exorcist' was

[x] A. D. 967. [y] Consultationis, cap. 9.
[z] Serm. 116. in Ramis Palmarum.—De lib. Ecclesiast. c. 26.

the 'catechist:' and Balsamon upon the twenty-sixth canon of the council of Laodicea says, that to exorcise is nothing but to catechise the unbelievers, Τινὲς ἐπεχείρουν ἐφορκίζειν, τουτέστι κατηχεῖν ἀπίστους, "Some undertook to exorcise, that is (says he), to catechise the unbelievers:" and St. Cyril, in his preface to his catechisms, speaking to the 'illuminati,' "Festinent (says he) pedes tui ad catecheses audiendas; exorcismos studiosè suscipe," &c. "Let your feet run hastily to hear the catechisms, studiously receive the exorcisms, although thou beest already inspired and exorcised; that is, although you have been already instructed in the mysteries, yet still proceed: for without exorcisms (or catechisms), the soul cannot go forward, since they are divine, and gathered out of the Scriptures." And the reason why these were called exorcisms he adds; "Because when the exorcists or catechists by the Spirit of God produce fear in your hearts, and do enkindle the spirit as in a furnace, the devil flees away, and salvation and hope of life eternal do succeed:" according to that of the evangelist[a] concerning Christ; 'They were astonished at his doctrine, for his word was with power:' and that of St. Luke[b] concerning Paul and Barnabas; 'The deputy, when he saw what was done, was astonished at the doctrine of the Lord.' It is the Lord's doctrine that hath the power to cast out devils and work miracles; catechisms are the best exorcisms. "Let us therefore, brethren, abide in hope, and persevere in catechisings (saith St. Cyril), although they be long, and produced with many words or discourses."—The same also we find in[c] St. Gregory Nazianzen, and[d] St. Austin.

The use that I make of this notion, is principally to be an exhortation to all of the clergy, that they take great care to catechise all their people, to bring up children in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, to prepare a holy seed for the service of God, to cultivate the young plants and to dress the old ones, to take care that those who are men in the world, be not mere babes and uninstructed in Christ, and that they who are children in age, may be wise unto salvation: for by this means we shall rescue them from early temptations, when being so prepared they are so assisted by

[a] Luke, iv. 32.
[b] Acts, xiii. 12.
[c] Orat. de Baptism.
[d] In Psal. lxviii.

a divine ministry; we shall weaken the devil's power, by which he too often and too much prevails upon uninstructed and unconfirmed youth. For μύρον βεβαίωσις τῆς ὁμολογίας, "confirmation is the firmament of our profession;" but we profess nothing till we be catechised. Catechisings are our best preachings, and by them we shall give the best accounts of our charges, while in the behalf of Christ we make disciples, and take prepossession of infant understandings, and by this holy rite, by prayer and imposition of hands, we minister the Holy Spirit to them, and so prevent and disable the artifices of the devil; "for we are not ignorant of his devices," how he enters as soon as he can, and taking advantage of their ignorance and their passion, seats himself so strongly in their hearts and heads.

Turpiùs ejicitur quam non admittitur hostis;

'It is harder to cast the devil out than to keep him out.' Hence it is that the youth are so corrupted in their manners, so devilish in their natures, so cursed in their conversation, so disobedient to parents, so wholly given to vanity and idleness; they learn to swear before they can pray, and to lie as soon as they can speak. It is not my sense alone, but was long since observed by Gerson* and Gulielmus Parisiensis, "Propter cessationem confirmationis tepiditas grandior est fidelibus, et fidei defensione;" there is a coldness and deadness in religion, and it proceeds from the neglect of confirmation rightly ministered, and after due preparations and dispositions. A little thing will fill a child's head: teach them to say their prayers, tell them the stories of the life and death of Christ, cause them to love the holy Jesus with their first love, make them afraid of a sin; let the principles which God hath planted in their very creation, the natural principles of justice and truth, of honesty and thankfulness, of simplicity and obedience, be brought into act, and habit, and confirmation, by the holy sermons of the Gospel. If the guides of souls would have their people holy, let them teach holiness to their children, and then they will (at least) have a new generation unto God, better than this wherein we now live. They who are most zealous in this particular, will with most comfort reap the fruit of their labours, and the blessings of

* De Exterminat. Schism.

their ministry; and by the numbers which every curate presents to his bishop fitted for confirmation, he will in proportion render an account of his stewardship with some visible felicity. And let it be remembered, that in the last rubric of the office of confirmation in our liturgy it is made into a law, that "none should be admitted to the holy communion, until such time as he could say the catechism, and be confirmed:" which was also a law and custom in the primitive church, as appears in St. Dionysius's Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, and the matter of fact is notorious. Among the Helvetians, they are forbidden to contract marriages, before they are well instructed in the catechism: and in a late synod at Bourges, the curates are commanded to threaten all that are not confirmed, that they shall never receive the Lord's supper, nor be married. And in effect the same is of force in our church: for the married persons being to receive the sacrament at their marriage, and none are to receive but those that are confirmed, the same law obtains with us as with the Helvetians or the 'synodus Bituricensis.'

There is another little inquiry which I am not willing to omit; but the answer will not be long, because there is not much to be said on either side. Some inquire whether the holy rite of confirmation can be ministered any more than once. St. Austin[f] seems to be of opinion that it may be repeated: "Quid enim aliud est impositio manuum nisi oratio super hominem?" 'Confirmation is a solemn prayer over a man;'—and if so, why it may not be reiterated can have nothing in the nature of the thing; and the Greeks do it frequently, but they have no warranty from the Scripture, nor from any of their own ancient doctors. Indeed when any did return from heresy, they confirmed them, as I have proved out of the first and second council of Arles, the council of Laodicea, and the second council of Seville: but upon a closer intuition of the thing, I find they did so only to such, who did not allow of confirmation in their sects, such as the Novatians and the Donatists. "Novatiani pœnitentiam à suo conventu arcent penitus, et iis qui ab ipsis tinguntur, sacrum chrisma non præbent. Quocirca qui ex hac hæresi corpori ecclesiæ conjunguntur, benedicti patres ungi jusserunt:" so Theodoret[g]. For that reason only the Novatians were to be

[f] Lib. 3. de Bapt. c. 16.

[g] Lib. 3. Hæret. Fabul.

confirmed upon their conversion, because they had it not before. I find also they did confirm the converted Arians; but the reason is given in the first council of Arles, "quia propriâ lege utuntur," "they had a way of their own:" that is, as the gloss saith upon the canon 'de Arianis Consecrat. dist. 4.' "their baptism was not in the name of the holy Trinity;" and so their baptism being null, or at least suspected, to make all as sure as they could, they confirmed them. The same also is the case of the Bonasiaci in the second council of Arles, though they were (as some of the Arians also were) baptized in the name of the most holy Trinity; but it was a suspected matter, and therefore they confirmed them: but to such persons who had been rightly baptized and confirmed, they never did repeat it. Πνεύματος ἁγίου σφραγίδα δῴῃ ἀνεξάλειπτον, "The gift of the Spirit is an indelible seal," saith St. Cyril[h];—ἀνεπιχείρητον St. Basil calls it, it is "inviolable." They who did rebaptize, did also reconfirm. But as it was an error in St. Cyprian and the Africans to do the first, so was the second also, in case they had done it; for I find no mention expressly that they did the latter but upon the forementioned accounts, and either upon supposition of the invalidity of their first pretended baptism, or their not using at all of confirmation in their heretical conventicles. But the repetition of confirmation is expressly forbidden by the council of Tarracon[i], cap. 6. and by Pope Gregory the Second: and "sanctum chrisma collatum et altaris honor propter consecrationem (quæ per episcopos tantùm exercenda et conferenda sunt) evelli non queunt," said the fathers in a council at Toledo[k]; 'confirmation and holy orders, which are to be given by bishops alone, can never be annulled, and therefore they can never be repeated.' And this relies upon those severe words of St. Paul: having spoken of "the foundation of the doctrine of baptisms and laying on of hands," he says, "if they fall away, they can never be renewed[l];" that is, the ministry of baptism and confirmation can never be repeated. To Christians that sin after these ministrations, there is only left a νήψατε, 'expergiscimini,' that they 'arise from slumber,' and stir up the graces

[h] Cyril. Hieros. in Procatech.
[i] Apud Gratian. de Consecrat. dist. 5. cap. Dictum est, et cap. de Homine.
[k] Concil. Toletan. 8. can. 7. [l] Heb. vi. 6.

of the Holy Ghost. Every man ought to be careful that he "do not grieve the Holy Spirit;" but if he does, yet let him not 'quench' him, for that is a desperate case. *Φύλαττε τὸν φυλακτικόν.* The Holy Spirit is the great conservative of the new life; only "keep the keeper;" take care that the Spirit of God do not depart from you: for the great ministry of the Spirit is but once; for as baptism is, so is confirmation.

I end this discourse with a plain exhortation out of St. Ambrose, upon those words of St. Paul, 'He that confirmeth us with you in Christ, is God;' "Repete quia accepisti signaculum spirituale, spiritum sapientiæ et intellectûs, spiritum consilii atque virtutis, spiritum cognitionis atque pietatis, spiritum sancti timoris, et serva quòd accepisti. Signavit te Deus Pater, confirmavit te Christus Dominus:" "Remember that thou (who hast been confirmed) hast received the spiritual signature; the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and strength, the spirit of knowledge and godliness, the spirit of holy fear: keep what thou hast received. The Father hath sealed thee, and Christ thy Lord hath confirmed thee, by his divine Spirit;"—and he will never depart from thee, *εἰ μὴ δι' ἔργων φαυλότητα ἡμεῖς ἑαυτοὺς ταύτης ἀποξενώσωμεν,* 'unless by evil works we estrange him from us[m].' The same advice is given by Prudentius,

> Cultor Dei, memento
> Te fontis et lavacri
> Rorem subîsse sanctum,
> Et chrismate innotatum[n].

Remember how great things ye have received, and what God hath done for you: ye are of his flock and his militia; ye are now to fight his battles, and therefore to put on his armour, and to implore his auxiliaries, and to make use of his strengths, and always to be on his side against all his and all our enemies. But he that desires grace, must not despise to make use of all the instruments of grace. For though God communicates his invisible Spirit to you, yet that he is pleased to do it by visible instruments, is more than he needs, but not more than we do need. And therefore since God descends to our infirmities, let us carefully and lovingly address ourselves to his ordinances: that as we receive remission of sins by the washing of water, and the body and

[m] Zonar. in Can. Laodicen. 48. [n] Innovatum.

blood of Christ by the ministry of consecrated symbols; so we may receive the Holy Ghost 'sub ducibus Christianæ militiæ,' by the prayer and imposition of the bishop's hands, whom our Lord Jesus hath separated to this ministry. "For if you corroborate yourself by baptism" (they are the words of St. Gregory Nazianzen [o]), "and then take heed for the future, by the most excellent and firmest aids consigning your mind and body with the unction from above" (viz. in the holy rite of confirmation), "with the Holy Ghost, as the children of Israel did with the aspersion on the door-posts in the night of the death of the first-born of Egypt, what (evil) shall happen to you?" (meaning, that no evil can invade you): "And what aid shall you get? If you sit down, you shall be without fear; and if you rest, your sleep shall be sweet unto you."—But if when ye have received the Holy Spirit, you live not according to his divine principles, you will lose him again; that is, you will lose all the blessing, though the impression does still remain, till ye turn quite apostates: "in pessimis hominibus manebit, licèt ad judicium" (saith St. Austin [p]); "the Holy Ghost will remain," either as a testimony of your unthankfulness unto condemnation; or else as a seal of grace, and an earnest of your inheritance of eternal glory.

[o] Orat. in Sanctum Lavacrum. [p] Lib. 2. contra Lit. Petil. c. 104.

A

DISCOURSE

OF THE

NATURE, OFFICES, AND MEASURES,

OF

FRIENDSHIP,

WITH

RULES OF CONDUCTING IT,

IN A LETTER TO THE MOST INGENIOUS AND EXCELLENT

MRS. KATHARINE PHILIPS.

A

DISCOURSE

OF THE

NATURE, OFFICES, AND MEASURES,

OF

FRIENDSHIP,

&c.

MADAM,

THE wise Ben Sirach advised that we should not consult with a woman concerning her of whom she is jealous, neither with a coward in matters of war, nor with a merchant concerning exchange; and some other instances he gives of interested persons, to whom he would not have us hearken in any matter of counsel. For wherever the interest is secular or vicious, there the bias is not on the side of truth or reason, because these are seldom served by profit and low regards. But to consult with a friend in the matters of friendship, is like consulting with a spiritual person in religion; they who understand the secrets of religion, or the interior beauties of friendship, are the fittest to give answers in all inquiries concerning the respective subjects; because reason and experience are on the side of interest; and that which in friendship is most pleasing and most useful, is also most reasonable and most true; and a friend's fairest interest is the best measure of the conducting friendships: and therefore you who are so eminent in friendships, could also have given the best answer to your own inquiries, and you could have trusted your own reason, because it is not only greatly instructed by the direct notices of things, but also by great experience in the matter of which you now inquire.

But because I will not use any thing that shall look like an excuse, I will rather give you such an account which you

can easily reprove, than by declining your commands, seem more safe in my prudence, than open and communicative in my friendship to you.

You first inquire, how far a dear and a perfect friendship is authorized by the principles of Christianity?

To this I answer; that the word 'friendship,' in the sense we commonly mean by it, is not so much as named in the New Testament; and our religion takes no notice of it. You think it strange; but read on before you spend so much as the beginning of a passion or a wonder upon it. There is mention of "friendship with the world," and it is said to be "enmity with God;" but the word is no where else named, or to any other purpose in all the New Testament. It speaks of friends often; but by friends are meant our acquaintance, or our kindred, the relatives of our family, or our fortune, or our sect; something of society, or something of kindness, there is in it; a tenderness of appellation and civility, a relation made by gifts, or by duty, by services and subjection; and I think I have reason to be confident, that the word 'friend' (speaking of human intercourse) is no otherways used in the Gospels or Epistles, or Acts of the Apostles: and the reason of it is, the word friend is of a large signification; and means all relations and societies, and whatsoever is not enemy. But by friendships, I suppose you mean the greatest love, and the greatest usefulness, and the most open communication, and the noblest sufferings, and the most exemplar faithfulness, and the severest truth, and the heartiest counsel, and the greatest union of minds, of which brave men and women are capable. But then I must tell you that Christianity hath new christened it, and calls this charity. The Christian knows no enemy he hath; that is, though persons may be injurious to him, and unworthy in themselves, yet he knows none whom he is not first bound to forgive, which is indeed to make them on his part to be no enemies, that is, to make that the word enemy shall not be perfectly contrary to friend, it shall not be a relative term and signify something on each hand, a relative and a correlative; and then he knows none whom he is not bound to love and pray for, to treat kindly and justly, liberally and obligingly. Christian charity is friendship to all the world; and when friendships were the noblest things in the world,

charity was little, like the sun drawn in at a chink, or his beams drawn into the centre of a burning-glass; but Christian charity is friendship expanded like the face of the sun when it mounts above the eastern hills: and I was strangely pleased when I saw something of this in Cicero; for I have been so pushed at by herds and flocks of people that follow any body that whistles to them, or drives them to pasture, that I am grown afraid of any truth that seems chargeable with singularity: but therefore, I say, glad I was when I saw Lælius [q] in Cicero discourse thus: "Amicitiæ ex infinitate generis humani, quam conciliavit ipsa natura, ita contracta res est, et adducta in angustum, ut omnis caritas, aut inter duos, aut inter paucos jungeretur."—Nature hath made friendships and societies, relations and endearments; and by something or other we relate to all the world; there is enough in every man that is willing to make him become our friend; but when men contract friendships, they enclose the commons; and what nature intended should be every man's, we make proper to two or three. Friendship is like rivers and the strand of seas, and the air, common to all the world; but tyrants, and evil customs, wars, and want of love, have made them proper and peculiar. But when Christianity came to renew our nature, and to restore our laws, and to increase her privileges, and to make her aptness to become religion, then it was declared that our friendships were to be as universal as our conversation; that is, actual to all with whom we conversed, and potentially extended unto those with whom we did not. For he who was to treat his enemies with forgiveness and prayers, and love and beneficence, was indeed to have no enemies, and to have all friends.

So that to your question, how far a dear and perfect friendship is authorized by the principles of Christianity? the answer is ready and easy. It is warranted to extend to all mankind; and the more we love, the better we are; and the greater our friendships are, the dearer we are to God. Let them be as dear, and let them be as perfect, and let them be as many, as you can; there is no danger in it; only where the restraint begins, there begins our imperfection. It

[q] Wetzel. V. 15. pag. 154.

is not ill that you entertain brave friendships and worthy societies: it were well if you could love and if you could benefit all mankind; for I conceive that is the sum of all friendship.

I confess this is not to be expected of us in this world; but as all our graces here are but imperfect, that is, at the best they are but tendencies to glory; so our friendships are imperfect too, and but beginnings of a celestial friendship, by which we shall love every one as much as they can be loved. But then so we must here in our proportion; and indeed that is it that can make the difference; we must be friends to all, that is, apt to do good, loving them really, and doing to them all the benefits which we can, and which they are capable of. The friendship is equal to all the world, and of itself hath no difference; but is differenced only by accidents, and by the capacity or incapacity of them that receive it. Nature and religion are the bands of friendships; excellency and usefulness are its great endearments: society and neighbourhood, that is, the possibilities and the circumstances of converse, are the determinations and actualities of it. Now when men either are unnatural, or irreligious, they will not be friends; when they are neither excellent nor useful, they are not worthy to be friends; when they are strangers or unknown, they cannot be friends actually and practically; but yet, as any man hath any thing of the good, contrary to those evils, so he can have and must have his share of friendship. For thus the sun is the eye of the world; and he is indifferent to the negro, or the cold Russian; to them that dwell under the line, and them that stand near the tropics; the scalded Indian, or the poor boy that shakes at the foot of the Riphean hills. But the fluxures of the heaven and the earth, the conveniency of abode, and the approaches to the north or south respectively, change the emanations of his beams; not that they do not pass always from him, but that they are not equally received below,—but by periods and changes, by little inlets and reflections, they receive what they can. And some have only a dark day and a long night from him, snows and white cattle, a miserable life, and a perpetual harvest of catarrhs and consumptions; apoplexies and dead palsies. But some have splendid fires, and aromatic

spices, rich wines, and well-digested fruits, great wit and great courage; because they dwell in his eye, and look in his face, and are the courtiers of the sun, and wait upon him in his chambers of the east. Just so is it in friendships: some are worthy, and some are necessary; some dwell hard by, and are fitted for converse; nature joins some to us, and religion combines us with others; society and accidents, parity of fortune, and equal dispositions, do actuate our friendships: which of themselves and in their prime disposition are prepared for all mankind according as any one can receive them. We see this best exemplified by two instances and expressions of friendships and charity: viz. alms and prayers; every one that needs relief, is equally the object of our charity; but though to all mankind in equal needs we ought to be alike in charity; yet we signify this severally, and by limits, and distinct measures: the poor man that is near me, he whom I meet, he whom I love, he whom I fancy, he who did me benefit, he who relates to my family,—he rather than another; because my expressions being infinite and narrow, and cannot extend to all in equal significations, must be appropriate to those, whose circumstances best fit me: and yet even to all I give my alms; to all the world that needs them: I pray for all mankind; I am grieved at every sad story I hear; I am troubled when I hear of a pretty bride murdered in her bride-chamber by an ambitious and enraged rival; I shed a tear when I am told that a brave king was misunderstood, then slandered, then imprisoned, and then put to death, by evil men: and I can never read the story of the Parisian massacre, or the Sicilian vespers, but my blood curdles, and I am disordered by two or three affections. A good man is a friend to all the world; and he is not truly charitable that does not wish well, and do good, to all mankind in what he can. But though we must pray for all men, yet we say special litanies for brave kings, and holy prelates, and the wise guides of souls, for our brethren and relations, our wives and children.

The effect of this consideration is, that the universal friendship of which I speak, must be limited, because we are so: in those things where we stand next to immensity and infinity, as in good wishes and prayers, and a readiness to benefit all mankind, in these our friendships must not be

limited: but in other things which pass under our hand and eye, our voices and our material exchanges; our hands can reach no further but to our arms' end, and our voices can but sound till the next air be quiet, and therefore they can have intercourse but within the sphere of their own activity; our needs and our conversations are served by a few, and they cannot reach to all; where they can, they must; but where it is impossible, it cannot be necessary. It must therefore follow, that our friendships to mankind may admit variety as does our conversation; and as by nature we are made sociable to all, so we are friendly; but as all cannot actually be of our society, so neither can all be admitted to a special, actual friendship. Of some intercourses all men are capable, but not of all; men can pray for one another, and abstain from doing injuries to all the world, and be desirous to do all mankind good, and love all men; now this friendship we must pay to all, because we can; but if we can do no more to all, we must shew our readiness to do more good to all by actually doing more good to all them to whom we can.

To some we can, and therefore there are nearer friendships to some than to others, according as there are natural or civil nearnesses, relations, and societies; and as I cannot express my friendships to all in equal measures and significations, that is, as I cannot do benefits to all alike: so neither am I tied to love all alike: for although there is much reason to love every man, yet there are more reasons to love some than others; and if I must love because there is reason I should, then I must love more, where there is more reason; and where there is a special affection and a great readiness to do good and to delight in certain persons towards each other, these are that special charity and endearment which philosophy calls friendship; but our religion calls love or charity. Now if the inquiry be concerning this special friendship, 1. How it can be appropriate, that is, who to be chosen to it; 2. How far it may extend, that is, with what expression signified; 3. How conducted? The answers will depend upon such considerations which will be neither useless nor unpleasant.

1. There may be a special friendship contracted for any special excellency whatsoever: because friendships are no-

thing but love and society mixed together, that is, a conversing with them whom we love; now for whatsoever we can love any one, for that we can be his friend; and since every excellency is a degree of amability, every such worthiness is a just and proper motive of friendship or loving conversation. But yet in these things there is an order and proportion. Therefore,

2. A good man is the best friend, and therefore soonest to be chosen, longer to be retained; and indeed never to be parted with, unless he cease to be that for which he was chosen.

> Τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ φίλον ὅστις ἄριστος,
> Μήποτε τὸν κακὸν ἄνδρα φίλον ποιεῖσθαι ἑταῖρον.
>
> Where virtue dwells, there friendships make,
> But evil neighbourhoods forsake.

But although virtue alone is the worthiest cause of amability, and can weigh down any one consideration; and therefore to a man that is virtuous, every man ought to be a friend; yet I do not mean the severe and philosophical excellences of some morose persons, who are indeed wise unto themselves, and exemplar to others. By virtue here I do not mean justice and temperance, charity and devotion; for these I am to love the man; but friendship is something more than that: friendship is the nearest love and the nearest society, of which the persons are capable: now justice is a good intercourse for merchants, as all men are that buy and sell; and temperance makes a man good company, and helps to make a wise man: but a perfect friendship requires something else, these must be in him that is chosen to be my friend, but for these I do not make him my privado, that is, my special and peculiar friend: but if he be a good man, then he is properly fitted to be my correlative in the noblest combination.

And for this we have the best warrant in the world: "for a just man scarcely will a man die;" the Syriac interpreter reads it, *ὑπὲρ ἀδίκου*, "for *an unjust* man scarcely will a man die," that is, a wicked man is at no hand fit to receive the expression of the greatest friendship; but all the Greek copies that ever I saw, or read of, read it as we do; "for a righteous man" or "a just man;" that is, justice and righteousness are not the nearest endearment of friendship; but for "a good man some will even dare to die," that is, for a man

that is sweetly disposed, ready to do acts of goodness and to oblige others, to do things useful and profitable; for a loving man, a beneficent, bountiful man, one who delights in doing good to his friend, such a man may have the highest friendship, he may have a friend that will die for him. And this is the meaning of Lælius, virtue may be despised, so may learning and nobility; "At una est amicitia in rebus humanis, de cujus utilitate omnes consentiunt;" "Only friendship is that thing, which because all know to be useful and profitable," no man can despise; that is, χρηστότης, or ἀγαθότης, 'goodness' or 'beneficence' makes friendships. For if he be a good man, he will love where he is beloved; and that is the first tie of friendship.

Ἀλλήλους δ' ἐφίλησαν ἴσῳ ζυγῷ.

That was the commendation of the bravest friendship in Theocritus[r],

They lov'd each other with a love
That did in all things equal prove.

——Ἦ ῥα τοτ' ἦσαν
Χρύσειοι πάλαι ἄνδρες, ὅτ' ἀντεφίλησ' ὁ φιληθείς.

The world was under Saturn's reign
When he that lov'd was lov'd again.

For it is impossible this nearness of friendship can be where there is not mutual love: but this is secured if I choose a good man; for he that is apt enough to begin alone, will never be behind in the relation and correspondency; and therefore I like the Gentile's litany well.

Ζεύς μοι τῶν τε φίλων δοίη τινὰς, οἵ με φιλεῦσι·
Ὀλβιοι οἱ φιλέοντες, ἐπὴν ἴσον ἀντεραῶνται.

Let God give friends to me for my reward,
Who shall my love with equal love regard;
Happy are they, who when they give their heart,
Find such as in exchange their own impart.

But there is more in it than this felicity amounts to. For χρηστὸς ἀνὴρ, 'the good man' is a profitable, useful person, and that is the band of an effective friendship. For I do not think that friendships are metaphysical nothings, created for contemplation, or that men or women should stare upon each other's faces, and make dialogues of news and pretti-

[r] xii. 15. Kiessling, p. 328.

nesses, and look babies in one another's eyes. Friendship is the allay of our sorrows, the ease of our passions, the discharge of our oppressions, the sanctuary to our calamities, the counsellor of our doubts, the clarity of our minds, the emission of our thoughts, the exercise and improvement of what we meditate. And although I love my friend because he is worthy, yet he is not worthy if he can do no good; I do not speak of accidental hinderances and misfortunes, by which the bravest man may become unable to help his child; but of the natural and artificial capacities of the man. He only is fit to be chosen for a friend, who can do those offices for which friendship is excellent. For (mistake not) no man can be loved for himself; our perfections in this world cannot reach so high; it is well if we would love God at that rate; and I very much fear, that if God did us no good, we might admire his beauties, but we should have but a small proportion of love towards him; and therefore it is, that God, to endear the obedience, that is, the love of his servants, signifies what benefits he gives us, what great good things he does for us. "I am the Lord God that brought thee out of the land of Egypt:" and, "Does Job serve God for nought?" and "he that comes to God, must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder:" all his other greatnesses are objects of fear and wonder, it is his goodness that makes him lovely: and so it is in friendships. He only is fit to be chosen for a friend who can give counsel, or defend my cause, or guide me right, or relieve my need, or can and will, when I need it, do me good: only this I add: into the heaps of doing good, I will reckon 'loving me,' for it is a pleasure to be beloved: but when his love signifies nothing but kissing my cheek, or talking kindly, and can go no further, it is a prostitution of the bravery of friendship to spend it upon impertinent people, who are, it may be, loads to their families, but can never ease my loads: but my friend is a worthy person when he can become to me instead of God, a guide or a support, an eye, or a hand, a staff, or a rule.

There must be in friendship something to distinguish it from a companion, and a countryman from a schoolfellow or a gossip, from a sweetheart or a fellow-traveller: friendship may look in at any one of these doors, but it stays not any

where till it come to be the best thing in the world. And when we consider that one man is not better than another, neither towards God nor towards man, but by doing better and braver things; we shall also see, that that which is most beneficent, is also most excellent; and therefore those friendships must needs be most perfect, where the friends can be most useful. For men cannot be useful but by worthinesses in the several instances: a fool cannot be relied upon for counsel; nor a vicious person for the advantages of virtue, nor a beggar for relief, nor a stranger for conduct, nor a tattler to keep a secret, nor a pitiless person trusted with my complaint, nor a covetous man with my child's fortune, nor a false person without a witness, nor a suspicious person with a private design; nor him that I fear, with the treasures of my love: but he that is wise and virtuous, rich and at hand, close and merciful, free of his money and tenacious of a secret, open and ingenuous, true and honest, is of himself an excellent man; and therefore fit to be loved; and he can do good to me in all capacities where I can need him, and therefore is fit to be a friend. I confess we are forced in our friendships to abate some of these ingredients; but full measures of friendship would have full measures of worthiness; and according as any defect is in the foundation, in the relation also there may be imperfection: and indeed I shall not blame the friendship so it be worthy, though it be not perfect; not only because friendship is charity, which cannot be perfect here, but because there is not in the world a perfect cause of perfect friendship.

If you can suspect that this discourse can suppose friendship to be mercenary, and to be defective in the greatest worthiness of it, which is to love our friend for our friend's sake, I shall easily be able to defend myself; because I speak of the election and reasons of choosing friends: after he is chosen, do as nobly as you talk, and love as purely as you dream, and let your conversation be as metaphysical as your discourse, and proceed in this method, till you be confuted by experience; yet till then, the case is otherwise when we speak of choosing one to be my friend: he is not my friend till I have chosen him, or loved him; and if any man inquires whom he shall choose or whom he should love, I suppose it

ought not to be answered, that we should love him who hath least amability, that we should choose him who hath least reason to be chosen. But if it be answered, he is to be chosen to be my friend who is most worthy in himself, not he that can do most good to me; I say, here is a distinction but no difference; for he is most worthy in himself who can do most good; and if he can love me too, that is, if he will do me all the good he can, or that I need, then he is my friend and he deserves it. And it is impossible from a friend to separate a will to do me good: and therefore I do not choose well, if I choose one that hath not power: for if it may consist with the nobleness of friendship, to desire that my friend be ready to do me benefit or support, it is not sense to say, it is ignoble to desire he should really do it when I need; and if it were not for pleasure or profit, we might as well be without a friend as have him.

Among all the pleasures and profits, the sensual pleasure and the matter of money are the lowest and the least; and therefore although they may sometimes be used in friendship, and so not wholly excluded from the consideration of him that is to choose, yet of all things they are to be the least regarded.

Ἐν τοῖς δὲ δεινοῖς, χρημάτων κρείττων φίλος.

When fortune frowns upon a man,
A friend does more than money can.

For there are, besides these, many profits and many pleasures; and because these only are sordid, all the other are noble and fair, and the expectations of them no disparagements to the best friendships. For can any wise or good man be angry if I say, I choose this man to be my friend, because he is able to give me counsel, to restrain my wanderings, to comfort me in my sorrows; he is pleasant to me in private, and useful in public; he will make my joys double, and divide my grief between himself and me? For what else should I choose? For being a fool, and useless? for a pretty face and a smooth chin? I confess it is possible to be a friend to one that is ignorant, and pitiable, handsome and good for nothing, that eats well, and drinks deep, but he cannot be a friend to me; and I love him with a fondness or a pity, but it cannot be a noble friendship.

Οὐκ ἐκ ποτῶν καὶ τῆς καθ' ἡμέραν τροφῆς
Ζητοῦμεν ᾧ πιστεύσομεν τὰ τοῦ βίου;
Πάτερ; οὐ περιττὸν οἶεται ἐξευρηκέναι
Ἀγαθὸν ἕκαστος, ἂν ἔχῃ φίλου σκίαν; said Menander[s].

By wine and mirth and every day's delight
We choose our friends, to whom, we think, we might
Our souls intrust; but fools are they, that lend
Their bosom to the shadow of a friend.

Εἴδωλα καὶ μιμήματα φιλίας, Plutarch calls such friendships, "the idols and images of friendship." True and brave friendships are between worthy persons; and there is in mankind no degree of worthiness, but is also a degree of usefulness, and by every thing by which a man is excellent, I may be profited: and because those are the bravest friends which can best serve the ends of friendships, either we must suppose that friendships are not the greatest comforts in the world, or else we must say, he chooses his friend best, that chooses such a one by whom he can receive the greatest comforts and assistances.

3. This being the measure of all friendships; they all partake of excellency, according as they are fitted to this measure: a friend may be counselled well enough, though his friend be not the wisest man in the world; and he may be pleased in his society, though he be not the best-natured man in the world; but still it must be, that something excellent is, or is apprehended, or else it can be no worthy friendship; because the choice is imprudent and foolish. Choose for your friend him that is wise and good, and secret and just, ingenuous and honest; and in those things which have a latitude, use your own liberty; but in such things which consist in an indivisible point, make no abatements; that is, you must not choose him to be your friend that is not honest and secret, just and true to a tittle; but if he be wise at all, and useful in any degree, and as good as you can have him, you need not be ashamed to own your friendships; though sometimes you may be ashamed of some imperfections of your friend.

4. But if you yet inquire further, whether fancy may be an ingredient in your choice? I answer, that fancy may minister to this as to all other actions, in which there is a liberty

[s] Clerici, p. 262.

and variety; and we shall find that there may be peculiarities and little partialities, a friendship improperly so called; entering upon accounts of an innocent passion and a pleased fancy; even our blessed Saviour himself loved St. John and Lazarus by a special love, which was signified by special treatments; and of the young man that spake well and wisely to Christ, it is affirmed, "Jesus loved him," that is, he fancied the man, and his soul had a certain cognation and similitude of temper and inclination. For in all things where there is a latitude, every faculty will endeavour to be pleased, and sometimes the meanest persons in a house have a festival: even sympathies and natural inclinations to some persons, and a conformity of humours and proportionable loves, and the beauty of the face, and a witty answer, may first strike the flint and kindle a spark, which, if it falls upon tender and compliant natures, may grow into a flame; but this will never be maintained at the rate of friendship, unless it be fed by pure materials, by worthinesses which are the food of friendship: where these are not, men and women may be pleased with one another's company, and lie under the same roof, and make themselves companions of equal prosperities, and humour their friend; but if you call this friendship, you give a sacred name to humour or fancy; for there is a Platonic friendship as well as a Platonic love; but they being but the images of more noble bodies, are but like tinsel dressings, which will shew bravely by candle-light, and do excellently in a mask, but are not fit for conversation and the material intercourses of our life. These are the prettinesses of prosperity and good-natured wit; but when we speak of friendship, which is the best thing in the world (for it is love and beneficence, it is charity that is fitted for society), we cannot suppose a brave pile should be built up with nothing; and they that build castles in the air, and look upon friendship, as upon a fine romance, a thing that pleases the fancy, but is good for nothing else, will do well when they are asleep, or when they are come to Elysium; and for aught I know, in the meantime may be as much in love with Mandana in the Grand Cyrus, as with the infanta of Spain, or any of the most perfect beauties and real excellences of the world: and by dreaming of perfect and abstracted friendships, make them so immaterial

that they perish in the handling and become good for nothing.

But I know not whither I was going; I did only mean to say that because friendship is that by which the world is most blessed and receives most good, it ought to be chosen amongst the worthiest persons, that is, amongst those that can do greatest benefit to each other; and though in equal worthiness I may choose by my eye, or ear, that is, into the consideration of the essential I may take in also the accidental and extrinsic worthinesses; yet I ought to give every one their just value; when the internal beauties are equal, these shall help to weigh down the scale, and I will love a worthy friend that can delight me as well as profit me, rather than him who cannot delight me at all, and profit me no more; but yet I will not weigh the gayest flowers, or the wings of butterflies, against wheat; but when I am to choose wheat, I may take that which looks the brightest. I had rather see thyme and roses, marjoram and July-flowers, that are fair, sweet, and medicinal, than the prettiest tulips, that are good for nothing: and my sheep and kine are better servants than racehorses and greyhounds: and I shall rather furnish my study with Plutarch and Cicero, with Livy and Polybius, than with Cassandra and Ibrahim Bassa; and if I do give an hour to these for divertisement or pleasure, yet I will dwell with them that can instruct me, and make me wise and eloquent, severe and useful to myself and others. I end this with the saying of Lælius[a] in Cicero: "Amicitia non debet consequi utilitatem, sed amicitiam utilitas." When I choose my friend, I will not stay till I have received a kindness; but I will choose such a one that can do me many if I need them: but I mean such kindnesses which make me wiser, and which make me better; that is, I will, when I choose my friend, choose him that is the bravest, the worthiest, and the most excellent person: and then your first question is soon answered; To love such a person and to contract such friendships, is just so authorized by the principles of Christianity, as it is warranted to love wisdom and virtue, goodness and beneficence, and all the impresses of God upon the spirits of brave men.

2. The next inquiry is how far it may extend? that is,

[a] Wetst. xiv. 11. pag. 188.

by what expression it may be signified? I find that David and Jonathan loved at a strange rate; they were both good men; though it happened that Jonathan was on the obliging side; but here the expressions were, Jonathan watched for David's good; told him of his danger, and helped him to escape; took part with David's innocence against his father's malice and injustice; and beyond all this, did it to his own prejudice; and they two stood like two feet supporting one body: though Jonathan knew that David would prove like the foot of a wrestler, and would supplant him, not by any unworthy or unfriendly action, but it was from God; and he gave him his hand to set him upon his own throne.

We find his parallels in the Gentile stories: young Athenodorus having divided the estate with his brother Xenon, divided it again when Xenon had spent his own share; and Lucullus would not take the consulship till his younger brother had first enjoyed it for a year; but Pollux divided with Castor his immortality; and you know who offered himself to death being pledge for his friend, and his friend by performing his word rescued him as bravely. And when we find in Scripture that 'for a good man some will even dare to die;' and that Aquila and Priscilla laid their necks down for St. Paul; and the Galatians 'would have given him their very eyes,' that is, every thing that was most dear to them, and some others were near unto death for his sake: and that it is a precept of Christian charity, 'to lay down our lives for our brethren,' that is, those who were combined in a cause of religion, who were united with the same hopes, and imparted to each other ready assistances, and grew dear by common sufferings, we need inquire no further for the expressions of friendships. "Greater love than this hath no man, than that he lay down his life for his friends;" and this we are obliged to do in some cases for all Christians; and therefore we may do it for those who are to us, in this present and imperfect state of things, that which all the good men and women in the world shall be in heaven, that is, in the state of perfect friendships. This is the biggest; but then it includes and can suppose all the rest; and if this may be done for all, and in some cases must for any one of the multitude, we need not scruple whether we may do it for those who are better than a multitude. But

as for the thing itself, it is not easily and lightly to be done; and a man must not die for humour, nor expend so great a jewel for a trifle: Μόλις ἀνεπνεύσαμεν, εἰδότες ἐπ' οὐδενὶ λυσιτελεῖ παρανάλωμα γενησόμενοι, said Philo; we will hardly die when it is for nothing, when no good, no worthy end, is served, and become a sacrifice to redeem a foot-boy. But we may not give our life to redeem another, unless, 1. The party for whom we die, be a worthy and a useful person; better for religion, and more useful to others than myself. Thus Ribischius the German died bravely, when he became a sacrifice for his master, Maurice duke of Saxony; covering his master's body with his own, that he might escape the fury of the Turkish soldiers. "Succurram perituro, sed ut ipse non peream, nisi si futurus ero magni hominis, aut magnæ rei merces," said Seneca: "I will help a dying person if I can; but I will not die myself for him, unless by my death I save a brave man, or become the price of a great thing;" that is, I will die for a prince, for the republic, or to save an army, as David exposed himself to combat with the Philistine for the redemption of the host of Israel: and in this sense, that is true, "Præstat ut pereat unus quàm unitas," "Better that one perish than a multitude." 2. A man dies bravely when he gives his temporal life to save the soul of any single person in the Christian world. It is a worthy exchange, and the glorification of that love by which Christ gave his life for every soul. Thus he that reproves an erring prince wisely and necessarily, he that affirms a fundamental truth, or stands up for the glory of the divine attributes, though he die for it, becomes a worthy sacrifice. 3. These are duty, but it may be heroic and full of Christian bravery, to give my life to rescue a noble and a brave friend, though I myself be as worthy a man as he; because the preference of him is an act of humility in me, and of friendship towards him; humility and charity making a pious difference, where art and nature have made all equal.

Some have fancied other measures of treating our friends. One sort of men say that we are to expect that our friends should value us as we value ourselves: which, if it were to be admitted, will require that we make no friendships with a proud man; and so far indeed were well; but then this pro-

portion does exclude some humble men who are most to be valued, and the rather because they undervalue themselves.

Others say, that a friend is to value his friend as much as his friend values him; but neither is this well or safe, wise or sufficient; for it makes friendship a mere bargain, and is something like the country weddings in some places where I have been; where the bridegroom and the bride must meet in the half way, and if they fail a step, they retire and break the match: it is not good to make a reckoning in friendship; that is merchandise, or it may be gratitude, but not noble friendship; in which each part strives to outdo the other in significations of an excellent love: and amongst true friends there is no fear of losing any thing.

But that which amongst the old philosophers comes nearest to the right, is that we love our friends as we love ourselves. If they had meant it as our blessed Saviour did, of that general friendship by which we are to love all mankind, it had been perfect and well; or if they had meant it of the inward affection, or of outward justice; but because they meant it of the most excellent friendships, and of the outward significations of it, it cannot be sufficient: for a friend may and must sometimes do more for his friend than he would do for himself. Some men will perish before they will beg or petition for themselves to some certain persons; but they account it noble to do it for their friend, and they will want rather than their friend shall want; and they will be more earnest in praise or dispraise respectively for their friend than for themselves. And indeed I account that one of the greatest demonstrations of real friendship is, that a friend can really endeavour to have his friend advanced in honour, in reputation, in the opinion of wit or learning, before himself.

Aurum et opes, et rura frequens donabit amicus:
Qui velit ingenio cedere, rarus erit.
Sed tibi tantus inest veteris respectus amici,
Carior ut mea sit quàm tua fama tibi[t].

Lands, gold, and trifles, many give or lend,
But he that stoops in fame, is a rare friend;
In friendship's orb thou art the brightest star,
Before thy fame mine thou preferrest far.

But then be pleased to think that therefore I so highly

[t] Martial. lib. 8. ep. 18.

value this signification of friendship, because I so highly value humility. Humility and charity are the two greatest graces in the world; and these are the greatest ingredients, which constitute friendship and express it.

But there needs no other measures of friendship, but that it may be as great as you can express it; beyond death it cannot go, to death it may, when the cause is reasonable and just, charitable and religious: and yet if there be any thing greater than to suffer death (and pain and shame to some are more insufferable), a true and noble friendship shrinks not at the greatest trials.

And yet there is a limit even to friendship. It must be as great as our friend fairly needs in all things where we are not tied up by a former duty, to God, to ourselves, or some preobliging relative. When Pollux heard somebody whisper a reproach against his brother Castor, he killed the slanderer with his fist: that was a zeal which his friendship could not warrant. "Nulla est peccati excusatio, si amici causâ peccaveris," said Cicero [a]; "No friendship can excuse a sin:" and this the braver Romans instanced in the matter of duty to their country. It is not lawful to fight on our friend's part against our prince or country; and therefore [b] when Caius Blosius of Cuma, in the sedition of Gracchus, appeared against his country, when he was taken he answered, that he loved Tiberius Gracchus so dearly, that he thought fit to follow him whithersoever he led; and begged pardon upon that account: they who were his judges, were so noble, that though they knew it no fair excuse, yet for the honour of friendship they did not directly reject his motion; but put him to death because he did not follow, but led on Gracchus, and brought his friend into the snare: for so they preserved the honours of friendship on either hand, by neither suffering it to be sullied by a foul excuse, nor yet rejected in any fair pretence. A man may not be perjured for his friend. I remember to have read, in the history of the Low Countries, that Grimston and Redhead, when Bergen-op-Zoom was besieged by the Duke of Parma, acted for the interest of the Queen of England's forces a notable design; but being suspected and put for their acquittance to take the sacrament of the altar, they dissembled their persons and their interest, their

[b] Wetzel, xi. 7. p. 174. [a] Val. Max. iv. 7. 1. Helfrecht. p. 267.

design and their religion, and did for the Queen's service (as one wittily wrote to her) give not only their bodies but their souls, and so deserved a reward greater than she could pay them: I cannot say this is a thing greater than a friendship can require, for it is not great at all, but a great villany, which hath no name, and no order in worthy intercourses; and no obligation to a friend can reach as high as our duty to God: and he that does a base thing in zeal for his friend, burns the golden thread that ties their hearts together; it is a conspiracy, but no longer friendship. And when Cato lent his wife to Hortensius, and Socrates lent his to a merry Greek, they could not amongst wise persons obtain so much as the fame of being worthy friends; neither could those great names legitimate an unworthy action under the most plausible title.

It is certain that amongst friends their estates are common; that is, by whatsoever I can rescue my friend from calamity, I am to serve him, or not to call him friend; there is a great latitude in this, and it is to be restrained by no prudence, but when there is on the other side a great necessity neither vicious nor avoidable: a man may choose whether he will or no; and he does not sin in not doing it, unless he have bound himself to it: but certainly friendship is the greatest band in the world, and if he have professed a great friendship, he hath a very great obligation to do that and more; and he can no ways be disobliged but by the care of his natural relations.

I said, 'friendship is the greatest band in the world;' and I had reason for it, for it is all the bands that this world hath; and there is no society, and there is no relation, that is worthy, but it is made so by the communications of friendship, and by partaking some of its excellences. For friendship is a transcendent, and signifies as much as unity can mean; and every consent, and every pleasure, and every benefit, and every society, is the mother or the daughter of friendship. Some friendships are made by nature, some by contract, some by interest, and some by souls. And in proportion to these ways of uniting, so the friendships are greater or less, virtuous or natural, profitable or holy, or all this together. Nature makes excellent friendships, of which we observe something in social plants; and growing better in

each other's neighbourhood than where they stand singly: and in animals it is more notorious, whose friendships extend sofar as to herd and dwell together, to play and feed, to defend and fight for one another, and to cry in absence, and to rejoice in one another's presence. But these friendships have other names less noble; they are sympathy, or they are instinct. But if to this natural friendship there be reason superadded, something will come in upon the stock of reason which will ennoble it; but because no rivers can rise higher than fountains, reason shall draw out all the dispositions which are in nature and establish them into friendships, but they cannot surmount the communications of nature: nature can make no friendships greater than her own excellences. Nature is the way of contracting necessary friendships; that is, by nature such friendships are contracted, without which we cannot live, and be educated, or be well, or be at all.

In this scene, that of parents and children is the greatest, which indeed is begun in nature, but is actuated by society and mutual endearments. For parents love their children because they love themselves. Children being but like emissions of water, symbolical or indeed the same with the fountain; and they in their posterity see the images and instruments of a civil immortality: but if parents and children do not live together, we see their friendships and their loves are much abated, and supported only by fame and duty, by customs and religion, which to nature are but artificial pillars, and make this friendship to be complicated, and to pass from its own kind to another. That of children to their parents is not properly friendship, but gratitude, and interest, and religion; and whatever can supervene of the nature of friendship, comes in upon another account; upon society and worthiness and choice.

This relation on either hand makes great dearnesses: but it hath special and proper significations of it, and there is a special duty incumbent on each other respectively. This friendship and social relation are not equal, and there is too much authority on one side, and too much fear on the other, to make equal friendships; and therefore, although this is one of the kinds of friendship, that is of a social and relative love and conversation; yet in the more proper use of the

word friendship does do something which father and son do not; I instance in the free and open communicating counsels, and the evenness and pleasantness of conversation; and consequently the significations of the paternal and filial love, as they are divers in themselves and unequal, and therefore another kind of friendship than we mean in our inquiry; so they are such a duty which no other friendship can annul: because their mutual duty is bound upon them by religion long before any other friendships can be contracted; and therefore having first possession must abide for ever. The duty and love to parents must not yield to religion, much less to any new friendships: and our parents are to be preferred before the 'corban,' and are at no hand to be laid aside but when they engage against God: that is, in the rights which this relation and kind of friendship challenge as its propriety, it is supreme and cannot give place to any other friendships; till the father gives his right away, and God or the laws consent to it; as in the case of marriage, emancipation, and adoption to another family: in which cases though love and gratitude are still obliging, yet the societies and duties of relation are very much altered, which in the proper and best friendships can never be at all. But then this also is true, that the social relations of parents and children, not having in them all the capacities of a proper friendship, cannot challenge all the significations of it; that is, it is no prejudice to the duty I owe there, to pay all the dearnesses which are due here, and to friends there are some things due which the other cannot challenge, I mean, my secret and my equal conversation, and the pleasures and interests of these, and the consequents of all.

Next to this is the society and dearness of brothers and sisters: which usually is very great amongst worthy persons; but if it be considered what it is in itself, it is but very little; there is very often a likeness of natural temper, and there is a social life under the same roof, and they are commanded to love one another, and they are equals in many instances, and are endeared by conversation when it is merry and pleasant, innocent and simple, without art and without design. But brothers pass not into noble friendships upon the stock of that relation: they have fair dispositions and advantages, and are more easy and ready to ferment into the

greatest dearnesses, if all things else be answerable. Nature disposes them well towards it: but in this inquiry if we ask what duty is passed upon a brother to a brother even for being so,—I answer, that religion and our parents and God and the laws, appoint what measures they please; but nature passes but very little, and friendship less; and this we see apparently in those brothers who live asunder, and contract new relations, and dwell in other societies. There is no love, no friendship, without the intercourse of conversation: friendships indeed may last longer than our abode together, but they were first contracted by it, and established by pleasure and benefit; and unless it be the best kind of friendship (which that of brothers in that mere capacity is not), it dies when it wants the proper nutriment and support: and to this purpose is that which was spoken by Solomon[u]; "Better is a neighbour that is near, than a brother that is far off:" that is, although ordinarily brothers are first possessed of the entries and fancies of friendship, because they are of the first societies and conversations; yet when that ceases and the brother goes away, so that he does no advantage, no benefit of intercourse; the neighbour that dwells by me, with whom if I converse at all, either he is my enemy, and does and receives evil; or if we converse in worthinesses and benefit and pleasant communication, he is better in the laws and measures of friendship than my distant brother. And it is observable that 'brother' is indeed a word of friendship and charity and of mutual endearment, and so is a title of the bravest society: yet in all the Scripture, there are no precepts given of any duty and comport, which brothers, that is, the descendants of the same parents, are to have one towards another in that capacity; and it is not because their nearness is such that they need none: for parents and children are nearer, and yet need tables of duty to be described; and for brothers, certainly they need it infinitely if there be any peculiar duty; Cain and Abel are the great probation of that, and you know who said,

> Fratrum quoque gratia rara est:—(Ov. M. 1. 145.)
> It is not often you shall see
> Two brothers live in amity.

But the Scripture, which often describes the duty of parents

[u] Prov. xxvii. 10.

and children, never describes the duty of brothers; except where by brethren are meant all that part of mankind who are tied to us by any vicinity and endearment of religion or country, of profession and family, of contract or society, of love and the noblest friendships; the meaning is, that though fraternity alone be the endearment of some degrees of friendship, without choice and without excellency; yet the relation itself is not friendship, and does not naturally infer it; and that which is procured by it, is but limited and little; and though it may pass into it, as other conversations may, yet the friendship is accidental to it, and enters upon other accounts, as it does between strangers; with this only difference, that brotherhood does oftentimes assist the valuation of those excellences, for which we entertain our friendships. Fraternity is the opportunity and preliminary disposition to friendship, and no more. For if my brother be a fool or a vicious person, the love to which nature and our first conversation dispose me, does not end in friendship, but in pity and fair provisions and assistances; which is a demonstration that brotherhood is but the inclination and address to friendship. And though I will love a worthy brother more than a worthy stranger, if the worthiness be equal, because the relation is something, and being put into the scales against an equal worthiness, must needs turn the balance, as every grain will do in an even weight; yet when the relation is all the worthiness that is pretended, it cannot stand in competition with a friend: for though a friend-brother is better than a friend-stranger, where the friend is equal, but the brother is not; yet a brother is not better than a friend; but, as Solomon's expression is, "There is a friend that is better than a brother;" and to be born of the same parents is so accidental and extrinsic to a man's pleasure, or worthiness, or spiritual advantages, that though it be very pleasing and useful that a brother should be a friend, yet it is no great addition to a friend that he also is a brother: there is something in it, but not much. But in short, the case is thus: The first beginnings of friendship serve the necessities; but choice and worthiness are the excellences of its endearment and its bravery; and between a brother that is no friend, and a friend that is no brother, there is the same difference as between the disposition and the act or habit: a brother,

if he be worthy, is the readiest and the nearest to be a friend; but till he be so, he is but the twilight of the day, and but the blossom of the fairest fruit of Paradise. A brother does not always make a friend, but a friend ever makes a brother and more: and although nature sometimes finds the tree, yet friendship engraves the image; the first relation places him in the garden, but friendship sets it in the temple, and then only it is venerable and sacred: and so is brotherhood when it hath the soul of friendship.

So that if it be asked which are most to be valued, brothers or friends; the answer is very easy; brotherhood is or may be one of the kinds of friendship, and from thence only hath its value, and therefore if it be compared with a greater friendship must give place: but then it is not to be asked which is to be preferred, a brother or a friend, but which is the better friend, Memnon or my brother? For if my brother says I ought to love him best, then he ought to love me best[x]; if he does, then there is a great friendship, and he possibly is to be preferred, if he can be that friend which he pretends to be, that is, if he be equally worthy: but if he says, I must love him only because he is my brother, whether he loves me or no, he is ridiculous; and it will be a strange relation which hath no correspondent: but suppose it, and add this also, that I am equally his brother as he is mine, and then he also must love me whether I love him or no; and if he does not, he says, I must love him though he be my enemy; and so I must; but I must not love my enemy, though he be my brother, more than I love my friend; and at last if he does love me for being his brother, I confess that this love deserves love again; but then I consider, that he loves me upon an incompetent reason: for he that loves me only because I am his brother, loves me for that which is no worthiness, and I must love him as much as that comes to, and for as little reason; unless this be added, that he loves me first: but whether choice and union of souls, and worthiness of manners, and greatness of understanding, and usefulness of conversation, and the benefits of counsel, and all those endearments which make our lives pleasant and our persons dear, are not better and greater reasons of love and

[x] Ut præstem Pyladen, aliquis mihi præstet Oresten.
Hoc non fit verbis; Marce, ut ameris, ama. Mart. lib. 6. ep. 11.

dearness than to be born of the same flesh, I think, amongst wise persons needs no great inquiry. For fraternity is but a cognation of bodies, but friendship is a union of souls, which are confederated by more noble ligatures. My brother, if he be no more, shall have my hand to help him; but unless he be my friend too, he cannot challenge my heart: and if his being my friend be the greater nearness, then friend is more than brother, and I suppose no man doubts but that David loved Jonathan for more than he loved his brother Eliab.

One inquiry more there may be in this affair, and that is, whether a friend may be more than a husband or wife; to which I answer, that it can never be reasonable or just, prudent or lawful: but the reason is, because marriage is the queen of friendships, in which there is a communication of all that can be communicated by friendship: and it being made sacred by vows and love, by bodies and souls, by interest and custom, by religion and by laws, by common counsels and common fortunes; it is the principal in the kind of friendship, and the measure of all the rest: and there is no abatement to this consideration, but that there may be some allay in this as in other lesser friendships by the incapacity of the persons: if I have not chosen my friend wisely or fortunately, he cannot be the correlative in the best union; but then the friend lives as the soul does after death, it is in the state of separation, in which the soul strangely loves the body and longs to be reunited, but the body is a useless trunk, and can do no ministries to the soul; which therefore prays to have the body reformed and restored, and made a brave and fit companion: so must these best friends, when one is useless or unapt to the braveries of the princely friendship, they must love ever, and pray ever, and long till the other be perfected and made fit; in this case there wants only the body, but the soul is still a relative, and must be so for ever.

A husband and a wife are the best friends, but they cannot always signify all that to each other which their friendships would; as the sun shines not upon a valley, which sends up a thick vapour to cover his face; and though his beams are eternal, yet the emission is intercepted by the intervening cloud. But however, all friendships are but parts of this; "a

man must leave father and mother and cleave to his wife;" that is, 'the dearest thing in nature is not comparable to the dearest thing of friendship:' and I think this is argument sufficient to prove friendship to be the greatest band in the world; add to this, that other friendships are part of this, they are marriages too; less indeed than the other, because they cannot, must not, be all that endearment which the other is; yet that, being the principal, is the measure of the rest, and are all to be honoured by like dignities, and measured by the same rules, and conducted by their portion of the same laws. But as friendships are marriages of the soul, and of fortunes, and interests, and counsels; so they are brotherhoods too; and I often think of the excellences of friendships in the words of David, who certainly was the best friend in the world; "Ecce quàm bonum et quàm jucundum fratres habitare in unum:" "It is good and it is pleasant, that brethren should live like friends;" that is, they who are any ways relative, and who are any ways social and confederate, should also dwell in unity and loving society: for that is the meaning of the word brother in Scripture; "It was my brother Jonathan," said David; such brothers contracting such friendships are the beauties of society, and the pleasure of life, and the festivity of minds: and whatsoever can be spoken of love, which is God's eldest daughter, can be said of virtuous friendships; and though Carneades made an eloquent oration at Rome against justice, yet I never saw a panegyric of malice, or ever read that any man was witty against friendship. Indeed it is probable that some men, finding themselves, by the peculiarities of friendship, excluded from the participation of those beauties of society which enamel and adorn the wise and the virtuous, might suppose themselves to have reason to speak the evil words of envy and detraction; I wonder not: for all those unhappy souls which shall find heaven's gates shut against them, will think they have reason to murmur and blaspheme; the similitude is apt enough, for that is the region of friendship, and love is the light of that glorious country, but so bright that it needs no sun: here we have fine and bright rays of that celestial flame, and though to all mankind the light of it is in some measure to be extended,—like the treasures of light dwelling in the south, yet, a little, do illus-

trate and beautify the north—yet some live under the line and the beams of friendship in that position are imminent and perpendicular.

I know but one thing more in which the communications of friendship can be restrained; and that is, in friends and enemies: "Amicus amici, amicus meus non est:" "My friend's friend is not always my friend;" nor his enemy mine; for if my friend quarrel with a third person with whom he hath had no friendships, upon the account of interest; if that third person be my friend, the nobleness of our friendships despises such a quarrel; and what may be reasonable in him, would be ignoble in me; sometimes it may be otherwise, and friends may marry one another's loves and hatreds, but it is by chance if it can be just; and therefore because it is not always right, it cannot be ever necessary.

In all things else let friendships be as high and expressive till they become a union, or that friends, like the Molionidæ, be so the same that the flames of their dead bodies make but one pyramis; no charity can be reproved, and such friendships which are more than shadows, are nothing else but the rays of that glorious grace drawn into one centre, and made more active by the union; and the proper significations are well represented in the old hieroglyphic, by which the ancients depicted friendship; "In the beauties and strength of a young man, bare-headed, rudely clothed, to signify its activity, and lastingness, readiness of action, and aptnesses to do service: upon the fringes of his garment was written 'Mors et vita,' as signifying that in life and death the friendship was the same: on the forehead was written 'Summer and winter,' that is, prosperous and adverse accidents and states of life: the left arm and shoulder were bare and naked down to the heart,—to which the finger pointed, and there was written 'Longè et propè:'" by all which we know that friendship does good far and near, in summer and winter, in life and death, and knows no difference of state or accident, but by the variety of her services: and therefore ask no more to what we can be obliged by friendship; for it is every thing that can be honest and prudent, useful and necessary.

For this is all the allay of this universality, we may do any thing or suffer any thing that is wise or necessary, or

greatly beneficial to my friend; and that in any thing, in which I am perfect master of my person and fortunes. But I would not in bravery visit my friend when he is sick of the plague, unless I can do him good equal at least to my danger; but I will procure him physicians and prayers, all the assistances that he can receive, and that he can desire, if they be in my power: and when he is dead, I will not run into his grave and be stifled with his earth; but I will mourn for him, and perform his will, and take care of his relatives, and do for him as if he were alive; and I think that is the meaning of that hard saying of a Greek poet[a];

Ἄνθρωπ', ἀλλήλοισιν ἀπόπροθεν ὦμεν ἑταῖροι·
Πλὴν τούτου, παντὸς χρήματός ἐστι κόρος.

To me, though distant, let thy friendship fly;
Though men be mortal, friendships must not die.
Of all things else there's great satiety.

Of such immortal abstracted pure friendships indeed there is no great plenty, and to see brothers hate each other is not so rare as to see them love at this rate. The dead and the absent have but few friends, say the Spaniards; but they who are the same to their friend ἀπόπροθεν, when he is in another country, or in another world, these are they who are fit to preserve the sacred fire for eternal sacrifices, and to perpetuate the memory of those exemplar friendships of the best men, which have filled the world with history and wonder: for in no other sense but this can it be true that friendships are pure loves, regarding to do good more than to receive it. He that is a friend after death, hopes not for a recompense from his friend, and makes no bargain either for fame or love; but is rewarded with the conscience and satisfaction of doing bravely: but then this is demonstration that they choose friends best, who take persons so worthy that can and will do so. This is the profit and usefulness of friendship; and he that contracts such a noble union, must take care that his friend be such who can and will; but hopes that himself shall be first used, and put to act it. I will not have such a friendship that is good for nothing, but I hope that I shall be on the giving and assisting part; and yet if both the friends be so noble, and hope and strive to do the benefit, I cannot well say which ought to yield,—and whether that

[a] Gaisford, p. 244.

friendship were braver that could be content to be unprosperous, so his friend might have the glory of assisting him;— or that which desires to give assistances in the greatest measures of friendship: but he that chooses a worthy friend that himself in the days of sorrow and need might receive the advantage, hath no excuse, no pardon, unless himself be as certain to do assistances, when evil fortune shall require them:— the sum of this answer to this inquiry I give you in a pair of Greek verses.

Ἶσον θεῷ σὺ τοὺς φίλους τιμᾶν θέλε·
Ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς δὲ τοὺς φίλους εὐεργέτει.

Friends are to friends as lesser gods, while they
Honour and service to each other pay.
But when a dark cloud comes, grudge not to lend
Thy head, thy heart, thy fortune, to thy friend.

3. The last inquiry is, how friendships are to be conducted; that is, what are the duties in presence and in absence; whether the friend may not desire to enjoy his friend as well as his friendship? The answer to which in a great measure depends upon what I have said already: and if friendship be a charity in society, and is not for contemplation and noise, but for material comforts and noble treatments and usages, this is no peradventure, but that if I buy land, I may eat the fruits, and if I take a house I may dwell in it; and if I love a worthy person, I may please myself in his society; and in this there is no exception, unless the friendship be between persons of a different sex; for then not only the interest of their religion, and the care of their honour, but the worthiness of their friendship, require that their intercourse be prudent, and free from suspicion and reproach. And if a friend is obliged to bear a calamity, so he secure the honour of his friend; it will concern him to conduct his intercourse in the lines of a virtuous prudence, so that he shall rather lose much of his own comfort, than she any thing of her honour; and in this case the noises of people are so to be regarded, that next to innocence they are the principal. But when, by caution and prudence and severe conduct, a friend hath done all that he or she can to secure fame and honourable reports; after this, their noises are to be despised: they must not fright us from our friendships, nor from her fairest intercourses; I may lawfully pluck the

clusters from my own vine, though he that walks by, calls me thief.

But by the way, Madam, you may see how much I differ from the morosity of those cynics, who would not admit your sex into the communities of a noble friendship. I believe some wives have been the best friends in the world; and few stories can outdo the nobleness and piety of that lady, that sucked the poisonous, purulent matter from the wound of our brave prince in the Holy Land, when an assassin had pierced him with a venomed arrow. And if it be told that women cannot retain counsel, and therefore can be no brave friends; I can best confute them by the story of Porcia, who, being fearful of the weakness of her sex, stabbed herself into the thigh to try how she could bear pain; and finding herself constant enough to that sufferance, gently chid her Brutus for not daring to trust her, since now she perceived that no torment could wrest that secret from her, which she hoped might be intrusted to her. If there were not more things to be said for your satisfaction, I could have made it disputable whether have been more illustrious in their friendships, men or women? I cannot say that women are capable of all those excellences, by which men can oblige the world; and therefore a female friend in some case is not so good a counsellor as a wise man, and cannot so well defend my honour; nor dispose of reliefs and assistances, if she be under the power of another: but a woman can love as passionately, and converse as pleasantly, and retain a secret as faithfully, and be useful in her proper ministries; and she can die for her friend as well as the bravest Roman knight; and we find that some persons have engaged themselves as far as death upon a less interest than all this amounts to: such were the Εὐχωλμαῖοι, as the Greeks call them; the 'Devoti' of a prince or general; the Assassins amongst the Saracens; the Soldurii amongst the old Gauls: they did as much as a friend could do. And if the greatest services of a friend can be paid for by an ignoble price, we cannot grudge to virtuous and brave women that they be partners in a noble friendship, since their conversation and returns can add so many moments to the felicity of our lives: and therefore though a knife cannot enter as far as a sword, yet a knife may be more useful to some purposes,

and in every thing, except it be against an enemy. A man is the best friend in trouble, but a woman may be equal to him in the days of joy: a woman can as well increase our comforts, but cannot so well lessen our sorrows: and therefore we do not carry women with us when we go to fight; but, in peaceful cities and times, virtuous women are the beauties of society and the prettinesses of friendship. And when we consider that few persons in the world have all those excellences, by which friendship can be useful and illustrious, we may as well allow women as men to be friends; since they can have all that which can be necessary and essential to friendships, and these cannot have all by which friendships can be accidentally improved; in all, some abatements will be made; and we shall do too much honour to women if we reject them from friendships, because they are not perfect: for if to friendships we admit imperfect men, because no man is perfect; he that rejects women, does find fault with them because they are not more perfect than men; which either does secretly affirm that they ought and can be perfect, or else it openly accuses men of injustice and partiality.

I hope you will pardon me that I am a little gone from my undertaking: I went aside to wait upon the women and to do countenance to their tender virtues: I am now returned, and, if I were to do the office of a guide to uninstructed friends, would add the particulars following. Madam, you need not read them now, but when any friends come to be taught by your precept and example how to converse in the noblest conjurations, you may put these into better words and tell them,

1. That the first law of friendship is, they must neither ask of their friend what is indecent; nor grant it if themselves be asked. For it is no good office to make my friend more vicious or more a fool; I will restrain his folly, but not nurse it; I will not make my groom the officer of my lust and vanity. There are villains who sell their souls for bread, that offer sin and vanity at a price: I should be unwilling my friend should know I am vicious; but if he could be brought to minister to it, he is not worthy to be my friend: and if I could offer it to him, I do not deserve to clasp hands with a virtuous person.

2. Let no man choose him for his friend whom it shall be possible for him ever after to hate; for though the society may justly be interrupted, yet love is an immortal thing, and I will never despise him whom I could once think worthy of my love. A friend that proves not good, is rather to be suffered, than any enmities be entertained: and there are some outer offices of friendship and little drudgeries, in which the less worthy are to be employed, and it is better that he be below-stairs than quite thrown out of doors.

3. There are two things which a friend can never pardon, a treacherous blow and the revealing of a secret, because these are against the nature of friendship; they are the adulteries of it, and dissolve the union; and in the matters of friendship, which is the marriage of souls, these are the proper causes of divorce: and therefore I shall add this only, that secrecy is the chastity of friendship, and the publication of it is a prostitution and direct debauchery; but a secret, treacherous wound is a perfect and unpardonable apostasy. I remember a pretty apologue that Bromiard tells,—A fowler in a sharp frosty morning having taken many little birds for which he had long watched, began to take up his nets; and nipping the birds on the head laid them down. A young thrush, espying the tears trickling down his cheeks by reason of the extreme cold, said to her mother, that certainly the man was very merciful and compassionate that wept so bitterly over the calamity of the poor birds: but her mother told her more wisely, that she might better judge of the man's disposition by his hand than by his eye;—and if the hands do strike treacherously, he can never be admitted to friendship, who speaks fairly and weeps pitifully. Friendship is the greatest honesty and ingenuity in the world.

4. Never accuse thy friend, nor believe him that does; if thou dost, thou hast broken the skin: but he that is angry with every little fault, breaks the bones of friendship. And when we consider that in society and the accidents of every day, in which no man is constantly pleased or displeased with the same things, we shall find reason to impute the change unto ourselves; and the emanations of the sun are still glorious, when our eyes are sore: and we have no reason to be angry with an eternal light, because we have a

changeable and a mortal faculty. But however, do not think thou didst contract alliance with an angel, when thou didst take thy friend into thy bosom; he may be weak as well as thou art, and thou mayest need pardon as well as he; and that man loves flattery more than friendship, who would not only have his friend, but all the contingencies of his friend, to humour him.

Μή ποτ' ἐπὶ σμικρῷ προφάσει φίλον ἄνδρ' ἀπολίσσῃς,
Πειθόμενος χαλεπῇ, Κύρνε, διαζολίῃ.
Εἴτις ἁμαρτωλῆσι φίλων ἐπὶ πάντι χολῶτο,
Οὔ ποτ' ἂν ἀλλήλοις ἄρθμιοι, οὐδὲ φίλοι.
Theog. 325. Gaisford, p. 229.

5. Give thy friend counsel wisely and charitably, but leave him to his liberty whether he will follow thee or no: and be not angry if thy counsel be rejected: for advice is no empire, and he is not my friend that will be my judge whether I will or no. Neoptolemus had never been honoured with the victory and spoils of Troy, if he had attended to the tears and counsel of Lycomedes, who being afraid to venture the young man, fain would have had him sleep at home safe in his little island. He that gives advice to his friend and exacts obedience to it, does not the kindness and ingenuity of a friend, but the office and pertness of a schoolmaster.

6. Never be a judge between thy friends in any matter where both set their hearts upon the victory: if strangers or enemies be litigants, whatever side thou favourest, thou gettest a friend; but when friends are the parties thou losest one.

7. Never comport thyself so, as that my friend can be afraid of thee: for then the state of the relation alters when a new and troublesome passion supervenes. "Oderunt quos metuunt."—"Perfect love casteth out fear;" and no man is friend to a tyrant; but that friendship is tyranny where the love is changed into fear, equality into empire, society into obedience; for then all my kindness to him also will be no better than flattery.

8. When you admonish your friend, let it be without bitterness; when you chide him, let it be without reproach; when you praise him, let it be with worthy purposes, and for just causes, and in friendly measures; too much of that is flattery, too little is envy: if you do it justly, you teach him

true measures; but when others praise him, rejoice, though they praise not thee, and remember that if thou esteemest his praise to be thy disparagement, thou art envious, but neither just nor kind.

9. When all things else are equal, prefer an old friend before a new. If thou meanest to spend thy friend, and make gain of him till he be weary, thou wilt esteem him as a beast of burden, the worse for his age: but if thou esteemest him by noble measures, he will be better to thee by thy being used to him, by trial and experience, by reciprocation of endearments, and an habitual worthiness. An old friend is like old wine, which when a man hath drunk, he doth not desire new, because he saith "the old is better." But every old friend was new once; and if he be worthy, keep the new one till he become old.

10. After all this, treat thy friend nobly, love to be with him, do to him all the worthinesses of love and fair endearment, according to thy capacity and his; bear with his infirmities till they approach towards being criminal; but never dissemble with him, never despise him, never leave him. [y] Give him gifts and upbraid him not, [z] and refuse not his kindnesses, and be sure never to despise the smallness or the impropriety of them. "Confirmatur amor beneficio accepto:" "A gift (saith Solomon) fasteneth friendships." For as an eye that dwells long upon a star, must be refreshed with lesser beauties and strengthened with greens and looking-glasses, lest the sight become amazed with too great a splendour; so must the love of friends sometimes be refreshed with material and low caresses; lest by striving to be too divine it become less human: it must be allowed its share of both: it is human in giving pardon and fair construction, and openness and ingenuity, and keeping secrets; it hath something that is divine, because it is beneficent; but much because it is eternal.

[y] Extra fortunam est, quicquid donatur amicis;
Quas dederis, solas semper habebis opes.—Mart. lib. 5. ep. 43.
Est tamen hoc vitium, sed non leve, sit licèt unum,
Quòd colit ingratas pauper amicitias.
Quis largitur opes veteri, fidóque sodali?—Ep. 19.

[z] Non bellè quædam faciunt duo: sufficit unus
Huic operi: si vis ut loquar, ipse tace.
Crede mihi, quamvis ingentia, Postume, dona
Auctoris pereunt garrulitate sui.—Ep. 53.

POSTSCRIPT.

MADAM,

IF you shall think it fit that these papers pass further than your own eye and closet, I desire they may be consigned into the hands of my worthy friend Dr. Wedderburne: for I do not only expose all my sickness to his cure, but I submit my weaknesses to his censure; being as confident to find of him charity for what is pardonable, as remedy for what is curable: but indeed, Madam, I look upon that worthy man as an idea of friendship; and if I had no other notices of friendship or conversation to instruct me than his, it were sufficient: for whatsoever I can say of friendship, I can say of his; and as all that know him reckon him amongst the best physicians, so I know him worthy to be reckoned amongst the best friends.

DUCTOR DUBITANTIUM,

OR

THE RULE OF CONSCIENCE.

TO

THE MOST SACRED MAJESTY

OF

CHARLES II.

KING OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND IRELAND,
DEFENDER OF THE FAITH, &c.

GREAT SIR,

THE circles of Divine Providence turn themselves upon the affairs of the world so, that every spondyl of the wheels may mark out those virtues, which we are then to exercise; and every new event in the economy of God is God's finger to point out to us by what instances he will be served. We have been sorely smitten and for a long time; for (that I may use the words of the Prophet), "Alas, for that day was great, so that none was like to it, it was even the time of Jacob's trouble[a];" and then, faith and patience, and all the passive graces of religion, were in their own season. But since God hath left off to smite us with an iron rod, and hath once more said unto these nations "They shall serve the Lord their God, and David their king whom I have raised up unto them;" now our duty stands on the sunny side; it is our work to rejoice in God and in God's Anointed,

[a] Jer. xxx. 7.

and to be glad, and worthily to accept of our prosperity is all our business: for so good a God we serve, that he hath made it our duty to be happy, and we cannot please him unless we be infinitely pleased ourselves. It was impossible to live without our king; but as slaves live, that is, such who are civilly dead, and persons condemned to metals; we lived to the lusts and insolency of others, but not at all to ourselves, to our own civil or religious comforts. But now our joys are mere and unmixed; for that we may do our duty and have our reward at once, God hath sent your Majesty amongst us, that we may feel the pleasures of obedience, and reap the fruits of that government which God loves and uses, which he hath constituted and adorned, which he hath restored to us by a conjugation of miracles, by the work of his hand and the light of his countenance, by changing the hearts of men, and 'scattering the people that delight in war,' by infatuating their counsels and breaking their cords asunder; that is, which he himself hath wrought amongst us by himself alone, and therefore will bless and will never interrupt: only we must be careful never to provoke him any more by our unthankfulness and infidel apostasy.

But now, great Sir, be pleased to give me leave in the throngs of those that rejoice to see the goodness of God to his servant Job, in imitation of them who presented him with, every man, an ear-ring of

gold, and a piece of silver [b], or a lamb, to bring also my offering, the signification of my joy. For though it be but two books, which, like the widow's two mites, make up but a contemptible sum; yet because it is all I have, your Majesty may be pleased to accept: and so much the rather, because it is also an expression of that part of the duty of my calling which hath fallen to my share. For your Majesty, like the king in the Gospel, hath been in a far country, and some of your citizens sent after you, and said, "Nolumus hunc regnare [c];" but God hath caused you to return and reign: and if your Majesty should by that example call us to render an account of our talents, I can only say, that amongst those many excellent persons who have greatly improved theirs, I was willing to negotiate and to labour. What fruit will from hence accrue to souls is wholly in the hands of God: but this semination and culture were much wanted in the reformed churches. For though in all things else the goodness of God hath made us to abound, and our cup to run over; yet our labours have been hitherto unemployed in the description of the rules of conscience and casuistical theology. In which because I have made some attempt, if this production be not unworthy, I am sure it is not improper to lay it at the feet of your Majesty. For your Majesty being by God appointed "custos utrius-

[b] [illegible] [c] Luke, xix. 14.

tabulæ," since, like Moses, you are from God descended to us with the two tables of the law in your hand, and that you will best govern by the arguments and compulsory of conscience, and this alone is the greatest firmament of obedience; whatsoever can be the measure of conscience "est res fisci," is part of your own propriety, and enters into the exchequer.

Be pleased therefore, gracious Sir, to accept this instance of my duty to God, to your Majesty, and to your great charge, the church of England. There are in it many things intended for the service, but nothing to disserve any of these great interests. Those cases that concern the power and offices of ecclesiastical superiors and supreme, were (though in another manner) long since done by the incomparable Mr. Hooker[d], and the learned Archbishop of Spalato[e]: but their labours were unhappily lost, and never saw the light. And though I cannot attain to the strength of these champions of David and guardians of the temple; yet since their portion of work is fallen into my hand, I have heartily endeavoured to supply that loss; though with no other event, but as charitable passengers by their little, but well-meaning, alms repair the breaches of his fortune, who was greatly undone by the war or fire. But therefore I humbly beg your Majesty's pardon in all things, where my weaknesses make me to despair of your more

[d] Lib. 7, 8. of Eccles. Polity. [e] Lib. 8. de Rep. Eccles.

gracious acceptance: and here I am therefore to be confident, because your mercy is, as your Majesty, this day in her exaltation, felt by all your subjects; and therefore humbly to be hoped for by,

Great Sir,

Your Majesty's

Most dutiful and most obedient Subject,

JER. TAYLOR.

THE

PREFACE.

THE reformation of religion in the western churches hath been so violently, so laboriously, so universally, opposed by evil spirits and evil men, by wilfulness and ignorance, by prejudice and interest, by error and partiality; and itself also hath been done so imperfectly in some places, and so unskilfully in some others, because the thick and long-incumbent darkness had made it impossible to behold the whole light in all its splendour; that it was found to be work enough for the ministers of religion to convince the gainsayers, to oppose their witty arts by the advantageous representment of wise truths, so to keep the people from their temptations. But since there were not found many able to do this but such which had other cures to attend, the conduct of souls in their public and private charges, and the consequent necessity of preaching and catechising, visiting the sick, and their public daily offices; it was the less wonder that in the reformed churches there hath been so great a scarcity of books of conscience: though it was not to be denied but the careless and needless neglect of receiving private confessions hath been too great a cause of our not providing materials apt for so pious and useful a ministration. But besides this it is certain that there was a necessity of labouring to other purposes than formerly: and this necessity was present and urgent; and the hearts and heads of men ran to quench that fire, and left the government of the house more loosely, till they could discern whether the house would be burnt or no by the flames of contention which then brake out: only this duty was supplied by excellent preachings, by private conferences, by admonitions and answers given when some more pious and religious persons came to confessions, and as they were upon particular occasions required and invited. But for any public provisions of books of casuistical theology,

we were almost wholly unprovided; and, like the children of Israel in the days of Saul and Jonathan, we were forced to go down to the forges of the Philistines to sharpen every man his share and his coulter, his axe and his mattock. We had swords and spears of our own, enough for defence, and more than enough for disputation: but in this more necessary part of the conduct of consciences, we did receive our answers from abroad, till we found that our old needs were sometimes very ill supplied, and new necessities did every day arise.

Some of the Lutherans have indeed done something in this kind which is well; Balduinus, Bidenbachius, Dedekanus, Konig, and the abbreviator of Gerard: some essays also have been made by others; Alstedius, Amesius, Perkins, and the late eloquent and reverend Bishop of Norwich. But yet our needs remain; and we cannot be well supplied out of the Roman storehouses: for though there the staple is, and very many excellent things exposed to view; yet we have found the merchants to be deceivers, and the wares too often falsified.

For, 1. If we consider what heaps of prodigious propositions and rules of conscience their doctors have given us, we shall soon perceive that there are so many boxes of poison in their repositories under the same paintings and specious titles, that as it will be impossible for every man to distinguish their ministries of health from the methods of death; so it will be unsafe for any man to venture indiscriminately. For who can safely trust that guide that teaches him, that "it is no deadly sin to steal, or privately against his will and without his knowledge to take a thing from him who is ready to give it if he were asked, but will not endure to have it taken without asking[a]:"—that "it is no theft privately to take a thing that is not great, from our father[b]:"—"that he who sees an innocent punished for what himself hath done, he in the meantime who did it, holding his peace, is not bound to restitution[c]:"—that "he who falls into fornication if he goes to confession, may, the same day in which he did fornicate, receive the communion; that communion is manducation, and therefore requires not attention[d]:"—"that he,

[a] Emman. Sa Aphor. 5. Furtum.
[b] Prov. xxviii. 24.
[c] Idem 5. Restitutio.
[d] Diana de Euchar. in compend. n. 30—32.

who, being in deadly sin, receives the holy communion, commits but one sin, viz. that against the dignity of the sacrament; and that the omission of confession is no distinct sin, meaning, amongst them who believe confession to be of divine institution?"—As bad or worse are those affirmatives and doctrines of repentance: "A dying man is not tied to be contrite for his sins; but confession and attrition are sufficient[d]:" and that we may know what is meant by attrition, we are told "it is a sorrow for temporal evil, disgrace, or loss of health, sent by God as a punishment, or feared to be sent[e]:" this alone is enough for salvation, if the dying man do but confess to the priest, though he have lived wickedly all his lifetime. And that we need not think the matter of confession to be too great a burden, we are told, "He that examines his conscience before confession, sins if he be too diligent and careful." But as for the precept of having a contrite and a broken heart, "it binds not but in the article or danger of death: nor then, but when we cannot have the sacrament of penance[f]."—To these may be added those contradictions of severity for the securing of a holy life; that "if a man purpose at the present to sin no more, though at the same time he believes he shall sin again (that is, he will break his purpose), yet that purpose is good enough: that it is not very certain whether he that hath attrition, does receive grace, though he does not formally resolve to sin no more[g]:" meaning, that it is probable, that it is not necessary to make any such resolution of leaving their sin; they are not certain it is so, nor certain that it is otherwise; that is, they find no commandment for these things: it may be they are counselled and advised in Scripture, but that is no great matter[h]; for "it is no sin not to correspond with the divine inspirations exhorting us to counsels."—Add to these, that "to detract from our neighbour's fame before a conscientious, silent, and a good man, is no deadly sin: to dispense with our vows in a year of jubilee is valid, though the condition of obtaining that jubilee be not performed[i]."—Thus men amongst them have leave to sin, and they may live in it, as long as their life lasts, without repentance: and that repent-

[d] Idem de Pœnit. n. 3. 7.
[e] Num. 11. 17, 18.
[f] Num. 18.
[g] Num. 19.
[h] Id. Verb. Detractio. num. 5.
[i] Dispensatio, num. 11.

ance in the sum of affairs is nothing but to call to the priest to absolve them; provided you be sorrowful for the evil you feel or fear God will send on you: but contrition, or sorrow proceeding from the love of God, is not at all necessary; "neither is it necessary that our sorrow be thought to be contrition [k]; neither is it necessary that attrition should go before confession, but will serve if it be some time after; and if you confess none but venial sins, it is sufficient if you be sorrowful for one of them; and the case is the same for mortal sins formerly confessed [l]." But I am ashamed of this heap of sad stories: if I should amass together what themselves have collected in their books, it would look like a libel: but who is pleased with variety of such sores, may enter into the hospitals themselves, and walk and look till he be weary.

2. But not only with the evil matter of their propositions; but we have reason to be offended with the strange manner of their answerings. I shall not need to instance in that kind of argument which is but too frequent among those who prevail more by their authority than their reason, of proving propositions by similitudes and analogies. I remember that Gregory Sayr [m] says, that all precepts of the moral law are to be reduced to the decalogue; because as all natural things are reduced to ten predicaments, so it is expedient that all kinds of virtue and vice be reduced to the ten commandments. And Bessæus infers seven sacraments from the number of the planets, and the seven ears of full corn in Egypt, and seven waterpots changed into wine (though they were but six), because as the wine filled six waterpots, so the sacrament of the eucharist fills the other six, and itself makes the seventh; and that therefore peradventure the sacraments are called vessels of grace. But this I look upon as a want of better arguments in a weak cause, managed by careless and confident persons; and note it only as a fault, that the guides of consciences should speak many things, when they can prove but few.

3. That which I suppose to be of greatest consideration is, that the casuists of the Roman church take these things for resolution and answer to questions of conscience, which are spoken by an authority that is not sufficient; and they

[k] Concil. Trid. sess. 14. cap. 4. [l] Dian. Compend. de Pœnit. Sacram. n. 8.
[m] Clavis Regia, lib. 4. c. 2. n. 5.

admit of canons, and the epistles of popes, for authentic warranties, which are suspicious, whether ever they were written by them to whose authority only they do pretend;—and they quote sayings of the old doctors, which are contradicted by others of equal learning and reputation, and all cited in their own canon law; and have not any sufficient means to ascertain themselves what is binding in very many cases argued in their canons, and decretal epistles, and bulls of popes. Nay, they must needs be at a loss in their conduct of consciences, especially in all inquiries and articles of faith when they choose such foundations, which themselves know to be weak and tottering; and yet lay the greatest load upon such foundations, and tie the conscience with the hardest ligature, where it is certain they can give no security. For it is not agreed in the church of Rome, neither can they tell upon whose authority they may finally rely: they cannot tell who is the visible head of the church: for they are not sure the pope is; because a council may be superior to him, and whether it be or no, it is not resolved: and therefore either they must change their principle, and rely only upon scriptures and right reason and universal testimonies, or give no answer to the conscience in very many cases of the greatest concernment; for by all other measures their questions are indeterminable. But the authority of man they make to be their foundation: and yet if their allegations were allowed to be good argument, it would serve them but to very few purposes, since the doctors, whose affirmative is the decision of the case, are so infinitely divided.

4. This to me, and to very many wise men, looks like a very great objection: but I find that they who are most concerned in it, account it none; for the Roman casuists profess it; and yet do not suppose that the consequent of this should be, that the case is difficult, and the men not to be relied upon, and the conscience to be otherwise informed, and that we ought to walk the more warily, but therefore the conscience is at liberty, and the question in order to practice hath no difficulty; hard in the case, but easy in the action: for by this means they entertain all interests, and comply with all persuasions, and send none away unsatisfied. For uncertain answers make with them no uncertain resolution; for they teach us, that in such cases we may follow either part: and therefore they studiously keep up this academical or ra-

ther sceptic theology, "alii aiunt, alii negant; utrumque probabile [n]." And upon this account, although with greatest severity they bind on men's persuasions the doctrines of meats and carnal ordinances, yet they have left them loose enough when it comes to the conscience, so loose that the precept is become ridiculous: for what can it be otherwise, when they teach, that "the fast is not broken by drinking of water or wine, nay, though we eat something that our drink may not hurt us; nor the usual collation at night if it be taken in the morning; nor if the butler or the cook lick his fingers: nor if we eat eggs or milk-meats, so it be not in the holy time of Lent; nor if after dinner awhile you eat something at the entreaty of a friend; nor if you upon a reasonable cause eat before your time: in all these cases you eat and fast at the same time [o]." All these things are derivatives from the contrary opinions of some easy, gentle doctors; and the effect of this stratagem is seen in things of greater consequence. For "we are free from our vow, or from a commandment, if it be a probable opinion of the doctors that we are free [p];" and it is probable, if it be the opinion of one grave doctor: that is, in effect, plainly, if it be probable in the doctrine, it is certain in practice; and it is probable, if any one of their doctors says it.

5. And the mischief of this is farther yet discernible, if we consider that they determine their greatest and most mysterious cases oftentimes by no other argument but the saying of some few of their writers. I shall give but one instance of it; but it shall be something remarkable. The question was, 'Whether the Pope can dispense in the law of God [q]?' The inquiry is not concerning a dish of whey, but of a considerable affair; upon which the right or the wrong of many thousand consciences amongst them do depend. It answered "that one opinion of the Catholics says, that the pope can dispense in all things of the law of God, excepting the articles of faith."—The proof is this, so Panormitan speaks, 'in cap. Proposuit, de Concess. Præbend. n. 20.' citing Innocentius 'in cap. cum ad Monasterium, de Statu Monachorum,' where he says, that without cause the pope cannot dispense in things of divine right; intimating that without cause he may. And the same is the opinion of Felinus 'in cap. Quæ in Ec-

[n] Sa Aphor. verb. Jejun. n. 11.
[o] Ibid. n. 8.
[p] Idem verb. Dubium.
[q] Suarez. lib. 10. de Leg. cap. 6. n. 3.

cles. de Const. n. 19 et 20.' where amongst other things he saith, that the pope when he hath cause, can change the usual form of baptism, and make it lawful to baptize in the name of the Trinity, which he reports out of Innocentius, 'cap. 1. de Baptis. in fine, num. 11.' Yea, the same Felinus is bold to affirm 'in cap. 1. de Const. n. 23.' that the pope with one word can create a priest, without any other solemnity, saying, Be thou a priest; which he reports out of Innocentius 'in cap. 1. Sacra Unct.' The same Felinus adds further, that the Pope with his word alone can make a bishop; and he cites 'Angelus in lib. 2. cap. de Crim. Sacrilegii; et in lib. 1. cap. de Sententiam passis.' The same is held by Decius 'consil. 112. n. 3. in fine: et in dict. cap. Quæ in Eccles. n. 25. et seq. alias n. 44 et 45. in Novis. Allegantur etiam alii Juristæ in cap. 2. de translat. Episcopi; et in lib. Manumissiones. ff. de just. et jure; et in lib. 2. cap. de Servit.'" &c.

Here is a rare way of probation: for these allegations are not only a testimonial that these Catholic authors are of that opinion; but it is intended to represent, that this opinion is not against the Catholic faith; that popes and great lawyers are of it; and therefore that it is safe, and it may be followed, or be let alone: but yet this is sufficient to determine the doubting conscience of a subject, or be propounded to him as that on which he may with security and indemnity rely. The thing is affirmed by Felinus, and for this he quotes Innocentius; and the same is the opinion of Decius, and for this opinion divers other lawyers are alleged. Now when this or the like happens to be in a question of so great concernment as this, it is such a dry story, such an improbable proof, so unsatisfying an answer to the conscience, that the great determination of all those questions and practices,—which can depend upon so universal an article as this, and a warranty to do actions which, their adversaries say, are abhorrent from the law of nature and common honesty,—shall, in their final resort, rest upon the saying of one or two persons, who, having boldly spoken a foolish thing, have passed without condemnation by those superiors, for whose interest they have been bold to tell so great a lie.

In conclusion, the effect of these uncertain principles and unsteady conduct of questions is this; that though by violence and force they have constrained and thrust their

churches into a union of faith, like beasts into a pound, yet they have made their cases of conscience and the actions of their lives unstable as the face of the waters, and immeasurable as the dimensions of the moon; by which means their confessors shall be enabled to answer according to every man's humour, and no man shall depart sad from their penitential chairs, and themselves shall take or give leave to any thing; concerning which I refer the reader to the books and letters written by their parties of Port-Royal, and to their own weak answers and vindications.

If I were willing, by accusing others, to get reputation to my own, or the undertakings of any of our persuasion or communion, I could give very many instances of their injustice and partialities in determining matters and questions of justice, which concern the church and their ecclesiastical persons; as if what was just amongst the reprobates of the laity were hard measure if done to an ecclesiastic, and that there were two sorts of justice, the one for seculars and the other for churchmen; of which their own books[r] give but too many instances. I could also remark that the monks and friars are 'iniquiores in matrimonium,' and make inquiries into matrimonial causes with an impure curiosity, and make answers sometimes with spite and envy, sometimes with licentiousness; that their distinction of sins mortal and venial hath intricated and confounded almost all the certainty and answers of moral theology; but nothing of this is fitted to my intention, which is only to make it evident that it was necessary that cases of conscience should be written over anew, and established upon better principles, and proceed in more sober and satisfying methods: nothing being more requisite than that we should all "be instructed, and thoroughly prepared to every good work;" that we should "have a conscience void of offence both towards God and towards man;" that we should be able "to separate the vile from the precious," and know what to choose and what to avoid; that "we may have our senses exercised to discern between good and evil," that we may not "call good evil, or evil good." For since obedience is the love of God, and to do well is the life of religion, and the end of faith is the

[r] Vide Summas Cas. Consc. in verbis, Immunitas. Ecclesia. Hospitale. Privilegium. Clericus. Monasterium, &c.

death of sin and the life of righteousness; nothing is more necessary than that we be rightly informed in all moral notices; because in these things an error leads on to evil actions, to the choice of sin, and the express displeasure of God; otherwise than it happens in speculation and ineffective notices and school-questions.

And indeed upon this consideration I was always confident, that though the questions of the school were nice and subtile, difficult and very often good for nothing; yet that in moral theology I should have found so perfect an accord, so easy determination of questions, that it would have been harder to find out questions than answers; and the great difficulty in books of this subject would be to put the great number of inquiries into order and method. I was not deceived in the ground and reason of my conjecture; because I knew that "in promtu et facili est æternitas;" God had made the way to heaven plain and simple; and what was necessary did lie open, and the lines of duty were to be read by every eye, or heard and learned by all understandings; and therefore it is certain that all practical truths are to be found out without much contention and dispute, because justice and obedience to God in all moral conversation are natural to us, just as logic and discourse are. But when I came to look a little nearer, I found that men were willing enough to be tied up to believe the inactive propositions of the doctors, but would keep a liberty of pleasing themselves in matters of life and conversation: in the former they would easily be governed by leading men; but in the latter they would not obey God himself, and without great regret would not be confined to strictness and severity in their cases of conscience. Some would; but many would not. They that would, gave laws unto themselves, and they could easily be governed; but they that would not, were ready to trample upon their yoke, if it were not made gentle and easy for their neck. But this was the least part of the evil.

For besides this, moral theology was made a trade for the house, and an art of the schools: and as nothing is more easy than natural logic, and yet nothing harder than sophistical, so it is in moral theology; what God had made plain, men have intricated; and the easy commandment is wrapped up in uneasy learning; and by the new methods, a sim-

ple and uncrafty man cannot be 'wise unto salvation;' which is but small comfort to him that stands in the place of the idiot and unlearned. Sometimes a severe commandment is expounded by the sense of ease and liberty, and the liberty is established in rule; but because the rule is not true in some hundreds of cases, a conscientious man does not know how to make use of it: and if the commandment be kept close to the sense of strictness and severity, there are so many outlets and escapes found out, that few men think themselves obliged. Thus in the rule, "Spoliatum ante omnia restituendum," which is an excellent measure of conscience in many cases, and certainly can have no direct abatement in the duty, and the party obliged can only be relieved by equity in the manner of doing it; yet of this plain and easy rule, Gabrielius brings no less than threescore and ten limitations: and to make all questions of that nature and the rule of conscience infinite and indeterminable, Menochius hath seven hundred ninety and eight questions concerning 'possession;'—and "who is sufficient for these things?"—There is a rule amongst the lawyers which very much relates to the conscience of those men, who are engaged in suits and sentences of law in all countries which are ruled by the civil law: "In quolibet actu requiritur citatio." Of this rule Porcius brings a hundred and sixteen ampliations, and a hundred and four-and-twenty limitations.—Maranta enumerates forty cases, in which a negative ought to be proved: and Socinus sets down eight hundred and two 'fallencies' (that is the word of the law), concerning the contestation of suits and actions at law. Many more might be reckoned even in the interpreters of the civil law, and in the measures we derive from thence. But if any man thinks it better in the canon law, which is supposed to be as great a rule of our conscience in the matter of religion as the other is of justice; I shall only say, that the very title of the canon law was 'Concordantia Discordantiarum,' a tying of contradictions together in one string: and when you begin to look into the interpreters of the 'Decretum,' which is the best part of the canon law, Simoncellus [a] tells that the word 'decretum' hath five-and-twenty significations. So that there is a wood before your doors, and a labyrinth within the wood, and locks

[a] Tract. de Decretis.

and bars to every door within that labyrinth; and after all we are like to meet with unskilful guides; and yet of all things in the world, in these things an error is the most intolerable.

But thus the enemy of mankind hath prevailed upon us, while we were earnest in disputations about things less concerning: then he was watchful and busy to interweave evil and uncertain principles into our moral institutions, to entangle what was plain, to divide what was simple, to make an art of what was written in the tables of our hearts with the finger of God. When a gentleman was commending Dr. Fisher's (bishop of Rochester) great pains in the confutations of Luther's books, the wise prelate said heartily, that he wished he had spent all that time in prayer and meditation which he threw away upon such useless wranglings. For that was the wisdom of the ancients: "Antiqua sapientia nihil aliud quam facienda et vitanda præcepit: et tunc meliores erant viri. Postquam docti prodierunt, boni desunt. Simplex enim illa et aperta virtus in obscuram et solertem scientiam versa est; docemurque disputare, non vivere:" "Our forefathers taught their children what to do and what to avoid; and then men were better. But when men did strive to become learned, they did not care so much to become good; then they were taught to dispute rather than to live[t]." To this purpose I understand that excellent saying of Solomon; "Of making many books there is no end, and much study is a weariness of the flesh. Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter. Fear God and keep his commandments; for this is the whole duty of man[u]:"—meaning, that books which serve to any other purpose, are a laborious vanity, consumptive of our time and health to no purpose: nothing else being to any purpose but such things which teach us to fear God, and how to keep his commandments. All books, and all learning, which minister to this end, partake of the goodness of the end; but that which promotes it not, is not to be regarded: and therefore the Chaldee paraphrast reads these words into an advice of making many books tending to holiness: "Fili mi, monitus esto ut facias libros sapientiæ plurimos, adeo ut non sit finis; et ut studeas verbis legis, conspiciasque defatigationem carnis:" "Make books of wisdom very many, and study in the words of the law till thou

[t] Seneca ad Lucil. [u] Eccles. xii. 12.

mayest see the weariness of thy flesh:" "Beata ætas quæ in vita hominum regenda totam disputandi rationem posuit;" "Blessed are the times in which men learn to dispute well that they may live the better."—And truly it were much to be wished that men would do so now; endeavouring to teach the ways of godliness in sincerity: to shew to men the right paths of salvation; to describe the right and plain measures of simplicity, Christian charity, chastity, temperance, and justice; to unwind the entanglements of art, and to strip moral theology of all its visors; to detract all the falsehoods and hypocrisies of crafty men; to confute all the false principles of evil teachers, who by uncertain and deceitful grounds teach men to walk confidently upon trap-doors and pitfalls, and preach doctrines so dangerous and false, that if their disciples would live according to the consequents of such doctrines, without doubt they must perish everlastingly.

It is a great work and too heavy for one man's shoulders; but somebody must begin; and yet no man ever would, if he can be affrighted with the consideration of any difficulty in the world. But I have laid aside all considerations of myself, and with an entire dependence upon God for help, I have begun an institution of moral theology, and established it upon such principles and instruments of probation which every man allows, and better than which we have none imparted to us. I affirm nothing but upon grounds of Scripture, or universal tradition, or right reason discernible by every disinterested person, where the questions are of great concern, and can admit of these probations: where they cannot, I take the next best; the laws of wise commonwealths and the sayings of wise men, the results of fame and the proverbs of the ancient, the precedents of holy persons and the great examples of saints. Πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τἀκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται· παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται, μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι, καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν [x]. "He that is well instructed will require in every kind of argument and disputation no other proof or subtilty than the subject-matter will bear. For it were ridiculous for a mathematician to go about to persuade with eloquence, or an orator to pretend to demonstrations."—But moral theo-

[x] Arist. lib. 1. Eth. c. 3. Wilkinson, p. 5.

logy is a collective body of all wisdom, whereof some things are demonstrable, and many are probable, and other things are better than their contraries; and they are to be proved accordingly, every thing in its proportion and capacity. And therefore here I make use of all the brocardics, or rules of interpreters; that is, not only what is established regularly in law, but what is concluded wise and reasonable by the best interpreters. Socinus, Duennas, Azo, Gabrielius, Damasus, and divers other great lawyers, attempted this way in the interpretation of the civil and canon law. I intermeddle not in the question, whether they did well or ill, but leave the contest as it lies between Duarenus and Balduinus, who blame them, and Wesenbech and Gribaldus, who are their confident advocates. But in the discourses of conscience, whatsoever is right reason, though taken from any faculty or science, is also of use and efficacy. Because whatever can guide the actions or discourses, or be the business or the conduct, of any man, does belong to conscience and its measures; and what is true in any science, is true in conscience.

I do not say that what is true or allowed in human laws is also true or allowed in the divine; because though God does justly and wisely, yet men do not always so; and what is true in sciences is not always understood to be true in civil laws. 'Qualis causa, talis effectus,' saith the philosopher; 'The cause and the effect are of the same nature.'—But the lawyer says, this is not always true. For manumission, which is a cause of liberty, is of the civil law and positive institution; but liberty, which is the effect of it, is of the law of nature. Now although the philosopher understands his rule of natural causes and effects, or those causes which are artificial, but operate by the way of nature, and intends it not at all to be persuasive in matters of positive and legal institution; yet this truth and all other truths must prevail in conscience, because they are emanations from the fountain of truth; from whence nothing can derive that is not always true, and in all senses true, where they are intended to persuade or teach. But then the truths of philosophy must be used in the measures of conscience by the intentions of philosophy, and not be carried on to a disparate matter, and without cause be indifferently applied, the same words to things of another nature. There is a rule in philo-

losophy, "Incorporalia sunt individua:" from hence Hottoman argues, therefore dominion, heritage, 'ususfructus,' or 'the use of a thing by him that is not the Lord,' are individual, because they are incorporeal.—Now this will deceive him that trusts upon it: not because what is true in one place, is not true always and every where; but because these words applied to other matters, and the words signifying other intentions, they abuse the weary hearer, but instruct not. But because the questions of conscience do relate to all matters, therefore to these all arts and sciences do minister. "Res fisci est, ubicunque natat," "Whatsoever swims upon any water, belongs to this exchequer;" that is, saith St. Austin [y], "Christianus Domini sui esse intelligit, ubicunque invenerit veritatem," "If it be truth, wheresoever it be found, the Christian knows it is his Lord's goods:" and therefore I have proved and adorned some truths with the wise saying of philosophers and poets, "ut Deo serviat quicquid puer utile didici," that (according to the expression of the same saint [z]) "whatsoever, being a child, I learned which can profit, may be brought in to serve and pay homage to God."—But still they are to be understood according to the sense and meaning of their proper art where they dwell. And though there is great need of skill in all those sciences from whence we derive notices in order to the conduct of conscience; and that it will be hard for any man to pretend to be master of all those things which must be used in these discourses; yet I, who will not pretend to that, have yet taken as good a course as I could to inform myself, though not in the whole system of every art in the whole circle which I have here occasionally used, yet I have been careful to understand those few things, which I have thence drawn in as auxiliaries: and lest I should yet fail, I have taken another course by way of caution and defence, that I may be right and sure in the reflex, if I had cause to doubt of any thing in the direct notice.

For I have propounded to myself general measures to be as boundaries to the determination of doubts and the answer of questions; which so long as I do deserve, my error will be very innocent, if any happens. For, 1. In hard and intricate questions I take that which is easy and intelligible,

[y] De Doct. Christi. lib. 2. c. 18. [z] Confess. lib. 1. c. 15.

and concerning which it will be easy to judge whether it be right or wrong. 2. In odious things, and matters of burden and envy, I take that part which is least, unless there be evident reason to the contrary. 3. In favours I always choose the largest sense, when any one is bettered by that sense, and no man is the worse. 4. In things and questions relating to men, I give those answers that take away scruples, and bring peace and a quiet mind. 5. In things relating to God, I always choose to speak that thing which to him is most honourable. 6. In matters of duty, I always choose that which is most holy. 7. In doubts I choose what is safest. 8. In probabilities, I prefer that which is the more reasonable, never allowing to any one a leave of choosing that, which is confessedly the less reasonable in the whole conjunction of circumstances and relative considerations.

Upon the account of these principles I hope to serve God and the good of souls. For these being the points of my compass, which way soever I sail, I shall not suffer shipwreck: and if at any time I go about, which I have avoided as much as my infirmities will permit, yet at last, and in the whole, I arrive where I ought to be. For indeed in this whole affair I have proceeded with great fear; as knowing that he who writes cases of conscience, does in a manner give laws to all that do believe him: and no man persuades more vehemently than he that tells you, 'This, God forbids;—This, God commands;' and therefore I knew that to be mistaken here was very evil, and might do much evil; but to be careless, or prejudicate, or partial, or flattering, or oppressive with severity, or unsafe with gentleness, was criminal in the cause as well as mischievous in the event: and the greatest security which I have that I have not spoken unsafely in any man's case, is, because that I have prayed much, and laboured much, that I might not at all minister to error or schism, to folly or vanity, but to the glory of God, and to the good of souls: and I have so determined every case that I have here presented, as I myself would practise, as I would account at the day of judgment, through the mercies of God in Jesus Christ, and the integrity and simplicity of my conscience: and therefore I desire that my reader will use the same caution and ingenuity before he condemns any conclusion, and consider, that as in these

things it was impossible to please every man, ἔργμασιν ἐν μεγάλοις πᾶσιν ἀδεῖν χαλεπόν[z]: so I designed to please no man but as he is a lover of truth, and a lover of his own soul.

The style that I here use, is according as it happens; sometimes plain, sometimes closer: the things which I bring are sometimes new, and sometimes old; they are difficult and they are easy; sometimes adorned with cases, and the cases specificated in stories, and sometimes instead of a story I recite an apologue, and disguise a true narrative with other names, that I may not discover the person whose case I discourse of: and in all things I mind the matter; and suppose truth alone and reason and the piety of the decision to be the best ornament; and indeed sometimes the thing itself will not be handled otherwise.

Ornari res ipsa negat, contenta doceri.

I was here to speak to the understanding, not to win the affections; to convince, not to exhort: and where I had no certainty in a case, or that the parts of a question were too violently contended for, without sufficient evidence on either side, I have not been very forward to give my final sentence; but my opinion and my reason;

Per verbum forte respondent sæpe periti[a].

And yet I hope that in some cases it will be found, that though I am not fierce, positive, and decretory, yet the case itself is sufficiently declared, so that he who hath occasion to use it, may upon those accounts determine himself. For the modesty of him that teaches, is not always an argument that he is uncertain in his proposition. Τὸ νομίζω, καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐ πάντως ἐπὶ ἀμφιβόλου τάττουσιν οἱ παλαιοὶ, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀληθεύειν· οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὸ νομίζω ἐνταῦθα ἀντὶ τοῦ κρίνω, καὶ πιστεύω, saith Ulpian[b]. When the ancients said, 'I suppose, I think, It seems,' they did not always mean that they were uncertain; but they sometimes intended it for a modest, but a direct affirmative: and so I do in some few cases where there is great reason on one side, and a great prejudice on the other: I give my reasons, and lay down the case, and all its allays, and leave it to prevail without my sentence by its own strength. And

[z] Solon. frag. Gaisford, p. 335.

[a] Glos. in c. quorum appel. non recipiuntur. [b] B. 3. 15. ad Olynth. 1.

for this, I hope, no man will be offended at me: if he be, it is because I was not willing to offend him; but I was desirous to instruct, to comfort, to determine and to establish, him that needs.

I have studiously avoided all questions that are curious and unprofitable; such, I mean, which are only trials of wit, but neither ministers of justice nor religion. Such was that which was brought before the lawyers and all the learned men of Athens, with great noises to little purpose.—A gentleman of Ægina, dying, left three daughters [c]; the one was beauteous and wanton; the second a lover of wine and gay pleasures; and the third a good spinster, and a great follower of country housewifery. He made the mother of these daughters to be his heir upon this condition, that she should divide all his estate between his daughters equally; but in such a manner, that what they received they should neither possess nor enjoy; and as soon as ever they had quitted their portions, they should pay, each of them, to their mother ten thousand philippics. The mother runs to Athens, consults the lawyers and philosophers how this will should be fulfilled; but they know not, as supposing one part to cross another, and altogether to be impossible; for if the whole estate should be divided amongst them, how is it that they shall not enjoy it? and if they do not, how shall they pay their mother her assignment? The mother therefore, finding no help there, contrives it thus herself; to the pretty wanton she gives rich clothes, smooth eunuchs, soft beds, sweet perfumes, silver lavatories, and all things which, she supposed, might please her lust, and consume her portion. To the drinking girl she provides vessels of rich wines, a house well furnished, and all things fitted for expensive entertainments. But to the country housewife a good farm, ploughmen, and a great stock, many horses and some cows, some menservants and a great many maidens, a kennel of hounds and a few swine; supposing this was no very probable way for her to thrive, but the likeliest way to do her husband's will; because the lust of the first, and thirst and debauchery of the second, and the ill-contrived stock of the third, would consume all their portions. But all this while she considered not, how, when they grew poor, she should receive her share. But at last a wiser man than was in the schools of Athens

[c] Phædrus, iv. 5.

advised her thus: Give to the drunken maiden the rich garments, the jewels, and the eunuchs; and because she loves them not, she will sell them all for old wines of Chios:—to the wanton give fields and cattle, oxen and ploughs, hinds and swine: and she will quickly sell them that she may entertain her lovers:—but if you give vessels of wine to the country-girl, she knows not what to do with them, and therefore will sell them to the merchant for ready money. Thus shall neither of them enjoy their portion; but by selling it, they shall be enabled to pay the money to their mother.—This was a riddle, rather than a case of law or conscience; and so are many others, which I therefore resolved to lay aside, and trouble no man's conscience or head with them; as supposing that the answer of the dull Diodorus, mentioned in the Greek epigram, is sufficient for such curiosities.

Ἦ σοι, ἢ τῷ ἰλλόττι, &c. [d]

It is so, or it is not so; it must be done this way, or some other; the thing in question is yours, or some body's else: but make the judge your friend, and I will warrant your cause, provided it be just; but look you to that. A slight answer to an intricate and useless question is a fit cover to such a dish; a cabbage-leaf is good enough to cover a pot of mushrooms: but I have taken a shorter way, and laid them all aside; remembering the saying of Friar John Annias to Nicolaus de Lyra; 'Testimonium Dei lucidum est, nec egent literæ divinæ plicis,' 'The things of God are plain and easy:' and therefore I have rejected every thing that is not useful and intelligible; choosing only to make such inquiries by which we may become better, and promoted in something of our duty;

Quid summus, et quidnam victuri gignimur, ordo
Quis datus, aut metæ quam mollis flexus, et undæ,
Quis modus argento, quid fas optare, quid asper
Utile nummus habet, patriæ, carisque propinquis
Quantum elargiri deceat, quem te Deus esse
Jussit, et humana qua parte locatus es in re:

viz. that we may be taught how to know what God requires of us, 'instructed to salvation, and fitted to every good work.'

But now I shall desire that he who reads my book, will

[d] Jacobs, Anthol. vol. 4. p. 26.—Brunck. iii. p. 57.

not expect this book to be a collective body of particular cases of conscience; for I find that they are infinite, and my life is not so; and I shall never live to write them all, or to understand them all: and if I should write some and not all, I should profit I know not whom, and do good but to a very few, and that by chance too; and, it may, be that their cases, being changed by circumstances, would not be fitted by my indefinite answers. I therefore resolved upon another way; which although no man before me hath trod in writing cases of conscience, yet I cannot say it is new; for I took my pattern from Tribonianus the lawyer, who out of the laws of the old Romans collected some choice rules, which give answer to very many cases that happen. And after I had considered and tried many others, I found this most reasonable, most useful, and most comprehensive, of all matters relating to my present undertaking. For I intend here to offer to the world a general instrument of moral theology, by the rules and measures of which, the guides of souls may determine the particulars that shall be brought before them; and those who love to inquire, may also find their duty so described, that unless their duties be complicated with laws, and civil customs, and secular interests, men that are wise may guide themselves in all their proportions of conscience: but if their case be indeed involved, they need the conduct of a spiritual guide, to untie the intrigue, and state the question, and apply the respective rules to the several parts of it; for though I have set them down all in their proper places relating to their several matters, yet when a question requires the reason of many rules, it is not every hand that can apply them: men will for ever need a living guide; and a wise guide of souls will, by some of these rules, be enabled to answer most cases that shall occur.

For although I have not given answers to every doubt, yet I have told what we are to do when any doubt arises; I have conducted the doubting conscience by such rules, which in all doubts will declare her duty: and therefore if the matter of the doubt be in the reception of the sacrament of the eucharist, or in wearing clothes, or in eating, the rule is the same and applicable to every matter. I have not disputed whether sumptuary laws be actually obligatory to us in England or Ireland; but I have told by what measures we shall

know concerning all laws, whether they be obligatory or no, in any place, and to every person. I have not expounded all the laws of God, but I have told by what rules they are to be expounded and understood. But because these rules have influence upon all particulars, I have, by way of instance and illustration, determined very many special cases: and I was a little curious to choose such which are the matter of our usual inquiries; and have been very studious to draw into particular scrutiny most of the principal and noblest questions of Christendom, which could relate to the matter of my rule; provided that they were practical and did minister to good manners; having that of Lactantius in my mind; "Non tam de rebus humanis bene meretur, qui scientiam bene dicendi affert, quam qui pie et innocenter docet vivere:" "He best deserves of mankind, who teaches men to live well rather than to talk well:" and therefore the wiser Greeks preferred philosophers before orators: "Illi enim recte vivendi doctores sunt existimandi, quod est longe præstabilius:" "It is better to be a doctor of good life, than of eloquent or learned speaking:" for they are but few who are capable of eloquence, but to live well is the duty of all: and I have always been pleased with the saying of Jupiter to Pallas in the apologue, when he kissed her cheek for choosing the fruitful olive.

Nisi utile est, quod facimus, stulta est gloria[e].

Unless it does good and makes us better, it is not worth the using: and therefore it hath been no small part of my labour not only to do what was necessary, but to lay aside what was useless and unfit, at least what I thought so.

In this manner by the divine assistance I have described a rule of conscience: in the performance of which I shall make no excuses for my own infirmities, or to guard myself from the censure of the curious or the scorners. I have with all humility and simplicity desired to serve God, and to minister to his church, and I hope he will accept me: and for the rest, I have laid it all at his most holy feet, and therefore will take no further care concerning myself in it. Only I am desirous that now I have attempted to describe a general rule, they who find it defective would be pleased to make

[e] Phædrus, iii. 17. Schwabe, vol. 2. p. 132.

this more perfect by adding their own symbol; which is much easier than to erect that building, which needs but some addition to make it useful to all its purposes and intentions. But if any man, like a bird sitting upon a tree, shall foul the fruit and dishonour it, that it may be unfit for food, I shall be sorrowful for him that does so, and troubled, that the good which I intended to every one, should be lost to any one. But I shall have the Prophet's[f] comfort, if I have done my duty in righteousness and humility: "Though I labour in vain and spend my strength for nought, yet surely my judgment is with the Lord, and my work is with my God."—

I know not whether I shall live to add matter to this form, that is, to write a particular explication of all the precepts of Christian religion; which will be a full design of all special cases and questions of conscience measurable by this general rule. If I do not, I hope God will excite some other to do it; but whoever does it, he will do it with so much the more profit, by how much he does dispute the less; and I remember that Socrates and Sozomen tell, that Ælius the heretic was counted an atheist "propter eristicum loquendi et disputandi modum," because he taught no part of religion, but he minced it into questions and chopped it into Aristotle's logic. The simple and rational way of teaching God's commandments, as it is most easy, so it is most useful; and all the cases that will occur, will the most easily be answered by him, that considers and tells in what cases they bind, and in what they bind not: which is the duty of him that explicates, and may be delivered by way of plain rule and easy commentary.

But this I shall advertise; that the preachers may retrench infinite number of cases of conscience, if they will more earnestly preach and exhort to simplicity and love; for the want of these is the great multiplier of cases. Men do not serve God with honesty and heartiness, and they do not love him greatly; but stand upon terms with him, and study how much is lawful, how far they may go, and which is their utmost step of lawful, being afraid to do more for God and for their souls than is simply and indispensably necessary; and oftentimes they tie religion and their own lusts together, and the one entangles the other, and both are made less discernible, and less

[f] Isa. xlix. 4.

practicable. But the good man understands the things of God; not only because God's Spirit, by secret immissions of light, does properly instruct him; but because he hath a way of determining his cases of conscience which will never fail him. For if the question be put to him whether it be fit for him to give a shilling to the poor; he answers that it is not only fit, but necessary to do so much at least, and to make it sure, he will give two: and in matter of duty he takes to himself the greater share; in privileges and divisions of right, he is content with the least: and in questions of priority and dignity he always prevails by cession, and ever is superior by sitting lowest, and gets his will, first by choosing what God wills, and then what his neighbour imposes or desires. But when men have no love to God, and desire but just to save their souls, and weigh grains and scruples, and give to God no more than they must needs, they shall multiply cases of consciences to a number which no books will contain, and to a difficulty that no learning can answer.

The multiplication also of laws and ceremonies of religion does exceedingly multiply questions of practice; and there were among the Jews, by reason of their numerous rites, many more than there were at first among the Christians. For we find the apostles only exhorting to humility, to piety towards parents, to obedience to magistrates, to charity and justice; and the Christians who meant well understood well, and needed no books of conscience but the rule, and the commandment. But when error crept in, truth became difficult and hard to be understood: and when the rituals of the church and her laws became numerous, then religion was hard to be practised: and when men set up new interests, then the laws of conscience were so many, that as the laws of the old Romans,

——— verba minantia fixo
Ære legebantur ———

which at first were nailed in a brass plate upon a wall, became at last so numerous and filled so many volumes, that their very compendium made a large digest; so are these too many to be considered, or perfectly to be understood; and therefore either they must be cut off by simplicity and an honest heart, and contempt of the world, and our duty must

look for no measures but love and the lines of the easy commandment,—or else we can have no peace and no security. But with these there is not only collateral security, but very often a direct wisdom. Because he that endeavours to keep a good conscience and hath an honest mind, besides that he will inquire after his duty sufficiently, he will be able to tell very much of it himself; for God will assist him, and cause that "his own mind shall tell him more than seven watchmen that sit in a tower;" and if he miss, he is next to an excuse, and God is ready to pardon him: and therefore in what sect of Christianity soever any man is engaged, if he have an honest heart, and a good conscience, though he be in darkness, he will find his way out, or grope his way within; he shall be guided, or he shall be pardoned; God will pity him, and find some way for his remedy; and if it be necessary, will bring him out.

But however it come to pass, yet now that the inquiries of conscience are so extremely numerous, men may be pleased to observe that theology is not every man's trade; and that it requires more wisdom and ability to take care of souls, than those men, who now-a-days run under the formidable burden of the preacher's office, can bring from the places of their education and first employment. Which thing I do not observe, that by it I might bring reputation to the office of the clergy; for God is their portion and lot, and as he hath given them work enough, so he hath given them honour enough, though the world despise them: but I speak it for their sakes who do what they ought not, and undertake what they cannot perform; and consequently do more hurt to themselves and others than possibly they imagine; which it were better they should amend, than be put to answer for it before him, who loves souls better than he loved his life, and therefore would not intrust them to the conduct of such persons, who have need to be taught the plain things of salvation, and learn to do justice and charity, and the proper things of a holy religion.

Concerning myself I shall make no request to my reader, but that he will charitably believe I mean well, and have done my best. If any man be troubled that he hath expected this nothing so long; I cannot make him other answer, but that I am afraid it is now too soon: and I bless God that I had

abilities of health and leisure now at last to finish it: but I should have been much longer, if God had not, by the piety of one of his servants, provided for me a comfortable retirement and opportunity of leisure: which if I have improved to God's glory, or to the comfort and institution of any one, he and I both have our ends, and God will have his glory; and that is a good conclusion, and to that I humbly dedicate my book.

From my study in Portmore in Kilultagh,
October 5, 1659.

THE

RULE OF CONSCIENCE.

BOOK I.

OF CONSCIENCE, THE KINDS OF IT, AND THE GENERAL RULES OF CONDUCTING THEM.

CHAP. I.

THE RULE OF CONSCIENCE IN GENERAL.

RULE I.

Conscience is the Mind of a Man governed by a Rule, and measured by the Proportions of Good and Evil, in Order to Practice; viz. to conduct all our Relations, and all our Intercourse, between God, our Neighbours, and ourselves: that is, in all moral Actions.

1. God governs the world by several attributes and emanations from himself. The nature of things is supported by his power, the events of things are ordered by his providence, and the actions of reasonable creatures are governed by laws, and these laws are put into a man's soul or mind as into a treasury or repository: some in his very nature, some by after-actions, by education and positive sanction, by learning and custom; so that it was well said of St. Bernard [g]; 'Conscientia candor est lucis æternæ, et speculum sine macula Dei Majestatis, et imago bonitatis illius:' 'Conscience is the brightness and splendour of the eternal light, a spotless mirror of the Divine Majesty, and the image of the goodness of God.' It is higher which Tatianus said of conscience; Μόνον εἶναι συνείδησιν Θεὸν, 'Conscience is God unto us;' which saying he had from Menander,

Βροτοῖς ἅπασι συνείδησις Θεός,

and it had in it this truth, that God, who is every where in

[g] Lib. de Interior. Domo.

several manners, hath the appellative of his own attributes and effects in the several manners of his presence.

Jupiter est quodcunque vides, quocunque moveris[h].

2. That providence which governs all the world, is nothing else but God present by his providence: and God is in our hearts by his laws: he rules in us by his substitute, our conscience. God sits there and gives us laws; and as God said to Moses[i], "I have made thee a god to Pharaoh," that is, to give him laws, and to minister in the execution of those laws, and to inflict angry sentences upon him; so hath God done to us. He hath given us conscience to be in God's stead to us, to give us laws, and to exact obedience to those laws, to punish them that prevaricate, and to reward the obedient. And therefore conscience is called οἰκεῖος φύλαξ, ἔνοικος Θεὸς, ἐπίτροπος δαίμων, 'the household guardian,' 'the domestic god,' 'the spirit or angel of the place:' and when we call God to witness, we only mean, that our conscience is right, and that God and God's vicar, our conscience, knows it. So Lactantius[k]: 'Meminerit Deum se habere testem, id est, ut ego arbitror, mentem suam, qua nihil homini dedit Deus ipse divinius:' 'Let him remember that he hath God for his witness, that is, as I suppose, his mind; than which God hath given to man nothing that is more divine.'—In sum, it is the image of God: and as in the mysterious Trinity, we adore the will, memory, and understanding,—and theology contemplates three persons in the analogies, proportions, and correspondences, of them: so in this also we see plainly that conscience is that likeness of God, in which he was pleased to make man. For although conscience be primarily founded in the understanding, as it is the lawgiver, and dictator: and the rule and dominion of conscience 'fundatur in intellectu,' 'is established in the understanding part;' yet it is also memory, when it accuses or excuses, when it makes joyful and sorrowful; and there is in it some mixture of will, as I shall discourse in the sequel; so that conscience is a result of all, of understanding, will, and memory.

3. But these high and great expressions are better in the spirit than in the letter; they have in them something of in-

[h] Lucan, ix. 580. Oudendorp. p. 720.
[i] Exod. vii. 1.
[k] Lib. 6. de Vero Cultu. cap. 24.

stitution, and something of design, they tellus that conscience is a guard and a guide, a rule and a law set over us by God, and they are spoken to make us afraid to sin against our conscience, because by so doing we sin against God; he having put a double bridle upon us, society and solitude, that is, company and ourselves, or rather, God and man; it being now impossible for us to sin in any circumstances, but we shall have a reprover: *ἵνα μήτε μόνωσις ἐπεγείρῃ σε πρὸς τὸ μὴ πρέπον, μήτε κοινωνία εὐαπολόγητόν σοι ποιήσῃ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν*, as Hierocles[1] said well; that neither company may give countenance or excuseto sin, or solitariness may give confidence or warranty; for as we are ashamed to sin in company, so we ought to fear our conscience, which is God's watchman and intelligencer.

4. To which purpose it was soberly spoken of Tertullian[m], 'Conscientia optima testis Divinitatis;' 'Our conscience is the best argument in the world to prove there is a God:' for conscience is God's deputy; and the inferior must suppose a superior; and God and our conscience are like relative terms, it not being imaginable why some persons in some cases should be amazed and troubled in their minds for their having done a secret turpitude, or cruelty; but that conscience is present with a message from God, and the men feel inward causes of fear, when they are secure from without: that is, they are forced to fear God, when they are safe from men. And it is impossible that any man should be an atheist, if he have any conscience: and for this reason it is, there have been so few atheists in the world, because it is so hard for men to lose their conscience wholly.

5. Quest. Some dispute whether it be possible or no for any man to be totally without conscience. Tertullian's sentence in this article is this: 'Potest obumbrari, quia non est Deus: extingui non potest, quia à Deo est:' 'It is not God, and therefore may be clouded: but it is from God, and therefore cannot be destroyed.'—But I know a man may wholly lose the use of his reason; some men are mad, and some are natural fools, and some are sots, and stupid; such men as these lose their conscience, as they lose their reason: and as some madmen may have a fancy that there is no sun; so some fools may say there is no God: and as they can be-

[1] Needham, p. 62, at the bottom. [m] Lib. de Testimon. Animæ.

lieve that,—so they can lose their conscience, and believe this. But as he that hath reason or his eyes, cannot deny but there is such a thing as the sun, so neither can he that hath conscience, deny there is a God. For as the sun is present by his light which we see daily,—so is God by our conscience which we feel continually: we feel one as certainly as the other.

6. (1.) But it is to be observed, that conscience is sometimes taken for the practical intellective faculty; so we say, The law of nature, and the fear of God, are written in the conscience of every man.

(2.) Sometimes it is taken for the habitual persuasion and belief of the principles written there; so we say, He is a good man, and makes conscience of his ways. And thus we also say, and it is true, that a wicked person is of a profligate and 'lost conscience;' he 'hath no conscience' in him. That is, he hath lost the habit, or that usual persuasion and recourse to conscience, by which good men govern their actions.

(3.) Or the word conscience is used effectively, for any single operation and action of conscience: so we speak of particulars, 'I make a conscience of taking up arms in this cause.' Of the first and last acception of the word 'conscience' there is no doubt; for the last may, and the first can never, be lost: but for the second, it may be lost more or less, as any other habit can: though this with more difficulty than any thing else, because it is founded so immediately in nature, and is so exercised in all the actions and intercourses of our life, and is so assisted by the grace of God, that it is next to impossible to lose the habit entirely; and that faculty that shall to eternal ages do the offices which are the last, and such as suppose some preceding actions, I mean, to torment and afflict them for not having obeyed the former act of dictate and command, cannot be supposed to die in the principle, when it shall be eternal in the emanation; for the worm shall never die.

For, that men do things against their conscience, is no otherwise than as they do things against their reason; but a man may as well cease to be a man, as to be wholly without conscience. For the drunkard will be sober, and his conscience will be awake next morning: this is a perpetual pulse, and though it may be interrupted, yet if the man be alive, it will beat before he dies; and so long as we believe

a God, so long our conscience will at least teach us, if it does not also smite us: but as God sometimes lets a man go on in sin and does not punish him, so does conscience; but in this case, unless the man be smitten and awakened before he dies, both God and the conscience reserve their wrath to be inflicted in hell. It is one and the same thing, God's wrath, and an evil guilty conscience; for by the same hand by which God gives his law, by the same he punishes them that transgress the law. God gave the old law by the ministry of angels; and when the people broke it, 'he sent evil angels among them[n];' now God gives us a law in our consciences, and there he hath established the penalty; this is the 'worm that never dies;' let it be trod upon never so much here, it will turn again. It cannot die here, and it shall be alive for ever.

But by explicating the parts of the rule, we shall the best understand the nature, use, and offices, of conscience.

Conscience is the Mind of a Man.

7. When God sent the blessed Jesus into the world to perfect all righteousness, and to teach the world all his Father's will, it was said, and done, "I will give my laws in your hearts, and in your minds will I write them[o];" that is, 'you shall be governed by the law of natural and essential equity and reason, by that law which is put into every man's nature: and besides this, whatsoever else shall be superinduced, shall be written in your minds by the Spirit, who shall write all the laws of Christianity in the tables of your consciences. He shall make you to understand them, to perceive their relish, to remember them because you love them, and because you need them, and cannot be happy without them: he shall call them to your mind, and inspire new arguments and inducements to their observation, and make it all as natural to us, as what we were born with.'

8. Our mind being thus furnished with a holy rule, and conducted by a divine guide, is called "conscience;" and is the same thing which in Scripture is sometimes called "the heart;" there being in the Hebrew tongue, no proper word for conscience, but instead of it they use the word לֵבָב 'the

[n] Psal. lxxviii. 49. [o] Heb. x. 16. Jer. xxxi. 33.

heart [p]; "Oftentimes also thine own heart knoweth," that is, thy conscience knoweth, "that thou thyself hast cursed others," so in the New Testament; "Beloved, if our hearts condemn us not, then have we peace towards God[q]," viz. if in our own consciences we are not condemned. Sometimes it is called 'spirit[r],' the third ingredient of the constitution of a Christian; the spirit, distinct from soul and body. For as our body shall be spiritual in the resurrection, therefore because all its offices shall entirely minister to the spirit, and converse with spirits, so may that part of the soul,—which is wholly furnished, taught and conducted by the spirit of grace, and whose work it is wholly to serve the spirit,—by a just proportion of reason be called the spirit. This is that which is affirmed by St. Paul; "The word of God is sharper than a two-edged sword, dividing the soul and the spirit[s];" that is, the soul is the spirit separated by the word of God, instructed by it, and, by relation to it, is called the spirit. And this is the sense of Origen[t]; "Testimonio sane conscientiæ uti Apostolus dicit eos, qui descriptam continent in cordibus legem," &c. "The Apostle says, that they use the testimony of conscience, who have the law written in their hearts. Hence it is necessary to inquire what that is which the Apostle calls conscience, whether it be any other substance than the heart or soul. For of this it is otherwhere said that it reprehends; but is not reprehended, and that it judges a man, but itself is judged of no man: as John saith, 'If our conscience condemn us not, then have we confidence towards God.' And again, St. Paul himself saith in another place, 'Our glorying is this, even the testimony of our conscience;' because therefore I see so great a liberty of it, that in good things it is always glad and rejoices, but in evil things it is not reproved, but reproves and corrects the soul itself to which it does adhere; I do suppose that this is the very spirit, which by the Apostle is said to be with the soul, as a pedagogue and social governor, that it may admonish the soul of better things, and chastise her for her faults, and reprove her: because 'no man knows the things of a man but the

[p] Eccles. vii. 22.—Apud Syros conscientia dicitur תאראא à radice תאר formavit, depinxit, descripsit; quia scilicet conscientia notat et pingit actiones nostras in tabula cordis.

[q] 1 John, iii. 21.

[r] Prov. xviii. 14.

[s] Heb. iv. 12.

[t] In Epist. ad Rom. cap. ii. lib. 2.

spirit of a man which is in him;' and that is the spirit of our conscience, concerning which, he saith, that spirit gives testimony to our spirit."—So far Origen.

9. Thus, conscience is the mind, and God "writing his laws in our minds," is, informing our conscience, and furnishing it with laws, and rules, and measures, and it is called by St. Paul, *νόμος τοῦ νοὸς*, 'the law of the mind[u];' and though it is once made a distinct thing from the mind (as in those words[x], "their minds and consciences are defiled,") yet it happens in this word as in divers others, that it is sometimes taken largely, sometimes specifically and more determinately: the mind is all the whole understanding part, it is the memory; so Peter 'called to mind' the word that Jesus spake[y], that is, he remembered it. It is, the signification or meaning, the purpose or resolution. "No man knoweth the mind of the spirit, but the spirit[z]." It is the discursive or reasoning part; "Mary cast in her mind what manner of salutation this should be[a]." It is the assenting and determining part; "Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind[b]:" and it is also taken for conscience, or that treasure of rules which are in order to practice. And therefore, when St. Paul intended to express the anger of God punishing evil men with evil consciences and false persuasions, in order to criminal actions, and evil worshippings, he said, "God gave them over, *εἰς νοῦν ἀδόκιμον*, to a reprobate mind[c]," that is, to a conscience evil persuaded, furnished with false practical principles; but the return to holiness, and the improvement of a holy conscience, is called, "a being renewed in the spirit of our mind[d]," *ἀνακαίνωσις τοῦ νοὸς*, "the renovation of the mind[e]."

10. Now there are two ways by which God reigns in the mind of a man, 1. Faith; and, 2. Conscience. Faith contains all the treasures of divine knowledge and speculation. Conscience is the treasury of divine commandments and rules in practical things. Faith tells us why; conscience tells us what we are to do. Faith is the measure of our persuasions; conscience is the measure of our actions. And as faith is a gift of God, so is conscience; that is, as the understanding

[u] Rom. vii. 23.
[x] Titus, i. 15.
[y] Mark, xiv. 72.
[z] 1 Cor. ii. 11.
[a] Luke, i. 29.
[b] Rom. xiv. 5.
[c] Rom. i. 28.
[d] Ephes. iv. 23.
[e] Rom. xii. 2.

of a man is taught by the Spirit of God in Scripture, what to believe, how to distinguish truth from errors; so is the conscience instructed to distinguish good and evil, how to please God, how to do justice and charity to our neighbour, and how to treat ourselves; so that when the revelations of Christ and the commandments of God are fully recorded in our minds, then we are 'perfectly instructed to every good work.'

Governed by a Rule.

11. St. Bernard [e] comparing the conscience to a house, says it stands upon seven pillars. 1. Good will. 2. Memory of God's benefits. 3. A clean heart. 4. A free spirit. 5. A right soul. 6. A devout mind. 7. An enlightened reason. These indeed are, some of them, the fruits and effects, some of them are the annexes and appendages, of a good conscience, but not the foundations or pillars upon which conscience is built. For as for

1. *Good Will*,—

12. Conscience relies not at all upon the will directly. For though a conscience is good or bad, pure or impure; and so the doctors of mystic theology divide and handle it; yet a conscience is not made so by the will, formally, but by the understanding. For that is a good conscience, which is rightly taught in the word of life; that is impure and defiled, which hath entertained evil and ungodly principles; such is theirs, who follow false lights, evil teachers, men of corrupt minds. For the conscience is a judge and a guide, a monitor and a witness, which are the offices of the knowing, not of the choosing faculty. "Spiritum, correctorem, et pædagogum animæ," so Origen [f] calls it; "the instructor of the soul, the spirit, the corrector."—"Naturale judicatorium," or "naturalis vis judicandi," so St. Basil.—"The natural power of judging or nature's judgment-seat."—"Lucem intellectus nostri," so Damascen calls it, "the light of our understanding." The conscience does accuse or excuse a man before God, which the will cannot. If it could, we should all stand upright at doomsday, or at least those would be acquitted, who fain would do well, but miss, who do the things they love not, and love those they do not; that is, "they who strive to enter in, but shall not be able."

[e] De Interior. Domo, cap. 7. [f] Ubi supra, In Psal. xlviii.

But to accuse or excuse is the office of a faculty which can neither will nor choose, that is, of the conscience, which is properly a record, a book, and a judgment-seat.

13. But I said, conscience relies not upon the will directly; yet it cannot be denied, but the will hath force upon the conscience collaterally and indirectly. For the evil will perverts the understanding, and makes it believe false principles; "deceiving and being deceived" is the lot of false prophets; and they that are "given over to believe a lie," will live in a lie, and do actions relative to that false doctrine, which evil manners first persuaded and introduced. For although it cannot be, that heretics should sin in the article against the actual light of their consciences, because he that wittingly and willingly sins against a known truth, is not properly a heretic but a blasphemer, and sins against the Holy Ghost; and he that sees a heretic run to the stake or to the gallows, or the Donatist kill himself, or the Circumcellian break his own neck with as much confidence to bear witness to his heresy, as any of the blessed martyrs to give testimony to Christianity itself, cannot but think he heartily believes, what so willingly he dies for; yet either heretics do sin voluntarily, and so distinguish from simple errors; or else they are the same thing, and either every simple error is damnable, or no heresy. It must therefore be observed, that

14. The will of man is the cause of its actions either mediately or immediately. Some are the next products of our will; such are pride, ambition, prejudice, and these blind the understanding, and make an evil and a corrupted conscience, making it an incompetent judge of truth and error, good and evil. So that the corruption of conscience in a heretic is voluntary in the principle, but miserable and involuntary in the product; it may proceed from the will efficiently, but it is formally a depravation of the understanding.

15. And therefore our wills also must be humble, and apt, and desirous to learn, and willing to obey. 'Obedite et intelligetis;' By humility and obedience we shall be best instructed. Not that by this means the conscience shall receive direct aids, but because by this means it will be left in its own aptnesses and dispositions, and when it is not hindered, the word of God will enter and dwell upon the conscience.

And in this sense it is that some say that 'Conscience is the inclination and propension of the will corresponding to practical knowledge.' Will and conscience are like the 'cognati sensus,' the touch and the taste; or the teeth and the ears, affected and assisted by some common objects, whose effect is united in matter and some real events, and distinguished by their formalities, or metaphysical beings.

2. Memory of God's Benefits,

16. Is indeed a good engagement to make us dutiful, and so may incline the will; but it hath no other force upon the conscience but that it reminds us of a special obligation to thankfulness, which is a new and proper tie of duty; but it works only by a principle that is already in the conscience, viz. that we are specially obliged to our gracious lords; and the obedience that is due to God as our Lord, doubles upon us by love and zeal, when we remember him to be our bountiful patron, and our gracious Father.

3. A clean Heart,

17. May be an effect and emanation from a holy conscience; but conscience in itself may be either good or bad, or it may be good when the heart is not clean, as it is in all the worst men who actually sin against conscience, doing that which conscience forbids them. In these men the principles are holy, the instruction perfect, the law remaining, the persuasions uncancelled; but against all this torrent, there is a whirlwind of passions, and filthy resolutions, and wilfulness, which corrupt the heart, while as yet the head is uncorrupted in the direct rules of conscience. But yet sometimes a clean conscience and a clean heart are the same; and a good conscience is taken for holiness: so St. Paul[g] uses the word, "holding faith and a good conscience, which some having put away have made shipwreck;" ὅτι τὴν ϑεόθεν ἠκουσαν συνείδησιν ἀπιστίᾳ κατεμίηναν,—so Clemens Alexandrinus explicates the place, "they have by infidelity polluted their divine and holy conscience:" but St. Paul seems to argue otherwise, and that they, laying aside a good conscience, fell into infidelity; their hearts and conscience were first corrupted, and then they turned heretics. But this sense of a good conscience is that, which in mystic divinity is more pro-

[g] 1 Tim. i. 5. 19.

perly handled, in which sense also it is sometimes used in law. "Idem est conscientia quod vir bonus intrinsece," said Ungarellus [h] out of Baldus [i]; and from thence Aretine [k] gathered this conclusion, that "if any thing be committed to the conscience of any one, they must stand to his determination, 'et ab ea appellari non potest;' 'there lies no appeal,' 'Quia vir bonus, pro quo sumitur conscientia, non potest mentiri et falsum dicere vel judicare;' 'A good man, for whom the word conscience is used, cannot lie, or give a false judgment or testimony." Of this sort of conscience it is said by Ben Sirach [l], "Bonam substantiam habet, cui non est peccatum in conscientia:" "It is a man's wealth to have no sin in our conscience."—But in our present and future discourses, the word conscience is understood in the philosophical sense, not in the mystical, that is, not for the conscience as it is invested with the accidents of good or bad, but as it abstracts from both, but is capable of either.

4. *A free Spirit,*

18. Is the blessing and effect of an obedient will to a well-instructed conscience, and more properly and peculiarly to the grace of chastity, to honesty and simplicity; a slavish, timorous, a childish and trifling spirit, being the punishment inflicted upon David, before he repented of his fact with Bathsheba. But there is also a freedom which is properly the privilege, or the affection, of conscience, and is of great usefulness to all its nobler operations; and that is, a being clear from prejudice and prepossession, a pursuing of truths with holy purposes, and inquiring after them with a single eye, not infected with any sickness or unreasonableness. This is the same thing with that which he distinctly calls, 5. 'a right soul.' To this is appendant also, that the conscience cannot be constrained, it is of itself 'a free spirit,' and is subject to no commands, but those of reason and religion. God only is the Lord of our conscience, and the conscience is not to subject itself any more to the empire of sin, to the law of Moses, to a servile spirit, but to the laws of God alone, and the obedience of Jesus, willingly, cheerfully, and in all in-

[h] Verb. Conscientia. [i] In c. Cum. Causa de Testi.
[k] In sect. Sed iste. Inst. t. de Act. Gl. in c. Statut. sect. Assess. Detent.
[l] Eccles. xiii. 30. alias 24

stances, whether the commandment be conveyed by the Holy Jesus, or by his vicegerents. But of this I shall afterward give particular accounts.

6. A devout Mind,

19. May procure more light to the conscience, and assistances from the Spirit of wisdom, in cases of difficulty, and is a good remedy against a doubting and a scrupulous conscience; but this is but indirect, and by the intermission of other more immediate and proper intercourses.

But the last is perfectly the foundation of conscience.

7. An enlightened Reason.

20. To which if we add what St. Bernard before calls a 'right soul,' that is, an honest heart, full of simplicity and hearty attention, and ready assent, we have all that by which the conscience is informed and reformed, instructed and preserved, in its just measures, strengths, and relations. For the rule of conscience is all that notice of things and rules, by which God would have good and evil to be measured, that is, the will of God, communicated to us by any means, by reason, and by enlightening, that is, natural and instructed. So that conscience is *νοῦς φυσικὸς*, and *θεοδίδακτος*, it is principled by creation, and it is instructed or illuminated in the regeneration. For God being the fountain of all good, and good being nothing but a conformity to him or to his will, what measures he makes, are to limit us. No man can make measures of good and evil, any more than he can make the good itself. Men sometimes give the instance in which the good is measured; but the measure itself is the will of God. For therefore it is good to obey human laws, because it is God's will we should; and although the man makes the law to which we are to give obedience, yet that is not the rule. The rule is the commandment of God, for by it obedience is made a duty.

Measured by the Proportions of Good and Evil.

21. That is, of that which God hath declared to be good or evil respectively, the conscience is to be informed. God hath taken care that his laws shall be published to all his subjects, he hath written them where they must needs read them, not in tables of stone or phylacteries on the forehead, but in a

secret table; the conscience or mind of a man is the φυλακτήριον, the preserver of the court-rolls of heaven. But I added this clause to the former of 'a rule,' because the express line of God's rule is not the adequate measure of conscience: but there are analogies and proportions, and commensurations of things with things, which make the measure full and equal. For he does not always keep a good conscience who keeps only the words of a divine law, but the proportions also and the reasons of it, the similitudes and correspondences in like instances, are the measures of conscience.

22. The whole measure and rule of conscience is, the law of God, or God's will, signified to us by nature, or revelation; and by the several manners and times and parts of its communication it hath obtained several names: the law of nature,—the consent of nations,—right reason,—the decalogue,—the sermon of Christ,—the canons of the apostles,—the laws ecclesiastical and civil of princes and governors,—fame, or the public reputation of things, expressed by proverbs and other instances and measures of public honesty. This is

οἶδεν τό γ' αἰσχρὸν, κανόνι τοῦ καλοῦ μαθών.

So Euripides[m] calls it, all the rule that teaches us good or evil. These being the full measures of right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful, will be the rule of conscience, and the subject of the present books.

In order to Practice.

23. In this, conscience differs from knowledge, which is in order to speculation, and ineffective notices. And it differs from faith, because although faith is also in order to practice, yet not directly and immediately: it is a collection of propositions, the belief of which makes it necessary to live well, and reasonable, and chosen. But before the propositions of faith pass into action, they must be transmitted through another principle, and that is conscience. That Jesus Christ is the Son of God, and our Lord, and our Master, is a proposition of faith, and from thence, if we pass on to practice, we first take in another proposition; 'If he be our Lord, where is his fear?'—and this is a sentence, or virtual proposition, of conscience. And from hence we may

[m] Hecub. 600. Priestley's edition of Euripides, vol. 1. p. 87.

understand the full meaning of the word 'conscience.' Συνείδησις, and 'conscientia,' and so our English word conscience, have in them science or knowledge: the seat of it is the understanding, the act of it is knowing, but there must be a knowing of more together.

24. Hugo de St. Victore says, that "conscientia est cordis scientia," "conscience is the knowledge of the heart." It is so, but certainly this was not the ἔτυμον and 'original' of the word. But there is truth in the following period. "Cor noscit et alia. Quando autem se noscit, appellatur conscientia; quando, præter se, alia noscit, appellatur scientia:" "Knowledge hath for its object any thing without; but when the heart knows itself, then it is conscience."—So it is used in authors sacred and profane. "Nihil mihi conscius sum," saith St. Paul; "I know nothing by myself;"—"ut alios lateas; tute tibi conscius eris:" and

> ——— hic murus aheneus esto,
> Nil conscire sibi.

so Cicero [m] to Marcus Rutilius uses it; "Cum et mihi conscius essem, quanti te facerem;" "When I myself was conscious to myself, how much I did value thee."—But this acception of the word conscience is true, but not full and adequate; for it only signifies conscience as it is a witness, not as a guide. Therefore it is more reasonable which Aquinas and the schoolmen generally use: that conscience is a conjunction of the universal practical law with the particular moral action: and so it is 'scientia cum rebus facti,' and then it takes in that which is called συντήρησις, or the general 'repository' of moral principles or measures of good, and the particular cases as reduced to practice. Such as was the case of St. Peter, when he denied his Lord: he knew that he ought not to have done it, and his conscience being sufficiently taught his duty to his Lord, he also knew that he had done it, and then there followed a remorse, a biting, or gnawing of his spirit, grief, and shame, and a consequent weeping: when all these acts meet together, it is the full process of conscience.

(1.) The συντήρησις or the first act of conscience, St. Jerome calls 'scintillam conscientiæ,' 'the spark' or fire put into the heart of man.

(2.) The συνείδησις, which is specifically called 'conscience' of the deed done, is the bringing fuel to this fire.

[m] Ad Divers. xiii. 8. Cortii, p. 674.

(3.) And when they are thus laid together, they will either shine or burn, acquit or condemn. But this complication of acts is conscience. The first is science, practical science: but annex the second; or it and the third, and then it is conscience. When David's heart smote him, that is, upon his adultery and murder, his conscience thus discoursed: 'Adultery and murder are high violations of the divine law, they provoke God to anger, without whom I cannot live, whose anger is worse than death.' This is practical knowledge, or the principles of conscience; but the following acts made it up into conscience. For he remembered that he had betrayed Uriah and humbled Bathsheba, and then he begs of God for pardon; standing condemned in his own breast, he hopes to be forgiven by God's sentence. But the whole process of conscience is in two practical syllogisms, in which the method is ever this. The συντήρησις or 'repository' of practical principles begins, and where that leaves, the conscience or the witness and judge of moral actions begins, like Jacob laying hold upon his elder brother's heel. The first is this:

Whatsoever is injurious ought not to be done:
But to commit adultery is injurious:
Therefore it ought not to be done:

This is the rule of conscience, or the first act of conscience as it is a rule and a guide, and is taken for the συντήρησις, or practical 'repository.' But when an action is done or about to be done, conscience takes the conclusion of the former syllogism, and applies it to her particular case.

Adultery ought not to be done:
This action I go about, or which I have done, is adultery:
Therefore it ought not to be done, or to have been done.

This is the full proceeding of this court; after which many consequent solemnities and actions do pass, of sentence, and preparatory torments and execution.

25. But this I am to admonish, that although this which I have thus defined, is the proper and full sense of the word 'conscience' according to art and proper acceptation, yet in Scripture [n] it is used indifferently for an act of conscience, or any of its parts, and does not always signify in its latitude and integrity, but yet it all tends to the same signification; and though the name be given to the faculty, to the habit, to

[n] Acts, xxiii. 1. xxiv. 16. Rom. xiii. 5. 1 Cor. viii. 10. 1 Tim. i. 5. 19. iii. 19. 2 Tim. i. 3. Titus, i. 15. 1 Pet. ii. 19. iii. 16. Heb. xiii. 18.

the act, to the object, to the effect, to every emanation from the mind in things practical, yet still it supposes the same thing: viz. that conscience is the guide of all our moral actions; and by giving the name to so many acts and parts and effluxes from it, it warrants the definition of it, when it is united in its own proper and integral constitution.

To conduct all our Relations and Intercourses between God, our Neighbours, and ourselves; that is, in all moral Actions.

26. This is the final cause of conscience: and by this it is distinguished from prudence, which is also a practical knowledge, and reduced to particular and circumstantiate actions. But, 1. Prudence consists in the things of the world, or relative to the world: conscience in the things of God, or relating to him. 2. Prudence is about affairs as they are of advantage or disadvantage: conscience is employed about them, as they are honest or dishonest. 3. Prudence regards the circumstances of actions, whether moral or civil: conscience only regards moral actions in their substance or essential proprieties. 4. Prudence intends to do actions dexterously and prosperously: conscience is to conduct them justly and according to the commandment. 5. There are many actions in which prudence is not at all concerned, as being wholly indifferent to this or that for matter of advantage; but there is no action but must pass under the file and censure of conscience; for if we can suppose any action in all its circumstances to be wholly indifferent to good or bad; yet none is so to lawful or unlawful, the very indifferent being therefore lawful because it is indifferent, and therefore to be considered by conscience, either actually or habitually: for in this sense even our natural actions, in their time and place, are also moral; and where they are not primarily moral, yet they come under conscience, as being permitted, and innocent; but wherever they are relative to another person, they put on some degrees of morality, and are of proper cognizance in this court.

Qui didicit, patriæ quid debeat, et quid amicis;
Quo sit amore parens, quo frater amandus et hospes;
Quod sit conscripti, quod judicis officium; quæ
Partes in bellum missi ducis: ille profecto
Reddere personæ scit convenientia cuique[o].

[o] Horat. de Arte Poet. 315. Schefle, p. 44.

That is the full effect of conscience, to conduct all our relations, all our moral actions.

RULE II.

The Duty and Offices of Conscience are to dictate, and to testify or bear Witness; to accuse or excuse; to loose or bind.

1. THE first and last are the direct acts and offices of conscience: the other are reflex or consequent actions, but direct offices. The first act, which is

To dictate,

Is that which divines call the συντήρησις, or the 'phylactery,' the keeper of the records of the laws, as by it we are taught our duty: God having written it in our hearts by nature and by the Spirit, leaves it there, ever placed before the eye of conscience, as St. Bernard calls it, to be read and used for directions in all cases of dispute of question or action: this is that which St. Paul[p] calls "the work of the law written in our hearts;" and therefore it is, that to sin against our conscience is so totally inexcusable, and according to the degree of that violence, which is done against the conscience, puts on degrees. For conscience dictates whatsoever it is persuaded of, and will not suffer a man to do otherwise than it suggests and tell us:

Αἰ γὰρ πῶς αὐτόν με μένος καὶ θυμὸς ἀνῇη
Ὤμ' ἀποταμνόμενον κρέα ἴδμεναι·

said Achilles[q] of Hector when he was violently angry with him; "I would my conscience would give me leave to eat thy very flesh."

2. Its universal dictates are ever the most certain, and those are the first principles of justice and religion; and whatsoever else can be infallibly and immediately inferred from thence, are her dictates also, but not primely and directly, but transmitted by the hands of reason. The same reason also there is in clear revelation. For whatsoever is put into the conscience immediately by God, is placed there

[p] Rom. ii. 15. [q] Iliad. χ. 346.

to the same purpose, and with the same efficiency and persuasion, as is all that which is natural. And the conscience properly dictates nothing else, but prime natural reason, and immediate revelation; whatsoever comes after these two, is reached forth to us by two hands, one whereof alone is ministered by conscience. The reason is this: because all that law by which God governs us, is written in our hearts, put there by God immediately, that is antecedently to all our actions; because it is that by which all our actions are to be guided, even our discoursings and arguings are to be guided by conscience, if the argument be moral: now the ways by which God speaks to us immediately, are only nature and the Spirit: nature is that principle which taught all men from the beginning until now; all that prime practical reason which is perfective of human nature, and in which all mankind agrees. Either the perfections, or the renovations, or the superadditions, to this are taught us by the Holy Spirit, and all this being written in the conscience by the finger of God, is brought forth upon all occasions of action; and whatsoever is done against any thing so placed, is directly and violently against the conscience; but when from thence reason spins a longer thread, and draws it out from the clue of natural principles or express revelation, that also returns upon the conscience, and is placed there as light upon a wall, but not as the stones that are there: but yet whatever is done against that light, is also against conscience, but not so as the other. Just as it is in nature and accident. To eat poison and filthiness is against every man's health and stomach; but if by an ἰδιοσυγκρασία, 'a propriety of temper' or an evil habit, or accidental inordination, wine, or fish, makes a man sick, then these are against his nature too, but not so as poison is, or stones. Whatever comes in the conscience primarily, or consequently, right or wrong, is brought forth upon occasion of action, and is part of her dictate: but as a man speaks some things of his own knowledge, some things by hearsay; so does conscience; some things she tells from God and herself, some things from reason and herself, or other accidental notices: those and these do integrate and complete her sermons, but they have several influence and obligation according to their proper efficiency. But of this I shall give full accounts in the second book.

To testify.

3. Conscience bears witness of our actions; so St. Paul[r], "their conscience bearing witness:" and in this sense, conscience is a practical memory. For as the practical knowledge, or notices subjected in the understanding, makes the understanding to be conscience; so the actions of our life, recorded in the memory and brought forth to practical judgments, change the memory also into conscience. Τοῦ γὰρ γένους τῶν ἀνθρώπων ταύτῃ διαφέροντος τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, ᾗ μόνοις αὐτοῖς μέτεστι νοῦ καὶ λογισμοῦ· φανερὸν, ὡς οὐκ εἰκὸς παρατρέχειν αὐτοὺς τὴν προειρημένην διαφορὰν, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων· ἀλλ' ἐπισημαίνεσθαι τὸ γιγνόμενον, καὶ δυσαρεστεῖσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι. "Man differing from brute beasts by the use of reason, it is not likely he should be a stranger to his own actionsas the beasts are: but that the evil which is done, should be recalled to their mind with the signification of some displeasure." So Polybius[s] discourses of the reason and the manner of conscience.

4. Every knowing faculty is the seat of conscience; and the same faculty, when it is furnished with speculativenotions, retains its natural and proper name of understanding, or memory; but as the same is instructed with notices in order to judgments practical, so it takes the Christian name of conscience. The volitive or choosing faculty cannot, but the intellectual may. And this is that book, which at doomsday shall be brought forth and laid open to all the world. The memory, changed into conscience, preserves the notices of some things, and shall be reminded of others, and shall do that work entirely and perfectly, which now it does imperfectly and by parts, according to the words of St. Paul[t]; "then shall we know as we are known," that is, as God knows us now, so then shall we see and know ourselves. "Nullum theatrum virtuti conscientia majus[u]," shall then be highly verified. Our conscience will be the great scene or theatre, upon which shall be represented all our actions good and bad. It is God's book, the book of life or death. According to the words of St. Bernard[x]; "Ex his, quæ scripta erunt in libris nostris, judicabimur; et ideo scribi debent secundum exemplar libri vitæ, et si sic scripti non sunt, saltem corrigendi

[r] Rom. ii. 15. [s] Lib. 6. Schweig. ii. 465. [t] 1 Cor. xiii. 12.
[u] Cicero 2. c. 25. Tuscul. Rath, p. 202. [x] De Inter. Dom. lib. 2. cap. ult.

sunt:" "We shall be judged by that which is written in our own books" (the books of conscience); "and therefore they ought to be written according to the copy of the book of life; and if they be not so written, yet they ought to be so corrected."

5. Consequently to these the conscience does

Accuse or Excuse.

So St. Paul[y] joins them as consequent to the former; "their conscience bearing witness, and their thoughts in the meantime accusing or excusing one another." — "Si optimorum consiliorum atque factorum testis in omni vita nobis conscientia fuerit, sine ullo metu summa cum honestate vivemus[z]:" "If our conscience be the witness that in our life we do good deeds, and follow sober counsels, we shall live in great honesty and without fear."—Δικαστὴν Θεὸς ἐπέστησε τὸν δικαιότατον ἅμα καὶ οἰκειότατον, τὸ συνειδὸς αὐτὸ, καὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, said Hierocles[a]; "God hath constituted a most righteous and domestic judge, the conscience and right reason:" Καὶ αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ, ὃν πάντων μάλιστα αἰδεῖσθαι προεπαιδεύθημεν, "Every man ought most of all to fear himself, because it is impossible but we should know what we have done amiss; and it concerns us also to make righteous judgment, for we cannot escape ourselves."—Μηδέποτε μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν ποιήσας ἔλπιζε λήσειν· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τοὺς ἄλλους λάθῃς, σαυτῷ γε συνειδήσεις, said Isocrates[b]: "Etsi à cæteris silentium est, tamen ipse sibimet conscius est posse se merito increpari," so Apuleius renders it. "Though others hold their peace, yet there is one within that will not."

Nec facile est placidam ac pacatam degere vitam,
Qui violat facteis communia fœdera pacis.
Etsi fallit enim Divom genus humanumque,
Perpetuo tamen id fore clam diffidere debet[c].

It is hard to be concealed from God and man too, and although we think ourselves safe for awhile, yet we have something within that tells us, οὐκ ἔστι λάθρα τι ποιοῦντα, he that does any thing is espied, and cannot do it privately. 'Quicum in tenebris?' was the old proverb; 'Who was with you in the dark?'—And therefore it was that Epicurus affirmed it to be impossible for a man to be concealed always. Upon

[y] Rom. ii. 15.
[z] Cicero pro Cluentio.
[a] Needham, p. 158.
[b] Lange, p. 5.
[c] Lucretius. v. 1155. Eichstadt, p. 242.

the mistake of which he was accused by Plutarch and others, to have supposed it lawful to do any injustice secretly; whereas his design was to obstruct that gate of iniquity, and to make men believe that even that sin which was committed most secretly, would some time or other be discovered and brought to punishment; all which is to be done by the extra-regular events of providence, and the certain accusations and discoveries of conscience.

6. For conscience is the looking-glass of the soul, so it was called by Periphanes in Plautus [c];

> Non oris causa modo homines æquom fuit
> Sibi habere speculum, ubi os contemplarent suum;
> Sed, qui perspicere possent cor, sapientiæ,
> Igitur perspicere ut possint cordis copiam.
> Ubi id inspexissent, cogitarent postea,
> Vitam ut vixissent olim in adolescentia.

And a man looking into his conscience, instructed with the word of God, its proper rule, is by St. James [d] compared to "a man beholding his natural face in a glass;" and that the Apostle describes conscience in that similitude, is to be gathered from the word ἔμφυτον λόγον, 'verbum insitum,' 'the ingrafted word,' the word of God written in our hearts,—which whoso looks on, and compares his actions with his rule, may see what he is: but he that neglects this word and follows not this rule, did indeed see his face, but hath forgotten what manner of man he was, that is, what he was framed in the works of the new creation, when he was newly formed and "created unto righteousness and true holiness."

7. This accusation and watchfulness, and vocal, clamorous guards of conscience, are in perpetual attendance, and though they may sleep, yet they are quickly awakened, and make the evil man restless. Τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ παρανομοῦντας ἀθλίως καὶ περιφόβως ζῆν τὸν πάντα χρόνον, ὅτι κἂν λαθεῖν δύνανται, πίστιν περὶ τοῦ λαθεῖν λαβεῖν ἀδύνατόν ἐστι· θθεν ὁ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἀεὶ φόβος ἐγκείμενος οὐκ ἐᾷ χαίρειν, οὔτε δαῤῥεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς παροῦσι, said Epicurus [e]: which is very well [f] rendered by Seneca, "Ideo non prodest latere latentibus, quia latendi

[c] In Epidico, act. 3. sc. 3. 1. Schmieder, p. 294. [d] James, i. 21. 23, 24.

[e] Diog. Laert.

[f] In the passage, which is quoted by Bishop Taylor, Seneca does not so much render as comment upon Epicurus: the words of Seneca are, "Eleganter itaque ab Epicuro dictum puto, 'Potest nocenti contingere ut lateat, latendi fides non potest.' Aut si hoc modo melius hunc explicari posse judicas sensum;—*Ideo non prodest latere peccantibus, quia latendi etiam si felicitatem habent, fiduciam non habent.*" Seneca, ep. 97. Rabbopf, vol. 3. p. 246.—(J. R. P.)

etiam si felicitatem habent, fiduciam non habent:" "They that live unjustly, always live miserably and fearfully; because although their crime be secret, yet they cannot be confident that it shall be so:" meaning, that because their conscience does accuse them, they perceive they are discovered, and pervious to an eye, which what effect it will have in the publication of the crime here and hereafter, is not matter of knowledge, but cannot choose but be matter of fear for ever.

——— fiet adulter
Publicus, et pœnas metuet, quascunque mariti
Exigere irati; nec erit felicior astro
Martis, ut in laqueos nunquam incidat [e].

If any chance makes the fact private, yet no providence or watchfulness can give security, because within there dwells a principle of fear that can never die, till repentance kills it. And therefore Chilo in Laertius said upon this account, that 'loss is rather to be chosen than filthy gain; because that loss brings sorrow but once, but injustice brings a perpetual fear and pain.'

Anne magis Siculi gemuerant æra juvenci,
Aut magis auratis pendens laquearibus ensis
Purpureas subter cervices terruit, *Imus*
Imus præcipites, quam si sibi dicat, et intus
Palleat infelix, quod proxima nesciat uxor [f]?

The wife that lies by his side, knows not at what the guilty man looks pale, but something that is within the bosom knows; and no pompousness of condition can secure the man, and no witty cruelty can equal the torment. For that also, although it be not directly the office of conscience, yet it is the act and effect of conscience; when itself is injured, it will never let any thing else be quiet.

To loose or bind,

8. Is the reflex act of conscience. Upon viewing the records, or the συντήρησις, the legislative part of conscience, it binds to duty; upon viewing the act, it binds to punishment, or consigns to comfort; and in both regards it is called by Origen, "affectuum corrector, atque animæ pædagogus," "the corrector of the affections, and the teacher of the soul."—Which kind of similitude Epictetus, in Stobæus, followed

[e] Juven. Sat. 10. 311. Ruperti, p. 176. [f] Pers. Sat. 3. 39. Koenig. p. 41.

also; "Parentes pueros nos pædagogo tradiderunt, qui ubique observaret ne læderemur; Deus autem clam viros insitæ conscientiæ custodiendos tradidit; quæ quidem custodiane quaquam contemnenda est;" "As our parents have delivered us to a guardian, who did watch lest we did or suffered mischief; so hath God committed us to the custody of our conscience that is planted within us: and this custody is at no hand to be neglected."

9. The binding to duty is so an effect of conscience, that it cannot be separated from it; but the binding to punishment is an act of conscience also as it is a judge, and is intended to affright a sinner, and to punish him: but it is such a punishment as is the beginning of hell-torments, and unless the wound be cured, will never end till eternity itself shall go into a grave.

Illo nocens se damnat quo peccat die [g];

"The same day that a man sins, on the same day he is condemned;" and when Menelaus in the tragedy did ask,

Τί χρῆμα πάσχεις; τίς σ' ἀπόλλυσιν νόσος;

What disease killed poor Orestes? he was answered,

Ἡ ξύνεσις, ὅτι σύνοιδα δεινὰ εἰργασμένος [h],

His disease was nothing but an evil conscience; he had done vile things, and had an amazed spirit that distracted him, and so he died. 'Curas ultrices' Virgil [i] calls the wounds of an evil conscience, 'revenging cares.'—"Nihil est miserius quam animus hominis conscius," said he in the comedy [k]; "Nothing is more miserable than an evil conscience:" and the being pained with it is called τῷ συνειδότι ἀπάγχεσθαι, 'to be choked or strangled' with an evil conscience, by St. Chrysostom, who, in his twenty-second homily upon the First Epistle to the Corinthians, speaks much and excellently to the same purpose: and there are some that fancy this was the cause of Judas's death; the horrors of his conscience were such, that his spirits were confounded, and restless, and uneasy; and striving to go from their prison, stopped at the gates of emanation, and stifled him. It did that, or as bad; it either choked him, or brought him to a halter, as it hath

[g] Apud Publium. [h] Euripid. Orest. 389.—Priestley's edition, vol. 1. p. 265.
[i] Æn. 6. 224. [k] Plautus.

done many besides him. And although I may truly say, as he did,

> Non mihi si linguæ centum ———
> Omnia pœnarum percurrere nomina possem[l],

No tongue is able to express the evils which are felt by a troubled conscience, or a wounded spirit; yet the heads of them are visible and notorious to all men.

10. (1.) The first is that which Nazianzen calls τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς δεινοῖς ἐξαγορεύσεις, 'accusations and vexings of a man when he is in misery;' then when he needs most comfort, he shall by his evil conscience be most disquieted. A sickness awakes a dull sleeping conscience, and when it is awakened it will make that the man shall not sleep. So Antiochus[m] when his lieutenant Lysias was beaten by the Jews, he fell sick with grief, and then his conscience upbraided him; "but now" (said he) "I remember the evils that I did at Jerusalem; 'quia invenerunt me mala ista' (so the Latin Bible reads it); 'because those evils now have found me out.'" For when a man is prosperous, it is easy for him to stop the mouth of conscience, to bribe it or abuse it, to fill it with noise, and to divert it with business, to outvie it with temporal gaieties, or to be flattered into weak opinions and sentences: but when a man is smitten of God, and divested of all the outsides and hypocrisies of sin, and that conscience is disentangled from its fetters and foolish pretensions, then it speaks its own sense, it ever speaks loudest when the man is poor, or sick, or miserable. This was well explicated by St. Ambrose; "Dum sumus in quadam delinquendi libidine, nebulis quibusdam conscientiæ mens obducitur, ne videat eorum, quæ concupiscit, deformitatem: sed cum omnis nebula transierit, gravia tormenta exercentur in quodam male conscii secretario." "A man is sometimes so surprised with the false fires and glarings of temptation, that he cannot see the secret turpitude and deformity. But when the cloud and vail are off, then comes the tormentor from within:"

> —— acuuntque metum mortalibus ægris,
> Si quando letum horrificum morbosque Deum Rex
> Molitur, meritas aut bello territat urbes[n],

Then the calamity swells, and conscience increases the trou-

[l] Æn. 6. [m] Macc. vi. 12. [n] Æneid. 12. 852.

ble, when God sends war, or sickness, or death. It was Saul's case: when he lost that fatal battle in which the ark was taken, he called to the Amalekite, "Sta super me et interfice me," "Fall upon me and slay me;" "Quoniam tenent me angustiæ," "I am in a great strait."—He was indeed; for his son was slain, and his army routed, and his enemies were round about: but then conscience stepped in, and told him of the evil that he had done in causing fourscore of the Lord's priests to be slain; and therefore Abulensis reads the words thus, "Fall upon me and slay me," "Quoniam tenent me oræ vestimenti sacerdotalis," "I am entangled in the fringes of the priests' garments."—"Videbatur sibi Saul, quod propinquus morti videret sacerdotes Dei accusantes eum in judicio coram Deo:" "He thought he saw the priests of the Lord accusing him before God."—And this hath been an old opinion of the world, that, in the days of their calamity, wicked persons are accused by those whom they have injured. Not much unlike to which is that of Plato, describing the torments of wicked souls: Βοῶσί τε καὶ καλοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν οὓς ἀπέκτειναν, οἱ δὲ, οὓς ὕβρισαν· καλέσαντες δ' ἱκετεύουσι τοὺς ἠδικημένους δοῦναί σφισι συγγνώμην, "They roar and cry out; some calling on them whom they killed, some on those they have calumniated; and calling they pray them whom they have injured, to give them pardon [o]." Then every bush is a wild beast, and every shadow is a ghost, and every glowworm is a dead man's candle, and every lantern is a spirit.

——— pallidumque visa
Matris lampade respicis Neronem [p].

When Nero was distressed, he saw his mother's taper, and grew pale with it.

11. (2.) The second effect is shame, which conscience never fails to inflict secretly, there being a secret turpitude and baseness in sin, which cannot be better expressed than by its opposition and contradiction to conscience. Conscience when it is right, makes a man bold; "Qui ambulat simpliciter, ambulat confidenter;" "He that walks honestly, walks confidently," because he hath innocence and he hath reason on

[o] Bp. Taylor seems to have quoted from memory: the original passage runs thus; Ἐνταῦθα βοῶσί τε, καὶ καλοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν οὓς ἀπέκτειναν, οἱ δὲ, οὓς ὕβρισαν· καλέσαντες δ' ἱκετεύουσι, καὶ δέονται, ἐᾶσαι σφᾶς ἐκβῆναι εἰς τὴν λίμνην, καὶ δέξασθαι. Fischer, p. 481. (J. R. P.)

[p] Statius, Sylv. 2. 7. 118. Bipont. p. 61.

his side. But he that sins, sins against reason, in which the honour and the nobleness of a man consist; and therefore shame must needs come in the destitution of them. For as by reason men naturally rule, so when they are fallen from it, unless by some accidental courages they be supported, they fall into the state of slaves and sneaking people. And upon this account it was that Plato said, "Si scirem Deos mihi condonaturos, et homines ignoraturos, adhuc peccare erubescerem propter solam peccati turpitudinem:" "If I were sure God would pardon me, and men would not know my sin, yet I should be ashamed to sin, because of its essential baseness."—The mistresses of our vile affections are so ugly we cannot endure to kiss them but through a veil, either the veil of excuse, or pretence, or darkness; something to hide their ugliness; and yet even these also are so thin that the filthiness and shame are not hid. "Bona conscientia turbam advocat, mala autem in solitudine anxia atque solicita est," said Seneca. An evil conscience is ashamed of light, and afraid of darkness; and therefore nothing can secure it. But being ashamed before judges, and assemblies, it flies from them into solitudes; and when it is there, the shame is changed into fear, and therefore from thence it runs abroad into societies of merry criminals, and drinking sanctuaries; which is nothing but a shutting the eyes, and hiding the head, while the body is exposed to a more certain danger. It cannot be avoided: it was and is and will eternally be true, "Perjurii pœna divina exitium; humana dedecus [p]." Which St. Paul perfectly renders, "The things whereof ye are now ashamed; the end of those things is death [q]." Death is the punishment which God inflicts, and shame is that which comes from man.

12. (3.) There is another effect which cannot be well told by him that feels it, or by him that sees it, what it is: because it is a thing without limit and without order. It is a distraction of mind, indeterminate, divided thoughts, flying every thing, and pursuing nothing. It was the case of Nebuchadnezzar, *οἱ διαλογισμοὶ αὐτοῦ διετάρασσον αὐτὸν*, 'his thoughts troubled him.'—"Varios vultus, disparilesque sensus [r]," like the sophisters who in their pursuit of vain-glory

[p] Cicero de Legib. lib. 2. c. ix. Wagner, p. 55.
[q] Rom. vi. 21.
[r] A. Gell. lib. 5. c. 1.

displeased the people, and were hissed from their pulpits; nothing could amaze them more; they were troubled like men of a disturbed conscience. The reason is, they are fallen into an evil condition, which they did not expect; they are abused in their hopes, they are fallen into a sad state of things, but they know not what it is, nor where they are, nor whither it will bear them, nor how to get out of it. This indeed is commonly the first part of the great evil; shame goes along with the sin, in the very acting it, but as soon as it is acted, then begins this confusion;

——— nefas tandem incipiunt sentire, peractis
Criminibus ———[r].

they thought of nothing but pleasure before; but as soon as they have finished, then they begin to taste the wormwood and the coloquintida; "perfecto demum scelere, magnitudo ejus intellecta est," said Tacitus[s]. While they were doing it, they thought it little, or they thought it none, because their fancy and their passion ruled; but when that is satisfied and burst with a filthy plethory, then they understand how great their sin is, but are distracted in their thoughts, for they understand not how great their calamity shall be.

Occultum quatiente animo tortore flagellum[t],

the secret tormenter shakes the mind, and dissolves it into indiscrimination and confusion. The man is like one taken in a lie, or surprised in a shameful act of lust, or theft; at first he knows not what to say, or think, or do, and his spirits huddle together, and fain would go somewhere, but they know not whither, and do something, but they know not what.

13. This confusion and first amazement of the conscience in some vile natures, and baser persons, proceeds to impudence, and hardness of face.

——— frontemque à crimine sumunt.

When they are discovered, they rub their foreheads hard, and consider it cannot be worse, and therefore in their way they make the best of it; that is, they will not submit to the judgment of conscience, nor suffer her infliction, but take the for-

[r] Juv. 13. 239. Ruperti. [s] Annal. 14. 10. Ruperti, p. 369.
[t] Juv. 13. 195.

tune of the banditi, or of an outlaw, rather than by the rule of subjects suffer the penalty of the law, and the severity of the judge. But conscience hath no hand in this, and whatsoever of this nature happens, it is in despite of conscience; and if it proceeds upon that method, it goes on to obstinacy, hardness of heart, a resolution never to repent, a hatred of God, and reprobation. For if conscience be permitted to do its work, this confusion when it comes to be stated, and that the man hath time to consider it, passes on to fear; and that is properly the next effect.

14. (4.) An evil or a guilty conscience is disposed for fear; shame and fear cannot be far asunder:

Ἔνθα δίος, ἐνταῦθα κ' αἰδώς [u].

Sin makes us ashamed before men, and afraid of God: an evil conscience makes man a coward, timorous as a child in a church-porch at midnight; it makes the strongest men to tremble like the keepers of the house of an old man's tabernacle.

Ὁ συνιστορῶν αὐτῷ τι, κἂν ᾖ θρασύτατος,
Ἡ σύνεσις αὐτὸν δειλότατον εἶναι ποιεῖ,

said Menander [x]. No strength of body, no confidence of spirit, is a defensative against an evil conscience, which will intimidate the courage of the most perfect warrior.

Qui terret, plus iste timet: sors ista tyrannis
Convenit: invident claris, fortesque trucident,
Muniti gladijs vivant septique venenis,
Ancipites habeant artes, trepidique minentur.

So Claudian [y] describes the state of tyrants and injurious persons; 'they do evil and fear worse, they oppress brave men, and are afraid of mean fellows; they are encompassed with swords, and dwell amongst poisons, they have towers with back-doors and many outlets; and they threaten much, but themselves are most afraid.' We read of Belshazzar, his knees beat against each other upon the arrest made on him by the hand on the wall, which wrote the sentence of God in a strange character, because he would not read the writing in his conscience. This fear is very great and very lasting,

[u] Epicharm. [x] Clerici, p. 216.
[y] De 4. Honor. Consol. 290. Gesner, vol. 1. p. 106.

even in this world: and is rarely well described by Lucretius[z]:

Cerberus et Furiæ ———
—— neque sunt usquam, nec possunt esse, profecto:
Sed metus in vita pœnarum pro male factis
Est insignibus insignis; scelerisque luela
Carcer, et horribilis de saxo jactus eorum,
Verbera, carnifices, robur, pix, lamina, tedæ;
Quæ tamen et si absunt, at mens sibi conscia factis,
Præmetuens, adhibet stimulos, torretque flagellis.

Which description of the evil and intolerable pains and fears of conscience is exceeded by the author of the Wisdom of Solomon[a], "Indisciplinatæ animæ erraverunt." That is the ground of their misery; "The souls were refractory to discipline, and have erred. They oppress the holy nation."—The effect was, "they became prisoners of darkness, and fettered with the bands of a long night; 'fugitivi perpetuæ providentiæ jacuerunt,' 'they became outlaws from the divine providence.' And while they supposed to lie hid in their secret sins, they were scattered under a dark veil of forgetfulness; 'paventes horrende, et cum admiratione nimia perturbati,' 'they did fear horribly, and disturbed with a wonderful amazement.' For neither might the corner that held them, keep them from fear, but a sound descending did trouble them; 'et personæ tristes apparentes pavorem illis præstabant,' 'sad apparitions did affright them;' a fire appeared to them very formidable; 'et timore percussi ejus quæ non videbatur faciei;' 'they were affrighted with the apprehensions of what they saw not:'" and all the way in that excellent description, there is nothing but fear and affrightment, horrid amazement and confusion; 'pleni timore,' and 'tremebundi peribant,' 'full of fear, and they perished trembling;' and then follows the philosophy and rational account of all this. "Frequenter enim præoccupant pessima, redarguente conscientia." "When their conscience reproves them, they are possessed with fearful expectations." For wickedness condemned by her own witness is very timorous: "Cum enim sit timida nequitia, dat testimonium condemnata:" "Conscience gives witness and gives sentence; and when wickedness is condemned, it is full of affrightment." For fear is 'præsumptionis adjutorium,' the allay of confidence and presumption, and the

[z] Lucretius, 3. 1024. Eichstadt, p. 137. [a] Wisd. xvii.

promoter of its own apprehensions, and betrays the succours that reason yields. For indeed in this case, no reason can dispute a man out of his misery, for there is nothing left to comfort the conscience, so long as it is divested of its innocence. The prophet Jeremy [b] instances this in the case of Pashur, who oppressed the prophets of the Lord, putting them in prison, and forbidding them to preach in the name of the Lord: "Thy name shall be no more called 'Pashur' but 'Magor Missabib,' that is, 'fear round about;' for I will make thee a terror unto thyself."

15. This fear of its own nature is apt to increase: for indeed it may be infinite.

> Nec videt interea, qui terminus esse malorum
> Possit, qui ve siet pœnarum denique finis:
> Atque eadem metuit magis, hæc ne in morte gravescant:
> Heinc Acherusia fit stultorum denique vita [c].

He that fears in this case, knows not the greatness and measure of the evil which he fears; it may arrive to infinite, and it may be any thing, and it may be every thing:—and therefore there is,

16. (5.) An appendant perpetuity and restlessness; a man of an evil conscience is never at quiet. "Impietas enim malum infinitum est, quod nunquam extingui potest," said Philo [d]: he is put to so many shifts to excuse his crime before men, and cannot excuse it to God or to himself, and then he is forced to use arts of forgetfulness, that he may not remember his sorrow; he runs to weakness for excuse, and to sin for a comfort, and to the methods and paths of hell for sanctuary, and rolls himself in his uneasy chains of fire, and changes from side to side upon his gridiron, till the flesh drop from the bones on every side. This is the poet's vulture [e],

> Immortale jecur tundens, fœcundaque pœnis
> Viscera, rimaturque epulis, habitatque sub alto
> Pectore; nec fibris requies datur ulla renatis.

It gnaws perpetually, and consumes not, being like the fire of hell, it does never devour, but torments for ever.

17. (6.) This fear and torment, which are inflicted by conscience, do not only increase at our death, but after death

[b] Jer. xx. 3, 4.
[c] Lucret. 3. 1033. Eichstadt, p. 138.
[d] De Profugis.
[e] Virg. Æn. 6, 598.

is the beginning of hell. For these are the fire of hell; ὀδυνῶμαι ἐν τῇ φλογὶ ταύτῃ, "I am tormented in this flame;" so said Dives, when he was in torments; that is, he had the torments of an evil conscience, for hell itself is not to be opened till the day of judgment; but the sharpest pain is usually expressed by fire, and particularly the troubles of mind are so signified. "Urit animum meum;" "This burns," that is, this exceedingly troubles, "my mind;"—and "Uro hominem" in the comedy, I vex him sufficiently, "I burn him;"—"Loris non ureris," "Thou art not tormented with scourgings."

> Pœna autem vehemens, ac multo sævior illis,
> Quos et Cædicius gravis invenit et Rhadamanthus,
> Nocte dieque suum gestare in pectore testem[f].

This is a part of hell-fire, the smoke of it ascends night and day; and it is a preparatory to the horrible sentence of doomsday, as the being tormented in prison is, to the day of condemnation and execution. The conscience in the state of separation does accuse perpetually, and with an insupportable amazement fears the revelation of the day of the Lord.

> Et cum fateri furia jusserit verum,
> Prodente clamet conscientiâ, *scripsi*[g].

'The fury within will compel him to confess,' and then he is prepared for the horrible sentence; as they who upon the rack accuse themselves, and then they are carried to execution. Menippus, in Lucian[h], says that the souls of them that are dead, are accused by the shadows of their bodies. Αὗται τοίνυν, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν, κατηγοροῦσι τε καὶ καταμαρτυροῦσι, καὶ διελέγχουσι τὰ πεπραγμένα ἡμῖν παρὰ τὸν βιον· and these he says are ἀξιόπιστοι, 'worthy of belief,' because they are always present, and never parted from their bodies; meaning, that a man's conscience, which is inseparable as a shadow, is a strong accuser and a perfect witness: and this will never leave them till it carries them to hell; and then the fear is changed into despair, and indignation, and hatred of God, and eternal blasphemy. This is the full progress of an evil conscience, in its acts of binding.

18. Quest. But if it be inquired by what instrument conscience does thus torment a man, and take vengeance of him

[f] Juvenal, 13. 196. [g] Martial, 10. 5. 18. Mattaire, p. 191.
[h] Νεκυομαντεία. 2. Bipont. vol. 3. p. 15.

for his sins, whether it hath a proper efficiency in itself, and that it gives torment, as it understands, by an exercise of some natural power; or whether it be by an act of God inflicting it, or by opinion and fancy, by being persuaded of some future events which shall be certainly consequent to the sin, or by religion and belief, or lastly by deception and mere illusion, and upon being affrighted with bugbears:—I answer,

19. That it does or may afflict a man by all these. For its nature is to be inquisitive and busy, querulous and complaining; and to do so is as natural to it, as for a man to be grieved when any thing troubles him. But because men have a thousand little arts to stifle the voice of conscience, or at least that themselves may not hear it; God oftentimes awakens a man by a sudden dash of thunder and lightning, and makes the conscience sick, and troublesome; just as upon other accidents a man is made sad, or hardened, or impudent, or foolish, or restless: and sometimes every dream, or sad story that the man hath heard, the flying of birds, and the hissing of serpents, or the fall of waters, or the beating of a watch, or the noise of a cricket, or a superstitious tale, is suffered to do the man a mischief and to increase his fear.

> —— Ergo exercentur pœnis, veterumque malorum
> Supplicia expendunt[1].

This the poets and priests expressed by their Adrastea, Nemesis, Minos, Æacus, and Rhadamanthus; not that these things were real,

> ——— neque sunt usquam, neque possunt esse, profecto,

said one of them; but yet to their pains and fears they gave names, and they put on persons; and a fantastic cause may have a real event, and therefore must come from some further principle: and if an evil man be affrighted with a meteor or a bird, by the chattering of swallows (like the young Greek in Plutarch), or by his own shadow (as Orestes was), it is no sign that the fear is vain, but that God is the author of conscience,—and will, beyond the powers of nature and the arts of concealment, set up a tribunal, and a gibbet, and a rack, in the court of conscience. And therefore we find this

[1] Virg. Æn. 6. 739.

evil threatened by God to fall upon sinners. "They that are left alive of you in the land of your captivity, I will send fainting in their hearts, in the land of their enemy, and the sound of a leaf shall chase them [k]:" and again; "The Lord shall give thee there a trembling heart, and failing of eyes, and sorrow of mind, and thy life shall hang in doubt before thee, and thou shalt fear day and night, and shalt have no assurance of thy life [l]:" and this very fear ends in death itself; it is a mortal fear sometimes: for when the prophet Isaiah [m] had told concerning Jerusalem, "Thy slain men are not slain with the sword, nor dead in battle:" to the inquiry of those who ask, How then were they slain? the answer is made by a learned gloss upon the place; "Homines hi expectato adventu hostis, velut transfossi, exanimantur metu:" "They were dead with fear, slain with the affrightments of their own conscience, as if they weretransfixed by the spear of their enemies."—"Quid ergo nos à diis immortalibus divinitus expectemus, nisi irrationibus finem faciamus," said Q. Metellus in A. Gellius [n]: There is no avoiding punishment unless we will avoid sin; since even a shadow as well as substances may become a Nemesis, when it is let loose by God, and conducted by conscience.

20. But the great instrument of bringing this to pass is that certainty of persuasion which is natural in all men, and is taught to all men, and is in the sanction of all laws expressly affirmed by God, that evil shall be to them that do evil;

Θεοὺς ἀτίζων τις ζοτῶν, δώσει δίκην [o],

"He that dishonours God, shall not escape punishment:" both in this life,

Ultrix Erinnys impio dignum parat
Letum tyranno ——— [p]

and after this life: for so they reckoned, that adulterers, rebels, and traitors, should be kept in prisons in fearful expectation of horrid pains;

Quique ob adulterium cæsi, quique arma secuti
Impia, nec veriti dominorum fallere dextras,
Inclusi pœnam expectant ——— [q]

[k] Levit. xxvi. 36. [l] Deut. xxviii. 65. [m] Isa. xxii. 2.
[n] Lib. 1. c. 6. [o] Æschyl. Suppl. 747. Schutz. Senec. Octav. 620. Schroeder, p. 782. [q] Virg. Æn. 6. 612.

all this is our conscience, which, in this kind of actions and events, is nothing but the certain expectation and fear of the divine vengeance.

21. Quest. But then why is the conscience more afraid in some sins than in others, since in sins of the greatest malignity we find great difference of fear and apprehension, when, because they are of extreme malignity, there can be no difference in their demerit?

22. I answer, Although all sins be damnable, yet not only in the several degrees of sin, but in the highest of all there is great difference: partly proceeding from the divine threatenings, partly from fame and opinion, partly from other causes.

For, (1.) There are some sins which are called 'peccata clamantia,' 'crying sins;' that is, such which cry aloud for vengeance; such which God not only hath specially threatened with horrid plagues, but such which do seldom escape vengeance in this life, but for their particular mischief are hedged about with thorns, lest by their frequency they become intolerable. Such are sacrilege, oppression of widows and orphans, murder, sodomy, and the like. Now if any man falls into any of these crimes, he sees an angel with a sword drawn stand before him; he remembers the angry words of God, and calls to mind that so few have escaped a severe judgment here, that God's anger did converse with men, and was clothed with our circumstances, and walked round about us; and less than all this is enough to scare an evil conscience.

But, (2.) There are some certain defensatives and natural guards which God hath placed in men against some sins; such as are, a natural abhorrency against unnatural lusts: a natural pity against murder and oppression: the double hedge of sacredness and religion against sacrilege. He therefore that commits any of these sins, does so much violence to those defensatives, which were placed either in or upon his heart, that such an act is a natural disease, and vexes the conscience, not only by a moral but by a natural instrument.

(3.) There are in these crying sins, certain accidents and appendages of horror, which are apt to amaze a man's mind: as in murder there is the circumstance and state of death, which when a man sees and feels alone, and sees that him-

self hath acted, it must needs affright him; since naturally most men abhor to be alone with a dead corpse. So also in oppression of widows, a man meets with so many sad spectacles, and hears so many groans, and clamorous complaints, such importunities, and such prayers, and such fearful cursings, and perpetual weepings, that if a man were to use any artifice to trouble a man's spirit, he could not dress his scene with more advantage.

(4.) Fame hath a great influence into this effect, and there cannot easily be a great shame amongst men, but there must be a great fear of vengeance from God; and the shame does but antedate the divine anger, and the man feels himself entering into it, when he is enwrapped within the other. A man committing a foul sin, which hath a special dishonour and singular disreputation among men, is like a wolf espied amongst the sheep: the outcry and noises among the shepherds make him fly for his life, when he hears a vengeance coming. And besides in this case, it is a great matter that he perceives all the world hates him for his crime, and that which every one decries, must needs be very hateful and formidable; and prepared for trouble.

(5.) It cannot be denied, but opinion also hath some hand in this affair; and some men are affrighted from their cradle in some instances, and permitted or connived at in others; and the fears of childhood are not shaken from the conscience in old age: as we see the persuasions of childhood in moral actions are permanent, so are the fear and hope which were the sanction and establishment of those persuasions. Education, and society, and country customs, and states of life, and the religion or sect of the man's professing, have influence into their portions of this effect.

23. The consequent of this discourse is this;—that we cannot take any direct accounts of the greatness or horror of a sin by the affrightment of conscience. For it is with the affrightments of conscience as it is in temporal judgments; sometimes they come not at all, and when they do, they come irregularly; and when they do not, the man does not escape. But in some sins God does strike more frequently than in others, and in some sins men usually are more affrighted than in others. The outward judgment and the inward fear are intended to be deletories of sin, and instruments of re-

pentance; but as some great sins escape the rod of God in this life, so are such sinners oftentimes free from great affrightments. But as he who is not smitten of God, yet knows that he is always liable to God's anger, and if he repents not, it will certainly fall upon him hereafter; so it is in conscience: he that fears not, hath never the less cause to fear, but oftentimes a greater, and therefore is to suspect and alter his condition, as being of a deep and secret danger: and he that does fear, must alter his condition, as being highly troublesome. But in both cases, conscience does the work of a monitor and a judge. In some cases conscience is like an eloquent and a fair-spoken judge, which declaims not against the criminal, but condemns him justly: in others, the judge is more angry, and affrights the prisoner more, but the event is the same. For in those sins where the conscience affrights, and in those in which she affrights not, supposing the sins equal but of differing natures, there is no other difference, but that conscience is a clock,—which in one man strikes aloud and gives warning, and in another the hand points silently to the figure, but strikes not; but by this he may as surely see what the other hears, viz. that his hours pass away, and death hastens, and after death comes judgment.

24. But by the measures of binding, we may judge of the loosing, or absolution, which is part of the judgment of conscience, and this is the greatest pleasure in the world;

> Μόνον δὲ τοῦτό φασ' ἀμιλλᾶσθαι βίῳ,
> Γνώμην δικαίαν κἀγαθὴν, ὅταν παρῇ [r].

A good conscience [s] is the most certain, clearest, and undisturbed felicity. "Lectulus respersus floribus bona est conscientia, bonis refecta operibus." No bed so soft, no flowers so sweet, so florid, and delicious, as a good conscience, in which springs all that is delectable, all that may sustain and recreate our spirits.—"Nulla re tam lætari soleo quam officiorum meorum conscientia:" "I am pleased in nothing so much as in the remembrances and conscience of my duty," said Cicero. Upon this pillow and on this bed, Christ slept soundly in a storm,—and St. Peter in prison so fast, that the brightness of an angel could not awake him, or make him to

[r] Hippolyt. 428.—Priestley's edition of Eurip. vol. 3. p. 137.
[s] 2 Cor. i. 12.

rise up without a blow on the side. This refreshed the sorrows of Hezekiah when he was smitten with the plague, and not only brought pleasure for what was past, and so doubled the good of it,

Vivere bis vita posse priore frui;

but it also added something to the number of his years,

Ampliat ætatis spatium sibi vir bonus ——[t]

And this made Paul and Silas sing in prison and in an earthquake; and that I may sum up all the good things in the world, I borrow the expression of St. Bernard, "Bona conscientia non solum sufficit ad solatium sed etiam ad coronam:" It is here a perpetual comfort, it will be hereafter an eternal crown.

25. This very thing Epicurus observed wisely, and in his great design for pleasure commended justice as the surest instrument to procure it. So Antiphon: "Conscium esse sibi in vita nullius criminis, multum voluptatis parit:" and Cato in Cicero [u]; "Conscientia bene actæ vitæ multorumque benefactorum recordatio jucundissima est." Nothing is a greater pleasure than a good conscience; for there is peace and no disturbance; καρπὸς μέγιστος ἀταραξία: 'quietness is the best fruit:' and that grows only upon the tree in the midst of Paradise, upon the stock of a holy heart or conscience. Only care is to be taken, that boldness be not mistaken for peace, and hardness of heart for a good conscience. It is easy to observe the difference, and no man can be innocently abused in this affair. Peace is the fruit of a holy conscience. But no man can say, 'I am at peace, therefore I have a holy conscience.' But, 'I have lived innocently,' or 'I walk carefully with my God, and I have examined my conscience severely, and that accuses me not; therefore this peace is a holy peace, and no illusion.' A man may argue thus: 'I am in health, and therefore the sleep I take, is natural and healthful.' But not thus: 'I am heavy to sleep, therefore I am in health;' for his dulness may be a lethargy. A man may be quiet, because he inquires not, or because he understands not, or because he cares not, or because he is abused in the notices of his condition. But the true peace of conscience is thus to be discerned.

[t] Martial, 10. 23. [u] De Amicit. Wetzel. c. 3. §. 7. pag. 21.

Signs of true Peace.

(1.) Peace of conscience is a rest after a severe inquiry. When Hezekiah was upon his death-bed as he supposed, he examined his state of life, and found it had been innocent in the great lines and periods of it; and he was justly confident.

(2.) Peace of conscience can never be in wicked persons, of notorious evil lives. It is a fruit of holiness; and therefore what quietness soever is in persons of evil lives, it is to be attributed to any other cause, rather than innocence; and therefore is to be called any thing rather than just peace. "The adulterous woman eateth and wipeth her mouth, and saith, I have done no wickedness[x]." And Pilate 'washed his hands,' when he was dipping them in the most innocent, the best and purest, blood of the world. But St. Paul had peace, because he really had 'fought a good fight.' And it is but a fond way to ask a sign how to discern, when the sun shines. If the sun shines we may easily perceive it, and then the beams we see, are the sun-beams; but it is not a sure argument to say, I see a light, therefore the sun shines; for he may espy only a tallow candle, or a glowworm.

(3.) That rest which is only in the days of prosperity, is not a just and a holy peace, but that which is in the days of sorrow and affliction[y]. The noise and madness of wine, the transportations of prosperity, the forgetfulness of riches, and the voice of flatterers, outcry conscience, and put it to silence; and there is no reason to commend a woman's silence and modesty, when her mouth is stopped. But in the days of sorrow, then conscience is vocal, and her muffler is off;

> —— Invigilant animo, scelerisque parati
> Supplicium exercent curæ: tunc plurima versat
> Pessimus in dubiis augur timor ——[z]

and then a man naturally searches every where for comfort; and if his heart then condemns him not, it is great odds but it is a holy peace.

(4.) Peace of mind is not to be used as a sign that God hath pardoned our sins, but is only of use in questions of particular fact. 'What evils have I done? what good have I

[x] Prov. xxx. 20. [y] Ecclus. xiii. 26.
[z] Statius Theb. iii. 4. Bipont. p. 208.

done?' The peace that comes after this examination, is holy and good. But if I have peace in these particulars, then have I peace towards God also, as to these particulars: but whether I have pardon for other sins which I have committed, is another consideration, and is always more uncertain. But even here also a peace of conscience is a blessing that is given to all holy penitents more or less, at some time or other, according as their repentance proceeds, and their hope is exercised: but it is not to be judged of by sense, and ease, but by its proper causes: it never comes but after fear, and labour, and prayers, and watchfulness, and assiduity: and then what succeeds is a blessing, and a fair indication of a bigger.

(5.) True peace of conscience is always joined with a holy fear; a fear to offend, and a fear of the divine displeasure for what we have offended; and the reason is, because all peace that is so allayed, is a peace after inquiry, a peace obtained by just instruments, relying upon proper grounds; it is rational, and holy, and humble; neither carelessness nor presumption is in it.

(6.) True peace of conscience relies not upon popular noises, and is not a sleep procured by the tongues of flatterers, or opinions of men, but is a peace from within, relying upon God and its own just measures. It is an excellent discourse which Seneca hath: "Est aliquando gratus, etiam qui ingratus videtur, quam mala interpres opinio contrarium traducit. Hic quid aliud sequitur, quam ipsam conscientiam? quæ etiam obruta delectat, quæ concioni ac famæ reclamat, et in se omnia reponit, et quum ingentem ex altera parte turbam contra sentientium aspexit, non numerat suffragia, sed una sententia vincit:" "Some men are thankful, who yet seem unthankful, being wronged by evil interpretation. But such a man, what else does he follow but his conscience, which pleases him, though it be overborne with slander; and when she sees a multitude of men that think otherwise, she regards not, nor reckons suffrages by the poll, but is victorious by her single sentence[a]." But the excellency and great effect of this peace he afterward describes: "Si vero bonam fidem perfidiæ suppliciis affici videt, non descendit è fastigio, sed supra pœnam suam consistit.—Habeo, inquit, quod volui, quod petii. Non pœnitet, nec pœnitebit, nec ulla iniquitate

[a] Lib. 4. de Benefic. c. 21. 4. Rabbayt, vol. 1. p. 169.

me eo fortuna perducet, ut hanc vocem audiam, Quid mihi volui? quid mihi nunc prodest bona voluntas? Prodest et in equuleo, prodest et in igne. Qui si singulis membris admoveatur, et paulatim vivum corpus circumeat; licet ipsum corpus plenum bona conscientia stillet: placebit illi ignis, per quem bona fides collucebit:" "A good conscience loses nothing of its confidence and peace for all the tortures of the world. The rack, the fire, shall not make it to repent and say, What have I purchased? But its excellency and integrity shall be resplendent in the very flames."—And this is the meaning of the proverb used by the Levantines, 'Heaven and hell are seated in the heart of man.' As his conscience is, so he is happy, or extremely miserable. "What other men say of us, is no more than what other men dream of us," said St. Gregory Nazianzen [b]; it is our conscience that accuses or condemns to all real events and purposes.

26. And now all this is nothing but a persuasion partly natural, partly habitual, of this proposition which all the nations, and all the men in the world, have always entertained as the band of all their religion, and private transactions of justice and decency,—"Deum remuneratorem esse," that "God is a just rewarder" of all actions. I sum up the premises in the words of the orator: "Magna vis est conscientiæ, judices, et magna in utramque partem: ut neque timeant qui nihil commiserint; et pœnam semper ante oculos versari putent, qui peccarint [c]." On either side conscience is mighty and powerful, to secure the innocent, and to afflict the criminal.

27. But beyond these offices now described, conscience does sometimes only counsel a thing to be done; that is, according to its instruction, so it ministers to holiness. If God hath put a law into our minds, conscience will force obedience, or make us to suffer for our disobedience; but if a proposition, tending to holiness and its advantages, be intrusted to the conduct of conscience, then it presses it by all its proper inducements, by which it was laid up there, and leaves the spirit of a man to his liberty; but if it be not followed, it upbraids our weaknesses, and chides our follies, and reproves our despising holy degrees, and greater excellences of glory laid up for loving and willing spirits. Such

[b] Orat. 25. [c] Cicero pro Milone, §. 23. 3. Wetzel, page 254.

as is that of Clemens Alexandrinus[d], in the matter of an evangelical counsel; Οὐχ ἁμαρτάνει μὲν κατὰ διαθήκην· οὐ γὰρ κεκώλυται πρὸς τοῦ νόμου· οὐ πληροῖ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον πολιτείας, κατ' ἐπίτασιν, τελειότητα, "He that does so and so, sins not; for he is not forbidden by the law of the Gospel; but yet he falls short of the perfection, that is designed and propounded to voluntary and obedient persons." To sum up this:

28. When St. Paul had reproved the endless genealogies of the Gnostics and Platonists, making circles of the same things, or of divers whose difference they understood not; as intelligence, fear, majesty, wisdom, magnificence, mercy, victory, kingdom, foundation, God, and such unintelligible stuff which would make fools stare and wise men at a loss; he subjoins a short, but a more discernible genealogy, and conjugation of things to our purpose: "The end of the commandment is love out of a pure heart, and a good conscience, and faith unfeigned[e]:" that is, out of an unfeigned faith proceeds a good conscience; that is, abstinence from sin;—and from thence comes purity of heart, or a separation from the trifling regards of the world, and all affections to sin; and these all end in charity: that is, in peace, in joy, and the fruition and love of God, in unions and contemplations in the bosom of eternity. So that faith is the first mover in the understanding part, and the next is conscience; and they both purify the heart from false persuasions, and evil affections; and then they join to the production of love and of felicity.

Thus far are the nature and offices of conscience: it will concern us next, to consider by what general measures we are to treat our conscience, that it may be useful to us in all the intentions of it, and in the designs of God.

[d] Stromat. lib. 4.

[e] 1 Tim. i. 5. 2 Tim. i. 3. ii. 22. Heb. ix. 14. x. 22. xiii. 18. Acts, xv. 9.

RULE III.

Be careful that Prejudice or Passion, Fancy and Affection, Error or Illusion, be not mistaken for Conscience.

1. NOTHING is more usual, than to pretend conscience to all the actions of men which are public, and whose nature cannot be concealed. If arms be taken up in a violent war; inquire of both sides, why they engage on that part respectively; they answer, because of their conscience. Ask a schismatic why he refuses to join in the communion of the church; he tells you, it is against his conscience:—and the disobedient refuse to submit to laws; and they also, in many cases, pretend conscience. Nay, some men suspect their brother of a crime, and are persuaded, as they say, in conscience that he did it: and their conscience tells them that Titius did steal their goods, or that Caia is an adulteress. And so suspicion, and jealousy, and disobedience, and rebellion, are become conscience; in which there is neither knowledge, nor revelation, nor truth, nor charity, nor reason, nor religion. "Quod volumus, sanctum est," was the proverb of Sichonius and the Donatists.

> Nemo suæ mentis motus non æstimat æquos,
> Quodque volunt homines, se bene velle putant[f].

Every man's way seems right in his own eyes; and what they think is not against conscience, they think or pretend to think, it is an effect of conscience; and so their fond persuasions and fancies are made sacred, and conscience is pretended, and themselves and every man else is abused. But in these cases and the like, men have found a sweetness in it to serve their ends upon religion, and because conscience is the religious understanding, or the mind of a man as it stands dressed in and for religion, they think that some sacredness or authority passes upon their passion or design, if they call it conscience.

2. But by this rule it is intended that we should observe the strict measures of conscience. For an illusion may make a conscience, that is, may oblige by its directive and compulsive power. Conscience is like a king, whose power and authority are regular, whatsoever counsel he follows.

[f] Prosper. Epigr. de Cohibenda Ira.

And although he may command fond things, being abused by flatterers, or misinformation, yet the commandment issues from a just authority, and therefore equally passes into a law; so it is in conscience. If error or passion dictates, the king is misinformed, but the inferiors are bound to obey: and we may no more disobey our conscience commanding of evil things, than we may disobey our king enjoining things imprudent and inconvenient. But therefore this rule gives caution to observe the information and inducement, and if we can discern the abuse, then the evil is avoided. For this governor 'conscience' is tied to laws, as kings are to the laws of God and nations, to justice and charity; and a man's conscience cannot be malicious: his will may; but if the error be discovered, the conscience, that is, the practical understanding, cannot. For it is impossible for a man to believe what himself finds to be an error: and when we perceive our conscience to be misguided, the deception is at an end. And therefore to make up this rule complete, we ought to be strict and united to our rule; for by that only we can be guided, and by the proportions to it we can discern right and wrong, when we walk safely, and when we walk by false fires. Concerning which, besides the direct survey of the rule and action, and the comparing each other, we may, in cases of doubt and suspicion, be helped by the following measures.

Advices for the Practice of the former Rule.

3. (1.) We are to suspect our conscience to be misinformed, when we are not willing to inquire into the particulars. He that searches, desires to find, and so far takes the right course: for truth can never hurt a man, though it may prejudice his vice, and his affected folly. In the inquiries after truth, every man should have a traveller's indifferency, wholly careless whether this or that be the right way, so he may find it. For we are not to choose the way because it looks fair, but because it leads surely. And to this purpose, the most hearty and particular inquest is most prudent and effective. But we are afraid of truth when we will not inquire, that is, when the truth is against our interest or passion, our lust or folly, that is, seemingly against us, in the present indisposition of our affairs.

4. (2.) He that resolves upon the conclusion before the premises, inquiring into particulars to confirm his opinion at a venture, not to shake it if it be false, or to establish it only in case it be true, unless he be defended by chance, is sure to mistake, or at least can never be sure whether he does or no.

This is to be understood in all cases to be so, unless the particular unknown be secured by a general that is known. He that believes Christ's advocation and intercession for us in heaven upon the stock of Scripture, cannot be prejudiced by this rule, although, in the inquiries of probation and arguments of the doctrine, he resolve to believe nothing that shall make against his conclusion; because he is ascertained by a proposition that cannot fail him. The reason of this exception is this, because in all discourses which are not perfectly demonstrative, there is one lame supporter, which must be helped out by the better leg; and the weaker part does its office well enough, if it can bring us to a place where we may rest ourselves and rely. He that cannot choose for himself, hath chosen well enough, if he can choose one that can choose for him; and when he hath, he may prudently rely upon such a person in all particulars, where he himself cannot judge, and the other can, or he thinks he can, and cannot well know the contrary. It is easier to judge of the general lines of duty, than of minutes and particulars: and travellers that are not well skilled in all the little turnings of the ways, may confidently rely upon a guide whom they choose out of the natives of the place; and if he understands the coast of the country, he may well harden his face against any vile person, that goes about wittily to persuade him he must go the contrary way, though he cannot answer his arguments to the contrary. A man may prudently and piously hold a conclusion, which he cannot defend against a witty adversary, if he have one strong hold upon which he may rely for the whole question; because he derives his conclusion from the best ground he hath, and takes the wisest course he can, and uses the best means he can get, and chooses the safest ways that are in his power. No man is bound to do better than his best.

5. (3.) Illusion cannot be distinguished from conscience, if, in our search, we take a wrong course and use incompetent

instruments. He that will choose to follow the multitude which easily errs, rather than the wise guides of souls; and a man that is his partner in the question, rather than him that is disinterested; and them that speak by chance, rather than them who have studied the question; and a man of another profession, rather than him whose office and employment it is to answer,—hath no reason to be confident he shall be well instructed. John Nider[g] tells an apologue well enough to this purpose:—Two brethren travelling together, whereof one was esteemed wise, and the other little better than a fool, came to a place where the way parted. The foolish brother espying one of them to be fair and pleasant, and the other dirty and uneven, would needs go that way, though his wiser brother told him, that in all reason that must needs be the wrong way; but he followed his own eyes, not his brother's reason: and his brother being more kind than wise, though against his reason, followed his foolish brother; they went on till they fell into the hands of thieves, who robbed them and imprisoned them, till they could redeem themselves with a sum of money. These brothers accuse each other before the king as author of each other's evil. The wiser complained that his brother would not obey him, though he was known to be wiser, and spake reason. The other complained of him for following him that was a fool, affirming, that he would have returned back, if he had seen his wise brother confident, and to have followed his own reason. The king condemned them both; the fool, because he did not follow the direction of the wise,—and the wise, because he did follow the wilfulness of the fool.—So will God deal with us at the day of judgment in the scrutinies of conscience. If appetite refuses to follow reason, and reason does not refuse to follow appetite, they have both of them taken incompetent courses, and shall perish together. It was wisely said of Brutus[h] to Cicero, "Malo tuum judicium, quam ex altera parte omnium istorum. Tu enim à certo sensu et vero judicas de nobis; quod isti ne faciant, summa malevolentia et livore impediuntur:" "I prefer thy judgment singly, before all theirs, because thou judgest by intuition of the thing; they cannot do that, being hindered by envy and ill-will."—The particulars of reducing this advice to practice in all special cases, I shall afterward enumerate; for the present I say

[g] In Lavacro Conscient. [h] Lib. 11. Famil. Epist. 10. Cortius, p. 570.

this only, that a man may consent to an evil authority, and rest in a false persuasion, and be conducted by an abused conscience, so long as the legislative reason is not conjoined to the judge conscience, that is, while by unapt instruments we suffer our persuasions to be determined.

6. (4.) That determination is to be suspected, that does apparently serve an interest, and but obscurely serve a pious end:

Utile quod nobis, do tibi consilium[i]:

When that appears, and nothing else appears, the resolution or counsel is to be considered warily before it be pursued. It is a great allay to the confidence of the bold talkers in the church of Rome, and hinders their gain and market of proselytes from among the wise and pious very much,—that most of their propositions, for which they contend so earnestly against the other parts of Christendom, do evidently serve the ends of covetousness and ambition, of power and riches, and therefore stand vehemently suspected of design and art, rather than of piety or truth of the article, or designs upon heaven. I instance in the pope's power over princes and all the world; his power of dispensation; the exemption of the clergy from jurisdiction of secular princes; the doctrine of purgatory and indulgences, by which once the friars were set a work to raise a portion for a lady, the niece of Pope Leo X.; the doctrine of transubstantiation, by the effects and consequence of which, the priests are made greater than angels, and next to God; and so is also that heap of doctrines, by the particulars of which the ecclesiastical power is far advanced beyond the authority of any warrant from Scripture, and is made highly instrumental for procuring absolute obedience to the Papacy. In these things every man with half an eye can see the temporal advantage; but how piety and truth shall thrive in the meanwhile, no eye hath yet been so illuminate as to perceive. It was the advice of Ben Sirach[k], "Consult not with a woman touching her of whom she is jealous; neither with a coward in matters of war; nor with a merchant concerning exchange; nor with a buyer, of selling; nor with an envious man, of thankfulness; nor with an unmerciful man touching kindness; nor with the slothful, for any work; nor with the hireling, for a year of

[i] Martial. 5. 20. 18. [k] Eccles. xxxvii. 11.

finishing work; nor with an idle servant, of much business; hearken not unto these in any matter of counsel." These will counsel by their interest, not for thy advantage.

But it is possible that both truth and interest may be conjoined; and when a priest preaches to the people the necessity of paying tithes, where they are by law appointed, or when a poor man pleads for charity, or a man in debt urges the excellency of forgetfulness; the truth which they discourse of, cannot be prejudiced by their proper concernments. For if the proposition serves the ends in religion, in providing for their personal necessities, their need makes the instances still the more religious, and the things may otherwise be proved. But when the end of piety is obscure, or the truth of the proposition is uncertain, then observe the bias; and if the man's zeal be bigger than the certainty of the proposition, it is to be estimated by the interest, and to be used accordingly.

But this is not to prejudice him that gives the counsel; for although the counsel is to be suspected, yet the man is not, unless by some other indications he betray himself. For he may be heartily and innocently persuaded of the thing he counsels, and the more easily and aptly believe that, against which himself did less watch, because he quickly perceived it could not be against himself.

Add to this, the counsel is the less to be suspected, if it be asked, than if it be offered. But this is a consideration of prudence, not of conscience directly.

7. (5.) If the proposition serve or maintain a vice, or lessen a virtue, it is certainly not conscience, but error and abuse; because no truth of God can serve God's enemy directly, or by its own force and persuasion. But this is to be understood only in case the answer does directly minister to sin, not if it does so only accidentally. Q. Furius is married to Valeria; but she being fierce and imperious, quarrelsome and loud, and he peevish and fretful, turns her away that he might have peace and live in patience. But being admonished by Hortensius the orator, to take her again,—he asked counsel of the priests, and they advise him to receive her. He answers, that then he cannot live innocently, but in a perpetual state of temptation, in which he daily falls. The priest replies, that it is his own fault; let him learn patience, and

prudence; for his fault in this instance is no warranty to make him neglect a duty in another; and he answered rightly. If he had counselled him to drink intemperately to make him forget his sorrow, or to break her bones to make her silent, or to keep company with harlots to vex her into compliance, his counsel had ministered directly to sin, and might not be received.

8. (6.) Besides the evidence of the thing, and a direct conformity to the rule, to be judged by every sober person, or by himself in his wits, there is ordinarily no other collateral assurance, but an honest hearty endeavour in our proportion, to make as wise inquiries as we can, and to get the best helps which are to be had by us, and to obey the best we do make use of. To which (because a deception may tacitly creep upon our very simplicity) if we add a hearty prayer, we shall certainly be guided through the labyrinth, and secured against ourselves, and our own secret follies. This is the counsel of the Son of Sirach[1]; "Above all this; pray to the Most High, that he will direct thy way in truth."

RULE IV.

The Conscience of a vicious Man is an evil Judge, and an imperfect Rule.

1. THAT I mean the superior and inferior part of conscience, is therefore plain, because the rule notes how the acts of conscience may be made invalid both as it is a ruler, and as it is a judge. But, according to the several offices, this truth hath some variety.

2. (1.) The superior part of conscience, or the *συντήρησις*, repository of practical principles (which for use and brevity's sake, I shall call the phylactery), or the keeper of records; that is, that part which contains in it all the natural and reasonable principles of good actions (such as are, God is to be worshipped,—Do to others as they should do to thee,—The pledge is to be restored,—By doing harm to others thou must not procure thy own good,—and the like), is always a

[1] Eccles. xxxvii. 15.

certain and regular judge in the prime principles of reason and religion, so long as a man is in his wits, and hath the natural use of reason. For those things which are first imprinted, which are universal principles, which are consented to by all men without a teacher, those which Aristotle calls κοινὰς ἐννοίας, those are always the last removed, and never without the greatest violence and perturbation in the world. But it is possible for a man to forget his name and his nature: a lycanthropy made Nebuchadnezzar to do so, and a fever made a learned Greek do so: but so long as a man's reason is whole, not destroyed by its proper disease; that is, so long as a man hath the use of reason, and can and will discourse, so long his conscience will teach him the general precepts of duty; for they are imprinted in his nature, and there is nothing natural to the soul, if reason be not; and no reason is, unless its first principles be, and those first principles are most provided for, which are the most perfective of a man, and necessary to his well-being, and those are such which concern the intercourse between God and man, and between men in the first and greatest lines of their society. The very opening of this chain is sufficient proof; it is not necessary to intricate it by offering more testimony.

3. (2.) But then these general principles are either to be considered as they are habitually incumbent on the mind, or as actually applied to practice. In the former sense they can never be totally extinguished, for they are natural, and will return whenever a man ceases from suffering his greatest violence; and those violences, which are so destructive of nature, as this must be that makes a man forget his being, will fall off upon every accident and change, "Difficile est personam diu sustinere." But then when these principles come to be applied to practice, a strong vice and a malicious heart can draw a veil over them, that they shall not then appear to disorder the sensual resolution. A short madness, and a violent passion, or a fit of drunkenness, can make a man securely sin by incogitancy, even when the action is in the manner of a universal principle. No man can be brought to that pass, as to believe that God ought not to be honoured; but supposing there is a God, it is unavoidable that this God must be honoured; but a transient and unnatural violence intervening in a particular case, suspends the application of

that principle, and makes the man not to consider his rule; and there he omits to worship and honour this God in many particulars to which the principle is applicable. But this discourse is coincident with that question, whether conscience may be totally lost? of which I have already given accounts[m]. That and this will give light to each other.

4. (3.) But further, there are also some principles which are indeed naturally known, that is, by principles of natural reason: but because they are not the immediate principles of our creation and proper being, they have the same truth, and the same seat, and the same certainty; but not the same prime evidence, and connaturality to the soul; and therefore these may be lost, or obscured to all purposes of usefulness, and their contradictories may be admitted into the rule of conscience. Of this nature, I reckon, that fornication, violent and crafty contracts, with many arts of deception, and overreaching our brother, theft, incest in some kinds, drunkenness, and the like, are to be avoided. For concerning these, it is certain that some whole nations have so abused their conscience by evil manners, that the law in their mind hath been cancelled, and these things have passed for lawful. And to this day, that duels may be fought by private persons, and authority, is a thing so practised by a whole sort of men, that it is believed: and the practice, and the belief of the lawfulness of it, are interchangeably daughter and mother to each other. These are such of whom the Apostle speaks[n], they are "given over to believe a lie," they are delivered "to a reprobate mind." And this often happens, and particularly in those cases wherein one sin is inferred by another naturally, or morally, or by withdrawing of the divine grace.

5. (4.) Wherever the superior or the ruling part of conscience is an imperfect rule; in the same cases the inferior is an evil judge, that is, acquits the criminal, or condemns the innocent, calling good evil, and evil good: which is to be understood when the persuasion of the erring conscience is permanent and hearty, not sudden, and by the rapid violence of a passion; for in this case the conscience condemns as soon as that is acted, to which, before the action, it was cozened and betrayed: but it proceeds only in abiding and lasting errors. And this is the cause why so many orders of

[m] In rule 1. numb. 5. et seq. [n] Rom. i. 28.

persons continue in a course of sin with delight, and uninterrupted pleasure, thinking rebellion to be a just defence, sacrilege a lawful title; while other men, that are otherwise and justly persuaded, wonder at their peace, and hate their practices. Our blessed Lord foretold concerning the prosecutors of the church, that they should 'think they did God good service.' But such men have an evil portion, they sing in the fire, and go dancing to their graves, and sleep on till they be awakened in hell. And on the other side, this is because of superstition, and scruples, and sometimes of despairing and unreasonable fears, when the conscience is abused by thinking that to be sin, which is none.

RULE V.

All Consciences are to walk by the same Rule; and that which is just to one, is so to all, in the like Circumstances.

1. If all men were governed by the same laws, and had the same interest, and the same degrees of understanding, they would perceive the truth of this conclusion. But men are infinitely differenced by their own acts and relations, by their understandings and proper economy, by their superinduced differences and orders, by interest and mistake, by ignorance and malice, by sects and deceptions. And this makes that two men may be damned for doing two contradictories: as a Jew may perish for not keeping of his sabbath, and a Christian for keeping it; an Iconoclast for breaking images, and another for worshipping them: for eating, and for not eating; for receiving the holy communion, and for not receiving it; for coming to church, or staying at home.

2. But this variety is not directly of God's making, but of man's. God commands us to walk by the same rule, and to this end, τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν, "to be of the same mind;" and this is ἀκρίβεια συνειδήσεως, "the exactness of our conscience;" which precept were impossible to be observed, if there were not one rule, and this rule also very easy. For some men have but a small portion of reason and discretion, and they cannot help it; and yet the precept is incumbent upon them all alike; and therefore as the rule is one, so it is plain and easy, and written in every man's heart; and as

every man's reason is the same thing, so is every man's conscience; and this comes to be altered, just as that.

3. Neither is the unity of the rule prejudiced by the infinite difference of cases. For as a river, springing from the mountains of the east, is tempted by the levels of the ground and the uneasiness of its passage, to make some turns backward towards its head, even while it intends westward; so are the cases of conscience branched out into instances, sometimes of contrary proceedings, which are to be determined to cross effects, but still upon the same account. For in all things of the world the obligation is uniform, and it is of the same persuasion.

The case is this:

4. Autolycus robbed the gardens of Trebonius, and asked him forgiveness, and had it. But when Trebonius was chosen consul, and Autolycus robbed him again, and was taken by others, and as a thief brought before him, he asked forgiveness again: but Trebonius condemned him to the galleys: for he who being a private man was bound to forgive a repenting trespasser, being a magistrate was bound not to forgive him; and both these were upon the same account. A man may forgive an injury done to himself, because it is his own right, and he may alone meddle in it; but an injury done to the commonwealth, she only could forgive, not her minister. So,

5. He that fasted upon a Saturday in Ionia or Smyrna, was a schismatic; and so was he who did not fast at Milan or Rome upon the same day, both upon the same reason;

> Cum fueris Romæ, Romano vivito more;
> Cum fueris alibi, vivito sicut ibi;

because he was to conform to the custom of Smyrna, as well as to that of Milan, in the respective diocesses.

6. To kill a man, in some cases, defiles a land; in others, it cleanses it, and puts away blood from the people; and it was plain in the case of circumcision. St. Paul did it, and did it not; both because he ought, and because he ought not; and all upon the same account and law of charity. And therefore all inquiries, and all contentions, and questions, should be relations to the rule, and be tried by nothing but a plain measure of justice and religion, and not stand or

fall by relations to separate propositions and distinct regards. For that is one and easy; these are infinite, uncertain, and contradictory. Τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ αἴτιον ἀνθρώποις πάντων τῶν κακῶν τὸ τὰς προλήψεις τὰς κοινὰς μὴ δύνασθαι ἐφαρμόζειν ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους. "It is a very great cause of mischief not to be able to deduce general propositions, and fit them to particular cases," said Arrianus [o]. But because all men cannot, therefore there will be an eternal necessity of spiritual guides, whose employment, and the business of their life, must be to make themselves able 'respondere de jure,' 'to answer in matters of law,' and they also must be truly informed in the matters of fact.

RULE VI.

In Conscience, that which is first, is truest, easiest, and most useful.

1. THERE are some practices, which, at the first sight, and by the very name and nature of the things themselves, seem as directly unreasonable and against a commandment, as any other thing of the foulest reproach; and yet, object the sin to the owners, and they will tell so many fine stories, and struggle, and distinguish, and state the question in a new manner, and chop it into fragments, and disguise the whole affair, that they do not only content and believe themselves, but also lessen the confidence of the adversary, and make a plain rule an uneasy lesson. I instance in the question of images, the making of some of which, and the worshipping of any, does at the first sight as plainly dash against the second commandment, as adultery does against the sixth. But if you examine the practice of the Roman church, and estimate them by the more wary determination of the article in Trent, and weigh it by the distinctions and laborious devices of its patrons, and believe their pretences and shows, it must needs be that you will abate something of the reproof; and yet all the while the worship of images goes forward: and if you lay the commandment over-against the devices and distinctions, it will not be easy to tell what the commandment does mean; and yet because it was given to

[o] In Epictet. lib. 3. c. 26.

the meanest understandings, and was fitted for them, either the conscience is left without a clear rule, or that sense is to be followed which stands nearest the light, that which is next to the natural and proper sense of the words. For it is certain God puts no disguises upon his own commandments, and the words are meant plainly and heartily; and the further you remove from their first sense, the more you have lost the purpose of your rule. In matters of conscience, that is the best sense, which every wise man takes in, before he hath sullied his understanding with the disguises of sophisters, and interessed persons; for then they speak without prejudice and art, that is, so as they should speak, who intend to guide wise men, and all men.

2. But this is to be understood otherwise, when the first sense of the words hath, in its letter, a prejudice open and easy to be seen; such as is that of 'putting out the right eye,' or 'cutting off the hand." The face is a vizor and a metaphor, and the heart of it only is the commandment, and that is to be understood by the measures of this rule; that is, the prime and most natural signification is the best, that which is of nearest correspondency to the metaphor and the design of the speaker, and the occasion and matter of discourse.

3. But in all things where the precept is given in the proper style of laws, and the vail is off, and the words are plain, he that takes the first sense is the likeliest to be well guided. If a war be commenced between a king and his people, he that is willing to read his duty, may see it in the words of Christ and of three apostles, and it is easy to know our duty; but when we are engaged against our prince, it is certain we are hugely put to it to make it lawful, and when our conscience must struggle for its rule, it is not so well as when it takes that which lies easy before us. Truth is easy, error is intricate and hard. If none but witty men could understand their duty, the ignorant and idiot could not be saved; but in the event of things it will be found that this man's conscience was better guided while simplicity held the taper, than by all the false fires of art, and witty distinctions. "Qui ambulat simpliciter, ambulat confidenter," saith Solomon. It is safer to walk on plain ground, than with tricks and devices to dance upon the ropes.

RULE VII.

Conscience by its several Habitudes and Relations, or Tendencies towards its proper Object, is divided into several Kinds.

1. CONSCIENCE in respect of its information, or as it relates to its object, taken materially, and in the nature of the thing, is either true or false, right or wrong; true when it is rightly informed, and proceeds justly; false when it is deceived. Between these as participating of either extreme, stands the probable conscience; which if we consider as it relates to its object, is sometimes right, and sometimes wrong, and so may be reduced to either, according as it is in the event of things. For in two contradictories which are both probable, as if one be, both are; if one part be true, the other is false; and the conscience of the several men holding the opposite parts, must be so too, that is, right and wrong, deceived and not deceived, respectively. The division then of conscience, in respect of its object, is tripartite.

2. For in all questions, if notice can be certainly had, he that gets the notice, hath a true conscience: he that misses it, hath a false or erring conscience. But if the notices that can be had, be uncertain, imperfectly revealed, or weakly transmitted, or understood by halves, or not well represented; because the understanding cannot be sure, the conscience can be but probable. But according as the understanding is fortunate, or the man wise and diligent, and honest enough to take the right side of the probability, so the conscience takes its place in the extreme, and is reduced to right or wrong accordingly.

3. But to be right or wrong, is wholly extrinsical to the formal obligation of conscience, as it is a judge and a guide, and to the consequent duty of the man. For an erring conscience binds as much as the right conscience, directly and immediately, and collaterally more; that is, the man who hath an erring conscience, is tied to more and other duties, than he that is in the right. The conscience binds because it is heartily persuaded, not because it is truly informed; not because it is right, but because it thinks so.

4. It does indeed concern the duty of conscience, and its felicity, to see that it be rightly instructed, but as to the

consequence of the action, it is all one: this must follow whatsoever goes before. And therefore, although it concerns the man, as much as his felicity and all his hopes come to, to take care that his conscience be not abused in the matter of duty; yet a right and a wrong conscience are not made distinct guides and different judges. Since therefore we are to consider and treat of conscience, as it is the guide of our actions, and judge of our persons, we are to take it in other aspects, than by a direct face towards its object; the relation to which alone, cannot diversify its kind, so much as to become a universal rule to us in all cases and emergencies.

5. Now because intellectual habits, employed about the same general object, have no way to make them of different natures, but by their formal tendencies, and different manners of being affected with the same object; we are in order to the perfect division and assignation of the kinds of conscience, to consider the right conscience, either as it is sure, or as it is only confident, but not sure. For an erring conscience and the unerring are the same judge, and the same guide, as to the authority and persuasion, and as to the effect upon the person: but yet they differ infinitely in their rule; and the persons under their conduct differ as much in their state and condition. But our conscience is not a good guide unless we be truly informed, and know it. For if we be truly informed, and know it not, it is an uncertain and an imperfect guide. But if we be confident and yet deceived, the uncertainty and hesitation are taken off, but we are still very miserable. For we are like an erring traveller, who being out of the way, and thinking himself right, spurs his horse and runs full speed: he that comes behind, is nearer to his journey's end.

6. That therefore is the first kind of conscience, the right sure conscience; and this alone is fit to be our guide; but this alone is not our judge.

7. (2.) Opposite to this is the confident or erring conscience; that is, such which indeed is misinformed, but yet assents to its objects with the same confidence as does the right and sure; but yet upon differing grounds, motives, and inducements: which because they are always criminal, although the assent is peremptory and confident, yet the de-

ception is voluntary and vicious in its cause; and therefore the present confidence cannot warrant the action, it only makes the sinner bold. So that these two differ in their manner of entering into the assent; the one entering by the door, the other by the breaches of the wall: good will and bad, virtue and vice, duty and sin, keeping the several keys of the persuasion and consent.

8. This erring conscience I therefore affirm to be always voluntary and vicious in its principle, because all God's laws are plain in all matter of necessary duty: and when all men are to be guided, learned and unlearned, the rule is plain and easy, because it is necessary it should be so. But therefore if there happen any invincible ignorance, or involuntary deception, it is there where the rule is not plain; and then the matter is but probable, and then the conscience is according. And this makes the third kind of conscience, in respect of the different manner of being affected with the object.

9. (3.) The probable conscience is made by that manner of assent to the object, which is indeed without fear, but not without imperfection. The thing itself is of that nature, that it cannot properly make faith or certainty of adherence; and the understanding considers it as it is represented without any prejudice or prepossession; and then the thing must be believed as it deserves, and no more: but because it does not deserve a full assent, it hath but an imperfect one; but it is perfect enough in its kind, that is, it is as much as it ought to be, as much as the thing deserves. These are all the kinds of conscience that are perfect.

10. (4.) But sometimes the state and acts of conscience are imperfect; as the vision of an evil eye, or the motion of a broken arm, or the act of an imperfect or abused understanding: so the conscience in some cases is carried to its object but with an imperfect assent, and operates with a lame and deficient principle: and the causes of it are the vicious or abused affections, accidents or incidents to the conscience. Sometimes it happens, that the arguments of both the sides in a question seem so indifferent, that the conscience being affrighted and abused by fear and weakness, dares not determine and consequently dares not do any thing; and if it be constrained to act, it is determined from without, not by itself, but by accidents and persuasion, by

importunity or force, by interest or fear: and whatever the ingredient be, yet when it does act, it acts with fear, because it reflects upon itself, and considers it hath no warrant, and therefore whatever it does, becomes a sin. This is the calamity of a doubting conscience. This doubting does not always proceed from the equality of the parts of the question, but sometimes wholly from want of knowing any thing of it: as if we were put to declare whether there were more men or women in the world? Whether the number of the stars were even or odd? Sometimes from inconsideration, sometimes from surprise, sometimes from confusion and disease; but from what principle soever it be, there is always some fear in it. This conscience can neither be a good guide, nor a good judge: we cannot do any thing by its conduct, nor be judged by it; for all that can be done before or after it, is not by it, but by the suppletories of the perfect conscience.

11. (5.) A less degree of this evil, is that which by the masters of moral theology is called the scrupulous conscience, which is not a distinct kind of conscience, as is usually supposed, but differs from the doubting conscience only in the degrees of the evil. The doubt is less, and the fear is not so violent as to make it unlawful to do any thing: something of the doubt is taken off, and the man can proceed to action without sin, but not without trouble; he is uneasy and timorous, even when he is most innocent; and the causes of this are not only portions of the same weaknesses which cause the doubting conscience; but sometimes superstition, and melancholy, and pusillanimity, and mean opinions of God, are ingredients into this imperfect assent: and in such cases, although the scrupulous man may act without sin, and produce his part of the determination, yet his scruple is not innocent, but sometimes criminal, but always calamitous. This is like a mote in the eye, but a doubt is like a beam.

12. This conscience may be a right guide, but dares not be a judge: it is like a guide in the dark, that knows the way, but fears every bush; and because he may err, thinks he does. The effect of this imperfection is nothing but a heartless and uncomfortable proceeding in our duty, and what else the devil can make of it, by heightening the evil

and abusing the man, who sits upon a sure foundation, but dares not trust it: he cannot rely upon that, which yet he cannot disbelieve.

13. (6.) There are some other affections of conscience, and accidental appendages; but because they do not vary the manner of its being affected with its proper object, they cannot diversify conscience into several kinds, as it is a guide and judge of human actions. But because they have no direct influence upon our souls, and relate not to duty, but are to be conducted by rules of the other kinds, I shall here only enumerate their kinds, and permit to preachers to discourse of their natures, and collateral obligations to duty, of their remedies and assistances, their advantages and disadvantages respectively. These also are five: 1. The tender conscience. 2. The hardened or obdurate. 3. The quiet. 4. The restless or disturbed. 5. And lastly, The perverse conscience. Concerning which, I shall at present say this only: that the two first are seated principally in the will, but have a mixture of conscience, as docibility hath of understanding. The two next are seated in the fancy, or the affections, and are not properly placed in the conscience, any more than love or desire; but yet from conscience they have their birth. And for the last, it is a heap of irregular principles, and irregular defects, and is the same in conscience, as deformity is in the body, or peevishness in the affections.

CHAP. II.

OF THE RIGHT OR SURE CONSCIENCE.

RULE I.

A right Conscience is that which guides our Actions by right and proportioned Means, to a right End.

THE end is, God's glory, or any honest purpose of justice or religion, charity or civil conversation. Whatsoever is good for us or our neighbour, in any sense perfective of our being as God purposed it, all that is our end. The means ought to be such as are apt instruments to procure it. If a

man intends to live a severe life, and to attend religion, his end is just and fair, and so far his conscience is right: but if his conscience suggest to him, that he to obtain his end should erect colleges of women; and in the midst of feasts, and songs, and society, he should preach the melancholy lectures of the cross, it is not right; because the end is reached at by a contrary hand. But when it tells him, that to obtain continence he must fast and pray, watch diligently, and observe prudently, labour and read, and deny his appetite in its daily attempts upon him, then it is a right conscience. For a right conscience is nothing but right reason reduced to practice, and conducting moral actions. Now all that right reason can be defined by, is the propoundiug a good end, and good means to that end.

RULE II.

In a right Conscience, the practical Judgment, that is, the last Determination to an Action, ought to be sure and evident.

1. This is plain in all the great lines of duty, in actions determinable by the prime principles of natural reason, or divine revelation; but it is true also in all actions conducted by a right and perfect conscience. This relies upon all that account on which it is forbidden to do actions of danger, or doubt, lest we perish in the danger;—which are to be handled in their proper place. But for the present we are to observe, that in the question of actions, whose rule is not notorious and primely evident, there is or may be a double judgment.

2. The first judges the thing probable by reason of the differing opinions of men wise and pious; but in this there is a fear or suspicion of the contrary, and therefore in the direct act nothing is certain. But there is also, secondly, a reflex act of judgment; which upon consideration that it is certain that a probable action may lawfully be done; or else, that that which is but probable in the nature of the thing (so far as we perceive it) may yet, by the superadding of some circumstances, and prudential considerations, or by equity or necessity, become more than probable in the particular; although, I say, the conscience be uncertain in the

direct act, yet it may be certain, right, and determined, in the reflex and second act of judgment; and if it be, it is innocent and safe, it is that which we call the right-sure conscience.

3. For in moral things there cannot ordinarily be a demonstrative or mathematical certainty: and in morality we call that certain, that is a thing to be followed and chosen, which oftentimes is but very highly probable; and many things do not attain that degree; and therefore because it is very often impossible, it is certainly not necessary that the direct judgment should be sure and evident in all cases. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν, ἀποδεικτόν· τέχνη δὲ καὶ φρόνησις τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, "Science is of those things which can be demonstrated; but prudence [and conscience], of things which are thus, or may be otherwise[p]."—But if it be not supplied in the reflex and second act of judgment, so that the conscience be either certain in the object, or in the act, the whole progress is a danger, and the product is criminal; the conscience is doubtful, and the action is a sin.

4. It is in this as is usually taught concerning the divine knowledge of things contingent; which although they are in their own nature fallible and contingent, yet are known certainly and infallibly by God, and according to the nature of the things, even beyond what they are in their natural, proper, and next causes: and there is a rare and secret expression of Christ's incarnation used by St. Paul, "in whom dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily," that is, the manner is contrary to the thing; the Godhead that is wholly incorporeal dwells in him corporally. After the like manner of signification is the present certainty I speak of. If it be not certain in the object, it must be certain in the faculty, that is, at least it must be a certain persuasion, though of an uncertain article: and we must be certain and fully persuaded, that the thing may be done by us lawfully, though whether the thing itself be lawful, is at most but highly probable.

5. So that in effect it comes but to this; The knowledge that is here required, is but the fulness of persuasion, which is and ought to be in a right conscience: Οἶδα καὶ πέπεισμαι. "I know and am persuaded in the Lord Jesus:" so St. Paul[q].—Our knowledge here, which is but in part, must yet be a full

[p] Aristot. Ethic. lib. 6. cap. 6. Wilkinson, p. 240.
[q] Rom. xiv. 14.

confidence for the matters of duty. The conclusions then are these:

1. There must be a certainty of adherence in the actions of a right conscience.

2. It must also, for the matter of it too, at least be on the right side of the probability.

The conscience must be confident, and it must also have reason enough so to be; or at least, so much as can secure the confidence from illusion; although possibly the confidence may be greater than the evidence, and the conclusion bigger than the premises. Thus the good simple man, that, about the time of the Nicene council, confuted the stubborn and subtle philosopher by a confident saying-over his creed: and the holy and innocent idiot, or plain easy people of the laity, that cannot prove Christianity by any demonstrations, but by that of a holy life, and obedience unto death; they believe it so, that they put all their hopes upon it, and will most willingly prove it again by dying for it, if God shall call them. This is one of the excellences of faith; and in all cases where the mercies of God have conducted the man into the right, it is not subject to illusion. But for that particular, I mean, that we be in the right, we are to take all that care which God hath put into our power:—of which I have already said something, and shall give fuller accounts in its proper place.

RULE III.

The practical Judgment of a right Conscience is always agreeable to the speculative Determination of the Understanding.

1. This rule is intended against those whose understanding is right in the proposition, and yet declines in the application; it is true in 'thesi,' but not in 'hypothesi;' it is not true when it comes to be their case: and so it is in all that sin against their conscience, and use little arts to evade the clamour of the sin. They are right in the rule, and crooked in the measuring; whose folly is apparent in this, because they deny in particular, what they affirm in the general; and it is true in all, but not in some. David was redargued wit-

tily by Nathan upon this account; he laid the case in a remote scene:—Titius, or Sempronius, a certain rich man, I know not who, somebody or other, robbed the poor man of his ewe lamb. Therefore, said David, 'He shall die, whoever he be.'—'Yea, but you are the man:'—what then? shall he die still? this is a new arrest; it could not be denied, his own mouth had already given the sentence.

2. And this is a usual but a most effective art to make the conscience right in the particular, by propounding the case separate from its own circumstances; and then to remove it to its own place is no hard matter. It was an ingenious device of Erasistratus the physician, of which Appian tells[r]:—When young Antiochus almost died for love of Stratonica his father Seleucus's wife, the physician told the passionate and indulgent father, that his son was sick of a disease, which he had indeed discovered, but found it also to be incurable. Seleucus with sorrow asking what it was, Erasistratus answered, 'He loves my wife.' But then the old king's hopes began to revive, and he turned wooer in the behalf of his son, begging of the physician, who was his counsellor and his friend, for pity's sake, for friendship and humanity, to give his wife in exchange or redemption for the young king's life. Erasistratus replied, 'Sir, you ask a thing too unreasonable and great; and though you are his father, yourself would not do it, if it were your own case; and therefore why should I?' when Seleucus swore by all his country gods that he would do it as willingly as he would live; Erasistratus drew the curtain of the device, and applied it to him, by telling, that the cure of his son depended upon his giving the queen Stratonica to him, which he did; and afterward made it as lawful as he could, by a law postnate to that insolent example, and confirmed it by military suffrages.

3. In all cases we are to consider the rule, not the relation; the law, not the person: for if it be one thing in the proposition, and another in the assumption, it must be false in one place or the other; and then the conscience is but an ill guide, and an ill judge.

4. This rule is not to extend to the exception of particular cases; nor to take away privileges, pardons, equity. For

[r] De Bellis Syriacis.

that which is fast in the proposition, may become loose in the particular by many intervening causes, of which I am to give account in its due place. For the present, this is certain, that whatsoever particular is of the same account with the general, not separate, or let loose by that hand which first bound it, is to be estimated as the general. But this rule is to go further also.

5. For hitherto, I have called the act of particular conscience directing to a single and circumstantiate action, by the name of practical judgment: and the general dictate of the συντήρησις, or phylactery, or upper conscience, teaching the kinds of good actions, by the name of 'speculative judgment.' But the rule also is true, and so to be understood, when practical and speculative are taken in their first and proper sense. If in philosophy we discourse that the true God, being a spirit without shape or figure, cannot be represented by an image; although this be only a speculation, and demonstrable in natural philosophy, and no rule of conscience; yet when conscience is to make a judgment concerning the picturing of God the Father, it must not determine practically against that speculation. "That an idol is nothing," is demonstrable in metaphysics; and therefore that we are to make nothing of it, is a practical truth: and although the first proposition be not directly placed in the upper region of conscience, but is one of the prime metaphysical propositions, not properly theological, according to those words of St. Paul[s], "Concerning things sacrificed to idols, we know ὅτι πάντες γνῶσιν ἔχομεν 'that we all have knowledge;' and we know that an idol is nothing in the world;" meaning, that this knowledge needs no revelation to attest it; we by our own reason and principles of demonstration know that; yet, the lower, or particular practical conscience, must never determine against that extrinsical, and therefore, as to conscience, accidental measure.

6. For whatsoever is true in one science, is true also in another; and when we have wisely speculated concerning the dimensions of bodies, their circumscriptions, the acts of sense, the certainty of their healthful perceptions, the commensuration of a place and a body; we must not esteem these to be unconcerning propositions, if ever we come to use

[s] 1 Cor. viii. 1. 4.

them in divinity: and therefore we must not worship that which our senses tell us to be a thing below worship: nor believe that infinite which we see measured; nor esteem that greater than the heavens, which, I see and feel, goes into my mouth. If philosophy gives a skin, divinity does not flay it off: and truth cannot be contrary to truth: and God would not in nature teach us any thing to misguide us in the regions of grace.

7. The caution for conducting this proposition is only this: that we be as sure of our speculation, as of any other rule which we ordinarily follow; and that we do not take vain philosophy, for true speculations. He that guides his conscience by a principle of Zeno's philosophy, because he hath been bred in the Stoical sect, and resolves to understand his religion to the sense of his master's theorems, does ill. The Christian religion suffered much prejudice at first by the weak disputings of the Greeks; and they would not admit a religion against the academy, or the cynics, or the Athenian schools; and the Christian schools drew some of their articles through the limbecs of Plato's philosophy, and to this day the relish remains upon some of them. And Baronius[t] complains of Origen, that, "In Paganorum commentis enutritus, eaque propagare in animo habens, divinas se utique Scripturas interpretari simulavit: ut hoc modo nefariam doctrinam suam sacrarum literarum monumentis maligne admiscens, Paganicum et Manichaicum errorem suum atque Arrianam vesaniam induceret." He mingled the Gentile philosophy with Christian religion, and by analogy to that, expounded this, and how many disciples he had, all the world knows. Nay, not only from the doctrine, but from the practices and rites of the Pagan religion, many Christians did derive their rites, and they in time gave authority and birth to some doctrines.—"Vigilias anniversarias habes apud Suetonium. Lustralem aquam, aspersionem sepulcrorum, lumina in iisdem parare, Sabbato lucernam accendere, cereos in populum distribuere[u]." The staff, the ring, the mitre, and many other customs, some good, some only tolerable, the Christians took from the Gentiles; and what effect it might have, and what influence it hath had, in some doctrines, is too notorious to dissemble. Thomas Aquinas did a little

[t] Ad Annum 538. sect. 34. [u] A. D. 44. n. 88.

change the scene, and blended Aristotle so with school-divinity, that something of the purity was lost, while much of our religion was exacted and conducted by the rules of a mistaken philosophy. But if their speculations had been right, Christianity would at first have entered without reproof, as being the most reasonable religion of the world, and most consonant to the wisest and most sublime speculations; and it would also have continued pure, if it had been still drawn from the fountains of our Saviour, through the limbecs of the evangelists and apostles, without the mixture of the salt waters of that philosophy, which every physician and witty man now-a-days thinks he hath reason and observation enough easily to reprove. But men have resolved to verify their sect rather than the truth; but if of this particular we be careful, we must then also verify every speculation in all things, where it can relate to practice, and is not altered by circumstances.

8. As an appendage, and for the fuller explication of this rule, it is a worthy inquiry which is by some men made, concerning the use of our reason in our religion. For some men, finding reason to be that guide which God hath given us, and concreated with us, know that religion which is superinduced, and comes after it, cannot prejudice that noblest part of this creation. But then, because some articles which are said to be of faith, cannot be made to appear consonant to their reason, they stick to this, and let that go. Here is a just cause of complaint. But therefore others say, that reason is a good guide in things reasonable and human, but our reason is blind in things divine, and therefore is of little or no use in religion. Here we are to believe, not to dispute. There are on both sides fair pretences, which when we have examined, we may find what part of truth each side aims at, and join them both in practice. They that speak against reason, speak thus.

9. (1.) There is to every state and to every part of man given a proportionable light to guide him in that way, where he ought and is appointed to walk. In the darknesses of this world, and in the actions of common life, the sun and moon in their proper seasons are to give us light: in the actions of human intercourse, and the notions tending to it, reason is our eye, and to it are notices proportioned, drawn

from nature and experience, even from all the principles with which our rational faculties usually do converse. But because a man is designed to the knowledge of God, and of things spiritual, there must spring a new light from heaven, and he must have new capacities, and new illuminations; that is, new eyes, and a new light: for here the eye of reason is too weak, and the natural man is not capable of the things of the Spirit, because they are spiritually discerned. Faith is the eye, and the Holy Spirit gives the light, and the word of God is the lantern, and the spiritual not the rational man can perceive the things of God. "Secreta Dei, Deo meo, et filiis domus ejus." "God and God's secret ones only know God's secrets."

10. (2.) And therefore we find in Holy Scripture that to obey God, and to love him, is the way to understand the mysteries of the kingdom. "Obedite et intelligetis:" "If ye will obey, then shall ye understand:" and it was a rare saying of our blessed Saviour, and is of great use and confidence to all who inquire after the truth of God, in the midst of these sad divisions of Christendom,—"If any man will do his will, he shall know whether the doctrine be of God or no[x]." It is not fineness of discourse, nor the sharpness of arguments, or the witty rencounters of disputing men, that can penetrate into the mysteries of faith: the poor humble man that prays, and inquires simply, and listens attentively, and sucks in greedily, and obeys diligently, he is the man that shall know the mind of the Spirit; and therefore St. Paul observes that the sermons of the cross were "foolishness to the Greeks;" and consequently, by way of upbraiding, he inquires[y], "Where is the wise man, where is the scribe, where is the disputer of the world? God hath made the wisdom of the world foolishness;" that is, 'God hath confounded reason, that faith may come in her place.'

11. (3.) For there are some things in our religion so mysterious, that they are above all our reason; and well may we admire but cannot understand them: and therefore the Spirit of God is sent into the world to bring our understanding into the obedience of Christ; we must obey and not inquire, and every proud thought[z] must be submitted to him, who is

[x] John, vii. 17. [y] 1 Cor. i. 20.
[z] 2 Cor. x. 5.

the wisdom of the Father, who hath, in the Holy Scriptures, taught us all his Father's will.

12. (4.) And therefore, as to this, nothing can be added from the stock of nature or principles of natural reason, so if it did need a supply, reason could ill do it. For the object of our faith must be certain and infallible; but no man's reason is so; and therefore to put new wine into broken bottles is no gain, or real advantage; and although right reason is not to be gainsaid, yet what is right reason is so uncertain, that in the midst of all disputes, every man pretends to it, but who hath it no man can tell, and therefore it cannot be a guide or measure of faith.

13. (5.) But above all, if we will pretend to reason in religion, we have but one great reason that we can be obliged to; and that is, to believe that whatsoever God hath said, is true: so that our biggest reason in religion is, to submit our reason, that is, not to use our reason in particular inquiries, but to captivate it in the whole. And if there be any particular inquiries, let them seem what they will to my reason, it matters not; I am to follow God, not man; I may be deceived by myself, but never by God. It is therefore sufficient to me that it is in the Scriptures. I will inquire no further. This therefore is a concluding argument; This is in the Scripture, therefore this is true: and this is against Scripture, therefore it is absurd, and unreasonable.

14. (6.) After all, experience is our competent guide and warning to us: for we see when witty men use their reason against God that gave it, they in pursuit of reason go beyond religion; and when by reason they look for God, they miss him; for he is not to be found but by faith, which when they dispute for, they find not; because she is built and persuaded by other mediums, than all schools of philosophy to this day have taught. And it was because of reason, that the religion of Jesus was so long opposed and hindered to possess the world. The philosophers would use their reason, and their reason would not admit this new religion: and therefore St. Paul being to remove every stone that hindered, bade them to beware of "vain philosophy;" which does not distinguish one kind of philosophy from another, but marks all philosophy. It is all vain, when the inquiries are into religious mysteries.

15. (7.) For is it not certain that some principles of reason are against some principles of faith and Scripture? and it is but reason, that we should hear reason wherever we find it; and yet we are to have no intercourse with devils, though we were sure they would tell us of hidden treasures, or secrets of philosophy: and upon this account it is that all genethliacal predictions and judicial astrology are decried by all religious persons; for though there be great pretensions of reason and art, yet they being against religion and revelation are intolerable. In these and the like cases, reason must put on her muffler, and we must be wholly conducted by revelation.

16. These are the pretences against the use of reason in questions of religion; concerning which the same account may be given, as by the Pyrrhonians and sceptics concerning their arguments against the certainty of sciences. These reasons are like physic, which if it uncertainly purges out the humour, it most certainly purges out itself: and these arguments either cannot prevail against the use of reason in religion, or if they do, they prevail against themselves: for either it is against religion to rely upon reason in religion, or it is not: if it be not, then reason may without danger to religion be safely relied upon in all such inquiries. But if it be against religion to rely upon reason, then certainly these reasons intended to prove it so, are not to be relied upon; or else this is no question of religion. For if this be a question of religion, why are so many reasons used in it? If it be no question of religion, then we may, for all these reasons to the contrary, still use our reason in religion without prejudice to it. And if these reasons conclude right, then we may, for these reasons' sake, trust the proposition which says, that in religion reason is to be used; but if these reasons do not conclude right, then there is no danger, but that reason may still be used, these arguments to the contrary notwithstanding.

17. But there is more in it than so: This foregoing discourse, or to the like purpose, is used by two sorts of persons; the one is by those, who in destitution of particular arguments, make their last recourse unto authority of men. For by how much more they press their own peremptory affirmative, by so much the less will they endure your rea-

sons and arguments for the negative. But to these men I shall only say, 'Let God be true, and every man a liar:' and therefore if we trust men concerning God, we do not trust God concerning men; that is, if we speak of God as men please, we do not think of men as God hath taught us; viz. that they are weak, and that they are liars: and they who have, by artifices and little devices, acquired to themselves a reputation, take the less care for proving what they say, by how much the greater credulity that is, by which men have given themselves up to be possessed by others. And if I would have my saying to prevail whether it be right or wrong, I shall the less endure that any man should use his own reason against me. And this is one of the great evils for which the church of Rome hath given Christendom a great cause to complain of her, who not only presses men to believe or to submit to what she says upon her own authority, without enduring them to examine whether she says true or no, but also requires as great an assent to what she cannot prove, as to what she can; requiring an adherence not less than the greatest, even to those things which she only pretends to be able to prove by prudential motives. Indeed in these cases if they can obtain of men to bring their faith, they are safe; but to come accompanied with their reason too, that is dangerous.

18. The other sort of men, is of those who do the same thing under another cover; for they not having obtained the advantages of union or government, cannot pretend to a privileged authority: but resolving to obtrude their fancies upon the world, and yet not being able to prove what they say, pretend the Spirit of God to be the author of all their theorems. If they could prove him to be their author, the thing were at an end, and all the world were bound to lay their necks under that pleasant yoke; but because they cannot prove any thing, therefore it is that they pretend the Spirit for every thing: and if the noise of so sacred a name will persuade you, you are within the snare; if it will not, you are within their hatred. But it is impossible that these men can prevail, because there are so many of them; it is as if it were twenty mountebanks in the piazza, and all saying they had the only antidote in the world for poison; and that what was not theirs, was not at all, and yet all pretend severally.

For all men cannot have the Spirit, unless all men speak the same thing: it were possible that even in union they might be deceivers; but in division they cannot be right; and therefore since all these men pretend the Spirit, and yet all speak several things and contradictory, they do well to desire of us not to use our reason; for if we do, they can never hope to prevail; if we do not, they may persuade, as they meet with fools, that were not possessed before.

19. Between these two there is a third that pretends to no authority on one hand, nor enthusiasm on the other; but offers to prove what he says, but desires not his arguments to be examined by reason, upon pretence that he urges Scripture; that is, in effect, he must interpret it; but your reason shall not be judge whether he says right or wrong: for if you judge his interpretation, he says you judge of his argument, and make reason umpire in questions of faith: and thus his sect is continued, and the systems of divinity rely upon a certain number of propositions from generation to generation, and the scholar shall be no wiser than his master for ever; because he is taught to examine the doctrines of his master by his master's arguments, and by no other. In effect, they all agree in this, they would rule all the world by religion, and they would have nobody wiser than themselves, but be fools and slaves, till their turn come to use others as bad as they have been used themselves: and therefore, as the wolves offered peace to the sheep upon condition they would put away their dogs; so do these men allow us to be Christians and disciples, if we will lay aside our reason, which is that guard of our souls, whereby alone we can be defended against their tyrannies and pretensions.

20. That I may therefore speak close to the inquiry, I premise these considerations:

(1.) It is a weak and a trifling principle, which supposes faith and reason to be opposite: for faith is but one way, by which our reason is instructed, and acquires the proper notices of things. For our reason or understanding apprehends things three several ways: the first is called *νόησις*, or the 'first notices' of things abstract, of principles and the 'primo intelligibilia;' such as are, The whole is greater than the half of the whole;—Good is to be chosen;—God is to be loved:—Nothing can be and not be at the same time;—

for these are objects of the simple understanding, congenite notices, concreated with the understanding. The second is called διανόησις, or 'discourse,' that is, such consequents and emanations which the understanding draws from her first principles. And the third is πίστις, that is, such things which the understanding assents to upon the report, testimony, and affirmation, of others, viz. by arguments extrinsical to the nature of the thing, and by collateral and indirect principles. For example, I naturally know that an idol or a false god is nothing; that is νόησις, or the act of abstract and immaterial reason. From hence I infer, that an idol is not to be worshipped: this my reason knows by διανόησις, or illation and inference, from the first principle. But therefore, that all monuments of idolatry are to be destroyed, was known to the Jews by πίστις, for it was not primely known, nor by the direct force of any thing that was primely known; but I know it from God by the testimony of Moses, into the notice of which I am brought by collateral arguments, by tradition, by miracle, by voices from heaven, and the like.

21. (2.) These three ways of knowing, are in all faculties sacred and profane: for faith and reason do not divide theology and philosophy, but in every science reason hath notices all these ways. For in natural philosophy there are prime principles, and there are conclusions drawn from thence, and propositions which we believe from the authority of Plato, or Socrates, or Aristotle; and so it is in theology; for every thing in Scripture is not, in the divided sense, a matter of faith: that the sun is to rule the day, the moon and the stars to govern the night, I see and feel; that God is good, that he is one, are prime principles: that nothing but good is to be spoken of this good God, reason draws by a διανόησις or discourse and illation: but that this good God will chastise his sons and servants, and that afflictions sent upon us are the issues of his goodness, or that this one God is also three in person, this is known by πίστις, or by belief; for it is not a prime truth, nor yet naturally inferred from a prime truth, but told by God, and therefore is an object of faith; reason knows it by testimony, and by indirect and collateral probations.

22. (3.) Reason knows all things as they are to be known, and enters into its notices by instruments fitted to the na-

ture of things. Our stock of principles is more limited than our stock of words; and as there are more things than words, so there are more ways of knowing than by principles direct and natural. Now as God teaches us many things by natural principles, many by experience, many at first, many more in time; some by the rules of one faculty, some by the rules of another; so there are some things which descend upon us immediately from heaven, and they communicate with no principle, with no matter, with no conclusion here below. Now as in the other things we must come to notices of things, by deriving them from their proper fountains; so must we do in these. He that should go to revelation to prove that nine and nine make eighteen, would be a fool; and he would be no less, that goes about to prove a trinity of persons by natural reason. Every thing must be derived from its own fountain. But because these things, which are derivatives from heaven, and communicate not at all with principles of philosophy or geometry, yet have their proper fountains, and these fountains are too high for us to search into their bottom, we must plainly take all emanations from them, just as they descend. For in this case, all that is to be done, is to inquire from whence they come. If they come from natural principles, I search for them by direct arguments: if they come from higher, I search for them by indirect arguments; that is, I inquire only for matter of fact, whether they come thence or no. But here my reason is set on work; first, I inquire into the testimony or ways of probation, if they be worth believing in what they say, my reason sucks it in. As if I be told that God said, 'There are three and one in heaven,' I ask, Who said it? Is he credible? Why? If I find that all things satisfy my reason, I believe him saying that God said so; and then πίστις or faith enters. I believe the thing also, not because I can prove it directly, for I cannot,—but I can prove it indirectly; testimony and authority are my argument, and that is sufficient. The apostles entered into much of their faith by their senses, they saw many articles of their creed; but as they which saw and believed were blessed, so they which see not, but are argued and disputed into their faith, and believe what they find reasonable to believe, shall have the reward of their faith, while they wisely follow their reason.

moment of pleasure to him? and if it makes any change, it is infinitely to the worse: that these things are so, our religion tells us; but our reason cannot reach it why it is so, or how. Whose reason can give an account why, or understand it to be reasonable, that God should permit evil for good ends, when he hates that evil, and can produce that good without that evil? and yet that he does so we are taught by our religion. Whose reason can make it intelligible, that God who delights not in the death of a sinner, but he and his Christ, and all their angels, rejoice infinitely in the salvation of a sinner, yet that he should not cause that every sinner should be saved, working in him a mighty and a prevailing grace, without which grace he shall not in the event of things be saved, and yet this grace is wholly his own production?

——— Omnipotens hominem cum gratia salvat,
Ipsa suum consummat opus, cui tempus agendi
Semper adest quæ gesta velit; non moribus illi
Fit mora, non causis anceps suspenditur ullis[a].

Why does not he work in us all to will and to do, not only that we can will, but that we shall will? for if the actual willing be any thing, it is his creation; we can create nothing, we cannot will unless he effect it in us: and why he does not do that which so well pleases him, and for the want of the doing of which he is so displeased, and yet he alone is to do it some way or other; human reason cannot give a wise or a probable account.

Nam prius immites populos urbesque rebelles,
Vincente obstantes animos pietate, subegit;
Non hoc consilio tantum hortatuque benigno
Suadens atque docens, quasi normam legis haberet
Gratia, sed mutans intus mentem atque reformans,
Vasque novum ex fracto fingens, virtute creandi.
Non istud monitus legis, non verba prophetæ,
Non præstata sibi præstat natura, sed unus
Quod fecit reficit. Percurrat Apostolus orbem,
Prædicet, hortetur, plantet, riget, increpet, instet,
Quaque viam verbo reseratam invenerit, intret;
Ut tamen his studiis auditor promoveatur,
Non doctor neque discipulus, sed gratia sola
Efficit ———[b]

Where is the wise discourser, that can tell how it can be, that

[a] Prosper. c. 15. de Ingrat. [b] Prosp. de Prædest. 55. cap. 8.

God foreknows certainly what I should do ten years hence, and yet it is free to me at that time, to will or not to will, to do or not to do, that thing? Where is the discerning searcher of secrets, that can give the reason why God should determine, for so many ages before, that Judas should betray Christ, and yet that God should kill him eternally for effecting the divine purpose, and foredetermined counsel? Well may we wonder that God should wash a soul with water, and with bread and wine nourish us up to immortality, and make real impresses upon our spirits by the blood of the vine, and the kidneys of wheat; but who can tell why he should choose such mean instruments to effect such glorious promises? since even the greatest things of this world had not been disproportionable instruments to such effects, nor yet too great for our understanding; and that we are fain to stoop to make these mean elements be even with our faith, and with our understanding. Who can divine, and give us the cause, or understand the reason, why God should give us so great rewards for such nothings, and yet damn men for such insignificant mischiefs, for thoughts, for words, for secret wishes, that effect no evil abroad, but only might have done, or, it may be, were resolved to be inactive: for if the goodness of God be so overflowing in some cases, we in our reason should not expect, that in such a great goodness there should be so great an aptness to destroy men greatly for little things: and if all mankind should join in search, it could never be told, why God should adjudge the heathen or the Israelites to an eternal hell, of which he never gave them warning, nor created fears great enough, to produce caution equal to their danger; and who can give a reason, why, for temporal and transient actions of sin, the world is to expect never-ceasing torments in hell to eternal ages? That these things are thus, we are taught in Scripture, but here our reason is not instructed to tell why or how; and therefore our reason is not the positive measure of mysteries, and we must believe what we cannot understand.

29. Thus they are to be blamed, who make intricacies and circles in mysterious articles, because they cannot wade through them; it is not to be understood why God should send his only Son from his bosom to redeem us, to pay our price; nor to be told why God should exact a price of him-

moment of pleasure to him? and if it makes any change, it is infinitely to the worse: that these things are so, our religion tells us; but our reason cannot reach it why it is so, or how. Whose reason can give an account why, or understand it to be reasonable, that God should permit evil for good ends, when he hates that evil, and can produce that good without that evil? and yet that he does so we are taught by our religion. Whose reason can make it intelligible, that God who delights not in the death of a sinner, but he and his Christ, and all their angels, rejoice infinitely in the salvation of a sinner, yet that he should not cause that every sinner should be saved, working in him a mighty and a prevailing grace, without which grace he shall not in the event of things be saved, and yet this grace is wholly his own production?

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Why does not he work in us all to will and to do, not only that we can will, but that we shall will? for if the actual willing be any thing, it is his creation; we can create nothing, we cannot will unless he effect it in us: and why he does not do that which so well pleases him, and for the want of the doing of which he is so displeased, and yet he alone is to do it some way or other; human reason cannot give a wise or a probable account.

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Quaque viam verbo reseratam invenerit, intret;
Ut tamen his studiis auditor promoveatur,
Non doctor neque discipulus, sed gratia sola
Efficit ——[b]

Where is the wise discourser, that can tell how it can be, that

[a] Prosper. c. 15. de Ingrat. [b] Prosp. de Prædest. 55. cap. 8.

God foreknows certainly what I should do ten years hence, and yet it is free to me at that time, to will or not to will, to do or not to do, that thing? Where is the discerning searcher of secrets, that can give the reason why God should determine, for so many ages before, that Judas should betray Christ, and yet that God should kill him eternally for effecting the divine purpose, and foredetermined counsel? Well may we wonder that God should wash a soul with water, and with bread and wine nourish us up to immortality, and make real impresses upon our spirits by the blood of the vine, and the kidneys of wheat; but who can tell why he should choose such mean instruments to effect such glorious promises? since even the greatest things of this world had not been disproportionable instruments to such effects, nor yet too great for our understanding; and that we are fain to stoop to make these mean elements be even with our faith, and with our understanding. Who can divine, and give us the cause, or understand the reason, why God should give us so great rewards for such nothings, and yet damn men for such insignificant mischiefs, for thoughts, for words, for secret wishes, that effect no evil abroad, but only might have done, or, it may be, were resolved to be inactive: for if the goodness of God be so overflowing in some cases, we in our reason should not expect, that in such a great goodness there should be so great an aptness to destroy men greatly for little things: and if all mankind should join in search, it could never be told, why God should adjudge the heathen or the Israelites to an eternal hell, of which he never gave them warning, nor created fears great enough, to produce caution equal to their danger; and who can give a reason, why, for temporal and transient actions of sin, the world is to expect never-ceasing torments in hell to eternal ages? That these things are thus, we are taught in Scripture, but here our reason is not instructed to tell why or how; and therefore our reason is not the positive measure of mysteries, and we must believe what we cannot understand.

29. Thus they are to be blamed, who make intricacies and circles in mysterious articles, because they cannot wade through them; it is not to be understood why God should send his only Son from his bosom to redeem us, to pay our price; nor to be told why God should exact a price of him-

self for his own creature; nor to be made intelligible to us, why he who loved us so well, as to send his Son to save us, should at the same time so hate us, as to resolve to damn us, unless his Son should come and save us. But the Socinians, who conclude that this was not thus, because they know not how it can be thus, are highly to be reproved for their excess in the inquiries of reason, not where she is a competent judge, but where she is not competently instructed; and that is the second reason.

30. (2.) The reason of man is a right judge always when she is truly informed; but in many things she knows nothing but the face of the article: the mysteries of faith are oftentimes like cherubim's heads placed over the propitiatory, where you may see a clear and a bright face and golden wings, but there is no body to be handled; there is light and splendour upon the brow, but you may not grasp it; and though you see the revelation clear, and the article plain, yet the reason of it we cannot see at all; that is, the whole knowledge which we can have here, is dark and obscure; "We see as in a glass darkly," saith St. Paul; that is, we can see what, but not why; and what we do see, is the least part of that which does not appear; but in these cases our understanding is to submit, and wholly to be obedient, but not to inquire further. "Delicata est illa obedientia, quæ causas quærit." If the understanding will not consent to a revelation, until it see a reason of the proposition, it does not obey at all, for it will not submit, till it cannot choose. In these cases, reason and religion are like Leah and Rachel: reason is fruitful indeed, and brings forth the first-born, but she is blear-eyed, and oftentimes knows not the secrets of her Lord; but Rachel produces two children, faith and piety, and obedience is midwife to them both, and modesty is the nurse.

31. From hence it follows, that we cannot safely conclude thus, 'This is agreeable to right reason, therefore this is so in Scripture, or in the counsel of God;' not that one reason can be against another, when all things are equal, but that the state of things and of discourses is imperfect; and though it be right reason in such a constitution of affairs, yet it is not so in others: that a man may repel force by force, is right reason, and a natural right, but yet it follows not, that it can be lawful for a private

Christian to do it, or that Christ hath not forbidden us to strike him that strikes us. The reason of the difference is this; In nature it is just that it be so, because we are permitted only to nature's provisions, and she hath made us equal, and the condition of all men indifferent; and therefore we have the same power over another, that he hath over us; besides, we will do it naturally: and till a law forbade it, it could not be amiss, and there was no reason in nature to restrain it, but much to warrant it. But since the law of God hath forbidden it, he hath made other provisions for our indemnity, and where he permits us to be defenceless (as in cases of martyrdom and the like), he hath promised a reward to make infinite amends: so that 'we may repel force by force,' says nature: 'we may not,' says Christ, and yet they are not two contradictory propositions. For nature says we may, when otherwise we have no security, and no reward for suffering; but Christ hath given both the defence of laws and authority, and the reward of heaven, and therefore in this case it is reasonable. And thus we cannot conclude, This man is a wicked man because he is afflicted, or his cause is evil because it does not thrive; although it be right reason, that good men ought to be happy and prosperous; because although reason says right in it, yet no reason can wisely conclude, that therefore so it should be in this world, when faith and reason too tell us it may be better hereafter. The result is this,—every thing that is above our understanding, is not therefore to be suspected or disbelieved; neither is any thing to be admitted that is against Scripture, though it be agreeable to right reason, until all information is brought in, by which the sentence is to be made.

32. For as it happens in dreams and madness, where the argument is good, and the discourse reasonable oftentimes; but because it is inferred from weak phantasms, and trifling and imperfect notices of things, and obscure apprehensions, therefore it is not only desultorious and light, but insignificant, and far from ministering to knowledge: so it is in our reason as to matters of religion, it argues well and wisely, but because it is from trifling, or false, or uncertain principles, and unsure information, it oftentimes is but a witty nothing. Reason is an excellent limbec, and will extract rare quintessences, but if you put in nothing but mushrooms, or

eggshells, or the juice of coloquintida, or the filthy gingrau, you must expect productions accordingly, useless or unpleasant, dangerous or damnable.

33. (3.) Although right reason is not the positive and affirmative measure of any article, yet it is the negative measure of every one. So that, whatsoever is contradictory to right reason, is at no hand to be admitted as a mystery of faith; and this is certain upon an infinite account:

34. (1.) Because nothing can be true and false at the same time; otherwise it would follow that there could be two truths contrary to each other: for if the affirmative be true, and the negative true too; then the affirmative is true and is not true, which were a perfect contradiction, and we were bound to believe a lie, and hate a truth; and yet at the same time, obey what we hate, and consent to what we disbelieve; no man can serve two such masters.

35. (2.) Out of truth nothing can follow but truth; whatsoever therefore is truth, this is therefore safe to be followed, because no error can be the product of it. It follows therefore, that by believing one truth, no man can be tied to disbelieve another. Whatsoever therefore is contrary to right reason, or to a certain truth in any faculty, cannot be a truth, for one truth is not contrary to another: if therefore any proposition be said to be the doctrine of Scripture, and confessed to be against right reason, it is certainly not the doctrine of Scripture, because it cannot be true, and yet be against what is true.

36. (3.) All truths are emanations and derivatives from God; and therefore whatsoever is contrary to any truth, in any faculty whatsoever, is against the truth of God, and God cannot be contrary to himself; for as God is one, so truth is one; for truth is God's eldest daughter, and so like himself, that God may as well be multiplied, as abstracted truth.

37. (4.) And for this reason God does not only prove our religion, and Jesus Christ prove his mission, by miracles, by holiness, by verification of prophecies, and predictions of future contingencies, and voices from heaven, and apparition of angels, and resurrection from the grave, and fulfilling all that was said of him by the prophets, that our faith might enter into us by discourse, and dwell by love, and be nursed and supported by reason: but also God is pleased to verify his

own proceedings, and his own propositions, by discourses merely like ours, when we speak according to right reason. Thus God convinces[c] the peevish people that spake evil of him, by arguing concerning the justice of his ways, and exposes his proceedings to be argued by the same measures and proportions by which he judges us, and we judge one another.

38. (5.) For indeed how can it be possibly otherwise; how can we confess God to be just if we understand it not? but how can we understand him so, but by the measures of justice? and how shall we know that, if there be two justices, one that we know, and one that we know not, one contrary to another? if they be contrary, they are not justice; for justice can be no more opposed by justice, than truth to truth: if they be not contrary, then that which we understand to be just in us, is just in God, and that which is just once, is just for ever in the same case and circumstances: and indeed how is it that we are, in all things of excellency and virtue, to be like God, and to be meek like Christ, 'to be humble as he is humble,' and to 'be pure like God,' to be just after his example, to be 'merciful as our heavenly Father is merciful?' If there is but one mercy, and one justice, and one meekness, then the measure of these, and the reason, is eternally the same. If there be two, either they are not essential to God, or else not imitable by us: and then how can we glorify God, and speak honour of his name, and exalt his justice, and magnify his truth, and sincerity, and simplicity, if truth, and simplicity, and justice, and mercy, in him, are not that thing which we understand, and which we are to imitate? To give an example: I have promised to give my friend a hundred pounds on the calends of March: the day comes, and he expects the donative; but I send him answer, that I did promise so by an open promise and signification, and I had an inclination to do so; but I have also a secret will to keep my money, and instead of that to give him a hundred blows upon his back: if he reproaches me for an unjust and a false person; I have nothing to answer, for I believe he would hardly take it for good payment to be answered with a distinction, and told, I have two wills, an open, and a secret will, and they are contrary to each other: he would tell me that I were a false person for having two wills, and those two wills were indeed but one, no-

[c] Isa. i. 18. v. 3. Ezek. xviii. 25.

thing but a will to deceive and abuse him. Now this is reason, right reason, the reason of all the world, the measure of all mankind, the measure that God hath given us to understand, and to walk, to live, and to practise, by. And we cannot understand what is meant by hypocrisy, and dissembling, if to speak one thing and not to mean it, be not that hypocrisy. Now put the case, God should call us to give him the glory of his justice and sincerity, of the truth of his promises, and the equity of his ways, and should tell us, that we perish by our own fault, and if we will die, it is because we will die, not because we must; because we choose it, not because he forces us; for he calls us, and offers us life and salvation, and gives us powers, and time, and advantages, and desires it really, and endeavours it passionately, and effects it materially, so far as it concerns his portion: this is a certain evidence of his truth and justice; but if we can reply, and say, It is true, O God, that thou dost call us, but dost never intend we should come; that thy open will is loving and plausible, but thy secret will is cruel, decretory, and destructive, to us, whom thou hast reprobated; that thy open will is ineffective, but thy secret will only is operative, and productive of a material event, and therefore although we are taught to say, "Thou art just, and true in all thy sayings," yet certainly it is not that justice which thou hast commanded us to imitate and practise, it is not that sincerity which we can safely use to one another, and therefore either we men are not just when we think we are; or else thou art not just who doest and speakest contrary things, or else there are two contrary things which may be called justice.

39. For let it be considered as to the present instance; God cannot have two wills, it is against the unity of God, and the simplicity of God. If there were two divine wills, there were two Gods; and if it be one will, then it cannot, at the same time, will contrary things; and if it does not, then when God says one thing, and yet he wills it not, it is because he only wills to say it, and not to do it; and if to say this thing of the good, the just, the true, the righteous Judge of all the world be not blasphemy, I know not what is.

40. The purpose of this instance is to exemplify, that in all virtues and excellences there is a perfect unity: and be-

cause all is originally and essentially in God, and from him derived to us, and all our good, our mercy, our truth, our justice, is but an imitation of his, it follows demonstratively, that what is unjust in men, and what is falsehood in our intercourses, is therefore false or unjust, because it is contrary to the eternal pattern: and therefore whatsoever our reason does rightly call unjust, or hypocrisy, or falsehood, must needs be infinitely far from God; and those propositions which asperse God with any thing of this nature, are so far from being the word of God, or an article of faith, or a mystery of religion, that it is blasphemous and false, hateful to God and good men.

41. In these things there is the greater certainty, because there is the less variety and no mystery; these things which in God we adore as attributes, being the lines of our duty, the limits and scores we are to walk by; therefore as our reason is here best instructed, so it cannot easily be deceived, and we can better tell what is right reason in these things, than in questions not so immediately relative to duty and morality.

42. But yet this rule also holds in every thing where reason is, or can be, right; but with some little difference of expression, but generally thus:

43. (1.) Whatsoever right reason says cannot be done, we cannot pretend from Scripture, that it belongs to God's almightiness to do it; it is no part of the divine omnipotency, to do things contradictory; for that is not to be done which is not, and it is no part of power to do that which is not an act or effect of power. Now in every contradictory, one part is a nonentity, a nothing, and therefore by power cannot be produced; and to suppose it producible, or possible to be effected by an almighty power, is to suppose an almighty power to be no power, or to do that which is not the effect of power.

44. But I need say no more of this, for all men grant it, and all sects and varieties of Christians endeavour to clear their articles from inferring contradictions, as implicitly confessing, that it cannot be true, to which any thing that is true, is contradictory. Only some men are forced by their interest and opinions to say, that although to human reason some of their articles seem to have in them contradictions,

yet it is the defect of their reason, and their faith is the more excellent, by how much reason is more at a loss. So do the Lutherans about the ubiquity of Christ's body, and the Papists about transubstantiation, and the Calvinists about absolute reprobation, as being resolved upon the propositions, though heaven and earth confute them. For if men can be safe from argument with such a little artifice as this, then no error can be confuted, then there is nothing so absurd but may be maintained, and a man's reason is useless in inquiry and in probation; and (which is to me very considerable) no man can, in any article, be a heretic, or sin against his conscience. For to speak against the words of Scripture, is not directly against our conscience, there are many ways to escape, by interpretation or authority; but to profess an article against our reason, is immediately against our conscience; for reason and conscience dwell under the same roof, and eat the same portions of meat, and drink the same chalice: the authority of Scripture is superinduced, but right reason is the eternal word of God; "The kingdom of God, that is within us;" and the best portions of Scripture, even the law of Jesus Christ, which in moral things is the eternal law of nature, is written in our hearts, is reason, and that wisdom to which we cannot choose but assent; and therefore in whatsoever he goes against his reason, he must needs go against his conscience, because he goes against that, by which he supposes God did intend to govern him, reason not having been placed in us as a snare and a temptation, but as a light and a star to lead us by day and night. It is no wonder that men maintain absurd propositions, who will not hear great reason against them, but are willing to take excuses and pretences for the justification of them.

45. (2.) This is not to be understood, as if God could do nothing, but what we can with our reason comprehend or know how. For God can do every thing, but we cannot understand every thing: and therefore infinite things there are, or may be, which our reason cannot master; they are above our understanding, but are to be entertained by faith. It is not to be said or believed, that God can do what right reason says cannot be: but it must be said and believed that God can do those things, to which our understanding cannot, by all its powers ministered here below, attain. For since

God is omnipotent, unless we were omniscient, we could not understand all that he can do; but although we know but little, yet we know some propositions which are truths taught us by God, and they are the measures whereby we are to speak and believe concerning the works of God.

46. For it is to be considered, whatsoever is above our understanding, is not against it: 'supra' and 'secundum' may consist together in several degrees: thus we understand the divine power of working miracles, and we believe and know God hath done many: and although we know not how our dead bones shall live again, yet our reason tells us, that it is within the power of God to effect it; and therefore our faith need not be troubled to believe it. But if a thing be against our understanding, it is against the work of God, and against a truth of God, and therefore is no part, and it can be no effect of the divine power: many things in nature are above our understanding, and no wonder if many things in grace are so too; "The peace of God passeth all understanding," yet we feel something of it, and hope for more, and long for all, and believe what we yet cannot perceive. But I consider further:

47. There are some things in reason which are certainly true, and some things which reason does infallibly condemn: our blessed Saviour's argument was certain, "A spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye perceive me to have;" therefore I am no spirit: and St. John's argument was certain, "That which we have seen with our eyes, and heard with our ears, and which our hands have handled of the Word of life, that we preach," that is, we are to believe what we see and hear and feel; and as this is true in the whole religion, so it is true in every article of it. If right sense and right reason tell us clearly, that is, tell us so that there is no absurdness, or contradiction, or unreasonableness, in it, we are to believe it, as we are to believe God; and if an angel from heaven should tell us any thing against these propositions, I do not doubt but we would reject him. Now if we inquire what things are certainly true or false; I must answer, that in the first place I reckon prime principles and contradictions: in the next place, those things which are manifestly absurd: but if it be asked further, which things are manifestly absurd, and what it is to be manifestly absurd? there can no more

answer be given to this, than to him who asks, How shall I know whether I am in light or in darkness? If therefore it be possible for men to dote in such things as these, their reason is useless in its greatest force and highest powers: it must therefore be certain, that if the parts of a contradiction or a right reason be put in bar against a proposition, it must not pretend to be an article of faith; and to pretend God's omnipotency against it, is to pretend his power against his truth. God can deliver us from our enemies, when to human reason it seems impossible, that is, when we are destitute of all natural help, and proper causes and probabilities of escape, by what we see or feel; that is, when it is impossible to men, it may be possible with God; but then the faith which believes that God can do it, is also very right reason: and if we hope he will do it, there is more than faith in it, but there is nothing in it beyond reason, except love also be there.

48. The result is this: (1.) Our reason is below many of the works, and below all the power, of God, and therefore cannot perceive all that God hath, or can, or will do, no more than an owl can stare upon the body of the sun, or tell us what strange things are in that immense globe of fire. But when any thing that is possible, is revealed, reason can consent; but if reason cannot consent to it when it is told of it, then it is nothing, it hath no being, it hath no possibility; whatsoever is in our understanding, is in being: for that which is not, is not intelligible; and to what reason cannot consent, in that no being can be supposed.

49. (2.) Not only what is impossible to reason, is possible in faith, but if any thing be really absurd or unreasonable, that is, against some truth, in which human reason is really instructed, that is a sufficient presumption against a proposition, that it cannot be an article of faith. For even this very thing, I mean, an avoiding of an absurdity, or an inconvenience, is the only measure and rule of interpreting very many places of Scripture. For why does not every Christian pull out his right eye, or cut off his hand, and leg, that he might enter into heaven halt and blind? why do not we believe that Christ is a door, and a vine, and a stone, since these things are dogmatically affirmed in Scripture? but that we expound scriptures as we confute them who deny princi-

ples, by declaring that such senses or opinions introduce evil and foolish consequents, against some other truth in some faculty or other in which human reason is rightly taught. Now the measure and the limit of this, is that very thing which is the reason of this, and all the preceding discourse,—One truth cannot be against another:—if therefore your opinion or interpretation be against a truth, it is false, and no part of faith. A commandment cannot be against a revelation, a privilege cannot be against a promise, a threatening cannot mean against an article, a right cannot be against a duty; for all reason, and all right, and all truth, and all faith, and all commandments, are from God, and therefore partake of his unity and his simplicity.

50. (3.) This is to be enlarged with this advice, that in all questions of the sense of Scripture, the ordinary way is to be presumed before the extraordinary: and if the plain way be possible, and reasonable, and useful, and the extraordinary of no other use, but to make wonder and strangeness to the belief of the understanding, we are to presume for that, and to let this alone, because that hath the advantage of reason, it being more reasonable that God will keep the methods of his own creation, and bring us to him by ways with which we are acquainted, and by which we can better understand our way to him, than that he will do a miracle to no purpose, and without necessity; God never doing any thing for the ostentation, but very many things for the manifestation, of his power: for his wisdom and his power declare each other, and in every thing where he shews his mightiness, he also shews his wisdom, that is, he never does any thing without great reason. And therefore the Roman doctrine of the holy sacrament suffers an intolerable prejudice, because it supposes daily heaps and conjugations of miracles, wholly to no purpose; since the real body can be taken by them to whom it does no good; and all the good can be conveyed to us, though the body be only taken in a spiritual sense; all the good being conveyed by moral instruments, and to spiritual effect; and therefore the ordinary way, and the sense which the church of England gives, is infinitely to be preferred, because it supposes no violences and effects of miracles, no cramps and convulsions to reason: and a man may receive the holy sacrament, and discourse of all its effects and mysteriousnesses,

self for his own creature; nor to be made intelligible to us, why he who loved us so well, as to send his Son to save us, should at the same time so hate us, as to resolve to damn us, unless his Son should come and save us. But the Socinians, who conclude that this was not thus, because they know not how it can be thus, are highly to be reproved for their excess in the inquiries of reason, not where she is a competent judge, but where she is not competently instructed; and that is the second reason.

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31. From hence it follows, that we cannot safely conclude thus, 'This is agreeable to right reason, therefore this is so in Scripture, or in the counsel of God;' not that one reason can be against another, when all things are equal, but that the state of things and of discourses is imperfect; and though it be right reason in such a constitution of affairs, yet it is not so in others: that a man may repel force by force, is right reason, and a natural right, but yet it follows not, that it can be lawful for a private

misbelievers: so is the incarnation of the Son of God, the mysterious Trinity, the presence of Christ in the holy sacrament. For so long as the mysteries are signified in simple, wise, and general terms, reason can espy no particular impossibilities in them: but when men will explicate what they cannot understand, and intricate what they pretend to explicate, and superinduce new clauses to the article, and by entering within the cloud, do less see the light,—they find reason amazed, where she could easily have submitted, and clouds brought upon the main article, and many times the body itself is supposed to be a phantasm, because of its tinsel and fairy dressing: and on the other side, he that would examine an article of faith, by a proposition in philosophy, must be careful that his philosophy be as right as he pretends. For as it will be hard to expect, that right reason should submit to a false article, upon pretence it is revealed, so it will be as hard to distrust an article, because it is against a false proposition, which I was taught in those schools of learning, who speak things by custom, or by chance, or because they are taught, and because they are not suffered to be examined. Whoever offers at a reproof of reason, must be sure that he is right in the article, and that must be upon the strength of stronger reason; and he that offers by reason to reprove a pretended article, must be sure his reason must be greater than the reverence of that pretension.

52. And therefore Holy Scriptures command us in those cases to such purposes, as not only teach us what to do in it, but also confirm the main inquiry; for therefore we are commanded to "try all things:" suppose that be meant that we try them by Scriptures; how can we so try them, but by comparing line with line, by considering the consequents of every pretence, the analogy of faith, the measures of justice, the laws of nature, essential right, and prime principles? And all this is nothing but by making our faith the limit of our reason, in matters of duty to God; and reason the minister of faith, and things that concern our duty. The same is intended by those other words of another apostle, "Beloved, believe not every spirit, but try if the spirits be of God;" how can this be tried? By Scripture? Yea; but how if the question be of the sense of Scripture, as it is gene-

rally at this day? Then it must be tried by something extrinsical to the question, and whatsoever you can call to judgment, reason must still be your solicitor and your advocate and your judge; only reason is not always the law, sometimes it is, for so our blessed Saviour was pleased to say, "Why of yourselves do you not judge that which is reasonable[f]?" For so δίκαιον there is used, 'that which is fitting and consonant to reason;' and in proportion to this it was, that so much of the religion of Jesus was clothed with parables, as if the theorems and propositions themselves were clothed with flesh and blood, and conversed after the manner of men, to whom reason is the law and the rule, the guide and the judge, the measure of good and evil for this life, and for that which is to come. The consequent is this:

53. He that says thus, 'This doctrine is against the word of God, and therefore it is absurd and against reason,' may, as it falls out, say true; but his proposition will be of no use, because reason is before revelation, and that this is revealed by God, must be proved by reason. But,

54. He that says, 'This is absurd, or this is against reason, therefore this is against the word of God,' if he says true in the antecedent, says true in the consequent, and the argument is useful in the whole, it being the best way to interpret difficult scriptures, and to establish right senses, and to confute confident heresies. For when both sides agree that these are the words of God, and the question of faith is concerning the meaning of the words, nothing is an article of faith, or a part of the religion, but what can be proved by reasons to be the sense and intentions of God. Reason is never to be pretended against the clear sense of Scripture, because by reason it is that we came to perceive that to be the clear sense of Scripture. And against reason, reason cannot be pretended; but against the words of Scripture produced in a question, there may be great cause to bring reason; for nothing seems plainer than those words of St. James, "Above all things, my brethren, swear not at all;" and yet reason interposes and tells us, that plain words must not be understood against plain reason and plain necessity: for if oaths before magistrates were not permitted and allowed, it were necessary to examine all men by tor-

[f] Luke, xii. 57.

ture; and yet neither so could they so well be secured of truth as they can by swearing. What is more plain than the words of St. Paul[g]? Νεκρώσατε τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν, τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, "Mortify (or kill) your members, that are upon the earth;" and yet reason tells us, that we must not hurt or destroy one limb; and wherever the effect would be intolerable, there the sense is still unreasonable; and therefore not a part of faith, so long as it is an enemy to reason, which is the elder sister, and the guide and guardian of the younger.

55. For as when the tables of the law were broken by Moses, God would make no new ones, but bade Moses provide some stones of his own, and he would write them over: so it is in our religion;—when God with the finger of his Spirit writes the religion and the laws of Jesus Christ, he writes them in the tables of our reason, that is, "in the tables of our hearts."—'Homo cordatus,' 'a wise, rational man,' sober, and humble, and discursive, hath the best faith: but the ἄτοποι (as St. Paul calls them) "the unreasonable," they are such who "have no faith[h]," for the Christian religion is called by St. Paul λογικὴ λατρεία, "a reasonable worship;" and the word of God is called by St. Peter[i], γάλα λογικὸν ἄδολον, "the reasonable and uncrafty milk;" it is full of reason, but it hath no tricks, it is rational, but not crafty, it is wise and holy: and he that pretends there are some things in our religion, which right reason cannot digest and admit, makes it impossible to reduce atheists, or to convert Jews and heathens. But if reason invites them in, reason can entertain them all the day.

And now to the arguments brought against the use of reason; the answers may easily be gathered from the premises;

56. To the first I answer, that reason is the eye of the soul in all things, natural, moral, and religious; and faith is the light of that eye, in things pertaining to God; for it is true, that natural reason cannot teach us the things of God; that is, reason instructed only by this world, which St. Paul calls "the natural man,"—cannot discern the things of the Spirit, for they are "spiritually discerned:" that is, that they are taught and perceived by the aids of God's Spirit, by revelation and divine assistances and grace: but though

[g] Coloss. iii. 5. [h] 2 Thess. iii. 2. [i] 1 Pet. ii. 2.

thing but a will to deceive and abuse him. Now this is reason, right reason, the reason of all the world, the measure of all mankind, the measure that God hath given us to understand, and to walk, to live, and to practise, by. And we cannot understand what is meant by hypocrisy, and dissembling, if to speak one thing and not to mean it, be not that hypocrisy. Now put the case, God should call us to give him the glory of his justice and sincerity, of the truth of his promises, and the equity of his ways, and should tell us, that we perish by our own fault, and if we will die, it is because we will die, not because we must; because we choose it, not because he forces us; for he calls us, and offers us life and salvation, and gives us powers, and time, and advantages, and desires it really, and endeavours it passionately, and effects it materially, so far as it concerns his portion: this is a certain evidence of his truth and justice; but if we can reply, and say, It is true, O God, that thou dost call us, but dost never intend we should come; that thy open will is loving and plausible, but thy secret will is cruel, decretory, and destructive, to us, whom thou hast reprobated; that thy open will is ineffective, but thy secret will only is operative, and productive of a material event, and therefore although we are taught to say, "Thou art just, and true in all thy sayings," yet certainly it is not that justice which thou hast commanded us to imitate and practise, it is not that sincerity which we can safely use to one another, and therefore either we men are not just when we think we are; or else thou art not just who doest and speakest contrary things, or else there are two contrary things which may be called justice.

39. For let it be considered as to the present instance; God cannot have two wills, it is against the unity of God, and the simplicity of God. If there were two divine wills, there were two Gods; and if it be one will, then it cannot, at the same time, will contrary things; and if it does not, then when God says one thing, and yet he wills it not, it is because he only wills to say it, and not to do it; and if to say this thing of the good, the just, the true, the righteous Judge of all the world be not blasphemy, I know not what is.

40. The purpose of this instance is to exemplify, that in all virtues and excellences there is a perfect unity: and be-

were not instructed how God would, by a way so contrary to flesh and blood, cause the spirits of just men to be made perfect. And they who were wise by Plato's philosophy, and only well skilled in Aristotle, could do nothing in the schools of Jesus, because they were not instructed in those truths by which such proceedings were to be measured; but still, reason is the great wheel, though according as the motion was intended, new weights must be proportioned accordingly.

58. The third objection presses upon the point of duty, and 'because the Scripture requires obedience of understanding, and submitting our most imperious faculties, therefore reason is to be excluded:' to this I answer, that we must submit our understanding to God, is very true, but that is only when God speaks. But because we heard him not, and are only told that God did speak, our reason must examine whether it be fit to believe them that tell us so; for some men have spoken falsely, and we have great reason to believe God, when all the reason in the world commands us to suspect the offerings of some men; and although we ought, for the greatest reasons, submit to God, yet we must judge and discern the sayings of God, from the pretences of men; and how that can be done without using our reason in the inquiries of religion, is not yet discovered; but for the obedience of understanding, it consists in these particulars:

The Particulars in which Obedience of Understanding consists.

59. (1.) That we submit to God only and not to man; that is, to God wherever it appears reasonable to be believed that he hath spoken,—but never to man, unless he hath authority from reason or religion to command our conformity.

60. (2.) That those things which, by the abuse and pretence of reason, are passed into a fictitious and usurped authority, make no part of our religion; for because we are commanded to submit our understanding to God, therefore we must "call no man master upon earth;" therefore it is certain that we must not believe the reports or opinions of men against a revelation of God. He that communicates with holy bread only, and gives not the chalice to all God's people that require the holy communion, does openly adhere to,

a fond custom and authority of abused men, and leaves the express, clearest, undeniable institution of God.

61. (3.) When reason and revelation seem to disagree, let us so order ourselves, that so long as we believe this to be a revelation, no pretence or reason may change our belief from it: if right or sufficient reason can persuade us that this is not a revelation,—well and good; but if reason leaves us in the actual persuasion that it is so, we must force our reason to comply with this, since no reason does force us to quit this wholly; and if we cannot quit our reason or satisfy it, let us carry ourselves with modesty, and confess the revelation, though with profession of our ignorance and unskilfulness to reconcile the two litigants.

62. (4.) That whatsoever is clearly and plainly told us, we obey it, and rest in it, and not measure it by the rules of folly and weak philosophy, or the sayings of men, in which error may be ingredient; but when things are unequal, that is, when we can doubt concerning our reason, and cannot doubt concerning the revelation, we make no question, but prefer this before that.

63. (5.) That in particular inquiries, we so order ourselves as to make this the general measure, that we never do violence to the word of God, or suspect that, but resolve rather to call ourselves liars, than that religion should receive detriment; and rather quit our arguments than hazard an article; that is, that when all things are equal, we rather prefer the pretence of revelation, than the pretences of reason, for the reverence of that and the suspicion of this. Beyond this we can do no more.

64. To the fourth I answer, that it is true, reason is fallible; or rather to speak properly, ratiocination, or the using of reason, is subject to abuse and deception; for reason itself is not fallible; but if reason, that is, reasonings, be fallible, so are the pretences of revelation subject to abuse; and what are we now the nearer? Some reasons are but probable, and some are certain and confessed, and so it is in the sense of scriptures, some are plain and need no interpreter, no discourse, no art, no reasonings, to draw out their sense; but many are intricate and obscure, secret and mysterious; and to use a fallible reasoning to draw out an obscure and uncertain sense of Scripture, is sometimes the best way we

have, and then we must make the best of it we can: but the use of reasoning is not only to find out truth the best we can, but sometimes we are as sure of it, as of light; but then and always our reason (such as it is) must lead us into such proportions of faith as they can: according as our reason or motives are, so ordinarily is the degree of our faith.

65. To the fifth I need give no other answer but this, that it confesses the main question; for if this be the greatest reason in the world, 'God hath said it, therefore it is true,' it follows, that all our faith relies upon this one reason; but because this reason is of no use to us till the minor proposition be reproved, and that it appear that God hath said it, and that in the inquiry after that, we are to use all our reason;—the consequent is, that in the first and last, reason lends legs to faith,—and nothing can be wisely believed, but what can, by some rational inducement, be proved. As for the last proposition in the objection, 'This is against Scripture, therefore it is absurd and unreasonable,' I have already made it appear to be an imprudent and useless affirmative.

66. The sixth objection complains of them that by weak reasonings lose their religion,—but this is nothing against right reasoning: for because mountebanks and old women kill men by vile physic, therefore is it true, that the wise discourses of physicians cannot minister to health? Half-witted people talk against God, and make objections against religion, and themselves have not wit or will enough to answer them,—and they intending to make reason to be the positive and affirmative measure of religion, are wholly mistaken, and abuse themselves and others. 2. We are not to exact every thing in religion according to our weak reasonings; but whatsoever is certain in reason, religion cannot contradict that; but what is uncertain or imperfect, religion oftentimes does instruct and amend it. But there are many mysteries of religion contrary to reason, corrupted with evil manners; and many are contrary to reason, corrupted with false propositions; now these men make objections, which upon their own principles they can never answer: but that which seems impossible to vicious persons, is reason to good men; and that which children and fools cannot answer, amongst wise men hath no difficulty; and 'the ignorant, and the unstable, wrest some scriptures to their own damna-

tion:' but concerning the new atheists that pretend to wit, it is not their reason, but their want of reason, that makes them such; for if either they had more learning, or did believe themselves to have less, they could never be atheists.

67. To the last I answer, (1.) that it is reason we should hear reason wherever we find it, if there be no greater evil brought by the teacher than he can bring good; but if a heretic preaches good things, it is not always lawful to hear them, unless when we are out of danger of his abuses also. And thus truth from the devil may be heard, if we were out of his danger; but because he tells truth to evil purposes, and makes wise sayings to become craft, it is not safe to hear him. (2.) But besides this, although it is lawful to believe a truth which the devil tells us, yet it is not lawful to go to school to the devil, or to make inquiries of him; because he that does so, makes him his master, and gives something of God's portion to God's enemy. As for judicial astrology and genethliacal predictions, for my part I therefore reprove them, not because their reason is against religion, for certainly it cannot be; but because I think they have not reason enough in what they say; they go upon weak principles which they cannot prove; they reduce them to practice by impossible mediums; they draw conclusions with artless and unskilful heads; they argue about things with which they have little conversation; they cannot make scientifical progress in their profession, but out of greediness to do something; they usually, at least are justly suspected to, take in auxiliaries from the spirits of darkness; they have always spoken uncertainly, and most part falsely; and have always lived scandalously in their profession: they have by all religions been cried down, trusted by none but fools, and superstitious people; and therefore, although the art may be very lawful, if the stars were upon the earth, or the men were in heaven, if they had skill in what they profess, and reason in all their pretences, and after all that their principles were certain, and that the stars did really signify future events, and that those events were not overruled by every thing in heaven and in earth, by God, and by our own will and wisdom,—yet because here is so little reason, and less certainty, and nothing but confidence and illusion, therefore it is that religion permits them not; and it is not

the reason in this art, that is against religion, but the folly or the knavery of it, and the dangerous and horrid consequents, which they feel, that run a whoring after such idols of imagination.

RULE IV.

A Judgment of Nature, or Inclination, is not sufficient to make a sure Conscience.

1. BECAUSE this rule is of good use, not only for making judgment concerning the states of some men, but also in order to many practices, it will not be lost labour to consider that there are three degrees of practical judgment.

2. The first is called an inclination, or the first natural consonancy between the faculty or disposition of man, and some certain actions. All men are naturally pitiful, in some degree, unless their nature be lame and imperfect: as we say, all men naturally can see,—and it is true, if they have good eyes: so all men naturally are pitiful, unless they have no bowels: but some more, some less. And therefore there is in their natures a conveniency, or agreeing between their dispositions and acts of charity. 1. In the lowest sort there is an aptness to it. 2. In the sweeter and better natures there is a virtual charity. 3. But in those that consider and choose, and observe the commandment, or the proportions of right reason, there is in these only a formal, deliberative, compound, or practical judgment.

3. Now concerning the first sort, that is, the natural disposition or first propensity, it is but a remote disposition towards a right conscience and a practical judgment; because it may be rescinded, or diverted by a thousand accidents, and is nothing else but a relic of the shipwreck which Adam and all the world have made, and may pass into nothing as suddenly as it came. He that sees two cocks fight, though he have no interest in either, will assist one of them at least by an ineffective pity and desire: but this passes no further than to natural effects, or the changes or affections of a loadstone; it may produce something in nature, but nothing in manners.

thing but a will to deceive and abuse him. Now this is reason, right reason, the reason of all the world, the measure of all mankind, the measure that God hath given us to understand, and to walk, to live, and to practise, by. And we cannot understand what is meant by hypocrisy, and dissembling, if to speak one thing and not to mean it, be not that hypocrisy. Now put the case, God should call us to give him the glory of his justice and sincerity, of the truth of his promises, and the equity of his ways, and should tell us, that we perish by our own fault, and if we will die, it is because we will die, not because we must; because we choose it, not because he forces us; for he calls us, and offers us life and salvation, and gives us powers, and time, and advantages, and desires it really, and endeavours it passionately, and effects it materially, so far as it concerns his portion: this is a certain evidence of his truth and justice; but if we can reply, and say, It is true, O God, that thou dost call us, but dost never intend we should come; that thy open will is loving and plausible, but thy secret will is cruel, decretory, and destructive, to us, whom thou hast reprobated; that thy open will is ineffective, but thy secret will only is operative, and productive of a material event, and therefore although we are taught to say, "Thou art just, and true in all thy sayings," yet certainly it is not that justice which thou hast commanded us to imitate and practise, it is not that sincerity which we can safely use to one another, and therefore either we men are not just when we think we are; or else thou art not just who doest and speakest contrary things, or else there are two contrary things which may be called justice.

39. For let it be considered as to the present instance; God cannot have two wills, it is against the unity of God, and the simplicity of God. If there were two divine wills, there were two Gods; and if it be one will, then it cannot, at the same time, will contrary things; and if it does not, then when God says one thing, and yet he wills it not, it is because he only wills to say it, and not to do it; and if to say this thing of the good, the just, the true, the righteous Judge of all the world be not blasphemy, I know not what is.

40. The purpose of this instance is to exemplify, that in all virtues and excellences there is a perfect unity: and be-

cause all is originally and essentially in God, and from him derived to us, and all our good, our mercy, our truth, our justice, is but an imitation of his, it follows demonstratively, that what is unjust in men, and what is falsehood in our intercourses, is therefore false or unjust, because it is contrary to the eternal pattern: and therefore whatsoever our reason does rightly call unjust, or hypocrisy, or falsehood, must needs be infinitely far from God; and those propositions which asperse God with any thing of this nature, are so far from being the word of God, or an article of faith, or a mystery of religion, that it is blasphemous and false, hateful to God and good men.

41. In these things there is the greater certainty, because there is the less variety and no mystery; these things which in God we adore as attributes, being the lines of our duty, the limits and scores we are to walk by; therefore as our reason is here best instructed, so it cannot easily be deceived, and we can better tell what is right reason in these things, than in questions not so immediately relative to duty and morality.

42. But yet this rule also holds in every thing where reason is, or can be, right; but with some little difference of expression, but generally thus:

43. (1.) Whatsoever right reason says cannot be done, we cannot pretend from Scripture, that it belongs to God's almightiness to do it; it is no part of the divine omnipotency, to do things contradictory; for that is not to be done which is not, and it is no part of power to do that which is not an act or effect of power. Now in every contradictory, one part is a nonentity, a nothing, and therefore by power cannot be produced; and to suppose it producible, or possible to be effected by an almighty power, is to suppose an almighty power to be no power, or to do that which is not the effect of power.

44. But I need say no more of this, for all men grant it, and all sects and varieties of Christians endeavour to clear their articles from inferring contradictions, as implicitly confessing, that it cannot be true, to which any thing that is true, is contradictory. Only some men are forced by their interest and opinions to say, that although to human reason some of their articles seem to have in them contradictions,

yet it is the defect of their reason, and their faith is the more excellent, by how much reason is more at a loss. So do the Lutherans about the ubiquity of Christ's body, and the Papists about transubstantiation, and the Calvinists about absolute reprobation, as being resolved upon the propositions, though heaven and earth confute them. For if men can be safe from argument with such a little artifice as this, then no error can be confuted, then there is nothing so absurd but may be maintained, and a man's reason is useless in inquiry and in probation; and (which is to me very considerable) no man can, in any article, be a heretic, or sin against his conscience. For to speak against the words of Scripture, is not directly against our conscience, there are many ways to escape, by interpretation or authority; but to profess an article against our reason, is immediately against our conscience; for reason and conscience dwell under the same roof, and eat the same portions of meat, and drink the same chalice: the authority of Scripture is superinduced, but right reason is the eternal word of God; "The kingdom of God, that is within us;" and the best portions of Scripture, even the law of Jesus Christ, which in moral things is the eternal law of nature, is written in our hearts, is reason, and that wisdom to which we cannot choose but assent; and therefore in whatsoever he goes against his reason, he must needs go against his conscience, because he goes against that, by which he supposes God did intend to govern him, reason not having been placed in us as a snare and a temptation, but as a light and a star to lead us by day and night. It is no wonder that men maintain absurd propositions, who will not hear great reason against them, but are willing to take excuses and pretences for the justification of them.

45. (2.) This is not to be understood, as if God could do nothing, but what we can with our reason comprehend or know how. For God can do every thing, but we cannot understand every thing: and therefore infinite things there are, or may be, which our reason cannot master; they are above our understanding, but are to be entertained by faith. It is not to be said or believed, that God can do what right reason says cannot be: but it must be said and believed that God can do those things, to which our understanding cannot, by all its powers ministered here below, attain. For since

God is omnipotent, unless we were omniscient, we could not understand all that he can do; but although we know but little, yet we know some propositions which are truths taught us by God, and they are the measures whereby we are to speak and believe concerning the works of God.

46. For it is to be considered, whatsoever is above our understanding, is not against it: 'supra' and 'secundum' may consist together in several degrees: thus we understand the divine power of working miracles, and we believe and know God hath done many: and although we know not how our dead bones shall live again, yet our reason tells us, that it is within the power of God to effect it; and therefore our faith need not be troubled to believe it. But if a thing be against our understanding, it is against the work of God, and against a truth of God, and therefore is no part, and it can be no effect of the divine power: many things in nature are above our understanding, and no wonder if many things in grace are so too; "The peace of God passeth all understanding," yet we feel something of it, and hope for more, and long for all, and believe what we yet cannot perceive. But I consider further:

47. There are some things in reason which are certainly true, and some things which reason does infallibly condemn: our blessed Saviour's argument was certain, "A spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye perceive me to have;" therefore I am no spirit: and St. John's argument was certain, "That which we have seen with our eyes, and heard with our ears, and which our hands have handled of the Word of life, that we preach," that is, we are to believe what we see and hear and feel; and as this is true in the whole religion, so it is true in every article of it. If right sense and right reason tell us clearly, that is, tell us so that there is no absurdness, or contradiction, or unreasonableness, in it, we are to believe it, as we are to believe God; and if an angel from heaven should tell us any thing against these propositions, I do not doubt but we would reject him. Now if we inquire what things are certainly true or false; I must answer, that in the first place I reckon prime principles and contradictions: in the next place, those things which are manifestly absurd: but if it be asked further, which things are manifestly absurd, and what it is to be manifestly absurd? there can no more

answer be given to this, than to him who asks, How shall I know whether I am in light or in darkness? If therefore it be possible for men to dote in such things as these, their reason is useless in its greatest force and highest powers: it must therefore be certain, that if the parts of a contradiction or a right reason be put in bar against a proposition, it must not pretend to be an article of faith; and to pretend God's omnipotency against it, is to pretend his power against his truth. God can deliver us from our enemies, when to human reason it seems impossible, that is, when we are destitute of all natural help, and proper causes and probabilities of escape, by what we see or feel; that is, when it is impossible to men, it may be possible with God; but then the faith which believes that God can do it, is also very right reason: and if we hope he will do it, there is more than faith in it, but there is nothing in it beyond reason, except love also be there.

48. The result is this: (1.) Our reason is below many of the works, and below all the power, of God, and therefore cannot perceive all that God hath, or can, or will do, no more than an owl can stare upon the body of the sun, or tell us what strange things are in that immense globe of fire. But when any thing that is possible, is revealed, reason can consent; but if reason cannot consent to it when it is told of it, then it is nothing, it hath no being, it hath no possibility; whatsoever is in our understanding, is in being: for that which is not, is not intelligible; and to what reason cannot consent, in that no being can be supposed.

49. (2.) Not only what is impossible to reason, is possible in faith, but if any thing be really absurd or unreasonable, that is, against some truth, in which human reason is really instructed, that is a sufficient presumption against a proposition, that it cannot be an article of faith. For even this very thing, I mean, an avoiding of an absurdity, or an inconvenience, is the only measure and rule of interpreting very many places of Scripture. For why does not every Christian pull out his right eye, or cut off his hand, and leg, that he might enter into heaven halt and blind? why do not we believe that Christ is a door, and a vine, and a stone, since these things are dogmatically affirmed in Scripture? but that we expound scriptures as we confute them who deny princi-

ples, by declaring that such senses or opinions introduce evil and foolish consequents, against some other truth in some faculty or other in which human reason is rightly taught. Now the measure and the limit of this, is that very thing which is the reason of this, and all the preceding discourse,—One truth cannot be against another:—if therefore your opinion or interpretation be against a truth, it is false, and no part of faith. A commandment cannot be against a revelation, a privilege cannot be against a promise, a threatening cannot mean against an article, a right cannot be against a duty; for all reason, and all right, and all truth, and all faith, and all commandments, are from God, and therefore partake of his unity and his simplicity.

50. (3.) This is to be enlarged with this advice, that in all questions of the sense of Scripture, the ordinary way is to be presumed before the extraordinary: and if the plain way be possible, and reasonable, and useful, and the extraordinary of no other use, but to make wonder and strangeness to the belief of the understanding, we are to presume for that, and to let this alone, because that hath the advantage of reason, it being more reasonable that God will keep the methods of his own creation, and bring us to him by ways with which we are acquainted, and by which we can better understand our way to him, than that he will do a miracle to no purpose, and without necessity; God never doing any thing for the ostentation, but very many things for the manifestation, of his power: for his wisdom and his power declare each other, and in every thing where he shews his mightiness, he also shews his wisdom, that is, he never does any thing without great reason. And therefore the Roman doctrine of the holy sacrament suffers an intolerable prejudice, because it supposes daily heaps and conjugations of miracles, wholly to no purpose; since the real body can be taken by them to whom it does no good; and all the good can be conveyed to us, though the body be only taken in a spiritual sense; all the good being conveyed by moral instruments, and to spiritual effect; and therefore the ordinary way, and the sense which the church of England gives, is infinitely to be preferred, because it supposes no violences and effects of miracles, no cramps and convulsions to reason: and a man may receive the holy sacrament, and discourse of all its effects and mysteriousnesses,

though he do not talk like a madman, or a man going out of his wits, and a stranger to all the reason and philosophy of the world; and therefore it is remarkable, that there is in our faith no article, but what is possible to be effected by the ordinary power of God; that a virgin should conceive is so possible to God's power, that it is possible in nature, say the Arabians; but however, he that made the virgin out of nothing, can make her produce something out of something: and for the resurrection of the dead, it is certainly less than the creation, and it is like that which we see every year, in the resurrection of plants and dead corn, and is in many degrees imitable by art, which can out of ashes raise a flower. And for all the articles of our creed, they are so far from being miraculous and strange to reason, that the greatest wonder is, that our belief is so simple and facile, and that we shall receive so great and prodigious events hereafter, by instruments so fitted to the weakest capacities of men here below. Indeed, some men have so scorned the simplicity of the Gospel, that because they thought it honourable to have every thing strange and unintelligible, they have put in devices and dreams of miracles of their own, and have so explicated them, that as without many miracles they could not be verified, so without one, they can hardly be understood. That which is easy to reason, and most intelligible, is more like the plainness, and truth, and innocence, and wisdom, of the Gospel, than that which is bones to philosophy, and iron to the teeth of babes.

51. But this is to be practised with caution; for every man's reason is not right, and every man's reason is not to be trusted: and therefore,

(4.) As absurd foolish things are not to be obtruded, under the pretence of being mysteries, so neither must mistaken philosophy, and false notices of things, be pretended for reason. There are mistakes on all hands, some Christians explicate their mysteries, and mince them into so many minutes and niceties, and speak of them more than they are taught, more than is said in the Scriptures, or the first creeds, that the article,—which in its own simplicity was indeed mysterious, and not to be comprehended by our dark and less instructed reason, but yet was not impossible to be believed,—is made impossible to be understood by the appendages, and exposed to scorn and violences by heretics and

misbelievers: so is the incarnation of the Son of God, the mysterious Trinity, the presence of Christ in the holy sacrament. For so long as the mysteries are signified in simple, wise, and general terms, reason can espy no particular impossibilities in them: but when men will explicate what they cannot understand, and intricate what they pretend to explicate, and superinduce new clauses to the article, and by entering within the cloud, do less see the light,—they find reason amazed, where she could easily have submitted, and clouds brought upon the main article, and many times the body itself is supposed to be a phantasm, because of its tinsel and fairy dressing: and on the other side, he that would examine an article of faith, by a proposition in philosophy, must be careful that his philosophy be as right as he pretends. For as it will be hard to expect, that right reason should submit to a false article, upon pretence it is revealed, so it will be as hard to distrust an article, because it is against a false proposition, which I was taught in those schools of learning, who speak things by custom, or by chance, or because they are taught, and because they are not suffered to be examined. Whoever offers at a reproof of reason, must be sure that he is right in the article, and that must be upon the strength of stronger reason; and he that offers by reason to reprove a pretended article, must be sure his reason must be greater than the reverence of that pretension.

52. And therefore Holy Scriptures command us in those cases to such purposes, as not only teach us what to do in it, but also confirm the main inquiry; for therefore we are commanded to "try all things:" suppose that be meant that we try them by Scriptures; how can we so try them, but by comparing line with line, by considering the consequents of every pretence, the analogy of faith, the measures of justice, the laws of nature, essential right, and prime principles? And all this is nothing but by making our faith the limit of our reason, in matters of duty to God; and reason the minister of faith, and things that concern our duty. The same is intended by those other words of another apostle, "Beloved, believe not every spirit, but try if the spirits be of God;" how can this be tried? By Scripture? Yea; but how if the question be of the sense of Scripture, as it is gene-

rally at this day? Then it must be tried by something extrinsical to the question, and whatsoever you can call to judgment, reason must still be your solicitor and your advocate and your judge; only reason is not always the law, sometimes it is, for so our blessed Saviour was pleased to say, "Why of yourselves do you not judge that which is reasonable[f]?" For so δίκαιον there is used, 'that which is fitting and consonant to reason;' and in proportion to this it was, that so much of the religion of Jesus was clothed with parables, as if the theorems and propositions themselves were clothed with flesh and blood, and conversed after the manner of men, to whom reason is the law and the rule, the guide and the judge, the measure of good and evil for this life, and for that which is to come. The consequent is this:

53. He that says thus, 'This doctrine is against the word of God, and therefore it is absurd and against reason,' may, as it falls out, say true; but his proposition will be of no use, because reason is before revelation, and that this is revealed by God, must be proved by reason. But,

54. He that says, 'This is absurd, or this is against reason, therefore this is against the word of God,' if he says true in the antecedent, says true in the consequent, and the argument is useful in the whole, it being the best way to interpret difficult scriptures, and to establish right senses, and to confute confident heresies. For when both sides agree that these are the words of God, and the question of faith is concerning the meaning of the words, nothing is an article of faith, or a part of the religion, but what can be proved by reasons to be the sense and intentions of God. Reason is never to be pretended against the clear sense of Scripture, because by reason it is that we came to perceive that to be the clear sense of Scripture. And against reason, reason cannot be pretended; but against the words of Scripture produced in a question, there may be great cause to bring reason; for nothing seems plainer than those words of St. James, "Above all things, my brethren, swear not at all;" and yet reason interposes and tells us, that plain words must not be understood against plain reason and plain necessity: for if oaths before magistrates were not permitted and allowed, it were necessary to examine all men by tor-

[f] Luke, xii. 57.

ture; and yet neither so could they so well be secured of truth as they can by swearing. What is more plain than the words of St. Paul[g]? Νεκρώσατε τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν, τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, "Mortify (or kill) your members, that are upon the earth;" and yet reason tells us, that we must not hurt or destroy one limb; and wherever the effect would be intolerable, there the sense is still unreasonable; and therefore not a part of faith, so long as it is an enemy to reason, which is the elder sister, and the guide and guardian of the younger.

55. For as when the tables of the law were broken by Moses, God would make no new ones, but bade Moses provide some stones of his own, and he would write them over: so it is in our religion;—when God with the finger of his Spirit writes the religion and the laws of Jesus Christ, he writes them in the tables of our reason, that is, "in the tables of our hearts."—'Homo cordatus,' 'a wise, rational man,' sober, and humble, and discursive, hath the best faith: but the ἄτοποι (as St. Paul calls them) "the unreasonable," they are such who "have no faith[h]," for the Christian religion is called by St. Paul λογικὴ λατρεία, "a reasonable worship;" and the word of God is called by St. Peter[i], γάλα λογικὸν ἄδολον, "the reasonable and uncrafty milk;" it is full of reason, but it hath no tricks, it is rational, but not crafty, it is wise and holy: and he that pretends there are some things in our religion, which right reason cannot digest and admit, makes it impossible to reduce atheists, or to convert Jews and heathens. But if reason invites them in, reason can entertain them all the day.

And now to the arguments brought against the use of reason; the answers may easily be gathered from the premises:

56. To the first I answer, that reason is the eye of the soul in all things, natural, moral, and religious; and faith is the light of that eye, in things pertaining to God; for it is true, that natural reason cannot teach us the things of God; that is, reason instructed only by this world, which St. Paul calls "the natural man,"—cannot discern the things of the Spirit, for they are "spiritually discerned:" that is, that they are taught and perceived by the aids of God's Spirit, by revelation and divine assistances and grace: but though

[g] Coloss. iii. 5. [h] 2 Thess. iii. 2. [i] 1 Pet. ii. 2.

natural reason cannot, yet it is false to say that reason cannot; for reason illuminated can perceive the things of God; that is, when reason is taught in that faculty, under that master, and by those rules which are proper for spiritual things, then reason can do all its intentions.

57. To the second I answer, that therefore humility and piety are the best dispositions, to the understanding the secrets of the Gospel.

(1.) Because these do remove those prejudices and obstructions which are bars and fetters to reason; and the humble man does best understand, because the proud man will not inquire, or he will not labour, or he will not understand any proposition that makes it necessary for him to lay aside his employment or his vanity, his interest or his vice.

(2.) These are indeed excellent dispositions to understanding, the best moral instruments, but not the best natural: if you are to dispute against a heathen, a good reason will sooner convince him than an humble thought; if you be to convert a Jew, an argument from the old prophets is better to him than three or four acts of a gracious comportment.

(3.) Sometimes by way of blessing and reward, God gives understanding to good persons, which to the evil he denies; but this which effects any thing by way of divine blessing, is not to be supposed the best natural instrument. Thus the divines say, that the fire of hell shall torment souls, "tanquam instrumentum divinæ voluntatis," as the instrument in the hand of a voluntary and almighty agent, but not as a thing apportioned properly to such an event,—for the worm of conscience is more apt to that purpose.

(4.) And when we compare man with man, so it is true that the pious man should be sooner instructed than the impious, 'cæteris paribus;' but if we compare discourse and piety, reason and humility, they excel each other in their several kinds, as wool is better than a diamond, and yet a diamond is to be preferred before a bag of wool; they operate to the same purpose of understanding in several manners: and whereas it is said in the argument, that "the doctrine of the cross was foolishness to the Greeks," it is true, but nothing to the present question. For therefore it was foolishness to them, because they had not been taught in the secrets of God, they

were not instructed how God would, by a way so contrary to flesh and blood, cause the spirits of just men to be made perfect. And they who were wise by Plato's philosophy, and only well skilled in Aristotle, could do nothing in the schools of Jesus, because they were not instructed in those truths by which such proceedings were to be measured; but still, reason is the great wheel, though according as the motion was intended, new weights must be proportioned accordingly.

58. The third objection presses upon the point of duty, and 'because the Scripture requires obedience of understanding, and submitting our most imperious faculties, therefore reason is to be excluded:' to this I answer, that we must submit our understanding to God, is very true, but that is only when God speaks. But because we heard him not, and are only told that God did speak, our reason must examine whether it be fit to believe them that tell us so; for some men have spoken falsely, and we have great reason to believe God, when all the reason in the world commands us to suspect the offerings of some men; and although we ought, for the greatest reasons, submit to God, yet we must judge and discern the sayings of God, from the pretences of men; and how that can be done without using our reason in the inquiries of religion, is not yet discovered; but for the obedience of understanding, it consists in these particulars:

The Particulars in which Obedience of Understanding consists.

59. (1.) That we submit to God only and not to man; that is, to God wherever it appears reasonable to be believed that he hath spoken,—but never to man, unless he hath authority from reason or religion to command our conformity.

60. (2.) That those things which, by the abuse and pretence of reason, are passed into a fictitious and usurped authority, make no part of our religion; for because we are commanded to submit our understanding to God, therefore we must "call no man master upon earth;" therefore it is certain that we must not believe the reports or opinions of men against a revelation of God. He that communicates with holy bread only, and gives not the chalice to all God's people that require the holy communion, does openly adhere to,

a fond custom and authority of abused men, and leaves the express, clearest, undeniable institution of God.

61. (3.) When reason and revelation seem to disagree, let us so order ourselves, that so long as we believe this to be a revelation, no pretence or reason may change our belief from it: if right or sufficient reason can persuade us that this is not a revelation,—well and good; but if reason leaves us in the actual persuasion that it is so, we must force our reason to comply with this, since no reason does force us to quit this wholly; and if we cannot quit our reason or satisfy it, let us carry ourselves with modesty, and confess the revelation, though with profession of our ignorance and unskilfulness to reconcile the two litigants.

62. (4.) That whatsoever is clearly and plainly told us, we obey it, and rest in it, and not measure it by the rules of folly and weak philosophy, or the sayings of men, in which error may be ingredient; but when things are unequal, that is, when we can doubt concerning our reason, and cannot doubt concerning the revelation, we make no question, but prefer this before that.

63. (5.) That in particular inquiries, we so order ourselves as to make this the general measure, that we never do violence to the word of God, or suspect that, but resolve rather to call ourselves liars, than that religion should receive detriment; and rather quit our arguments than hazard an article; that is, that when all things are equal, we rather prefer the pretence of revelation, than the pretences of reason, for the reverence of that and the suspicion of this. Beyond this we can do no more.

64. To the fourth I answer, that it is true, reason is fallible; or rather to speak properly, ratiocination, or the using of reason, is subject to abuse and deception; for reason itself is not fallible; but if reason, that is, reasonings, be fallible, so are the pretences of revelation subject to abuse; and what are we now the nearer? Some reasons are but probable, and some are certain and confessed, and so it is in the sense of scriptures, some are plain and need no interpreter, no discourse, no art, no reasonings, to draw out their sense; but many are intricate and obscure, secret and mysterious; and to use a fallible reasoning to draw out an obscure and uncertain sense of Scripture, is sometimes the best way we

have, and then we must make the best of it we can: but the use of reasoning is not only to find out truth the best we can, but sometimes we are as sure of it, as of light; but then and always our reason (such as it is) must lead us into such proportions of faith as they can: according as our reason or motives are, so ordinarily is the degree of our faith.

65. To the fifth I need give no other answer but this, that it confesses the main question; for if this be the greatest reason in the world, 'God hath said it, therefore it is true,' it follows, that all our faith relies upon this one reason; but because this reason is of no use to us till the minor proposition be reproved, and that it appear that God hath said it, and that in the inquiry after that, we are to use all our reason;—the consequent is, that in the first and last, reason lends legs to faith,—and nothing can be wisely believed, but what can, by some rational inducement, be proved. As for the last proposition in the objection, 'This is against Scripture, therefore it is absurd and unreasonable,' I have already made it appear to be an imprudent and useless affirmative.

66. The sixth objection complains of them that by weak reasonings lose their religion,—but this is nothing against right reasoning: for because mountebanks and old women kill men by vile physic, therefore is it true, that the wise discourses of physicians cannot minister to health? Half-witted people talk against God, and make objections against religion, and themselves have not wit or will enough to answer them,—and they intending to make reason to be the positive and affirmative measure of religion, are wholly mistaken, and abuse themselves and others. 2. We are not to exact every thing in religion according to our weak reasonings; but whatsoever is certain in reason, religion cannot contradict that; but what is uncertain or imperfect, religion oftentimes does instruct and amend it. But there are many mysteries of religion contrary to reason, corrupted with evil manners; and many are contrary to reason, corrupted with false propositions; now these men make objections, which upon their own principles they can never answer: but that which seems impossible to vicious persons, is reason to good men; and that which children and fools cannot answer, amongst wise men hath no difficulty; and 'the ignorant, and the unstable, wrest some scriptures to their own damna-

tion:' but concerning the new atheists that pretend to wit, it is not their reason, but their want of reason, that makes them such; for if either they had more learning, or did believe themselves to have less, they could never be atheists.

67. To the last I answer, (1.) that it is reason we should hear reason wherever we find it, if there be no greater evil brought by the teacher than he can bring good; but if a heretic preaches good things, it is not always lawful to hear them, unless when we are out of danger of his abuses also. And thus truth from the devil may be heard, if we were out of his danger; but because he tells truth to evil purposes, and makes wise sayings to become craft, it is not safe to hear him. (2.) But besides this, although it is lawful to believe a truth which the devil tells us, yet it is not lawful to go to school to the devil, or to make inquiries of him; because he that does so, makes him his master, and gives something of God's portion to God's enemy. As for judicial astrology and genethliacal predictions, for my part I therefore reprove them, not because their reason is against religion, for certainly it cannot be; but because I think they have not reason enough in what they say; they go upon weak principles which they cannot prove; they reduce them to practice by impossible mediums; they draw conclusions with artless and unskilful heads; they argue about things with which they have little conversation; they cannot make scientifical progress in their profession, but out of greediness to do something; they usually, at least are justly suspected to, take in auxiliaries from the spirits of darkness; they have always spoken uncertainly, and most part falsely; and have always lived scandalously in their profession: they have by all religions been cried down, trusted by none but fools, and superstitious people; and therefore, although the art may be very lawful, if the stars were upon the earth, or the men were in heaven, if they had skill in what they profess, and reason in all their pretences, and after all that their principles were certain, and that the stars did really signify future events, and that those events were not overruled by every thing in heaven and in earth, by God, and by our own will and wisdom,—yet because here is so little reason, and less certainty, and nothing but confidence and illusion, therefore it is that religion permits them not; and it is not

the reason in this art, that is against religion, but the folly or the knavery of it, and the dangerous and horrid consequents, which they feel, that run a whoring after such idols of imagination.

RULE IV.

A Judgment of Nature, or Inclination, is not sufficient to make a sure Conscience.

1. BECAUSE this rule is of good use, not only for making judgment concerning the states of some men, but also in order to many practices, it will not be lost labour to consider that there are three degrees of practical judgment.

2. The first is called an inclination, or the first natural consonancy between the faculty or disposition of man, and some certain actions. All men are naturally pitiful, in some degree, unless their nature be lame and imperfect: as we say, all men naturally can see,—and it is true, if they have good eyes: so all men naturally are pitiful, unless they have no bowels: but some more, some less. And therefore there is in their natures a conveniency, or agreeing between their dispositions and acts of charity. 1. In the lowest sort there is an aptness to it. 2. In the sweeter and better natures there is a virtual charity. 3. But in those that consider and choose, and observe the commandment, or the proportions of right reason, there is in these only a formal, deliberative, compound, or practical judgment.

3. Now concerning the first sort, that is, the natural disposition or first propensity, it is but a remote disposition towards a right conscience and a practical judgment; because it may be rescinded, or diverted by a thousand accidents, and is nothing else but a relic of the shipwreck which Adam and all the world have made, and may pass into nothing as suddenly as it came. He that sees two cocks fight, though he have no interest in either, will assist one of them at least by an ineffective pity and desire: but this passes no further than to natural effects, or the changes or affections of a loadstone; it may produce something in nature, but nothing in manners.

4. Concerning the second, that is, a virtual judgment, that is a natural inclination passing forth into habit or custom, and delight in the actions of some virtues; it is certain that it is one part of the grace of God, and a more promoted and immediate disposition to the virtue of its kind than the former. Some men are naturally very merciful, and some are abstemious, and some are continent: and these in the course of their life take in every argument and accidental motive, and the disposition swells, and the nature is confirmed. But still it is but nature. The man, it may be, is chaste, because he hates the immodesty of those addresses which prepare to uncleanness; or he loves his quiet, or fears the accidents of his enemy-crime; or there was a terror infused into him by the sight of a sad spectacle, the evil reward of an adulterous person:

——— quosdam mœchos dum mugilis intrat.—(Juv. x. 317.)

Concerning this kind of virtual judgment, or confirmed nature, I have two things to say:

5. (1.) That this virtual judgment can produce love or hatred to certain objects, ineffective complacences or disrelishes respectively, proper antipathies and aversations from a whole kind of objects; such as was that hatred that Tamerlane had to Zercon, or some men to cats. And thus much we cannot deny to be produced by the operation and simple apprehension of our senses by pictures and all impressions of fancy: "Cum opinamur difficile aliquid aut terribile, statim compatimur: secundum imaginem autem similiter nos habemus." We find effects and impresses according to the very images of things we see, and by their prime apprehensions: and therefore much rather may these 'actus imperati,' or more natural and proper effects and affections of will be entertained or produced respectively. Men at first sight fall in love with women, and that against their reason, and resolution, and counsel, and interest, and they cannot help it; and so they may do with some actions of virtue. And as in the first case they are rather miserable than vicious; so in this they are rather fortunate than virtuous: and they may be commended, as we praise a fair face, or a strong arm, an athletic health, or a good constitution; and it is indeed a

[k] Vide Aristot. de Anima lib. 2. text. 154.

very good disposition and a facilitation of a virtuous choice. But,

6. (2.) This virtual judgment, which is nothing but nature confirmed by accidents, is not a state of good by which a man is acceptable to God. Neither is it a sufficient principle of a good life, nor indeed of the actions of its own kind. Not of good life, because it may be in a single instance; and it can never be in all. The man that is good-natured, that is naturally meek and loving, goes the furthest upon this account; but without the conjunction of other virtues, it is a great way off from that good state, whither naturally it can but tend and incline: and we see some good things are made to serve some evil; and by temperance, and a moderate diet, some preserve their health, that they may not preserve their chastity: and they may be habitually proud, because they are naturally chaste: and then this chastity is no virtue, but a disposition and an aptness only. In this sense that of St. James may be affirmed, "He that offends in one, is guilty of all;" that is, if his inclinations, and his accidentally-acquired habits, be such as to admit a mixture, they are not genuine and gracious: such are these that are the effects of a nature fitted towards a particular virtue. It must be a higher principle that makes an entire piety; nature and the habits growing upon her stock, cannot do it. Alexander was a continent prince, and the captive beauties of Persia were secured by it in their honours; but by rage he destroyed his friend, and by drunkenness he destroyed himself.

But neither is this virtual judgment a sufficient principle of the actions of its own kind; for this natural strength is nothing but an uneasiness and unaptness to suffer by common temptations; but place the man where he can be tempted, and this good disposition secures him not, because there may be something in nature bigger than it.

7. It remains then, that to the constitution of a right and sure conscience, there is required a formal judgment, that is, a deliberation of the understanding, and a choice of the will, that being instructed, and this inclined by the grace of God: "Tantoque laudabilior munificentia nostra fore videbatur, quod ad illam non impetu quodam, sed consilio trahebamur," said Secundus[1]: then it is right and good, then when it is not

[1] Lib. 1. ep. 8. §. 9. Gierig, vol. 1. p. 38.

violent, necessary, or natural, but when it is chosen. This makes a right and sure conscience, because the grace of God hath a universal influence into all the course of our actions. "For he that said, Do not kill, said also, Do not steal:" and if he obeys in one instance, for that reason must obey in all, or be condemned by himself, and then the conscience is right in the principle and fountain, though defiled in the issue and emanation. For he that is condemned by his own conscience, hath the law written and the characters still fair, legible, and read; but then the fault is in something else; the will is corrupted. The sum is this:

8. It is not enough that the conscience be taught by nature, but it must be taught by God, conducted by reason, made operative by discourse, assisted by choice, instructed by laws and sober principles; and then it is right, and it may be sure.

RULE V.

When two Motives concur to the Determination of an Action, whereof one is virtuous, and the other secular, a right Conscience is not prejudiced by that Mixture.

1. He that fasts to punish himself for his sins, and at the same time intends his health, though it will be very often impossible for him to tell himself which was the final and prevailing motive and ingredient into the persuasion, yet it is no detriment to his conscience; the religious motive alone did suffice to make it to be an act of a good conscience; and if the mixture of the other could change this, it could not be lawful to use, or in any degree to be persuaded by, the promises of those temporal blessings which are recorded in both Testaments, and to which there is a natural desire, and proper inclination. But this also is with some difference.

2. If the secular ingredient be the stronger, it is in the same degree as it prevails over the virtuous or religious, a diminution of the worthiness of the action; but if it be a secular blessing under a promise, it does not alter the whole kind of the action. The reason is this: Because whatever God hath promised, is therefore desirable and good, because

he hath promised it, or he hath promised it because it is of itself good, and useful to us; and therefore whatever we may innocently desire, we may innocently intend: but if it be mingled with a religious and spiritual interest, it ought not to sit down in the highest place, because a more worthy is there present, lest we be found to be passionate for the things of this life, and indifferent for God and for religion.

3. If the secular or temporal ingredient be not under a promise, and yet be the prime and chief motive, the whole case is altered: the conscience is not right, it is natural inclination, not conscience, it is sense or interest, not duty. He that gives alms with a purpose to please his prince, who is charitable and religious, although his purpose be innocent, yet because it is an end which God hath not encouraged by propounding it as a reward of charity, the whole deliberation is turned to be a secular action, and passes without reward. Our blessed Saviour hath, by an instance of his own, determined this case. "When thou makest a feast, call not the rich, who can make thee recompense; but call the poor, and thou shalt have reward in heaven." To call the rich to a feast is no sin; but to call them is to lose the reward of charity, by changing the whole nature of the action from charity to civility, from religion to prudence.

4. And this hath no other exception or variety in it, but when the mixture is of a thing that is so purely natural, that it is also necessary: thus to eat upon a festival-day to satisfy a long hunger, to be honestly employed to get a living, do not cease to be religious,—though that which is temporal, be the first and the greatest cause of the action or undertaking. But the reason of this difference, if any be apprehended, is because this natural end is also a duty, and tacitly under a promise.

5. Quest. It is usually required, that all that enter into the holy offices of the ministry, should so primely and principally design the glory of God; that all other considerations should scarce be ingredients into the resolution: and yet if it be inquired how far this is obligatory, and observe how little it is attended to in the first preparations to the order, the very needs of most men will make the question material.

But I answer to the question, in proportion to the sense of the present rule.

6. (1.) Wherever a religious act by God's appointment may serve a temporal and a spiritual, to attend either is lawful; but it is still more excellent, by how much preference and greater zeal, we more serve the more excellent. Therefore although it be better to undertake the sacred function wholly for ends spiritual, yet it is lawful to enter into it with an actual design to make that calling the means of our natural and necessary support. The reason is:

7. Because it is lawful to intend what God hath offered and propounded. The end which God hath made, cannot be evil, and therefore it cannot be evil to choose that instrument to that end, which by God's appointment is to minister to that end. Now since "God hath ordained that they who preach the Gospel, should live of the Gospel," it cannot be unlawful to design that in order to this.

8. (2.) If our temporal support and maintenance be the first and immediate design, it makes not the whole undertaking to be unlawful. For all callings, and all states, and all actions, are to be directed or done to the glory of God; according to that saying of St. Paul, "Whether ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God:" and that one calling should be more for God's glory than another, is by reason of the matter and employment; but in every one, for its portion still, God's glory must be the principal: and yet no man questions but it is lawful for any man to bring his son up to the most gainful trade, if in other things there be no objection; and therefore why this may not be the first moving consideration in the susception of, or designation to, the calling ecclesiastical, cannot have any reason in the nature of the thing: for if in all things God's glory must be the principal end, and yet in some callings the temporal advantage is the first mover, then it may be so in all,—the intention of God's glory notwithstanding: for if it hinders not in that, it hinders not in this. But yet,

9. (3.) It is a great imperfection actually to think of nothing but the temporal advantages, of which God hath in that calling made provisions; but I say, it is not always a sin to make them the first mover in the designing the person to that calling.

10. But therefore this is only tolerable in those persons, who at great distance design the calling; as when they first study to make themselves capable of it, then it is tolerable, because they are bound to provide for themselves in all just ways, and standing at so great distances from it, cannot behold the beauties which are 'in interiori domo;' the duty which is on them, is to do that which is their proper work; that is, to fit themselves with abilities and skill to conduct it, and therefore their intention must be fitted accordingly, and move by the most powerful and prevailing motive, so it be lawful. He that applies himself to learn letters, hath an intention proportionable to his person and capacity when he first enters, and as he grows in powers, so must he also in purposes; so that as he passes on to perfection, he may also have intentions more noble and more perfect: and a man in any calling may first design to serve that end that stands next him; and yet when he is possessed of that, look on further to the intention of the thing, and its own utmost capacity. But therefore,

11. (4.) Whoever does actually enter into orders, must take care that his principal end be the glory of God, and the good of souls. The reasons are these:

12. (1.) Because no man is fit for that office, but he that is spiritual in his person, as well as his office: he must be a despiser of the world, a light to others, an example to the flock, a great denier of himself, of a celestial mind, he must mind heavenly things; with which dispositions it cannot consist, that he who is called to the lot of God, should place his chief affections in secular advantages.

13. (2.) This is that of which the Apostle was a glorious precedent, "We seek not yours, but you; for the parents lay up for the children, not children for their parents[m]:" meaning, that between the spiritual and the natural paternity, there is so much proportion, that when it is for the good of the children, they must all quit their temporal advantages; but because this is to be done for the spiritual, it follows, this must be chief.

14. And this I suppose is also enjoined by another apostle, "feeding the flock of God, not for filthy lucre's sake," ἀλλὰ προθύμως, that is, but "of a prompt, ready mind[n];" a

[m] 2 Cor. xii. 14. [n] 1 Pet. v. 2.

mind moved by intrinsic arguments of fair design, not drawn by the outward cords of vanity and gain.

15. (3.) The work of the calling being principally and immediately for the good of souls, and for the glory of God, it cannot be pursued as the nature of the work requires, if that be not principally intended, which is principally to be procured; all that which is necessary in order to it, must also be taken care of: thus the ministers of religion may attend their health, and must look to their necessary support, and may defend themselves against all impediments of their offices in just and proportionable ways: but because all these have further purposes, although they standing nearest may be first regarded by an actual care, at some times, and in some circumstances, and by actual attention; yet habitually, and principally, and constantly, the glory of God, and the good of souls, must be in the heart, and in the purpose of every action.

16. But the principality and pre-eminence of this intention are no otherwise to be judged of, either by ourselves or others, than by these following significations.

(1.) No man can in any sense principally, that is, as he ought, intend the good of souls, who enters into the sacred ministry without those just measures of preparation and disposition, which are required by the church, and the nature of the thing itself; that is, that he be well instructed in the Holy Scriptures, and be fit to teach, to exhort, to reprove. For he who undertakes a work, which can serve God's end and his own in several capacities, and is not sufficiently instructed to serve the ends of God,—it is apparent that what he undertakes, is for his own end.

17. (2.) His intentions cannot be right, who by any indirect arts does enter, for that which does not begin at God, cannot be for God: "Non enim ambitione, vel pretio, sed probatæ vitæ et disciplinarum testimonio, ad honoris et sacerdotii insignia oportet promoveri," said the emperor Theodosius. He therefore who simoniacally enters, fixes his eye and heart upon that which he values to be worth money, not upon the spiritual employment, between which and money there can be no more proportion, than between contemplation and a cartrope; they are not things of the same nature; and he that comes into the field with an elephant,

cannot be supposed to intend to hunt a hare: neither can he be supposed to intend principally the ministry of souls, who comes to that office instructed only with a bag of money.

18. (3.) He may be supposed principally to intend the ministry of souls, and in it the glory of God, who so attends to the execution of his office, that it does really and sufficiently minister to the thing. For since the calling is by God really designed to that end, and if the ministers be not wanting to themselves, they are sufficiently enabled and assisted to that purpose; he that zealously and wisely ministers in the office, hath given a most real testimony of his fair intention, because he does that thing so as those intentions only can be effected. The thing itself is sufficient for the end if God blesses it; he therefore that does the thing, does actuate the intention of God, and sanctifies his own: but this is to be understood with the addition of the following caution.

19. (4.) He may be confident that his intentions for God's glory and the good of souls are right and principal, who so conjoins his other lesser ends with the conduct of the greater, that they shall always be made to give place to the greater. That is, who still pursues the interest of souls, and the work of his ministry, when the hopes of maintenance, or honour, or secular regards, do fail. For he that for carnal or secular regards will either quit or neglect his ministry, it is certain, his carnal or secular ends were his chief motive and incentive in the work. It was the case of Demas, who was St. Paul's minister and work-fellow in the service of the Gospel, but he left him, because "he loved the present world [o];" concerning which, it is to be considered, that this lapse and recession of Demas from the assistances of St. Paul, did not proceed from that love of the world which St. John speaks of, and is criminal, and forbidden to all Christians, which "whosoever hath, the love of the Father dwells not in him [p]," but is so to be understood of such a love, which to other Christians is not unlawful, but was, in those times especially, inconsistent with the duty of evangelists, in those great necessities of the church: Demas was a good man, but weak in his spirit, and too secular in his relations, but he returned to his station, and did the work of an evangelist,

[o] 2 Tim. iv. 10. [p] 1 John, ii. 15.

awhile after, as appears in the Epistle to the Colossians and Philemon; but for the present he was to blame. For he would secure his relations and his interests with too great a caution and diligence, and leave the other, to attend this. Such as now-a-days is too great care of our estates, secular negotiations, merchandises, civil employments, not ministering directly unto religion, and the advantages of its ministration. For our great king the Lord Jesus, hath given to all Christians some employment, but to some more, to some less, and in their own proportion they must give a return: and in a minister of the Gospel, every inordination of carefulness, and every excess of attendance to secular affairs, and every unnecessary avocation from, or neglect of, his great work is criminal: and many things are excesses in them, which are not in others, because the ministerial office requires more attendance and conversation with spiritual things, than that of others.

20. (5.) If ever the minister of holy things, for hope or fear, for gain or interest, desert his station, when he is persecuted, or when he is not persecuted,—it is too much to be presumed, that he did not begin for God, who, for man, will quit God's service. They that wander till they find a rich seat, do all that they do for the riches of the place, not for the employment: "Si non ubi sedeas, locus est, est ubi ambules," said he in the comedy; the calling of these men is not fixed but ambulatory: and if that which fixes them, be temporal advantages, then that which moved them principally, is not spiritual employment.

21. For it is considerable, that if it be unlawful to undertake the holy calling, without a divine vocation to it, then to forsake it without a divine permission must be criminal. He that calls to come, calls to continue, where the need is lasting, and the office perpetual. But to leave the calling when the revenue is gone, to quit the altar when it hath no offering, to let the souls wander when they bring no gifts,—is to despise the religion, and to love only the fat of the sacrifices: for the altar indeed does sanctify the gift, but not the gift the altar; and he hath but a light opinion of an eternal crown of glory, or thinks God but an ill paymaster, that will not do him service upon the stock of his promises, and will not feed the flock, though he have no other reward

but to be feasted in the eternal supper of the lamb. Who are hirelings, but they who fly when the wolf comes? And woe be to that evangelist, who upon any secular regard neglects to preach the Gospel; woe be to him, to whom it shall be said at the day of judgment, 'I was hungry, and my flock was hungry, and ye fed neither it nor me.'

But this is to be understood with these liberties;

22. (1.) That it be no prejudice to these ecclesiastics, who in time of persecution, do so attend to their ministries, that no material part of it be omitted, or slightly performed, and yet take from it such portions of time as are necessary for their labour or support, by any just and honest employment. Thus St. Paul wrought in the trade of a tent-maker, because he would not be a burden to the church of Corinth; and when the church is stripped naked of her robes, and the bread of proposition is stolen from her table by soldiers, there is no peradventure but the ecclesiastical offices are so to be attended to, that the natural duty and necessity be not neglected.

23. (2.) That it be no prejudice to ecclesiastics in the days of peace or war, to change their station from bishop to bishoprick, from church to church, where God or the church, where charity or necessity, where prudence or obedience, calls. Indeed it hath been fiercely taught, that ecclesiastics ought never, and upon no pretence, to desert their church, and go to another, any more than a man may forsake his wife; and for this a decretal of Pope Evaristus is pretended, and is recorded in the canon law. "Sicut vir non debet adulterare uxorem suam, ita nec episcopus ecclesiam suam, ut illam dimittat ad quam fuit sacratus[q]:" and therefore when Eusebius the bishop of Cæsarea was called to be bishop of Antioch, he refused it pertinaciously, and for it was highly commended by the Emperor; and St. Jerome in his epistle to Oceanus tells, "In Nicenâ synodo à patribus decretum est, ne de alia in aliam ecclesiam episcopus transferatur, ne, virginalis pauperculæ societate contempta, ditioris adulteræ quærat amplexus." Something indeed like it was decreed by the fifteenth and sixteenth canons of the Nicene council; and it was a usual punishment amongst the holy primitives, "careat cathedra propria, qui ambit alienam."

[q] Cap. Sicut Vir. can. 7. q. 1.

But these things, though they be true and right, yet are not contradictory to the present case. For,

24. (1.) Evaristus, it is clear, forbade translations and removes from church to church, " ambitus causa," for ambition or covetousness, and therefore it is by him expressly permitted in their proper cases and limits; that is, " in inevitabili necessitate, aut apostolica, vel regulari mutatione," ' when there is inevitable necessity,' or the command and authority of a superior power: and yet upon perusal of the decree I find, that Evaristus's intent was, that a bishop should not thrust his church from him by way of divorce and excommunication, and take another: as appears not only by the corresponding part of the decree, viz. " that neither must the church take in another bishop or husband upon him to whom already she is espoused;" but by the expression used in the beginning of it, " Dimittere ecclesiam episcopus non debet;" and it is compared to the adultery of a man that puts away his wife, and marries another; and also it appears more yet by the gloss, which seems to render the same sense of it, and wholly discourses of the unlawfulness to excommunicate a church or a city, lest the innocent should suffer with the criminal: for when a church is excommunicated, though all those persons die upon whom the sentence fell, yet the church is the same under other persons their successors; and therefore all the way it does injustice, by involving the new-arising innocents, and at last is wholly unjust by including all and only innocent persons. But which way soever this decree be understood, it comes not home to a prohibition of our case.

25. (2.) As for Eusebius, it is a clear case he imposed upon the good Emperor, who knew not the secret cause of Eusebius's denial to remove from Cæsarea to Antioch. For he having engaged the Emperor beforetime to write in his behalf, that he might be permitted to enjoy that bishoprick, was not willing to seem guilty of levity and easiness of change. But that was not all, he was a secret favourer of the Arians, and therefore was unwilling to go to that church, where his predecessor Eustathius had been famous for opposing that pest.

(3.) To that of St. Jerome out of the Nicene council, I answer, That the prohibition is only of such, as without au-

thority, upon their own head, for their own evil purposes, and with injury to their own churches, did it; and of covetousness it is, that St. Jerome notes and reproves the practice: to despise our charge because it is poor, is to love the money more than the souls, and therefore this is not to be done by any one of his own choice; but if it be done by the command or election of our superior, it is to be presumed it is for the advantage of the church in matter of direct reason, or collateral assistances, and therefore hath in it no cause of reproof.

26. And to this purpose the whole affair is very excellently stated by the fourteenth canon of the apostles; "A bishop must not leave his own parish or diocess, and invade that of another man, 'nisi forte quis cum rationabili causa compellatur, tanquam qui possit ibidem constitutus plus lucri conferre, et in causa religionis aliquid profectus prospicere.'" If there be a reasonable cause, he may; and the cause is reasonable, if by going he may do more good or advantage to religion: but of this he is not to be judge himself, but must be judged by his superiors; "et hoc non à semetipso pertentet, sed multorum episcoporum judicio, et maxima supplicatione perficiat;" "he must not do it on his own head, but by the sentence and desire of the bishops."

27. There needs no more to be added to this, but that if a greater revenue be annexed to another charge, and that it be 'in rem ecclesiæ,' that the more worthy person should be advanced thither, to enable his better ministries by those secular assistances, which our infirmity needs, there is nothing to be said against it, but that if he be the man he is taken for, he knows how to use those advantages to God's glory, and the good of souls, and the services of the church; and if he does so, his intentions are to be presumed pure and holy, because the good of souls is the principal.

28. Upon the supposition of these causes, we find that the practice of the ancient bishops and clerks in their translations was approved. Origen did first serve God in the church of Alexandria, afterward he went to Cæsarea, to Antioch, to Tyre: and St. Gregory Nazianzen changed his episcopal see eight times. Nay, the apostles themselves did so: St. Peter was first bishop of Antioch, afterward of Rome: and the necessity and utility of the churches called St. Paul

to an ambulatory government and episcopacy, though at last he also was fixed at Rome, and he removed Timothy and Titus from church to church, as the need and uses of the church required. But in this, our call must be from God, or from our superiors, not from levity or pride, covetousness or negligence. Concerning which, who please further to be satisfied, may read St. Athanasius's epistle to Dracontius, of old; and of late, Chytræus 'in epistolis p. 150 et 678.' and Conradus Porta in his 'Formalia.' This only; If every man were indispensably tied to abide where he is first called to minister, then it were not lawful for an inferior minister to desire the good work of a bishop; which because it is not to be administered in the same place or charge, according to the universal discipline of the church for very many ages, must suppose that there can be a reasonable cause to change our charges, because the Apostle commends that desire which supposes that change.

29. These being the limits and measures of the rule, it would be very good if we were able to discern concerning the secrets of our intentions, and the causes of actions. It is true, that because men confound their actions and deliberations, it will be impossible to tell, in many cases, what motive is the principal ingredient. "Sed ut tunc communibus magis commodis, quam privatæ jactantiæ studebamus, cum intentionem adfectumque muneris nostri vellemus intelligi; ita nunc in ratione edendi veremur, ne fortè non aliorum utilitatibus, sed propriæ laudi servisse videamur[r]." It is hard for a wise and a gallant man, who does public actions of greatest worthiness deserving honour, to tell certainly whether he is more pleased in the honours that men do him, or in the knowledge that he hath done them benefits. But yet in very many cases, we may at least guess probably which is the prevailing ingredient, by these following measures; besides those which I have noted[s] and applied to the special case of undertaking the calling ecclesiastical.

Signs of Difference, whereby we may in a mixed and complicated Intention, discern which is the principal Ingredient.

30. (1.) Whatsoever came in after the determination was made, though it add much the greater confidence, and

[r] Gierig, vol. 1. p. 35. [s] Vide Rule of Holy Living, chap. 1. sect. 2.

makes the resolution sharper and more active, yet it is not to be reckoned as the prevailing ingredient; for though it add degrees, yet the whole determination was perfected before. The widow Fulvia was oppressed by Attilius; she complains to Secundus the lawyer. He considers whether he should be advocate for his friend Attilius, or for the oppressed Fulvia; and at last determines on the side of piety and charity, and resolves to relieve the widow, but with some abatement of his spirit and confidence, because it is against his friend; but charity prevails. As he goes to court he meets with Caninius, who gloriously commends the advocation,—and by superadding that spur made his diffidence and imperfect resolution confident and clear. In this case the whole action is to be attributed to piety, not to the love of fame; for this only added some moments, but that made the determination.

31. (2.) When the determination is almost made, and wants some weight to finish it, whatsoever then supervenes and casts the scales, is not to be accounted the prevailing ingredient, but that which made most in the suspension and time of deliberation, and brought it forward. It is like buying and selling: not the last maravedi that was stood upon, was the greatest argument of parting with the goods; but that farthing added to the bigger sum, made it big enough: and a child's finger may thrust a load forward, which being haled by mighty men stands still for want of a little assistance.

32. (3.) That is the prevailing ingredient in the determination which is most valued, not which most pleases; that which is rationally preferred, not that which delights the senses. If the man had rather lose the sensual than the intellectual good, though in that his fancy is more delighted, yet this is the stronger and greater in the divine acceptance, though possibly in nature it be less active, because less pleasing to those faculties, which whether we will or no, will be very much concerned in all the intercourses of this life. He—that keeps a festival in gratitude and spiritual joy to do God glory, and to give him thanks, and in the preparation to the action is hugely pleased by considering the music, the company, the festivity and innocent refreshments, and in his fancy, leaps at this, but his resolution walks on by that,—hath

not spoiled the regularity of his conscience by the intertexture of the sensual with the spiritual, so long as it remains innocent. For though this flames brightest, yet the other burns hottest, and will last longer than the other. But of this there is no other sign, but that first we be infinitely careful to prescribe measures and limits to the secular joy, that it may be perfectly subordinate to, and complying with, the spiritual and religious: and secondly, if we are willing to suppress the light flame, rather than extinguish the solid fire.

33. (4.) Then the holy and pious ingredient is overpowered by the mixture of the secular, when an instrument towards the end is chosen more proportionable to this, than to that. Cæcilius, to do a real not a fantastic benefit to his tenants, erected a library in his villa, and promised a yearly revenue for their children's education, and nobler institution: and thus far judgment ought to be made, that he intended piety rather than fame; for to his fame, plays and spectacles would (as the Roman humour then was) have served better: but when in the acting his resolution he praised that his pious purpose, and told them he did it for a pious, not a vainglorious end, however the intention might be right, this publication was not right: but, when he appointed that anniversary orations should be made in the praise of his pious foundation, he a little too openly discovered what was the bigger wheel in that motion. For he that serves a secret piety by a public panegyric, disorders the piety by dismantling the secret: it may still be piety, but it will be lessened by the publication; though this publication be no otherwise criminal, than because it is vain. "Meminimus, quanto majore animo honestatis fructus in conscientia, quam in fama, reponatur. Sequi enim gloria, non appeti, debet: nec si casu aliquo non sequatur, idcirco quod gloriam meruit, minus pulchrum est. Ii vero, qui benefacta sua verbis adornant, non ideo prædicare, quia fecerint, sed ut prædicarent, fecisse creduntur[u];" which is the very thing which I affirm in this particular. If the intermediate or consequent actions, serve the collateral or secular end, most visibly it is to be supposed, that this was the greater motive, and had too great an influence into the deliberation.

[u] Plin. lib. 1. ep. 8. Gierig, vol. 1. pag. 35.

But because the heart of man is so intricate, trifling, and various, in most cases it must be sufficient for us to know, that if the mixture be innocent, the whole deliberation is secured in the kind of it, and for degrees we must do as well as we can.

35. But, on the other side, if the secular end mixed with the spiritual and religious, the just and the honest, be unlawful, and yet intended, though in a less degree, though but accidentally and by an after-consent; the conscience is neither sure nor right, but is dishonoured and defiled; for the whole deliberation is made criminal by mingling with forbidden purposes. He that takes up arms under his prince in a just war, and at the same time intends revenge against his private enemy, casually engaged on the adverse party, loses the reward of his obedience, and changes it for the devilish pleasures of revenge.

Concerning the measure and conduct of our intentions, there are some other things to be said, but because they are extrinsical to the chief purpose of this rule, they are properly to be considered under their own head.

RULE VI.

An Argument not sufficient nor competent, though it do persuade us to a Thing in itself good, is not the Ground of a Right, nor a sufficient Warrant for a sure Conscience.

1. He that goes to public prayers because it is the custom, or communicates at Easter to avoid a censure, hath done an act in itself good, but his motive was neither competent nor sufficient to make the action religious, or to manifest and declare the conscience to be sure and right. For conscience is the repository of practical reasons: and as in civil actions, we count him a fool who wears clothes only because they cost him nothing, or walks because he would see his shadow move upon the wall: so it is in moral. When the reason is incompetent, the action is by chance, neither prudent nor chosen, alterable by a trifle, tending to a cheap end, proceeding by a regardless motion: and conscience might as well

be seated in the fancy, or in the foot, as in the understanding, if its nature and proper design were not to be conducted with reasons proportionable to such actions, which tend to an end perfective of man, and productive of felicity.

2. This rule is so to be understood, that it be not required of all men to have reasons equally good for the same determinations, but sufficient and reasonable in themselves, and apt to lead them in their proper capacities and dispositions, that is, reasons proportionable to that kind of things in which the determination is instanced, viz. a religious reason for an action of religion; a prudent reason for a civil action: but if it be in its proper kind, it is sufficient if it be probable, provided always, that it makes a sure mind, and a full persuasion.

3. He that believes Christian religion, because the men are charitable and chaste, and so taught to be, and commanded by the religion, is brought into a good place by a single taper; but he came in by no false light, and he is there where he ought to be. He did not see the way in so brightly as St. Paul did, who was conducted in by an angel from heaven, with a bright flame in his hand; but he made shift to see his way in: and because the light that guided him, came from heaven, his conscience was rightly instructed, and if it persuaded him heartily, his conscience is as sure as it is right.

4. Quest. Upon the account and consequence of this rule it is proper to inquire, Whether it be lawful and ingenuous, to go about to persuade a man to the belief of a true proposition, by arguments with which himself is not persuaded, and which he believes are not sufficient? The case is this:

5. Girolami, a learned priest of Ferrara, finds that many of his parishioners are infected with Judaism, by reason of their conversation with the Jewish merchants. He studies the Jewish books to discover the weakness of their arguments, and to convince them upon their own grounds. But finding his parishioners moved only by popular arguments, and not capable of understanding the secrets of the old prophets, the synchronisms, nor the computation of Daniel's weeks, the infinite heaps of reasons by which Christianity stands firm in defiance of all pretensions to the contrary; sees it necessary to persuade them by things as easy as those

are by which they were abused. But then he considers; if they were by error led into error, it is not fit that by error also they should be led out of it into truth, for God needs not to be served with a lie, and evil must not be done that good may be thence procured. But if I go by a false argument to cozen them into truth, I tell a lie to recover them from a lie, and it is a disparagement to the cause of God, that it must be supported by the devil. But having discoursed thus far, he considers further: every argument which I am able to answer, I know cannot conclude in the question; for if it be to be answered, it is at most but a specious outside of reason; and he that knows this, or believes it so, either must not use that instrument of persuasion, or, if he does, he must resolve to abuse the man's understanding before he can set it right: and this he believes to be against the honour of truth, and the rules of charity, and the simplicity and ingenuity of the spirit of a Christian.

To this Question I answer by several Propositions.

6. (1.) It is not lawful to tell a lie for God and for truth; because God will not be served by that which he hates, and there are no defects in truth which need such violent remedies. Therefore Girolami might not, to persuade his Judaizing parishioners, tell them a tale of a vision, or pretend a tradition which is not, or falsify a record; because these are direct arts of the devil, this is a doing evil for a good end: and every single lie is equally hated by God, and where there is a difference, it is made by complication, or the mixing of something else with a lie: and because God hath created and communicated to mankind, not only sufficient but abundant justifications of whatsoever he hath commanded us to believe, therefore he hates infinitely to have his glorious economy of faith and truth to be disordered and discomposed by the productions of hell. For every lie is of the devil.

7. (2.) It is lawful to use an argument 'cui potest subesse falsum,' such which I know is not certain, but yet I actually believe it to be true. That is, though the argument be not demonstrative, but probable only, yet I may safely use it, if I believe myself to be on the right side of the probability: for a real truth and a supposed truth are all one as to

the innocence of my purposes. And he that knows how little certainty there is in human discourses, and how "we know in part, and prophesy in part," and that of every thing whereof we know a little, we are ignorant in much more, must either be content with such proportions as the things will bear, or as himself can get, or else he must never seek to alter or to persuade any man to be of his opinion. For the greatest part of discourses that is in the whole world, is nothing but a heap of probable inducements, plausibilities, and witty entertainments: and the throng of notices is not unlike the accidents of a battle, in which every man tells a new tale, something that he saw, mingled with a great many things which he saw not; his eyes and his fear joining together equally in the instruction and the illusion, these make up the stories. And in the observation of things, there is infinitely more variety than in faces, and in the contingencies of the world. Let ten thousand men read the same books, and they shall all make several uses, draw several notes, and understand them to several effects and purposes. Knowledge is infinite, and out of this infinity every one snatches some things real, and some images of things; and there are so many cognoscitive faculties above and below, and powers ministering to knowledge, and all these have so many ways of being abused, or hindered, and of being imperfect; and the degrees of imperfection, positive, and privative, and negative, are also themselves absolutely so infinite, that to arrive at probabilities in most things is no small progression. But we must be content to make use of that, both for ourselves and others.

8. Upon this account we may quote scriptures to those senses which they can well serve in a question, and in which they are used by learned men, though we suppose the principal intention be of a different thing, so it be not contrary. For all learned men know, that in Scripture many sayings are full of potential significations, besides what are on the face of the words, or in the heart of the design: and therefore although we may not allege scriptures in a sense contrary to what we believe it meant; yet to any thing beside its first meaning, we may, if the analogy will bear it; and if by learned men it be so used, that is in effect, because for aught we know it may be so indeed.

9. (3.) If a man suppose his arguments sufficient and competent to persuade, though they be neither fitting to persuade, nor at all sufficient, he may yet lawfully use them. For in this case though himself be deceived, yet because it is upon the strength of those arguments he relies, he can be tied to use no better than he hath: and since his conscience is heartily persuaded, though it be in error, yet that which follows that persuasion is innocent (if it be not mingled with design), though, it may be, that which went before was not so.

10. (4.) In the persuasion of a truth, it is lawful to use such arguments whose strength is wholly made prevailing by the weakness of him that is to be persuaded. Such as are arguments 'ad hominem,' that is, proportionable to the doctrines, customs, usages, belief, and credulity, of the man. The reasons are these:

1. Because ignorant persons are not capable of such arguments as may demonstrate the question; and he that goes about to draw a child to him, may pull him by the long sleeve of his coat, and need not to hire a yoke of oxen.

2. That which will demonstrate a truth to one person, possibly will never move another. Because our reason does not consist in a mathematical point: and the heart of reason, that vital and most sensible part, in which only it can be conquered fairly, is an ambulatory essence, and not fixed; it wanders up and down like a floating island, or like that which we call the life-blood; and it is not often very easy to hit that white, by which only our reason is brought to perfect assent: and this needs no other proof but our daily experience, and common notices of things. That which at one time is not regarded, at another time is a prevailing motive; and I have observed that a discourse at one time hath been lightly regarded, or been only pleasing to the ear, which, a year or two after, hath made great impressions of piety upon the spirit of the hearers. And therefore, that I can answer the argument, it is not enough to make me think it necessary to lay it aside or to despise it; there may be something in him that hears me, that can make the argument to become perfect and effectual; and the want of that, it may be, in me, makes me apt to slight it. And besides that some pretended answers are illusions rather than solutions, it may be, that beyond my answer, a wiser man may make a reply,

and confirm the argument so as I know not: and therefore if it be truth you persuade, it were altogether as good, and I am sure much more easy, to let the man you persuade, enter at the first and broadest gate of the true proposition, than after having passed through a great many turnings and labyrinths, at last come but to the same place where he might first have entered. There are some witty men that can answer any thing; but suppose they could not, yet it would be impossible that men should be tied in all cases to speak nothing but demonstrations.

3. Some men are to be wrought upon not by direct argument, but by artifices and back-blows; they are easy enough to believe the truth, if they could; and therefore you must, to persuade them, remove their prejudices and prepossessions; and to this purpose, it will not be necessary to bring those things which are proper to the question, but things accidental and extrinsical. They who were prejudiced at our blessed Saviour because he was of Galilee, needed no other argument to make them to believe in him, but to confute that foolish proverb, "Out of Galilee comes no good:" and yet he that from thence thinks the question of his being the Messias sufficiently concluded, is very far from understanding the effect and powers of argument.

4. The hinderances of belief are seated in several faculties, in our fancy, in our will, in our appetite: now in these cases there is no way to persuade, but by arguing so as to prevail with that faculty. If any man should say that our blessed Saviour is not yet come in the flesh, upon a foolish fancy that he believes not, that God would honour such a wicked nation with so great a glory, as that the Saviour of the world should be born of them; he needs no argument to persuade him to be a Christian, but by having it proved to him, that it was not only likely, but really so, and necessary it should be so, not only for the verification of the prophecies of him, but for divers congruities in the nature and circumstances of things. Here the argument is to confute the fancy only, not the reason.

5. Sometimes the judgment is right, but the affections are perverse; and then, not demonstrations, but popular arguments are not only lawful, but useful, and sufficient. For reasons of abstracted speculation move not the lower man.

Make the people in love with your proposition, and cause them to hate the contrary, and you have done all that they are capable of. When some divines in Germany were forced for their own defence to gain the people to their party, they disputed against the absolute decree of reprobation, by telling them that their adversaries' doctrine did teach that God did drag the pretty children from their mothers' breasts, and throw many of them into the eternal portion of devils: this moved the women, who follow reason as far as they can be made in love with it, and their understanding is oftentimes more in their heart than in their head. And there are thousands of people, men and women, who believe upon no other account than this, neither can they be taught otherwise. When St. Paul would persuade the Jews to reason, and from laying violent hands upon him; he was not to attempt it by offering undeniably to prove that he did well by going to the Gentiles, since God had rejected the Jews, excepting a remnant only: but he persuaded them by telling them he did nothing against the law of Moses and the temple.

6. There are some fondnesses, and strange adherences to trifles in most people, humours of the nation, love of the advantage of their families, relations to sects or dignities, natural sympathies and antipathies, in a correspondency to which, all those arguments which are dressed, are like to prevail, and cannot otherwise do it. For when a man's understanding is mingled with interest, his arguments must have something of this, or else they will never stir that: and therefore all our arguments cannot be freed from such allays.

7. In all the discourses of men, not only orators, but philosophers, and even in their severest discourses, all the good and all the wise men of the world heap together many arguments, who yet cannot suppose them all certain; but yet they therefore innocently use them, because, as there are several capacities of men to be dealt withal, so there are several notices of things; and that may be highly concluding, which, it may be, is not well represented, and therefore not fancied or observed by him that uses it; and to another it becomes effective because he does.

8. The Holy Spirit of God himself in his intercourses with men is pleased to descend to our capacities, and to use arguments taken from our own principles, and which prevail

more by silencing us, rather than demonstrating the thing. Thus St. Paul in his arguments for the resurrection uses this; "If Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain[x]." There are some, even too many now-a-days, and many more then, who would have granted both the antecedent and the consequent; but because the Corinthians disavowed the consequent, they were forced to admit the antecedent. And at last, thousands of persons could never be drawn from their error, if we might not make use of arguments, weak like their capacities, and more proportionable to their understanding than to the question.

There are two cautions to be added to make the rule perfect:

1. That if the disciple relying upon his master's authority more than his own ability to judge, ask the doctor, whether upon his knowledge and faith that argument does evict the question; if the doctor himself does not believe it, he must then put no more force upon it by his affirmation and authority, than he thinks it does in nature bear; but must give prudent accounts of the whole question in compliance to the present necessity of the demander.

Of the same consideration it is, when a question being disputed between two parties, the standers-by expect the truest and most proper account of things. In this case, all openness and ingenuity is to be used according to our own sense of things, not according to what may comply with any man's weakness; and the not doing so is want of ingenuity, and the worthiness of Christian charity, and a perfect deceiving them who expect and desire such things as ought to be finally relied upon.

2. In all arguments which are to prevail by the weakness or advantages taken from the man, he that goes about to persuade, must not say any thing that he knows to be false; but he must comply and twist about the man's weakness, so as to be innocent all the way. Let him take him that is weak and wrap him in swaddling-clothes, but not encompass him with snakes: but yet this hath one loose and permission that may be used.

11. (3.) It is lawful for a man, in persuading another to a truth, to make use of a false proposition, which he that is to

[x] 1 Cor. xv. 14.

be persuaded, already doth believe: that is, a man may justly dispute upon the supposition, not upon the concession and granting of an error. Thus St. Paul disputed with the Corinthians, and to induce them into a belief of the resurrection, made use of a foolish custom among them in use, of being baptized for the dead. For the Christian church hath but two sacraments, baptism, and the Lord's supper; at the beginning some of the Christians used baptism, and in succeeding ages, they used to celebrate the Lord's supper for the dead, and do to this day in the church of Rome. Upon this fond custom of theirs, St. Paul thus argues: 'If there be no resurrection, then it is to no purpose that you are baptized for the dead; but that is to purpose (as you suppose), therefore there is a resurrection.' Thus prayer for the dead, and invocation of saints, according to the principles taught in the primitive church, might have been made use of against each other. If all men are imperfect till the day of judgment, and till then enter not into heaven, then you cannot with confidence make prayers for them, who, for aught you know, need your help more: but if all that die well, that is, if all that die in the Lord, do instantly enjoy the beatifical vision, and so are in a condition to be prayed to, then they need not be prayed for. As for the middle place, they in those ages knew no such thing, as men have since dreamed of. As God in such cases makes use of a prepared wickedness, though he infers none, much less does he make any to be necessary and unavoidable; so may good men and wise make use of a prepared error, a falsehood already believed; but they must neither teach nor betray any one into it.

The objections mentioned in the state of this question, are already answered in the stating the propositions.

But now arises another question, and the solution will follow upon the same grounds.

12. Quest. Whether it be lawful, for a good end, for preachers to affright men with panic terrors, and to create fears that have no ground; as to tell them, if they be liars, their faces will be deformed; if they be perjured, the devil will haunt them in visible shapes; if they be sacrilegious, they shall have the leprosy; or any thing whereby weak and ignorant people can be most wrought upon?

I answer briefly:

13. There are terrors enough in the New Testament to affright any man from his sins, who can be wrought upon by fear: and if all that Moses and the prophets say, and all that Christ and his apostles published, be not sufficient, then nothing can be. For I am sure nothing can be a greater or more formidable evil than hell; and no terrors can bring greater affrightment, than those which are the proper portion of the damned. But the measures of the permission and liberty that can be used, are these:

14. (1.) A preacher or governor may affright those that are under him, and deter them from sin, by threatening them with any thing which probably may happen. So he may denounce a curse upon the estate of sacrilegious persons, robbers of churches, oppressors of priests, and widows and orphans; and particularly, whatsoever the widow or orphan in the bitterness of their souls do pray, may happen upon such evil persons; or what the church in the instruments of donation have expressed: as, to die childless; to be afflicted with the gout; to have an ambulatory life, the fortune of a penny, since for that he forsakes God and his religion; a distracted mind or fancy, or any thing of this nature. For since the curses of this life and of the other are indefinitely threatened to all sinners, and some particularly to certain sins, as want is to the detainers of tithes, a wandering fortune to church-robbers[y]; it is not unreasonable, and therefore it is lawful to make use of such particulars, as are most likely to be effective upon the consciences of sinners.

15. (2.) It is lawful to affright men with the threatening of any thing, that is possible to happen in the ordinary effects of Providence. For every sin is against an infinite God, and his anger is sometimes the greatest, and can produce what evil he please; and he uses to arm all his creatures against sinners, and sometimes strikes a stroke with his own hand, and creates a prodigy of example to perpetuate a fear upon men to all ages.

But this is to be admitted with these cautions;

1. It must be done so as to be limited within those ways, which need not suppose a miracle to have them effected. Thus to threaten a sinner in England, that if he profanes the holy sacrament, a tiger shall meet him in the church-

[y] Malachi, iii. 8, &c. Psal. lxxxiii. 13.

yard and tear him, is so improbable and unreasonable, that it is therefore not to be done, lest the authority, and the counsel, and the threatening, become ridiculous: but we have warrant to threaten him with diseases, and sharp sicknesses, and temporal death; and the warrant is derived from a precedent in Scripture, God's dealing with the Corinthian communicants [z].

2. He who thus intends to dissuade, must in prudence be careful that he be not too decretory and determinate in the particular; but either wholly instance in general threatenings, or with exceptive and cautious terms in the particular; as, 'Take heed lest such an evil happen:' or, 'It is likely it may,' and 'We have no security for a minute against it;' and 'So God hath done to others.'

3. Let these be only threatenings, not prophecies, lest the whole dispensation become contemptible; and therefore let all such threatenings be understood with a provision, that if such things do not happen, the man hath not escaped God's anger, but is reserved for worse. God walketh upon the face of the waters, and his footsteps are not seen; but however, evil is the portion of the sinner.

16. (3.) In all those threatenings which are according to the analogy of the Gospel, or the state of things and persons with which we have intercourse, we may take all that liberty that can by apt instruments concur to the work of God: dressing them with circumstances of terror and affrightment, and representing spiritual events by metaphors, apologues, and instances of nature. Thus our blessed Lord, expressing the torments of hell, signifies the greatness of them by such things which in nature are most terrible; as "brimstone and fire, the worm of conscience, weeping, and wailing, and gnashing of teeth." But this, I say, must ever be kept within the limits of analogy to what is revealed, and must not make excursions to extraregular and ridiculous significations. Such as is the fancy of some divines in the Roman church, and particularly of Cornelius à Lapide [a], that the souls of the damned shall be rolled up in bundles like a heap and involved circles of snakes, and in hell shall sink down like a stone into the bottomless pit, falling still downward for ever and ever. This is not well; but let the expres-

[z] 1 Cor. xi. 30. [a] In Apocal.

sions be according to the proportions of what is revealed. The divines in several ages have taken great liberty in this affair, which I know no reason to reprove, if some of their tragical expressions did not, or were not apt to, pass into dogmatical affirmatives and opinions of reality in such inventions.

17. (4.) If any extraregular example hath ever happened, that may be made use of to affright men from the same or the like sins, and so pass into a regular warning. Thus, though it but once happened, that God punished rebellion by causing the earth to open and swallow up the rebels against their prince and priest, Moses and Aaron, that is, it is but once recorded in Holy Scripture; yet God hath the same power now, and the same anger against rebellion; and as he can, so we are not sure that he will not, oftentimes do the same. Whatsoever hath happened and can happen, we ought to fear lest in the like cases it should happen. And therefore this is a proper instrument of a just fear, and apt rightly to minister to a sure and a right conscience.

18. (5.) If any prodigy of accident and judgment hath happened, though it be possible it may be done for the manifestation of the divine glory, yet because it is ten thousand to one, but it is because of sin too; this may be made use of to affright sinners, although there be no indication for what sin that judgment happened. Thus the ruin of the Greek monarchy finished upon the day of Pentecost: the fearful and prodigious swallowing up the cities of the Colossians and Laodiceans; the burning towns and villages by eruption of fire from mountains; the sudden cataracts of water breaking from the Indian hills; the sudden death and madness of many people; the horrible ruin and desolation of families and kingdoms, may be indifferently used and propounded to all sorts of persons, where there is need of such violent courses: and provided that they be charitably and prudently applied, may effect fear and caution in some sinners, who otherwise would be too ready for gaieties and unsafe liberties.

19. (6.) To children and fools, and all those whose understanding is but a little better, it hath been in all ages practised, that they be affrighted with mormoes and bugbears, that they may be cozened into good. But this is

therefore permitted, because other things which are real, certain, or probable, cannot be understood or perceived by them: and therefore these things are not to be permitted, where it can well be otherwise. If it cannot, it is fit that their understandings should be conducted thither where they ought to go, and by such instruments as can be useful.

RULE VII.

A Conscience determined by the Counsel of wise Men, even against its own Inclinations, may be sure and right.

For in many cases the counsel of wise men is the best argument; and if the conscience was first inclined by a weaker, every change to a better is a degree of certainty: In this case, to persist in the first inclination of conscience, is obstinacy, not constancy: but on the other side, to change our first persuasion when it is well built, for the counsel of men of another persuasion, though wiser than ourselves, is levity, not humility. This rule is practicable only in such cases where the conscience observes the weakness of its first inducement, or justly suspects it, and hath not reason so much to suspect the sentence of wiser men. How it is further to be reduced to practice, is more properly to be considered in the third chapter, and thither I refer it.

RULE VIII.

He that sins against a right and sure Conscience, whatever the Instance be, commits a great Sin, but not a double one.

1. His sin is indeed the greater, because it is less excusable and more bold. For the more light there is in a regular understanding, the more malice there is in an irregular will. "If I had not come to them (said Christ [b]), they had not had sin; but now have they no cover for their sin:" that is, because they are sufficiently taught their duty. It is not an aggravation of sin, barely to say, 'It was done against our

[b] John, xv. 22.

conscience:' for all sins are so, either directly or indirectly, mediately or immediately, in the principle or in the emanation. But thus; the more sure and confident the conscience is, the sin receives the greater degree. It is an aggravation of it, that it was done against a clear light, and a full understanding, and a perfect, contrary, determination.

2. But even then it does not make it to be a distinct sin. "Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin," said the Apostle; but he did not say it was two. It is a transcendent passing upon every sinful action, that it is against a known law, and a contrary reason and persuasion; but if this could make the act to be doubly irregular,—by the same reason, every substance must be two, viz. by having a being, and a substantial being. And the proper reason of this is, because the conscience obliges and ties us by the band of the commandment, the same individual band, and no other. The conscience is therefore against the act, because the commandment is against it; the conscience being God's remembrancer, the record, and the register of the law. A thief does not sin against the law and the judge severally; neither does the magistrate punish him one way, and the law another. The conscience hath no law of its own, but the law of God is the rule of it. Therefore, where there is but one obligation to the duty, there can be but one deformity in the prevarication. But,

3. In sins where there is a double formality, there, indeed, in one action there may be two sins, because there is a double law: as he that kills his father, sins twice, he is impious and unjust; he breaks the laws of piety and justice; he sins against the fifth and the sixth commandments at once; he is a murderer, and he is ungrateful, and he is impious. But in sins of a single nature, there is but a single relation. For the conscience and the law, is the rule and the parchment; and he that sins against the one, therefore also sins against the other, because they both terminate but one relation.

4. But although he does not commit two sins, yet he commits one great one,—there being nothing that can render an action culpable or imputable in the measures of justice, but its being a deviation from, or a contradiction to, the rule. It is against my conscience, that is, against my illuminated and instructed reason, therefore it is a sin: this is a demonstration, because it is against God, and against my-

self; against my reason, and his illumination; that is, against all bands, divine and human.

5. Quest. But then what shall a judge do, who knows the witnesses in a criminal cause to have sworn falsely? The case is this: Conopus, a Spartan judge, walking abroad near the gardens of Onesicritus, espies him killing of his slave Asotus; who, to palliate the fact, himself accuses another of his servants, Orgilus, and compelled some to swear it as he affirmed. The process was made, advocates entertained by Onesicritus, and the poor Orgilus convict by testimony and legal proof. Conopus, the judge, knows the whole process to be injurious, but knows not what to do, because he remembers that he is bound to judge according to allegation and proof, and yet to do justice and judgment, which, in this case, is impossible. He therefore inquires for an expedient, or a peremptory resolution on either hand: since he offends against the laws of Sparta, the order of law, and his own life, if he acquits one who is legally convicted; and yet, if he condemns him whom he knows to be innocent, he sins against God and nature, and against his own conscience.

6. That a judge not only may, but is obliged to, proceed according to the process of law, and not to his own private conscience, is confidently affirmed by Aquinas, by his master, and by his scholars, and, of late, defended earnestly by Didacus Covaruvias, a learned man indeed and a great lawyer; and they do it upon this account:

7. (1.) For there is a double person or capacity in a judge; he is a private person, and hath special obligations and duties incumbent upon him in that capacity: and his conscience hath a proper information, and gives him laws, and hath no superior but God: and as he is such a one, he must proceed upon the notices and persuasions of his conscience, guided by its own measures. But as he is a judge, he is to do the office of a judge, and to receive information by witnesses and solemnities of law, and is not to bring his own private conscience to become the public measure. Not Attilius Regulus, but the consul, must give sentence: and since he is bound to receive his information from witnesses, as they prove, so the law presumes; whose minister because he is, if there be any fault, it is in the law, not in the judge; and in

this case, the judge does not go against his conscience, because by oath he is bound to go according to law. He, indeed, goes against his private knowledge; but that does not give law to a judge, whose knowledge is to be guided by other instruments. (2.) And it is here as in case of execution of sentences, which is another ministry of law. "Ordinarius tenetur obsequi delegato, etsi sciat sententiam illam injustam, exequi nihilominus tenetur eandem," said Innocentius III.[c] The executioner is not to refuse his office, though he know the judge to have condemned an innocent; for else he might be his judge's judge, and that not for himself alone, but also for the public interest. For if an executioner, upon hispersuasion that the judge did proceed unjustly against the life of an innocent, shall refuse to put him to death, he judges the sentence of the judge over again, and declares publicly against it, and denies to the commonwealth the effect of his duty: so does a judge, if he acquits him whom the law condemns, upon the account of his private knowledge. (3.) It is like speaking oracles against public authority from a private spirit. (4.) Which thing, if it were permitted, the whole order and frame of judicatures would be altered, and a door opened for a private and an arbitrary proceeding: and the judge, if he were not just, might defame all witnesses, and acquit any criminal, and transfer the fault to an innocent and unsuspected, and so really do that which he but pretends to avoid. (5.) And the case would be the same, if he were a man confident and opinionative. For he might seem to himself to be as sure of his own reason, as of his own sense; and his conscience might be as effectively determined by his argument as by his eyes; and then by the same reason he might think himself bound to judge against the sentence of the law, according to his own persuasion, as to judge against the forms of law, and proceedings of the court according to his own sense. (6.) And therefore not only in civil but in the ecclesiastical courts we find it practised otherwise: and a priest may not refuse to communicate him, whom he knows to have been absolved upon a false allegation, and unworthily; but must administer sacraments to him according to the public voice, not to his own private notice; for it would be intolerable, if that which is just in public, should be rescinded by a private

[c] Cap. Pastoralis, sect. Quia Verò de Officio et Potestate Judicis Delegati.

pretence, whether materially just or no; not only because there are other measures of the public and private, and that to have that overborne by this would destroy all government; but because if this private pretence be admitted, it may as well be falsely as truly pretended: and therefore, since real justice by this means cannot be secured, and that unless it were, nothing could make amends for the public disorder, it follows that the public order must be kept, and the private notice laid aside. (7.) For the judge lays aside the affections of a man, when he goes to the seat of judgment; and he lays aside his own reason, and submits to the reason of the law,—and his own will, relinquishing that to satisfy the law; and therefore he must bring nothing of a private man with him, but his own abilities fitted for the public. (8.) And let no man in this case pretend to zeal for truth and righteousness; for since in judicatures, legal or seeming truth is all that can be secured, and with this the laws are satisfied, we are sure we may proceed upon the testimony of concurring witnesses, because they do speak legal truth; and that being a proportionable conduct to legal persons, is a perfect rule for the conscience of a judge; according to the words of our blessed Saviour quoted out of Moses' law, "It is written in your law, the testimony of two men is true[d]," that is, it is to be accepted as if it were true, and proceedings are to be accordingly. In pursuance and verification of this, are those words of St. Ambrose[e]: "Bonus judex nihil ex arbitrio suo facit, et domesticæ proposito voluntatis, sed juxta leges et jura pronunciat, scitis juris obtemperat, non indulget propriæ voluntati, nihil paratum et meditatum domo defert, sed sicut audit, ita judicat:" "A good judge does nothing of his will, or the purpose of his private choice, but pronounces according to laws and public right, he obeys the sanctions of the law, giving no way to his own will, he brings nothing from home prepared and deliberated, but as he hears so he judges." This testimony is of the more value, because St. Ambrose had been a judge and a ruler himself in civil affairs, and therefore spake according to the sense of those excellent laws, which almost all the civil world have since admitted. (9.) And the thing is confessed in the parallel cases: for a judge may not proceed upon the evidence of an instrument

[d] John, viii. [e] In Psal. cxviii.

which he hath privately perused, if it be not produced in court, though he by that could be enabled to do justice to the oppressed party; for he does not know it as a judge, but as a private man; and though that be a distinction without a real difference of subject, yet in effect it means, that the laws do not permit a judge to take notice of any private information, which might prove an inlet to all manner of violence and robbery. (10.) And therefore if a priest hearing the confession of Caius, understands that Titius was the complice of Caius's crime, he may not refuse to absolve Titius, though he do not confess the fact in which he took part with Caius; because he is to proceed by the method of that court where he sits judge. For private and personal notice is not sufficient. (11.) And if I do privately know that my neighbour is excommunicate, I am not bound to refuse him my society, till I know it legally; and therefore much less may a judge do a public act upon private notice, when we may not do even a private act referring to law without a public notice. (12.) And all this is confirmed by the authority of Ulpian[f]: "Veritas rerum erroribus gestarum non vitiatur, et ideo præses provinciæ id sequatur, quod convenit eum ex fide eorum quæ probabuntur:" "The truth of things is not prejudiced by errors in matters of fact: and therefore let the president of the province follow that which is fitting for him, proceeding by the faith of those things which shall be proved." (13.) For since no man must judge by his own private authority, he must not judge by his own private knowledge. (14.) And to what purpose shall he call in witnesses, to give him public information, if when they have done so, he by his private may reject the public?

8. But if after all this you inquire, 'What shall become of the judge as a man, and what of his private conscience?' these men answer,—that the judge must use what ingenious and fair artifices he can to save the innocent, or to do justice according to truth, but yet so as he may not prevaricate the duty of a judge: he may use the prudence of a friend and a private man: let him, by various and witty interrogatories, in which he may be helped by the advantage of his private knowing the secret, make ways to entrap the false witnesses, as Daniel did to the two elders in the case of Susanna: or let him refer the cause to the supreme power, or resign his

[f] L. Illicita. sect. Veritas.

office, or make a deputation to another, or reprieve the injured man, or leave a private way for him to escape, or use his power of interpretation, or find some way to elude the unjust hand of justice, which in this case does him wrong by doing right. But if none of these ways, nor any other like them, can preserve the innocent man, or the judge's private conscience, he must do justice according to law, standing upright as a public person, but not stooping to particulars, or twisting himself by his private notices.

9. This is the sum of what is or can be said in this opinion; and though they speak probably and well, yet I answer otherwise, and I suppose, for reasons very considerable. Therefore,

To the question, I answer, that a judge in this case may not do any public act against his private conscience; he may not condemn an innocent whom he knows to be so, though he be proved criminal by false witnesses. And my reasons are these:

10. (1.) "Innocentem et justum non occides," said God[s]; To slay an innocent person is absolutely and indispensably evil. Upon which ground I argue; That which is in its own nature essentially and absolutely evil, may not be done for any good, for any pretence, for any necessity, nor by any command of man. Since therefore in the present case, the man is supposed innocent, he ought not to be delivered to death for any end in the world, nor by any authority, much less for the preservation of the forms of courts, or to prevent a possible evil that may accidentally and by abuse arise; especially since the question here is not matter of prudence or policy, but of justice and conscience; nor yet of the public interest, but of the judge's duty; nor at all, what the laws actually do constitute and appoint, but what the judge may really practise. Now, in all cases, if a man dies, it must be by the merit of the cause, or for some public end. The first is not supposed in this question, because the man is supposed innocent; and if the latter be pretended, it is an open profession of doing evil that good may come of it. And if it be answered, that this is true, if the man did appear to be innocent, but in law he appears otherwise: I reply, that it is true, to the law he does so, but not to the judge; and there-

[s] Exod. xiii. 7.

fore, though the law can condemn him, yet she cannot do it by that judge. He must not do it, because it being by an unavoidable defect or error, that the law may do it, and if the law could be rightly informed, she would not, she could not, do it, it follows that the judge who is rightly informed, can no more do it than the law itself, if she had the same information.

11. (2.) To judge according to forms and processes of law, is but of human positive right and constitution; for the law may command a judge to proceed according to his own knowledge, if she will trust him and his knowledge: and in all arbitrary courts it is so; and in the supreme power it is always so, if it be absolute. But not to condemn the innocent, is of divine and eternal right, and therefore cannot be prejudiced by that which only is human. And indeed if we look into the nature and causes of things, we shall find, that the reason why judges are tied to forms and processes of laws, to testimonies and judicial proofs, is, because the judge is supposed not to know the matters brought before him, till they appear in the forms of law. For if a judge did know men's hearts, and the secrets of things and causes,—supposing him to be honest, he were the fittest person in the world to be a judge, and can proceed summarily, and needs no witnesses. But this is the way of the divine judgment, who proceeds upon his own knowledge, though for the declaration of his justice to men, he sometimes seems to use processes, and measures of human inquiry; as in the case of Sodom, and the like. And in proportion, if God should reveal to a judge the truth of every case that lies before him, I think no man doubts, but he might safely proceed to judgment upon that account. This was the case of Daniel and Susanna. For she was convicted and proved guilty by concurrent witnesses; God revealed the truth to Daniel, and he arrested judgment upon that account. Upon examination of the witnesses he finds them disagree in the circumstances; but this was no legal conviction of their falsehood in the main; but it was therefore sufficient, because Daniel came in the manner of a prophet, and knew the truth from God, not by forms of law. Now it matters not, as to the justice of the proceeding, which way the truth be known; for the way of receiving it is but extrinsical to the main question: and as Daniel being made

judge by God, might not have consented to the death of Susanna, though not only the two elders, but ten more, had sworn that they had seen Susanna sin: so neither can a judge, to whom God by some special act of providence in behalf of truth and innocence hath made known the matter, proceed to sentence against that knowledge, which he by divine dispensation hath received.

12. (3.) If a king, or senate, or any supreme power, receive testimony of a matter of fact concerning any of their council, whom they know to be innocent; as if it be legally proved that Sempronius robbed a man, upon the kalends of March, a hundred miles from the place where the king or senate saw him sitting all that day; that they may not deliver him to death appears therefore, because they, being accountable to none but God, must judge by his measures, that is, so as to preserve the innocent, and not by those measures which men's necessity, and imperfection, and weaknesses, have made regularly necessary. But that which is regularly necessary, may irregularly and by accident in some cases be unjust, and in those the supreme power must make some provisions where it can, and it can when it knows the truth of the particular. For since the legislative power can dispense in the administration of its own laws upon particular necessities, or charity upon the affirmation and petition of him that needs it: much more must it dispense with the forms of proceedings in a case of such necessity, and justice, and charity, and that upon their own knowledges. The affirmation of the argument is, that princes and senates may, and must, do this; that it is necessary, and therefore, also just in them to do so. The consequent of the argument is this: That therefore if private judges may not do so, it is because they have no authority to do so, but are compelled by their princes to proceed by forms: and, if this be all, it declares the necessity of such proceedings to be only upon man's authority; and so, though by law he may be bound to do so, yet our inquiry being what he is tied to do in conscience, the law cannot prevail above conscience, the subordinate above the superior,—there being, in this case, a knowledge of the fact, and the law of God for the right.

13. (4.) For the case is this; God says, "Thou shalt not slay the innocent," and the judge does certainly know, that the accused man is truly innocent: the conclusion is, There-

fore this man must not die. Against this, the argument opposed is this: Human authority says, Thou shalt not slay him that is convicted of a fault, whether by true or false witnesses: here are witnesses which do convict him, and I know them to be false: the conclusion is, Therefore this man must die. Which of these two arguments ought to prevail, I think needs not much inquiry.

14. (5.) And what if Titius be accused for killing Regulus, whom the consul at that time hath living in his house, or hath lately sent abroad; would not all the world hoot at him, if he should deliver Titius to the tormentors, for killing the man whom the judge knows to be at home, it may be dressing his dinner, or abroad gathering his rents? But if this be so absurd (as it is indeed extremely), it follows, that he may use his private knowledge against a false testimony that is public. Or how if he sees the fact done before him in the court? a purse cut, or a stone thrown at his brother-judge, as it happened at Ludlow not many years since? The judge proceeded to sentence upon intuition of the fact, and stayed not for the solemnities of law. Or put case that there be depositions offered on both sides, for and against the innocent, either directly or indirectly. If in this case the judge's private knowledge may determine for either, it follows that his private knowledge can be admitted as the instrument of justice; and if it may, it must: for nothing can hinder him to do it, but because he may not. But that he may, appears in the now alleged instances.

15. (6.) Adrianus puts another case, in which it is also without contradiction evident that private notice is to be preferred before public solemnity, where there is an error in this and none in that. The case I choose to express in this narrative. Viretta, a naughty woman, pretends to be wife to Coloro, an Italian gentleman, and brings a priest and witnesses whom she had suborned, to prove the marriage. The judge gives sentence for Viretta, and commands Coloro to pay the duties of a husband to her, and to use her as a wife. He knows the contrary, and that he is husband to Vittoria Morisini, and therefore pays her all his duty, and neglects the other; and he is bound to it, because no man's error or malice can alter the laws of God, and from paying that duty which he knows is due by the laws of God, he cannot be excused by any formal error arising in the administration of the laws of

man. The same is the judge's case. For if the law commands him to do an act against a known private duty, he is so to follow the duty he knows he owes to God, in preserving the innocent, as Coloro is bound to preserve his duty to his wife, and the judge may no more commit murder than Coloro may commit adultery; but neither of them can be rescued but by their private conscience, therefore they may use that. And there is no escape in this instance, because the subject is as much bound to submit to the sentence of the law, as the judge is to the forms of it; and that which secures one, secures both.

16. (7.) The evils that may be consequent to the strict adherence to the forms and proofs of law against the judge's conscience, may be so great as to be intolerable, and much greater than can be supposed to be consequent to the following a certain unsolemn truth. And there is no man, but put the case so as himself and his party may be involved in ruin by false witness, and he will grant that himself is by all means to be preserved. Put case a whole order of the clergy, of monks, of lawyers, should be accused falsely and oppressed by evil men, as the knights templars were accused fiercely, and so were the religious in Henry VIII.'s time: if the king had known that the monks, and the Pope had known that the templars had been innocent, no man ought to have persuaded them to condemn the guiltless. For if the king had proceeded against them to confiscation, making use of his advantage gotten by the sin of vile men, the effect had been, that he would rather have gotten money by a lie, than have done justice to the oppressed according to his conscience. And indeed, because it is not to be supposed but all the world would have given sentence for themselves in their own case, it is to be supposed that the contrary opinion is but the sentence of men in prosperity, or of inexperienced scholars, who care not what load they put upon others to verify their own opinion. And what Christian will not condemn Pilate for condemning the holy Jesus, according to the testimonies of his false accusers, and against his own conscience? And let the case be put, that the witnesses had agreed, and proved foul things against the unspotted Lamb of God, and made all clear in forms of law, and that Pilate had known the Lord to be innocent and injured, could the

water in the basin have washed him clean, if he had, against his conscience in compliance with the solemn perjurers, have condemned him who was purer than the angels? In this case the effect had been intolerable, for which no pretence of necessity, or legal formalities, could have made recompense.

17. (8.) A law founded upon presumption binds not in the court of conscience, when the presumption is found to be an error. The law presumes that the heir entering upon an estate, if he makes not an inventory, does it to conceal the goods, and defraud the creditors. But if an heir does so by negligence, or ignorance, or an impertinent fear, or upon ill counsel, or be betrayed to do so; if the creditor knows that the goods are not sufficient, he may not in conscience take the advantage the law gives him, but is bound to do charity and justice by the measures of his private knowledge, and not by the measures of the law to do violence and oppression, which was the thing in question.

18. (9.) To the verification of the sentence of death upon an accused person there are required, 1. A reality of the crime. 2. A power in the judge. 3. And equity in the law. Now if divers men should swear that the judge hath a competent power, nay, though they threaten him with death if he does not, yet he may not exercise any such power, which himself privately knows that he hath not. So also, if he knows the fact does not deserve death, though men swear it, or a higher power declare it, or another competent judge affirm it, yet a judge must not consent to it, if himself knows it to be unjust. And I have read of an excellent prince, who because he did consent to the forms and processes of law made by his senate against the bravest of his subjects, against his own conscience and knowledge, repented of it all the days of his life, and was not pardoned for it till the day of his death; and the first confidence he had of pardon, was upon St. Paul's words, "He that is dead, is justified from sins." But then, since the defect of either of these two makes it unlawful for a judge to proceed according to the forms of law, and ties him to follow his conscience even against allegation and proof, much more must it be so, if there be no reality of fact in the accused party; because in the destitution of this, the laws themselves have no power, and therefore they can give none to a judge their minister. "Justis lex non est po-

sita;" "The law was not made for the innocent," but to defend them, and therefore hath no power to destroy them; and then the judge can have none,—and so cannot in that case be tied to proceed according to formalities,—and therefore must proceed according to his conscience, or not at all. For,

19. (10.) If a law were made that a judge should be bound to condemn an innocent person, though he knows him to be so, and to be accused by calumny, and supplanted by perjury, it were an unjust law, as all men (that I know of) grant, and indeed must grant. For it were a law made to encourage perjurers and oppressors, to discourage innocence: a law made against the intention of laws, which is, to defend the right, and punish the wrong-doer: it were a law disabling the judge to rescue the oppressed, and a law expressly disowning the cause of the afflicted: and if any judge should undertake his office upon such terms, he should openly profess, that if the case happened, he would do against his conscience. And all laws going the best way they can to find out truth, would never disable a judge to make use of it when he had found it out, and assisted the inquiry of the laws by a fortunate discovery. For the examining of witnesses being but a means to find out truth, cannot possibly be so adhered to, as to be preferred before the end to which it is designed; that were as if a man should rather love to seek than find. Since, therefore, no lawyer ever was, or can be, so unreasonable as to decree that a judge shall not, in such a case, directly relieve the innocent, but proceed to his condemnation, it follows that he can have no obligation to do so, and then the obligation of his conscience can upon no pretence be declined. The law does not intend to oblige the judge in that case, because no law can be made expressly to do so; he, therefore, being free from the law in that case, stands bound to his private conscience, without excuse. Nay, the canon law expressly enjoins that a judge should give sentence according to his own conscience, as appears in "c. 1. de Re Judic. in 6. et in Clem. 1. sect. Verum de Hæret."

20. (11.) Suppose a judge should suborn false witnesses against an innocent; either he is bound not to proceed according to allegation and proof, but according to his secret conscience, or else he is bound to go on in his crime, and

effect that which he had maliciously designed. For it is not enough that he is bound to disengage the witnesses and take off the subornation: for suppose the persons already appearing will not cease, lest they should be shamed and ruined, but will take confidence from their crime, and perseverance from their publication, then there is no remedy for the innocent, neither can the judge rescue him from himself, nor give over sinning, unless he proceed by his private certain measures, and not by those which are false and public. For to say he may be sorry for his fault, and yet proceed in it, is to make him a hypocrite: if he confesses that he suborned the witnesses, and yet proceed to condemn the innocent, he is ridiculous, and makes the law put on the face of tyranny and unreasonable violence and oppression. So that either he must go on and sin to the end without remedy, or he must be admitted to proceed by his private conscience, and that in his case would be justice and penitence besides.

21. (12.) Lastly, all laws being intended for the good of the subjects, are bound not only to comply with their ordinary cases by ordinary provisions, but for their accidental needs by the extraordinary. And so we find it, that all laws yield in particulars, when the law is injurious in the special cases: and this is the ground of all chancery, because "summum jus, summa injuria;" and Solomon advised well, "Noli esse justus nimium," "Be not over righteous;" and the justice of God being ἐπιείκεια, gentleness and favour, equity and mercy, ours is best when we follow the best precedent: now since no case is more favourable than the present, the laws are unjust that will not bend and stoop to the miseries of the oppressed; and therefore the judge having no hinderance, he is tied by a double band to relieve the oppressed innocent, by his direct sentence (where it can be admitted), or by his open declaration, and "quantum in se est," but at no hand to consent to his condemnation.

22. I conclude, therefore, with that rule of the canon[h] law, "Melius est scandalum nasci quam ut veritas deseratur;" "It is better that a scandal should be suffered, and an offence done to the forms and methods of judicial proceedings, than that truth should be betrayed and forsaken;" and what was said in the prophecy concerning our blessed Sav-

[h] Cap. penult. de Reg. Jur.

iour, "Non secundum auditum aurium arguet," "He shall not reprove according as he hears," but according as he knows, is also true of judges in this case: they do judge most perfectly, when, in truth and in defence of the innocent, they follow the pattern of the divine judgment, and not the imperfection of the human, that is, they are to judge by the eyes, not by the ears;

> Segnius irritant animos demissa per aures,
> Quam quæ sunt oculis subjecta fidelibus ——

That is a sure sentence that can rely upon ocular demonstration; for our eyes are a better guard of innocence than the tongues of sycophants, and our conscience are surer informers than the forms of law; and since no law hath declared against it, the conscience is at perfect liberty; and yet if it were not, we are certain it is better to obey God than men; the conscience is no man's servant, it is God's only. Conscience is God's angel: "Grieve not the angel, lest he smite thee; do nothing against him, lest he forsake thee."—"Viro bono fixum in omni vita est, traversum unguem à recta conscientia non discedere," said Cicero[1]; "Every good man is perfectly resolved not to depart from his right conscience a hair's breadth during his whole life."

23. And now to the pretences which are made on the other side, there will be the less need of a reply, if we consider that they only prove that a judge is tied to observe the forms of judicial process, and to proceed according to allegation and proof, ordinarily and regularly, as supposing that this is the best ordinary way of information, as it is most certainly. But as the law, using the best she hath, would not yet refuse a prophet from heaven, or a miracle to bring truth from her retirements, or her veil, so neither will she refuse any better way that can be offered; but whatever the law would do, yet the question now being concerning the judge, it is certain that the judge in the case now put, hath a surer way of evidence: and therefore as the law, if she had a surer way of evidence, ought not to go against so clear a light, so neither can the judge. And the arguments, only proceeding upon the usual suppositions, conclude that regularly judges must do as usually they can do, that is, proceed according to proof, because they can have no better way,

[1] Ad Atticum, xiii. 20.

but they cannot be drawn to this extraregular and rare contingency. For though most men are brought in upon suspicion or private accusation, yet the Apostle says that 'some men's sins are manifest, going before unto judgment:' and when this happens, the judge must not go in inquest after what he sees. And the same arguments may as well be urged against all dispensations and remissions, against favour and chancery, and destroy all equity, and all religion, as to destroy all conscience when it is certain and infallible. But I shall say something to the particulars.

24. (1.) It is true that a judge hath a double capacity, and he hath offices proportionable; some as a man, some as a judge; that is, he hath some natural and essential obligations, some which are superinduced upon his office. And therefore, I refuse to use this distinction as it is commonly used, and so made more subject to mistake and abuse. In this case the judge is not to be considered as a public man and a private man; for private is as much superinduced as public, and his other relations are as much to yield to his essential duty, as that of a judge: such as are the relation of a husband, of a father, of a tutor, of a master; and, amongst these, the more private is often tied to yield to the more public. But therefore in this case the judge is to be considered as a judge and as a man; and in this case the duties are sometimes disparate, but never contrary; and when there is a dispute, the superinduced must yield to that which is original; for whatsoever is his duty as a man, the judge may not prevaricate; for it is the man that is the judge, in the man that office is subjected, and the office of a judge is bound upon him by the conscience of the man. If the judge had two consciences, and two real persons, then it were to be granted that they were to be served and attended to in their several callings; but it is not so: they are but two persons in fiction of law, but materially, and to all real events, the same: it is the same conscience ministering to divers duties: and therefore as the judge is always that man, so his conscience is the conscience of that man; and because as a man he must not go against his conscience,—so when that man is a judge, he must not go against the man's conscience, for the judge is still that man ruled by that conscience. The essential duty of a man cannot by any superinduced formal-

ity be dispensed with. Now to go according to our conscience and knowledge is the essential rule and duty of a man, which he cannot put off by being a judge. The new office superinduces new obligations, but none contrary, no more than he can cease being a man by being a judge. "Certe prior anima quam litera, et prior sermo quam liber, et prior sensus quam stylus, et prior homo quam philosophus et poeta[k]:" He is first a man, and then a philosopher, a poet, or a judge; and that which is first, cannot be prejudiced by what is superinduced. And if the judge go against the conscience of the man, pretending to do according to the conscience of the judge, the man shall be damned,—and where the judge shall then appear, any child can tell. If the Bishop of Bayeux, as earl of Kent, will rebel against his prince, the Earl of Kent shall lose his head, though the Bishop of Bayeux may plead his clergy. For in this there is a great mistake. To be a man and to be a judge, are not to be compared as two distinct capacities of equal consideration. To be a bishop and to be a judge are properly such, and have distinct measures; but to be a man is the subject of the two capacities, and cannot be laid aside as either of the other may; and therefore the distinction is vain and sophistical: and if it could be admitted in metaphysics (in which yet it appears to have an error), yet it can never be suffered to pass to real events. This being the ground of all the contrary opinion, and being found false, the superstructure must also fall to the ground. To the special cases this I answer:

25. (2.) An executioner may not refuse to do his office, though the judge hath given an unjust sentence: it is true only when the matter is dubious, or not known, or intolerable. But if the judge commands the hangman to flay a prophet alive, or to crucify Christ, or to strike his king through with a sword, I doubt not but the adversaries themselves will think he is not obliged to obey.—Indeed, this ought not easily to be drawn into a rule, lest such people turn it into a pretence.—But if the executioner be sure, and the matter be notorious, and such as cannot deceive him, his hand ought not to be upon an innocent. For as receivers are to thieves, so are executioners to unjust judges. When the fact is notorious, and the injustice evident, then it is such as all men

[k] Tertul. lib. de Testim. Animæ.

can see it: and then, as if there were no receivers, there would be no thieves; so if there were no executioners of unjust sentences, the judge would be apt to reverse his sentence.

26. (3). Now whereas it is pretended that if a private notice were admitted against public evidence, it were like a private spirit against a public article, and would open a way to every pretension, it would dissolve the forms of judicatures, and introduce many evils: I answer, that if all this were true, and that for this there could be no remedy, nor yet any recompense in the special cases, it would follow that the law were prudent, if it did refuse to admit such a proceeding, unless she had some reason to trust the judge: but this were nothing to the judge. For the law therefore refuses his testimony, because she hath that which she presumes is better, and because she, not knowing the secret, follows the best way she hath. But the judge knows the secret, and he is not deceived, and he does not make pretences, for the case supposes him to speak according to his conscience; and therefore, although the law in prudence does not believe him, yet he cannot but believe himself, and therefore in duty to God must proceed accordingly, or must not proceed at all.

27. (4.) Neither is this like a private spirit against a public article; because this conscience of the judge does not impose upon the public, who hath power to admit or to refuse his sentence; but it is only for himself: and although his conscience ought not to be the public measure, yet it ought to be his own. I do not doubt but the law may go against the judge's conscience, but the judge himself may not go against his own.

28. (5.) And this we see verified in a matter of a private evidence; for though the judge hath seen it in a chamber, yet he must not judge by it in the court, the law will not suffer him to do so; but yet for himself he may so far make use of it, as to be persuaded in his conscience, and to understand on which side the right stands, and to favour it in all the ways that are permitted him. But the case here being not matter of life and death, the law hath power to dispose of estates, and the conscience of the judge is not obliged to take more care of a man's money or land than himself does, but it can be obliged to take care of men's lives: when the in-

jured person is not able. A man may give away his estate, but he may not give his life away; and therefore he may lose his estate by such ways, by which he ought not to be permitted to lose his life. Add to this, that a judge having seen an instrument in private which could much clear the cause depending, may not upon that account proceed to sentence, because, it may be, the adverse party can give an answer to it, and make it invalid: whereas in matters of fact, of which the judge is conscious, there is no uncertainty nor fallibility. And, lastly, the suffering party, in the question of money or lands suffers no inconvenience, but what is outweighed to the public by the order of justice and solemnities of law; and the man that loses to-day for want of producing his evidence, may produce it to-morrow and recover it. But in matter of life and death, nothing can make recompense to the oppressed innocent; and if he suffers to-day, he cannot plead an error in the indictment to-morrow. For these and many other considerations the case is wholly different.

29. (6.) By some of these things we may also answer to the instance of a confident and opinionative judge. He may not prefer his private opinion before the sentence of the law, and bring it into open judgment. 1. Because he himself may be deceived in his opinion, and his confidence is no argument that he is not deceived. 2. Because if the sentence and decree of the law be less reasonable, yet the judge without sin may proceed to it, because the more reasonable is not in his choice, and the less reasonable is not absolutely and simply unjust. 3. In matters of prudence and civil government there is no demonstration of reason, but the legislative power may determine for the public interest as is presently apprehended, and may refuse the better counsel, and yet do well enough; for that which is simply the better, is not in these cases necessary; and in such things a man's reason ought not to be so confident, as he is of what he sees, or what is matter of faith; and therefore in these only he is to be guided by his own, in the other he must proceed by the public measures. And as in all things, not demonstratively certain or evident, the executioner is bound to obey the judge; so is the judge bound to obey the law; and the presumption will lie for the law against the judge, as it will lie for the judge against the officer. 4. And, yet after all, I do not

doubt but if a judge's conscience were effectively determined against a law, and that he did believe it to be unjust and unlawful, he ought to follow his conscience. As if a judge did believe it to be a sin to put a man to death for stealing thirteen pence halfpenny, he might not condemn such a thief to the gallows. And he is not excused by saying, 'It is not the judge but the law that does amiss.' For if the judge believe the law to be unjust, he makes himself a partner in the injustice by ministering to an unjust law against his conscience. For not only he that commands evil to be done, is guilty, but he that obeys such a command. In this case, either the judge must lay aside his opinion or his office: for his conscience must not be laid aside.

30. (7.) The instance of a priest and an excommunicate person unworthily absolved will no way conclude this question. 1. Because the case is infinitely differing between condemning an innocent, and acquitting the guilty. If any man pretends he is satisfied in conscience that the accused person is criminal, though it cannot be legally proved, yet there is no wrong done, if the accused man be let free; an inconvenience there may be, but the judge must not be permitted to destroy by his private conscience, against or without legal conviction, because the evil may be intolerable if it be permitted, and the injustice may be frequent and insufferable; but if it be denied, there may sometimes happen an inconvenience by permitting a criminal to live, but there can be no injustice done. It may have excuse, and it may have reason, and it may have necessity, that a judge refuse to consent to the death of an innocent; but that he should against his conscience kill him, can have no warrant: and if he be not innocent, there may be reason to let him alone, but none to condemn if he be. Conscience can oblige a judge to an unsolemn absolution, but not to an illegal and unsolemn condemnation. This should have been considered in the Earl of Strafford's case. The law hath power to forgive the criminal, but not to punish the guiltless. And therefore if a man be absolved when he deserved it not, we may suppose him pardoned, and the private priest is not his judge in that case. For to refuse to communicate him is in act of public judicature, and to absolve him is an act of the same power, and therefore must be dispensed by authority, not by usur-

pation, that is, by the public sentence, not by the private minister, since to give the holy communion to such a person is not against any essential duty of a Christian. And therefore if the priest knows him unworthy to communicate, he may separate him so far as he hath power to separate him, that is, by the word of his proper ministry: let him admonish to abstain, represent his insufficiency, threaten him with the danger; but if he will despise all this, the private priest hath no more to do, but to pray and weep for him, and leave him to God and the church. But of this I am to speak more largely in its proper place.

31. (8.) As for the case of a priest hearing confessions, though he find Titius accused by Caius, yet if Titius does not accuse himself, Titius is rather to be believed in his own case than Caius in another man's. Because in this intercourse every man is so concerned to do his duty, that every man is to be believed for himself and against himself, because if he speaks false, himself only is the loser. 2. Caius accusing Titius may, for aught the confessor knows, tell a lie and abuse him, and therefore he cannot pretend knowledge and conscience against Titius; and so this comes not home to the present case, which supposes the judge to know the accused person to be innocent. 3. This argument supposes that a man cannot be absolved unless he enumerate all his sins to the priest; which being in many cases false (as I have shewn otherwhere [1]), that which relies upon it can signify nothing.

32. (9.) Last of all, although the judge must lay aside his affections, and his will, and his opinion, when he sits upon the seat of judgment, because these are no good measures of judicature, nor ought to have immediate influence upon the sentence; yet he cannot lay aside his knowledge, and if he lay aside his conscience, he will make but an ill judge. 2. And yet the judge must lay his affections and his will aside never, but when they tempt him to injustice. For a judge must not cease to be merciful when it does not make him unjust; nor need he cease to please himself, so long as he is pleased to do right: these if they do hurt, indeed must be left off, else not; and therefore it cannot with any colour from hence be pretended, that they must lay aside his knowledge, when it is the only way by which he can do good.

[1] Unum Necessarium.

33. (10.) To the authority of St. Ambrose, what I have already said is a sufficient answer. For he speaks of a judge's office regularly and usually, not what he is to do in cases extraordinary, and such is the present question. But he that said, "Sicut audit, ita judicat," would no less have said, "Sicut videt, ita judicat." The seeing of his eyes is as sure a measure as the hearing of his ears.

34. (11.) As for the words of Ulpian I will give no other answer, than that Panormitan and Covaruvias, who urge them and are concerned to make the most of them, do yet confess that they make as much against them as for them, and that they say true, will appear to an ordinary understanding that considers them.

(12.) For although no judge must do acts of a private authority, yet he may as well use his own private knowledge, as he may use the private knowledge of the witnesses; for their knowledge is as private as the judge's till it be brought into open court, and when it is brought thither, it is as public as theirs; but however, to argue from the authority to the knowledge is a plain paralogism; for the prince who armed him with public authority, did not furnish him with a commission of knowledge, but supposed that to be induced by other ways.

(13.) And therefore the judge may, when he hath called witnesses, reject them upon his own certain knowledge, as well as use arts of discovery, or any other collateral ways to secure the innocent. For it may as well be inquired concerning the judge's using his knowledge to the infatuating or discovering the falsehood of the evil witnesses, as to the rejecting them. For if he must absolutely take all for granted which they say, then he must use no arts to invalidate their testimony; but if he may do that, he may do the other, and yet the calling in of witnesses may be to many good purposes, and by the collision of contraries light may arise, and from falsehood also truth may be produced like a fair child from a foul mother. And after all, though this question is not to be determined on either side by authorities, yet because amongst the writers of cases of conscience very many rely much upon the testimony of authors, I think it not amiss to say, that this sense of the question which I defend, was the sentence of many eminent divines and lawyers, particularly

Nicolaus Lyra, Adrianus, Angelus, Navarre, Hostiensis, Calderinus, Panormitan, Martinus, Johannes Arboræus, Oldendorp, Corrasius, Lessius, Bresser, and divers others; and therefore besides the strength of the reasons, I walk the more confidently by having such good company.

35. To conclude: All those advices of prudence which are given by the adverse party in this affair, as expedients for the judges to proceed by in such cases, I am ready to admit, if they will secure their conscience and the life of the innocent oppressed. But if they will not, but that the judge must give sentence for law or for conscience, the case to me seems very clear. God is greater than our conscience, but our conscience is greater than any thing besides. "Fiat jus et pereat mundus," said St. Austin; "ad hæc, imagine ne naturæ veritas obumbretur, curandum." For images and forms of things, the natural and substantial truth of things may not be lost or prejudiced. Let justice be done whatsoever be the event.

"Accipere personam improbi non est bonum, ut pervertas justum in judicio:" "It is not good to receive the person of a wicked man, thereby to overthrow the righteous in his cause[m]."

RULE IX.

The Goodness of an Object is not made by Conscience, but is accepted, declared, and published, by it, and made personally obligatory.

1. No object can have its denomination from the judgment of reason, save only that from thence it may be said to be understood to be good, to be declared, to be consented to; all which supposes the object to be good, or to be so apprehended. Just as an emerald is green before the eye perceives it so: and if the object were not in itself good, then the reason were deceived in consenting to it, and a deceiver in publishing it.

2. This is true in respect of the material, fundamental, and proper goodness of the object; for this it hath independently

[m] Prov. xviii. 5.

of the conscience: and the rectitude of the conscience is dependent on this, and consequent to the perception of it. But yet there is a formal, extrinsical, and relative goodness passed upon an object by the conscience, by whose persuasion although an evil object do not become naturally good, yet it becomes personally necessary; and in the same proportion a good object may become evil.

3. The purpose of this is to remonstrate that we must rather look to the rule than to the present persuasion; first taking care that our conscience be truly informed, before it be suffered to pass a sentence; and it is not enough that our conscience tells us thus, unless God hath told the conscience. But yet if the conscience does declare, it engages us, whether it be right or wrong. But this hath in it some variety.

4. (1.) The goodness of an act depends upon the goodness of an object, that is, upon its conformity to a rational nature and the commands of God. For all acts of will and understanding are of themselves indefinite and undetermined till the relation to an object be considered; but they become good or bad, when they choose or refuse that which is good or bad respectively. To will to do an act of theft is bad, because theft itself is so: to be willing to commit an act of adultery is evil, because all adultery is evil: and on the other side, to be willing to do an act of justice is therefore good, because justice itself is good. And therefore Aristotle defines justice by a habitude or relation to its object. It is "voluntas dandi suum cuique," "a will of giving to every one their due." And therefore our conscience, because it is to receive its information from the rule by which every action is made good or bad, and its motion from the object, is bound to take in that only which is really and truly good, and without sin or error cannot do otherwise.

5. (2.) Although conscience is bound to proceed this way, yet sometimes the younger takes the elder brother by the heel, or gets out before him, and the act gets before the object by indirect means. For though all things should be thought good because they are good, yet some things are made good because they are thought so; and the conscience looking upon its object finds error dressed up in the shape of truth, and takes it in, and adopts it into the portion of truth. And though it can never be made really and natu-

rally good, yet by being supposed so by the conscience, it is sometimes accepted so by God.

6. (3.) Although the rule by which good and bad are measured, be in itself perfect, yet it is not always perfectly received by us. Good is proportionable to reason; and as there is 'probabiliter verum,' so there is 'probabiliter bonum,' 'a probable good,' as well as 'a probable truth:' and in the inquest after this, we often shew a trick of humanity, even to be pitifully deceived; and although when it is so, it is an allay of the good it intends, yet it does not wholly destroy it: God, in his goodness, accepting at our hands for good, what we really and innocently suppose to be so. Just like the country fellow that gave a handful of water to his prince; he thought it a fine thing, and so it was accepted. For when the action and the rule are to be made even, if either of them comply and stoop, the equality is made. God indeed requires the service of all our faculties, but calls for no exact measures of any but the will. For the acts of the will are perfect in their kind, but our understanding is imperfect, therefore this may find an excuse, but that never.

7. (4.) Upon this account it is, that though the goodness or badness of an act depends upon the quality of the object regularly and naturally, yet the acts become irregularly or accidentally good or bad by the conscience, because the conscience changes the object; that is, the act is good by the object really good, or so apprehended. The object always changes or constitutes the act, but the conscience changing the object immediately, hath a mediate influence upon the act also, and denominates it to be such as in the event it proves. But then in what degrees, and to what events, this change is made, is of more intricate consideration.

What Changes can be made in moral Actions by the Persuasion and Force of Conscience.

8. (1.) Whatsoever is absolutely and indispensably necessary to be done, and commanded by God expressly, cannot be changed by conscience into an evil, or into that which is unnecessary. Because in such cases where the rule is plain, easy, and fitted to the conscience, all ignorance is voluntary, and spoils the consequent act, but never can legitimate it. And the same reason is for things plainly and expressly for-

bidden, as adultery, murder, sacrilege, and the like; they can never become good by any act of conscience. And therefore in such cases it often happened, that God did declare his judgment to be contrary to the opinion, which men had of themselves and of their actions. Sometimes men live contrary to their profession; 'they profess' the worship of God, but deny him in their hearts[n], even when they least think they do. Thus the Israelites having constrained Aaron[o] to make a golden calf, proclaimed a feast, "To-morrow is a feast unto Jehovah:" but God says of them, "they offered sacrifice to devils and not to God." And so it was with their children after them, who killed and persecuted the apostles and servants of Jesus, and thought they did God good service. He that falls down before an idol, and thinks to do honour to the Lord;—or robs a temple, and thinks it is for religion,—must stand or fall, not by his own fancy, but by sentence of God, and the rule of his law; "Protestatio contra factum," is invalid in law. To strike a man's eye out, and say he did it in sport,—to kill his brother, and think it is well done, because done to prevent his sin, though it may be thought charity by the man,—yet it is murder before God.

9. (2.) Where the rule is obscure, or the application full of variety, or the duty so intricate, that the conscience may inculpably err; there the object can be changed by conscience, and the acts adopted into a good or an evil portion by that influence. He that thinks it unlawful to give money to a poor Turk, hath made it to become unlawful to him, though of itself it seems to be a pious act. So also it is in the uncertain application of a certain proposition. It is certainly unlawful to commit adultery; but if Jacob supposes he lies with Rachel, and she prove to be Leah, his conscience hath not changed the rule, but it hath changed the object and the act; the object becomes his own by adoption, and the act is regular by the integrity of the will. This is that which is affirmed by the Apostle, "I know and am persuaded in the Lord Jesus, that there is nothing unclean of itself, but he that thinketh it is unclean, to him it is unclean[p]." This instance is in a case in which they might easily be mistaken, and innocently abused, by reason of the

[n] Tit. i. 16. [o] Deut. xxxii. 17.
[p] Rom. xiv. 14. Vide Chrysost. in hunc locum. St. Ambros. ib. Theophyl. ib.

prepossession of their minds by Moses's law and, therefore, in such cases the conscience rules. They who believe themselves married, may mutually demand and pay their duty: but if they be not married, it is fornication or adultery, as it happens. But if conscience says they are married, it is not adultery, but an act of duty; because the same conscience that declares for the marriage, obliges also to pay their duty, as a matter of necessity. Wherever the understanding is wrong, and the will is wholly right, the action is accepted, and the error pardoned.

10. (3.) When the act is materially evil, the conscience adopting it into a good portion, that is, believing it to be good, does not make a perfect change, but leaves an allay in the several degrees of its persuasion. For it is impossible, that a right conscience and a wrong should have no difference in the effect, especially if there be any thing criminal or faulty in the cause of the error. When two men take up arms in a different cause, as suppose one for his prince, and the other against him; though they be both heartily persuaded, and act according to conscience, yet they do not equally do well or ill. The one shall be accepted, and, it may be, the other pardoned, or excused in various degrees. But this which needs a pardon for one thing, is not, in the whole constitution of it, good for any thing, nor can it be accepted to reward.

4. If the conscience dictate a thing to be necessary, the thing is become necessary, and at no hand to be declined. This was it which St. Paul said, "He that is circumcised, is a debtor of the whole law [q]," meaning, that though Christ had broken the yoke of Moses, yet if conscience did take up one end of it, and bound it upon itself: the other end would be dragged after it, and by the act of conscience become necessary. If a man inquires, whether he is bound to say his prayers kneeling, or whether he may do it standing, or lying, or leaning; if his conscience be persuaded that he must do it kneeling, it is necessary he should do so, and he may not do it in his bed; because the conscience is a lawgiver, and hath authority over the man, and ought to prevail, when the contrary part is only, that they may do otherwise. For whether this part be true or false, the matter is not so

[q] Gal. v. 3.

great, because there is no danger if a man do not make use of a liberty that is just: he can let it alone and do well enough: and therefore to follow the other part which is supposed necessary, must needs be his safest way.

But if the question be, whether it be necessary to keep a holy day, or necessary to let it alone; there if the conscience determine that for necessary to be done, which is necessary to be let alone, the man is indeed bound to follow his conscience, but he cannot escape a sin. For conscience makes no essential alterations in the thing, though it makes personal obligations to the man; and if it be an evil superstition to keep a holy day, it cannot be made lawful, because the conscience mistaking calls it necessary. And if this were otherwise, it were not a pin-matter what a man thought; for his thinking so becomes his law, and every man may do what is right in his own eyes. And therefore God was pleased expressly to declare it, that if a prophet did mislead the people, both he and they should perish; and our blessed Saviour signified the same thing in a parabolical expression, "If the blind lead the blind, they both fall into the ditch." But in this case there is a fault somewhere, and the man smarts under the tyranny, not the empire of his conscience; for conscience can have no proper authority against the law of God. In this case, that which the conscience falsely calls necessary, becomes so relatively and personally (that is, he thinks so, and cannot innocently go in the right way, so long as his guide conducts him in the wrong, and yet cannot innocently follow his guide, because she does abuse him), but in itself, or in the divine acceptation, it only passes for a 'bonum,' something there is in it that is good, and that God may regard; there is a 'præparatio animi,' a willingness to obey.

12. (5.) If the conscience being mistaken in a question, whether an action be good or no, calls that good which is nothing but indifferent; the conscience alters it not, it is still but lawful; but neither necessary nor good, but relatively and collaterally: the person may be pitied and have a gift given him in acknowledgment, but the thing itself cannot expect it. When the lords of the Philistines, that they might deprecate the divine judgments, offered to God golden mice and emerods, the thing itself was not at all

agreeable to the way by which God chose to be worshipped: but their conscience told them it was good, it therefore became lawful to them, but not good in itself; and God, who is the Father of mankind, saw their heart, and that they meant it for good, and he was pleased to take it so. But the conscience, I say, cannot make it good. For to be good or bad is wholly another consideration than to be necessary or not necessary. This distinction is relative to persons, and therefore can be made by conscience in the sense above allowed. But good and bad is an abstract consideration, and relates to the materiality of the object, and is before the act of conscience, not after.

18. (6.) If the conscience being mistaken calls a thing lawful, which is not so in the rule or law of God, there the conscience neither makes an alteration in the thing, nor passes an obligation upon the person. Elenora de Ferrante was married to a Spanish gentleman, who first used her ill, then left her worse. After some years she is courted by Andrea Philippi her countryman, to marry him. She inquires whether she may or no, and is told by some whom she ought not easily to have believed, that she may; and so she does. But being told, by her confessor, of her sin and shame, she pretends that she did it 'bono animo,' her conscience was persuaded she might do it, and therefore hopes to be excused or pardoned. He answers her, that her conscience could not make that lawful which God had forbidden, and therefore she ought not to pretend conscience; for though her conscience did say it was lawful, she was not bound to follow it; because though she must do nothing that is unlawful, yet she is not tied to do every thing that is lawful: and though her conscience can give her a law, yet it cannot give her a privilege. She is bound to do what her conscience says is necessary, though it be deceived: and if she does not, she sins against her conscience, which can never be permitted or excused. But if her conscience tells her only it is lawful so to do; if she does not do the thing which her conscience permits, she offends it not, because, though it allows, yet it does not command it. If therefore she does it, and there be an error in the conscience, the sin is as great as the error, great as the matter itself; as if the fact materially be adultery, it is also morally so, and the per-

suasion of the conscience does not excuse it from being such. The reason is plain; for since the conscience when she allows, does not command, if the person chooses that thing which materially is a sin, it is in pursuance of her own desires, not in obedience to her conscience. It is lust more than conscience. But yet whereas she says she hopes for pardon in this case, there is no question but she may. For she sinned as St. Paul did in persecuting the church; he did it 'ignorantly,' and so did she. Here only was the difference; he was nearer to pardon than she; because he thought he was bound to do so, and therefore could not resist his conscience so persuaded: she only thought she might do it, and therefore might have chosen. The conscience hath power in obligations and necessities, but not so much, nor so often, in permissions.

END OF THE ELEVENTH VOLUME.

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